Appropriation (Parliamentary Departments) Act (No. 2) 2024-2025

The Act defines several key concepts that structure how the appropriation operates in practice. A “Parliamentary Department” is defined in section 3 to mean the Department of the Senate, the Department of the House of Representatives, the Department of Parliamentary Services, and the Parliamentary Budget Office. These are each non-corporate Commonwealth entities under the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act), and also within the extended definition in the PGPA Act the High Court is included as a non-corporate entity for certain purposes, but not relevant here.

The concept of an “item” is central. Section 3 defines “item” to include four types: a departmental item, an administered item, an administered assets and liabilities item, and an other departmental item. Each corresponds to a different category of expenditure authority. A departmental item authorises expenditure for the departmental operations of the Parliamentary Department itself, such as staff salaries, office accommodation, and administrative costs. An administered item authorises expenditure for contributing to achieving a specific outcome identified in Schedule 1, typically for payments to third parties or program delivery. An administered assets and liabilities item covers expenditure for any outcome specified for the department, not just one tied to a particular line. An “other departmental item” covers equity injections, which are amounts for capital investment.

The Schedule 1 for this Act only contains a departmental item for the Department of the House of Representatives. No administered or equity injection items exist for any department. The table in Schedule 1 shows a total of $132,000 under the heading “Departmental” for the Department of the House of Representatives, with no further breakdown by outcome. However, the detailed schedule shows a breakdown under Outcome 1: “Advisory and administrative services support the House of Representatives to fulfil its representative and legislative role” with $132,000 departmental and nil administered. This outcome linkage is notional for departmental items: section 3’s note clarifies that amounts set out opposite outcomes under “Departmental” are not part of the item and do not restrict expenditure scope. For administered items, the outcome linkage is binding.

The “responsible Presiding Officer” concept designates who can exercise the advance powers. For the Department of the Senate it is the President; for the House of Representatives, the Speaker; for the Department of Parliamentary Services and the Parliamentary Budget Office, both the President and the Speaker together. This dual approval for the latter two departments ensures joint parliamentary oversight.

“Portfolio statements” comprise the Portfolio Budget Statements (tabled for the No. 1 Act) and the Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements (tabled for this Bill). Section 4 declares them relevant documents under section 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901, meaning a court may consider them to confirm the ordinary meaning of a provision or to determine meaning if ambiguous. This is significant for interpretation of outcome links and scope of expenditure.

“Special account” has the same meaning as in the PGPA Act. Section 12 permits amounts debited against an appropriation item to be credited to a special account if any of the special account’s purposes is covered by the item, even if the item does not expressly refer to the special account. This is a broad provision that can route appropriated money into special accounts without needing explicit mention in Schedule 1.

The “Advance to the responsible Presiding Officer” mechanism in Part 3 allows the responsible Presiding Officer to determine advances from the Consolidated Revenue Fund up to the caps specified in the No. 1 Act, subject to total limits. This Act resets those caps, effectively providing a new tranche of emergency or unforeseen funding authority for each Parliamentary Department.

The direct beneficiary is the Department of the House of Representatives, which receives an additional $132,000 for its departmental operations in 2024-2025. This funding supports the advisory and administrative services that enable the House to fulfil its representative and legislative role. The $132,000 is likely a supplementary allocation for specific unforeseen needs such as additional staffing for a parliamentary inquiry, IT upgrades, or increased security requirements that were not anticipated in the original budget appropriation of $29,669,000 for that department.

The other three Parliamentary Departments (Senate, Parliamentary Services, and Parliamentary Budget Office) do not receive any new appropriation from this Act. However, they are affected indirectly through the advance reset provisions in Part 3. The responsible Presiding Officers for those departments regain access to the full advance caps: $300,000 for the Senate, $300,000 for the Parliamentary Budget Office, and $1 million for Parliamentary Services. For Parliamentary Services, which already had a budget of $210,169,000 in departmental appropriations plus $6,432,000 administered and $41,133,000 non-operating, the additional advance capacity of $1 million represents a potential increase in discretionary spending authority. This matters because the advance can be used without prior parliamentary appropriation for urgent or unforeseen expenditure, subject only to the responsible Presiding Officer’s determination.

Taxpayers ultimately fund these appropriations through the Consolidated Revenue Fund. The $132,000 is a relatively small sum, but the total parliamentary departments’ budget for 2024-2025, as shown in the summary table, is $326,716,000 (including this Act). The Act does not impose any direct obligations on private citizens, businesses, or state governments. It is entirely internal to Commonwealth governance.

