Appropriation (Parliamentary Departments) Act (No. 2) 2025‑2026

The Act rests on several concepts fundamental to Commonwealth financial management. An item (s 3) is any of four types: departmental item, administered item, administered assets and liabilities item, or other departmental item. This Act only uses departmental items. A departmental item is the total amount set out in Schedule 1 opposite a Parliamentary Department under the heading “Departmental”. Critically, the amounts set out against outcomes under that heading are described in the note as “notional” and “do not in any way restrict the scope of the expenditure authorised by the item.” That means the $670,000 for the House of Representatives departmental item can be spent on any departmental expenditure of that department, even if the notional outcome breakdown suggests a different split. This is a deliberate design to give departmental managers flexibility within the total.

An administered item (s 8) is tied to a specific outcome, and expenditure must be for contributing to achieving that outcome. This Act has no administered items. An administered assets and liabilities item (s 9) is for expenditure contributing to any outcome for the department; again none here. An other departmental item (s 10) is for equity injections , not used here.

Parliamentary Department (s 3) means four entities: Department of the Senate, Department of the House of Representatives, Department of Parliamentary Services, and Parliamentary Budget Office. They are all non‑corporate entities under s 3 , meaning non‑corporate Commonwealth entities under the PGPA Act, with the High Court also included in that definition (but not relevant here). Non‑corporate entities are not separate legal entities from the Commonwealth; their appropriations are direct draws on the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

Portfolio statements (s 4) are declared relevant documents for interpretation under s 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901. This is a significant tool: if there is ambiguity about what expenditure is authorised, the Portfolio Budget Statements and Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements can be used to resolve it. For example, the portfolio statements might describe a new IT system for Parliament House; if this Act appropriates funds, the statements help confirm that expenditure on that system falls within the outcome.

The Advance to the responsible Presiding Officer (Part 3) is a mechanism for urgent spending before the next appropriation Act passes. Each Presiding Officer (President for the Senate, Speaker for the House, President and Speaker together for DPS and PBO) can draw up to a capped total. Section 11 of this Act “resets” the advance by providing that previous drawings under the No. 1 or Supply Acts are disregarded for the purpose of the balance remaining under the No. 1 Act. After this Act commences, each responsible Presiding Officer essentially has a fresh cap. However, s 11(2) ensures that if this Act later appropriates money for expenditure that was already funded by an advance, the appropriation is reduced by the advance amount. This prevents the same expenditure being funded twice.

Notional transactions (s 5) treat payments between non‑corporate entities as real for appropriation purposes. Even though no cash leaves the Consolidated Revenue Fund when, say, the Department of Parliamentary Services “pays” the Department of the House of Representatives for services, the paying entity’s appropriation is debited. This aligns with s 76 of the PGPA Act and ensures that each department’s spending is tracked and remains within its appropriations.

The concept of special accounts (s 12) allows amounts to be credited from an appropriation to a special account if any of the account’s purposes are covered by an item. This is a technical but important mechanism: money can be transferred into a special account (e.g., the Parliamentary Contingency Fund) without needing a separate appropriation, provided the item covers the purpose.

Finally, the Act is self‑repealing (s 14) at the start of 1 July 2028. This is standard for annual appropriation acts; the repeal does not affect any rights or liabilities accrued before that date (by operation of the Acts Interpretation Act). However, any unspent appropriation lapses on repeal unless it has been validly credited to a special account or carried forward under PGPA rules.

The direct impact falls on the four Parliamentary Departments and their finance officers, who must administer the additional $9.183 million in accordance with the Act and the PGPA framework. The Department of the House of Representatives receives $670,000 extra; the Department of Parliamentary Services receives $8,513,000 extra. These departments must ensure that any expenditure is within the scope of the departmental item; they cannot exceed the total. The responsible Presiding Officers , the President of the Senate, the Speaker, or both jointly , are directly affected by Part 3: they have the authority to determine advances up to the caps, and must ensure that any advance drawn before this Act commenced is correctly accounted for under the reduction formula in s 11(2). The Secretaries of the departments, as accountable authorities under the PGPA Act, bear the primary duty to manage appropriations, keep records, and report.

Indirectly, the Act affects every Australian taxpayer. The $9.183 million is sourced from the Consolidated Revenue Fund, which is primarily funded by taxation. Every additional dollar of appropriation increases the call on taxpayers’ incomes or reduces the surplus. While $9.183 million is small relative to total Commonwealth spending (which runs into hundreds of billions), it still represents a real economic cost: resources that could have been left in the private sector are instead consumed by government. The opportunity cost depends on what the money is used for , if it funds more efficient parliamentary services that reduce delays in legislation, there may be a net economic benefit, but if it funds gold‑plated fitouts or unnecessary headcount, the burden is a deadweight loss.

Parliamentarians themselves are indirectly affected. If the extra funds are used for the Department of Parliamentary Services to maintain or improve facilities in Australian Parliament House, members and senators benefit from better working conditions. If the extra $670,000 for the House of Representatives goes towards more research support or committee operations, that could affect the quality and speed of legislative work. But these are indirect, difficult to measure.

Suppliers and contractors to the parliamentary departments are also affected. The additional spending will flow to companies providing goods and services , IT services, building maintenance, furniture, catering, security. This is a small stimulus to those particular industries, but it is government demand, not private demand; it may crowd out private sector spending if the government pays higher prices or imposes more onerous contract terms.

The Act does not directly affect private businesses, individuals, or state governments. It does not regulate conduct, impose taxes, create new offences, or change property rights. Its effect is purely fiscal: it authorises spending that would otherwise be unlawful without an appropriation.

The Act creates very few duties or rights directly; most duties arise under the PGPA Act, but the appropriation Act provides the legal authority to spend. The primary duty on each Parliamentary Department’s accountable authority (usually the Secretary) is to ensure that expenditure does not exceed the departmental item total for that department (s 7). The duty is not just financial; it also requires that any expenditure must be for the purposes of the department, and if the portfolio statements indicate activities linked to a particular outcome, those statements can be used to interpret the scope (s 4 and s 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act). The note to the definition of “departmental item” clarifies that the outcome notional amounts are not binding, so the duty is simply to stay within the total departmental item.

The responsible Presiding Officers have the right to determine advances under s 11 of the No. 1 Act, as clarified by s 11 of this Act. However, that right is circumscribed by the caps and by the reduction mechanism in s 11(2). The Presiding Officer cannot effectively double‑fund the same expenditure. Their duty is to make determinations in writing, and to ensure that any advance is for urgent expenditure that cannot await the ordinary appropriation process.

The departments have the right to credit amounts to special accounts (s 12). This is a discretion: they may choose to transfer money to a special account (e.g., a working capital account) if the item covers the purpose. This right is subject to the special account’s purposes being covered by the item; the item does not need to explicitly name the account. This provides flexibility but also risk: it could be used to circumvent the normal appropriation limitations if not carefully managed, but the PGPA Act imposes governance obligations.

The Act also gives the departments the right to treat notional transactions as real (s 5). This is more of an accounting convenience than a substantive right, but it means that inter‑departmental charges reduce the paying department’s appropriation, which could constrain their real spending power if internal charging is extensive.

There is no private right of action created by this Act. No person can sue if a department misapplies an appropriation; enforcement is through the PGPA Act framework (civil penalties for officials) and through parliamentary scrutiny. The Auditor‑General can audit expenditure. The Act is essentially an internal authorisation for the executive to draw money, not a source of enforceable rights for outsiders.

This Act contains no penalty provisions. It is a machinery appropriation Act; penalties for misuse of public money come from the PGPA Act. Under s 83 of the PGPA Act, an official who engages in conduct that contravenes a duty may be subject to civil penalty provisions. For example, causing a department to exceed its appropriation could breach the duty of proper use of Commonwealth resources (s 15 of the PGPA Act). The maximum penalty for an individual is 500 penalty units (currently $156,500) for each contravention. Additionally, the Commonwealth can recover amounts paid without legal authority as a debt due to the Commonwealth (s 77 of the PGPA Act).