Private sector effects are indirect. Suppliers of goods and services to the Department of the House of Representatives - such as IT contractors, furniture suppliers, or security firms - may see a small increase in demand if the $132,000 is spent on procurement. However, the amount is trivial relative to the total parliamentary budget. More significant for private sector participants may be the portfolio statements’ interpretive weight. Companies that contract with the parliament need to understand that portfolio statements can be used to interpret the scope of appropriation items. If a contract is funded from a departmental item and the portfolio statements describe certain activities, those descriptions could affect the legal scope of the department’s spending authority. But this is an indirect and low-risk effect.

The Act does not affect state governments, local councils, or international obligations. It does not create any new regulatory burdens or compliance costs for private enterprise. The primary impact is on the internal operations of the Commonwealth Parliament.

The Act creates rights to spend appropriated money and imposes duties to ensure expenditure falls within the scope of each item. For the Department of the House of Representatives, section 7 provides that the amount specified in the departmental item may be applied for the departmental expenditure of that department. This is a right to incur expenditure, but it is circumscribed by the purpose limitations. Departmental expenditure is defined broadly as payments for expenses, acquiring assets, making loans, or paying liabilities. The department may use the money for any of these purposes as long as they relate to its departmental operations. The note to section 3 clarifies that the outcome statements under the “Departmental” heading are not binding on the scope.

The rights under administered items (section 8) are narrower. Money may only be applied for expenditure that contributes to achieving the specified outcome. Further, subsection 8(2) provides that if portfolio statements indicate particular activities were intended to be treated as activities in respect of a particular outcome, then expenditure on those activities is taken to be for that outcome. This gives the portfolio statements an interpretive function but also a binding one for determining whether expenditure is within scope. The responsible officer must consult the portfolio statements to confirm.

For administered assets and liabilities items (section 9), the right is similar but broader: the amount may be applied for expenditure contributing to achieving any outcome specified for the department, not just one particular outcome line. Again, portfolio statements can link activities to outcomes.

The right to credit amounts to special accounts under section 12 is significant. If a special account’s purposes are covered by an item, the department may debit the appropriation and credit the account, even if the item does not mention the account. This provides flexibility but also creates a duty not to use this power to circumvent appropriation limits. The special account must have a valid purpose that aligns with the item.

The duties of the responsible Presiding Officer under Part 3 are procedural. Before determining an advance under the No. 1 Act, the officer must be satisfied that the expenditure is not provided for elsewhere and is urgent. The advance reset provision in section 11 does not alter those duties; it simply restores the caps.

The Act does not impose duties on private individuals. It does not create enforceable rights for third parties to sue for failure to spend or for misspending. As an appropriation Act, its primary function is to authorise executive spending from the Consolidated Revenue Fund, which is a constitutional requirement under section 83 of the Constitution. Courts have held that appropriation Acts create no private rights; they are authority for the Executive to spend, not a contract or entitlement.

The duty to comply with the PGPA Act is implicit. Sections 5, 12, and 13 reference PGPA provisions. The PGPA Act imposes duties on accountable authorities to manage public resources properly, to maintain records, and to ensure spending is authorised. Non-compliance can lead to personal liability. This Act sits within that framework.

This Act contains no penalty provisions of its own. It does not create offences, set fines, or provide for imprisonment. Enforcement relies on external legal frameworks, primarily the PGPA Act 2013, the Criminal Code, and the general law of government finance.

If a responsible Presiding Officer or departmental officer spends money under this Act for a purpose not authorised by the relevant item, the expenditure could be ultra vires. The PGPA Act section 71 requires that expenditure be in accordance with the Appropriation Act. Breach of that duty could result in a report by the Auditor-General, which may lead to parliamentary scrutiny and potential removal from office for officers who are senior public servants. Criminal penalties under the Criminal Code for abuse of public office (section 142.2) or for obtaining a financial advantage (section 135.1) could apply if the misuse is intentional and involves dishonesty. The maximum penalty for abuse of public office is five years imprisonment.

The advance provision under Part 3 also carries enforcement risks. If a responsible Presiding Officer determines an advance in excess of the cap (e.g., more than $300,000 for the House of Representatives or more than the total remaining after accounting for reductions under subsection 11(2)), the determination would be invalid. Any expenditure made under that invalid determination could be unauthorised. The officer could face personal liability if the Commonwealth suffers loss. The note in subsection 11(1) may create ambiguity about the cap calculation, given it says the advance amounts mentioned apply “regardless of amounts that have already been determined”. This could be interpreted as meaning that even if $300,000 had already been determined under No. 1, after this Act the full $300,000 is available again. However, subsection 11(2) reduces the appropriation by the advanced amount if the expenditure is identical. The interaction is complex and could lead to disputes about whether double spending has occurred.