The primary enforcement mechanism is not judicial but administrative and parliamentary. Portfolio statements are tabled; the Finance Minister prepares reports on expenditure; the Auditor‑General audits financial statements of departments. If an appropriation is exceeded, it is a serious matter that may lead to a qualified audit opinion, media scrutiny, and potentially a censure by the Parliament itself. The Secretary of the department is personally accountable to the relevant Minister (or Presiding Officer) and to the Parliament.

The Act’s s 11(2) reduction mechanism is a self‑enforcing provision: if the department has already used an advance for a particular expenditure, the appropriation for that expenditure is reduced automatically. This is a legal limitation, not a penalty. If a department inadvertently spends money twice, the second payment would lack appropriation and could be recovered under s 77 of the PGPA Act.

There is no criminal sanction specifically tied to this Act. However, fraud or theft of Commonwealth money would be prosecuted under the Criminal Code (e.g., s 135.1 for obtaining property by deception, or s 142.1 for abuse of public office). The existence of an appropriation does not immunise officials from criminal law.

For private citizens, there are no penalties under this Act at all. A citizen who receives a payment from a department without entitlement may have to repay it under the PGPA Act or common law restitution, but that is not a penalty.

The Act operates within a dense legal framework. The most important interaction is with the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act). Section 76 of the PGPA Act deals with notional transactions between non‑corporate entities, and s 5 of this Act mirrors that by treating such transactions as real for appropriation purposes. Section 74 of the PGPA Act allows the Finance Minister to adjust appropriations in certain circumstances (e.g., to correct a minor error or to give effect to a machinery‑of‑government change). Section 75 deals with the reduction of appropriations for savings. The notes to s 6 of this Act explicitly reference sections 74 to 75 of the PGPA Act, confirming that those adjustment powers remain available.

The Acts Interpretation Act 1901 is engaged through s 4, which declares the portfolio statements to be relevant documents under s 15AB. This means a court or tribunal can have regard to those statements to interpret an ambiguity in the appropriation provisions. This is particularly relevant if a dispute arises about whether a particular expenditure falls within an item’s scope.

The Supply (Parliamentary Departments) Act (No. 1) 2025‑2026 and the Appropriation (Parliamentary Departments) Act (No. 1) 2025‑2026 are the immediate predecessors. The advance provisions in Part 3 of this Act expressly cross‑refer to those Acts, modifying their operation. Section 11(1) disregards advances made under those Acts for the purpose of the remaining balance, effectively resetting the advance caps. Section 11(2) then reduces the new appropriation by amounts already advanced, preventing double funding.

The Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 was repealed by the PGPA Act but transitional provisions may still apply for earlier arrangements. The current framework is governed by the PGPA Act and its rules.

The Constitution is the ultimate source of the requirement that no money may be drawn from the Treasury except under an appropriation made by law (s 83). This Act satisfies that requirement. The High Court has interpreted s 83 strictly (e.g., Pape v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, though not cited in this Act, is the leading case). The Act does not expand executive power; it merely provides the necessary parliamentary authorisation for specific spending. Any expenditure that does not fall within an item would be unconstitutional, regardless of the PGPA Act.

The Act also interacts with the Criminal Code indirectly: spending in excess of appropriation could constitute an offence of misconduct in public office if done knowingly, but the Act itself is silent on that.

Part 4 s 12 allows crediting to special accounts. Special accounts themselves are established under the PGPA Act or other legislation. For example, the Parliamentary Contingency Fund (if it exists as a special account) could receive appropriations via this mechanism. The Act does not create any special accounts; it just authorises transfers.

Finally, the Act’s repeal (s 14) interacts with the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 s 8 and s 8A, which preserve rights and obligations accrued before repeal. If a contract was entered into using this appropriation before 1 July 2028, the contract continues to be enforceable even after the Act is repealed, because the appropriation already authorised the expenditure.