Section 12 (crediting to special accounts) provides flexibility but also carries audit risk. If a special account’s purposes do not actually align with the item, crediting amounts could be seen as circumventing the appropriations framework. The Auditor-General would scrutinise whether the special account purposes genuinely cover the expenditure. The PGPA Act section 80 requires special accounts to be established by law and specifies their purposes.

No litigation has been reported under this Act, given its recent passage (assented 14 February 2025). Historically, appropriation Acts rarely generate direct litigation because they deal with government spending authority. However, challenges could arise if a spending decision under this Act is alleged to be beyond power, perhaps by a parliamentary committee or a taxpayer with standing. The High Court has considered appropriation cases such as Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, which distinguished between appropriation authority and substantive legislative power. If an expenditure under this Act were argued to be for a purpose outside Commonwealth legislative power, standing issues would arise. The Act itself does not confer standing on any person to enforce its provisions.

The primary interaction is with the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act). Section 5 of this Act states that notional transactions between non-corporate entities are to be treated as real, noting that this aligns with section 76 of the PGPA Act. Section 12 permits crediting amounts to special accounts as defined in the PGPA Act. Section 13 provides that the Consolidated Revenue Fund is appropriated for this Act “including the operation of this Act as affected by the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013”. This means that PGPA provisions that modify appropriation amounts (such as sections 74 and 75, which allow for adjustments for GST and for certain receipts) apply to this Act. For example, if the department receives money that is legally required to be paid into the CRF, the appropriation may be adjusted.

The Act interacts with the Appropriation (Parliamentary Departments) Act (No. 1) 2024-2025. That Act provided the main annual appropriation for these departments. This Act supplements it and, through Part 3, modifies the advance provisions of the No. 1 Act. Specifically, subsection 11(1) disregards previous advance determinations, resetting the caps. Subsection 11(2) performs a reconciliation: if an expenditure was already advanced under No. 1, the corresponding amount under this Act is reduced. This prevents double funding for the same purpose.

The Acts Interpretation Act 1901 is relevant via section 4. The portfolio statements are declared relevant documents for section 15AB, which allows courts to consider such documents. This affects the interpretation of key terms like “outcome” and “expenditure for the purpose of contributing to achieving that outcome”. The portfolio statements may also assist in determining the meaning of “departmental expenditure” and “administered expenditure”. However, the declaratory effect is limited to interpretation, not to create new rights or obligations.

The Constitution section 83 requires that no money be drawn from the Treasury except under appropriation made by law. This Act satisfies that requirement for the amounts within its scope. It does not, however, provide substantive power to undertake any activity beyond spending. The High Court’s reasoning in Pape (2009) confirms that appropriation authority alone does not confer legislative power to conduct a program. Therefore, any activity funded by this Act must be supported by a head of Commonwealth power, such as section 51 of the Constitution. For parliamentary departments, the incidental power and the powers relating to the constitution and government of the Commonwealth likely suffice.

The Act also interacts with the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 (now repealed and replaced by PGPA) indirectly, but the PGPA is the current framework. Any transitional provisions in the PGPA Act would apply.

There is no interaction with state legislation. The Act is exclusively a Commonwealth law. It does not affect the operation of the Criminal Code, the Competition and Consumer Act, or other regulatory statutes. It does not modify the parliamentary privilege under the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987, though expenditure on parliamentary services is related to parliamentary function.

The Act was enacted on 14 February 2025, having been passed by both houses: the House of Representatives on 4 February 2025 and the Senate on 12 February 2025. It received Royal Assent on 14 February 2025. As at the date of its passage, there are no amendments to this Act. The Act is a simple supply bill with a short life. It is scheduled to be repealed automatically on 1 July 2027 under section 14. This automatic repeal is standard for annual appropriation acts, ensuring that spending authority does not persist beyond the financial year to which it relates. The repeal does not affect any past spending; it merely ends the appropriation authority.

Future amendments are possible but unlikely. If the Parliament wishes to increase the appropriation for the Department of the House of Representatives further, it would typically pass a new Appropriation Act (No. 3) in the same financial year, rather than amending this one. The Act’s provisions are largely self-contained; any amendment would likely be to the advance caps or remove the advance reset provision. However, because the Act expires on 1 July 2027, any amendment after that date would need to extend its operation.