This Act has no amendment history because it is a new enactment. It received Royal Assent on 27 March 2026 and has not been amended since. However, its life cycle is predetermined: s 14 provides for automatic repeal at the start of 1 July 2028. That repeal can be considered a form of amendment , the Act ceases to exist. Before that date, the Parliament could amend the Act (e.g., to increase or decrease appropriations, or to extend the repeal date), but as of the time of writing no such amendments have been made.

The Act is part of a sequence: it is the second Appropriation (Parliamentary Departments) Act for the 2025‑2026 financial year. The first Act was passed in mid‑2025. In the normal cycle, a third Act (No. 3) might be passed later in 2026 if additional funds are needed. The Supply Act (No. 1) was passed earlier in 2025 to provide interim funding before the Budget was passed. Each of those Acts may have their own amendment histories.

It is worth noting that appropriation Acts are rarely amended once passed; if a further need arises, the government typically introduces a new appropriation Act rather than amending an existing one. The Portfolios Statements were tabled for the Bill before it passed; they are not part of the Act but are relevant documents (s 4). Any subsequent change in government policy that required different spending would be handled via a new appropriation, not by amending this Act.

Thus, the only “amendment” likely to occur is the self‑repeal. The practitioner should be aware that this Act is only valid for outlays up to 30 June 2026 (since it is for the 2025‑2026 year), plus any carry‑forward allowed under PGPA rules for commitments entered into before year‑end. After 30 June 2026, no further spending should be charged to this Act, even though the Act remains in force until 1 July 2028 (to allow for finalisation of payments and adjustments). The repeal date is merely a clean‑up provision; the substantive authority expires at the end of the financial year to which it relates.

As of the date of this deep dive, there is no reported litigation specifically concerning this Act. It is a routine annual appropriation Act that authorises a modest additional sum. It is highly unlikely to be challenged in court because it does not regulate conduct, alter legal rights, or affect private parties. The legal issues that could arise would be constitutional: a challenge that the appropriation is for a purpose not within Commonwealth power. However, parliamentary departments are manifestly part of the Commonwealth’s core functions (Chapter I of the Constitution), and an appropriation for their operations is squarely within power. The High Court has never struck down an appropriation for the Parliament’s own departments.

The potential for litigation is also low because the Act does not give standing to any plaintiff. A taxpayer may seek standing to challenge an appropriation as violating s 83 of the Constitution (no appropriation without law), but such challenges are rare and usually require the plaintiff to be a member of Parliament or to have a special interest. In Comptroller‑General of Customs v Wood (1988) 80 ALR 491, the Full Federal Court held that a taxpayer does not have standing to challenge an appropriation unless there is also an attack on the validity of the underlying program. Since this Act funds standard departmental operations, no such attack is likely.

If a dispute arose about the interpretation of an item , for example, whether a particular piece of furniture is “departmental expenditure” or falls under an administered item , the resolution would likely be handled internally through the Department of Finance’s advice rather than through litigation. The PGPA Act creates a system of administrative oversight, not judicial enforcement. The Auditor‑General could report adverse findings, but those are not court rulings.

The only conceivable litigation scenario is if a contractor sues a parliamentary department for non‑payment and the department argues it had no appropriation to pay. The court would then examine the scope of the relevant item. The portfolio statements would be admissible (s 4). But even then, the appropriation Act is merely a procedural hurdle; if the department has the appropriation, it can pay. If it does not, the court could not order payment unless the contract was validly entered into and the department had implied authority to contract.

In summary, this Act has generated no litigation and is extremely unlikely to do so. It is a textbook example of a non‑justiciable appropriation measure.

Several provisions in this Act can trip up finance officers, auditors, and even Presiding Officers if not read carefully.

1. The notional restriction on departmental items is not (really) a restriction. Section 3’s note states that the amounts set out opposite outcomes under the heading “Departmental” are “notional” and “do not in any way restrict the scope of the expenditure authorised by the item.” This means the Department of the House of Representatives can spend its entire $670,000 on, say, building maintenance, even if the schedule shows the notional outcome breakdown as “advisory and administrative services.” This flexibility is intentional, but it can confuse those accustomed to administered items being strictly outcome‑tied. Relying on the notional figures in planning may mislead.