No amendment history exists because the Act is new. The pre-legislative history includes the second reading speeches made by the Minister in the House and Senate on the dates mentioned. The speech notes that the additional funding is for the Department of the House of Representatives. It does not specify the exact purpose of the $132,000. The Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements, which were tabled with the Bill, would provide more detail, but they are not part of the Act.

The Act was introduced as a Bill in the House of Representatives on 4 February 2025, passed that same day, and then transmitted to the Senate, which passed it on 12 February 2025. No amendments were moved to the Bill in either house. The second reading speech characterises the Act as a routine additional estimate.

There is no history of amendments to related appropriation Acts that directly bears on this Act, but it is worth noting that the Advance provisions in Part 3 are not standard across all appropriation Acts. Many supply Acts for general government departments contain advance provisions (Advance to the Finance Minister), but this Act has a unique “Advance to the responsible Presiding Officer” tailored to Parliamentary Departments. This design reflects the separate governance of Parliament from the Executive.

There is no litigation history for this Act given its recent commencement. It is less than one month old as of this writing. No court has interpreted its provisions. Given the narrow scope and low stakes ($132,000), litigation is unlikely. Appropriation Acts are rarely challenged directly because they deal with internal government finance. Challenges would most likely arise from broader constitutional or administrative law disputes.

Potential grounds for future litigation could include: an argument that the advance reset provision in section 11(1) violates the requirement for appropriation by law under section 83 of the Constitution, because it could be seen as an attempt to revive lapsed appropriation authority. However, the advance power itself derives from the No. 1 Act, which was properly enacted. The reset merely recalculates the cap; it does not create a new advance without appropriation. Another ground could be that the portfolio statements, declared relevant documents, are given too much weight in interpreting the Act’s provisions, possibly expanding the scope of appropriations beyond what Parliament intended. A court would need to consider whether this violates the rule that appropriations must be express. The High Court’s decision in Combined State Unions v Minister for Finance (1982) 40 ALR 31 suggests that appropriation language is construed strictly. However, the portfolio statements are only relevant for interpretation, not for creating new spending authority.

If an officer were to spend money under an invalid advance determination, the Commonwealth could seek recovery under the PGPA Act or through common law action for money had and received. The responsible Presiding Officer could be personally liable, but the PGPA Act provides indemnities for decisions made in good faith.

There is no reported case law on any previous version of this Act because this is the No. 2 Act for 2024-2025, and the first such Act (No. 1 for 2024-2025) similarly has no litigation. The predecessors, such as the Appropriation (Parliamentary Departments) Acts for prior years, also have no significant litigation. The closest analogue is litigation under the general government appropriation acts, such as Pape v Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 238 CLR 1, where the High Court distinguished between appropriation and substantive legislative power. That case held that appropriation alone does not give the executive capacity to spend for any purpose; there must be a substantive head of power. For parliamentary departments, the spending is incidental to the constitutional functions of the Parliament, so it is likely within power.

No class actions, taxpayer challenges, or freedom of information cases have involved this Act. The small amount and administrative nature make it a low target for litigation.

In summary, the litigation history is a blank slate. The Act’s design minimises legal risk by being narrow, and by incorporating standard coordination provisions with the PGPA Act.

The first gotcha is the advance reset provision in section 11(1). It states that amounts determined before commencement under the No. 1 Act are disregarded for the purposes of subsections 11(3) to (6) of that Act. The note boldly says the responsible Presiding Officers have access to the full advance amounts “regardless of amounts that have already been determined”. This could be read as authorising a responsible Presiding Officer to effectively double-dip: draw up to the cap again even if the full cap was already drawn under No. 1. The provision is clearly intended to restore full advance capacity for the remainder of the financial year, but it creates a perverse incentive for officers to drain the No. 1 advance before this Act commences, knowing the caps will be reset. The Commonwealth might end up with total advances for the year that exceed what would have been the case if the reset had not occurred. The only check is subsection 11(2), which reduces the appropriation under this Act by the advanced amount for the same expenditure. But if the advanced amounts were for different expenditure, there is no clawback. This is a design flaw.

The second gotcha is the interplay between departmental items and outcome statements. The Schedule 1 shows the $132,000 opposite “Outcome 1” under the “Departmental” heading. The note in section 3 says these outcome amounts are notional and do not restrict expenditure. But a reader unfamiliar with the note might think the money is tied to Outcome 1. A later government or auditor might argue that the portfolio statements or the outcome label could be used to interpret the item’s scope, especially under section 4 which declares portfolio statements relevant for interpretation. If the portfolio statements describe Outcome 1 in a narrow way, a court could be invited to read down the departmental item. The note in section 3 is a statutory safeguard, but it is not absolute. The court could consider the portfolio statements as part of the contextual material under section 15AB, potentially narrowing the appropriation. This is a subtle risk.