2. The advance reset in s 11(1) creates a window for double dipping if not tracked. Section 11(1) says that amounts determined under the No. 1 Act or Supply Act before commencement are disregarded for the balance remaining under those Acts. This means the responsible Presiding Officer effectively has a fresh cap after commencement. However, s 11(2) then reduces the appropriation in this Act by any advance already made for the same expenditure. This is a self‑executing reduction; the department must ensure it does not spend the same dollar twice. The danger: if the advance was made for a broad purpose (e.g., “urgent repairs”), and this Act appropriates for “repairs”, the department must identify the specific expenditure and reduce its available appropriation. Failure to do so could lead to overspending. The reduction is automatic , the Act reduces the appropriation “by the advanced amount;” it is not a discretionary offset. Finance officers must create a ledger to track these reductions.

3. The portfolio statements are binding for interpretation but not limit appropriations. Section 4 declares the portfolio statements relevant documents under s 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act. This means if there is ambiguity, the statements can restrict what is considered proper expenditure. However, for departmental items, the statements cannot override the clear language of the item itself. The note to the definition of “departmental item” explicitly says the notional outcome amounts do not restrict. So the portfolio statements can be used to interpret the heading “Departmental” but cannot reduce the total allocated. A finance officer who spends money contrary to a specific statement in the portfolio might be exposed to criticism but not to an illegality , as long as the total is not exceeded.

4. Notional transactions are real for appropriation purposes (s 5). This section treats charges between parliamentary departments as if they were real payments. If the Department of Parliamentary Services charges the Department of the Senate for use of AV equipment, that charge reduces the Senate’s departmental appropriation. The Senate’s finance team must budget for these internal charges. An unexpected internal charge could eat into the $670,000 additional appropriation for the House of Representatives if the charge is not anticipated.

5. The repeal date (s 14) is 1 July 2028, but the appropriation is for 2025‑2026 only. Unspent amounts after 30 June 2026 generally lapse, but under s 74 of the PGPA Act, the Finance Minister may allow a carry‑forward to the next year in limited circumstances. However, this Act ceases to be a valid source of appropriation after the year end for new expenditure. Do not attempt to draw on this Act in 2026‑2027 thinking the repeal date is the limit. The repeal date only cleans up the statute book.

6. Crediting to special accounts (s 12) can circumvent outcome restrictions. If a special account exists for a purpose, this section allows crediting from an item even if the item does not mention the account. For example, if there is a special account for “Parliamentary Contingency Fund” and its purposes are “unforeseen expenses relating to Parliament,” then the Department of Parliamentary Services could credit part of its $8.513 million to that fund, even though the schedule shows the funding is for Outcome 1 (supporting Parliament). This is legal, but it could be seen as shifting funds from budgeted activities to a contingency. Governance under the PGPA Act applies.

7. The abbreviated schedule uses confusing formatting. The schedule shows two tables: a summary table with “Abstract” and then a detailed table with “PARLIAMENT”. The summary includes a note with “Additional Appropriation (bold figures) , 2025‑2026 Budget Appropriation (italic figures) , 2025‑2026 Actual Available Appropriation (light figures) , 2024‑2025”. These are three columns for each department, but the layout can be misread. The $9,183 total is in bold; the italic and light figures are for comparison. Pay attention to column headings , the $8,513 for DPS is “Additional Appropriation” not total. The total departmental appropriation for DPS for 2025‑2026 is $209,819 (italic) plus $8,513 (bold) = $218,332, but that is the sum of No. 1 and No. 2. This Act only concerns the bold column.

Compliance with this Act is straightforward for the affected departments, but requires meticulous attention to the appropriation limits and the advance reduction mechanism.

Step 1: Identify the total departmental item for each department. The Department of the House of Representatives has a departmental item of $670,000 additional; the Department of Parliamentary Services has $8,513,000 additional. These amounts are on top of the No. 1 Act amounts. The Department of the Senate and PBO have nil additional, so they cannot spend any money under this Act (though they may have leftover from No. 1). Ensure that no expenditure is charged to this Act for those departments.

Step 2: Apply the s 11(2) reduction if applicable. Before spending any of the additional $670,000 or $8,513,000, the department must determine whether any part of that expenditure has already been advanced under the Supply or No. 1 Act’s advance provisions. If an advance was drawn for a specific purpose (e.g., $200,000 for urgent security upgrades), and this Act also appropriates for that purpose (the DPS departmental item covers departmental expenditure broadly, so security upgrades are included), then the amount appropriated by this Act is reduced by $200,000. The department must adjust its internal budget accordingly. This reduction is not optional; it is automatic by law. The department should maintain a register of advances drawn and compare against the purposes for which this Act’s appropriation is intended.

Step 3: Ensure expenditure is for departmental purposes and within the item total. Section 7 allows the departmental item amount to be applied for “departmental expenditure” , defined in s 3 as “payments for expenses, acquiring assets, making loans or paying liabilities.” This is broad. The expenditure must be for the Parliamentary Department’s own operations. For DPS, that includes maintaining Parliament House, providing advice, facilities. For the House of Representatives, advisory and administrative services. The portfolio statements can help delineate. But the note to the definition of “departmental item” confirms that the notional outcome breakdown does not restrict, so there is no risk of breaching a limit by spending on a different outcome.

Step 4: Record notional transactions correctly. If a department receives services from another parliamentary department and pays with an internal journal entry, treat that as a real reduction of the appropriation under s 5. The paying department’s appropriation is debited. This may affect the available balance. Ensure accounting systems reflect this.

Step 5: Comply with the PGPA Act. The appropriation Act provides the legal authority to spend, but the PGPA Act governs how spending is managed. The accountable authority (Secretary) must have a proper system of financial control, must ensure expenditure is efficient and effective, and must report annually. The additional appropriation must be included in the department’s budget estimates and reported in the annual financial statements. The audit committee should be informed of the additional funding.

Step 6: Do not exceed the total item amount. This is the cardinal rule. The Department of the House of Representatives cannot spend more than $670,000 additional under this Act; DPS cannot exceed $8,513,000 additional. If further funding is needed, the department must seek a new appropriation or use the advance mechanism (up to the caps). Exceeding the appropriation is a breach of s 83 of the Constitution and can lead to personal liability for officials under the PGPA Act.

Step 7: Handle repeal. Although the Act is repealed on 1 July 2028, compliance for the 2025‑2026 year ends on 30 June 2026. Any commitments entered into before 1 July 2026 that will be paid after that date should be covered by the appropriation (since the Act remains in force until repeal, the appropriation is available for payments after 30 June 2026 but before 1 July 2028). However, departments should not plan to incur new expenditure after 30 June 2026 under this Act; that would be contrary to the annual nature of appropriations. The Finance Department’s guidance on carry‑forwards should be consulted.

Step 8: Monitor the advance cap reset. The responsible Presiding Officer for each department now has a fresh cap after commencement of this Act (see note to s 11(1)). However, if they draw an advance after commencement, that drawing will reduce the cap under the No. 1 Act. The note shows the caps: $300k for Senate, House, PBO; $1m for DPS. Ensure any future advance draws are within those caps and that the previous draws are disregarded for cap purposes but are still subject to s 11(2) reduction.

Practical tip: Create a spreadsheet that tracks total additional appropriation, subtracts any advance amounts already used for expenditure within the scope of the appropriation, and then monitor actual spending against the net available amount. The portfolio statements should be read alongside the Act to inform the scope of expenditure. If in doubt, seek a legal opinion from the Office of Parliamentary Counsel or the Australian Government Solicitor. Compliance with this Act is largely mechanical and administrative, but mistakes can have serious constitutional and financial consequences.