The third gotcha is the notional transaction treatment in section 5. Notional transactions between non-corporate entities are treated as real for appropriation purposes. This means that if the Department of the House of Representatives provides a service to the Department of Parliamentary Services and records a notional payment, that notional payment is debited from the House’s appropriation. This could exhaust the $132,000 appropriation quickly if notional transactions are substantial. The department must budget for notional transactions as if they were real cash flows. There is no warning label on the appropriation amount about this.

The fourth gotcha is the special account provision in section 12. Amounts may be credited to a special account if any of its purposes are covered by an item, even if the item does not mention the account. This could allow money to be moved from a departmental item into a special account that has broader purposes, effectively expanding the spending power. For example, if a special account exists for “parliamentary IT systems” and the departmental item covers “departmental expenditure”, money could be transferred. But the special account’s purposes might allow spending on things not strictly within the department’s departmental expenditure. The section does not require the special account’s purposes to be identical, only that they are covered. “Covered” could be interpreted broadly. This creates a risk of scope creep.

The fifth gotcha is the repeal date of 1 July 2027. The Act appropriates money for the 2024-2025 financial year. If any amounts are unspent after 30 June 2025, the appropriation lapses. But the Act does not repeal until two years later. That is standard, but practitioners should not assume the appropriation remains available. The PGPA Act sections that allow carry-forward of certain appropriations do not apply to this Act because it is an annual appropriation. The department must expend the $132,000 by 30 June 2025 or lose it.

Compliance with this Act is primarily a matter for the accountable authority of the Department of the House of Representatives, which is the Clerk of the House (or as designated under the PGPA Act). The responsible officer must ensure that any expenditure from the $132,000 departmental item is for departmental expenditure of the department. “Departmental expenditure” includes payments for expenses, acquiring assets, making loans, or paying liabilities. The department should document how each expenditure relates to its operations, such as staffing, accommodation, or supplies. While the outcome statement is notional, it is prudent to ensure the expenditure aligns with Outcome 1 as described in the portfolio statements, to avoid interpretive ambiguity.

The department must track notional transactions with other non-corporate entities and ensure they are debited against the appropriation. Section 5 requires this treatment. The responsible officer should maintain records of notional payments, treating them as if they were real. This may affect cash flow accounting within the government’s central ledger.

For the advance reset provision, the responsible Presiding Officer for the House of Representatives (the Speaker) should confirm the amount advanced under the No. 1 Act that was determined before 14 February 2025. That amount is disregarded for computing the remaining advance cap under No. 1 after this Act commences. The Speaker may draw up to $300,000 in advances under No. 1 for the remainder of the 2024-2025 financial year, regardless of prior draws. However, the Speaker must ensure that any expenditure advanced under No. 1 after this Act does not duplicate expenditure funded by this Act. Subsection 11(2) reduces this Act’s appropriation by any advanced amount for the same expenditure. The Speaker should coordinate with the Clerk to avoid advancing money for the same purpose that is already covered by this Act.

The department must also manage the special account provisions. If it wishes to credit any of the $132,000 to a special account, it must ensure the special account’s purposes are covered by the departmental item. The department should obtain legal advice on whether “covered” means the special account’s purposes must be wholly within the departmental expenditure definition or merely overlap. It should maintain a trail showing which purposes align.

The portfolio statements are declared relevant documents. The department should retain copies of the Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements for this Bill and the Portfolio Budget Statements for the No. 1 Act. When interpreting the scope of the administered items (if any were present) or when advising on the meaning of “outcome”, these documents can be used. Even though there are no administered items in this Act, the portfolio statements could be relevant to any future interpretation dispute about the nature of the departmental item if a court considers them.

Finally, the department must comply with the PGPA Act’s reporting and accountability provisions. This includes keeping records of expenditure, preparing annual financial statements, and submitting to audit by the Australian National Audit Office. The money must be spent in accordance with the PGPA Act’s requirements for proper use of public resources. If any part of the $132,000 is not expended by 30 June 2025, it must be returned to the Consolidated Revenue Fund unless the PGPA Act allows otherwise (which it generally does not for annual appropriations).

The department should also monitor the scheduled repeal of the Act on 1 July 2027. Although the appropriation lapses after 30 June 2025, the Act will remain on the statute book until its repeal. The department should be aware that any legal proceedings or obligations arising under the Act (such as disputes about advance determinations) can still occur before repeal. After repeal, those proceedings may have to rely on transitional provisions in the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.