Appropriation (Parliamentary Departments) Act (No. 2) 2023-2024

Departmental item. s 3 defines this as “the total amount set out in Schedule 1 in relation to a Parliamentary Department under the heading ‘Departmental’.” For each department, Schedule 1 shows a single dollar figure under that heading (e.g., Department of the House of Representatives $273,000). That total is the legal limit of departmental expenditure authorised. The note to the definition clarifies that the amounts set out opposite specific outcomes under the “Departmental” heading are notional and do not restrict expenditure. This is a critical distinction: the outcome‑level breakdown assists interpretation but does not constrain spending. s 7 provides that the departmental item may be applied for the “departmental expenditure” of the department - broadly covering operating costs, staff, accommodation and administrative functions.

Administered item. Defined as an amount set out in Schedule 1 opposite an outcome under the heading “Administered”. In this Act, all administered items are zero. But if used, s 8(1) limits expenditure to contributing to the specified outcome, and s 8(2) ties the purpose to activities indicated in portfolio statements as belonging to that outcome. This creates a more constrained spending power than a departmental item.

Administered assets and liabilities item. This item type, listed separately in Schedule 1, is also zero here. If used, it could be applied for expenditure to achieve any outcome for the department (s 9(1)), again interpreted with portfolio statements (s 9(2)).

Other departmental item. Defined as an amount opposite “Equity Injections” in Schedule 1. Zero here. s 10 allows it to be applied for departmental expenditure (same as departmental items).

Advance to the responsible Presiding Officer. Part 3 re‑activates the section 11 mechanism from the No. 1 Act. The responsible Presiding Officers (President for Senate, Speaker for House of Representatives, both together for DPS and PBO - see s 3 definition) can determine advances up to prescribed caps to meet urgent or unforeseen expenditure before further appropriation is passed. The effect of s 11(1) is to re‑set the counters to zero, giving each officer a fresh cap. This is a flexibility device that reduces the need for immediate further legislation but also reduces parliamentary scrutiny of individual spending decisions.

Notional transactions. s 5 treats inter‑departmental transactions as real for the purpose of debiting appropriations, consistent with s 76 of the PGPA Act. This prevents double‑counting or escape from appropriation limits when one non‑corporate entity provides services to another.

Portfolio statements. Declared relevant documents for interpretation under s 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901. They are not the law but can be used to clarify ambiguous appropriation wording. For example, if a portfolio statement indicates that certain activities relate to a particular outcome, expenditure on those activities is taken to contribute to that outcome (ss 8(2), 9(2)). This gives the Executive’s budget papers legal weight in interpreting spending authority.

Special account. Defined by reference to the PGPA Act 2013. s 12 allows an amount appropriated by an item to be credited to a special account if the account’s purpose is covered by the item. This facilitates the use of earmarked funds without requiring a separate appropriation.

The Act directly affects the four Parliamentary Departments: the Department of the Senate, the Department of the House of Representatives, the Department of Parliamentary Services, and the Parliamentary Budget Office. These are the entities that may spend the appropriated money. Of these, the Department of Parliamentary Services receives the largest additional appropriation ($10 million), which funds professional services, advice and facilities for Parliament and the maintenance of Australian Parliament House. The Department of the House of Representatives receives $273,000 for outcome 1 (advisory and administrative services supporting the House of Representatives). The Senate and the PBO receive no additional funds, meaning their current appropriation from the No. 1 Act remains unchanged.

The responsible Presiding Officers (the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, acting jointly for DPS and PBO) are directly affected because they are given the authority to determine advances under the reset mechanism. This power expands their discretion to authorise spending without prior parliamentary appropriation, within the caps set.

Indirectly, the Act affects all Commonwealth taxpayers, because the $10.273 million is drawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund (general tax revenue). It also affects the staff of the Parliamentary Departments, who will have their salaries and operating costs paid from the appropriation. Contractors and suppliers to these departments (e.g., building maintenance firms, IT providers, catering services) will also be impacted as the additional money flows to them through procurement.

Parliamentarians (Senators and Members) are affected indirectly through the services they receive - especially from the Department of Parliamentary Services, whose $10 million boost may support building upgrades, security or technology enhancements. The Act does not provide new money for the PBO, so its analytical capacity is not expanded by this Act.

The Department of Finance and the Treasury are affected in their administrative roles overseeing the Consolidated Revenue Fund and ensuring appropriations are correctly recorded and reported. The Auditor‑General may also be affected through audit scrutiny of spending.

The Act creates few duties; it primarily grants rights to spend. The central right is the right of each Parliamentary Department to apply the amounts appropriated by its items for departmental expenditure (s 7). For administered items (if used), the right is constrained to expenditure that contributes to the specified outcome (s 8(1)). The responsible Presiding Officers have the right to determine advances under the reset mechanism in s 11, up to the prescribed caps, for urgent or unforeseen expenditure.

A notable duty arises from the interaction with portfolio statements. s 4 declares the portfolio statements relevant documents for interpretation, which means that departments (and officers) must have regard to them when applying items. If a department spends money in a way inconsistent with portfolio statement descriptions, it may be exceeding its legal authority. s 8(2) and s 9(2) explicitly provide that expenditure for activities indicated in portfolio statements as belonging to a particular outcome is taken to be for that outcome - but this could also be read as imposing a limit: if an activity is not indicated for any outcome in the statements, it may not be funded from an administered item.

The Act also imposes a duty to reduce the appropriation where an advance determination has already been made for the same expenditure before commencement (s 11(2)). This prevents double‑counting.

There is a right to credit amounts to special accounts under s 12, but only if the special account’s purpose is covered by an item. The officer administering the special account must therefore ensure alignment.

No individual duty is placed on any officer to keep spending within items; that duty arises from the broader Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act), not from this Act itself. The responsible Presiding Officer has a discretion, not a duty, to make advances - there is no compulsion to use the advance mechanism.

This Act does not itself create any criminal offences or civil penalties. Enforcement is indirect, through the general financial management framework. Misapplication of appropriated money (e.g., spending in excess of an item or for an unauthorised purpose) may constitute a breach of the PGPA Act, which carries penalties for officials including potential criminal liability for theft, fraud or misuse of public office (Criminal Code offences). The Auditor‑General and the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit have oversight roles, and the Parliament can withhold future supplies or censure ministers or Presiding Officers.

The Act’s only automatic legal effect is the repeal of the entire Act on 1 July 2026 (s 14). Any unspent appropriation after that date ceases to be available. This self‑enforcing sunset is a penalty of sorts: if a department fails to spend within time, the authority lapses and the money returns to the Consolidated Revenue Fund unless re‑appropriated.

Section 5’s treatment of notional transactions as real means that inter‑departmental payments must be tracked as if they were real cash flows. If an officer fails to record such a transaction correctly, the appropriation may be overstated or underspent, leading to compliance issues under the PGPA Act.

The Advance mechanism (s 11) does not impose a penalty for misuse; the responsible Presiding Officer is accountable to the Parliament through the usual reporting channels, but no specific penalty for exceeding the advance cap is stated in this Act. In practice, exceeding the cap would require further appropriation or risk unlawful expenditure.

Overall, enforcement relies on the broader public governance framework, not this Act.

The most significant interaction is with the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act). Under s 76 of the PGPA Act, notional transactions between non‑corporate entities are treated as real - a concept that s 5 of this Act repeats and applies to this appropriation. Sections 74‑75 of the PGPA Act allow adjustments to appropriations in certain circumstances (e.g., following a re‑allocation of functions between entities). This Act explicitly acknowledges in the note to s 6 that those PGPA provisions can adjust the amounts appropriated. The PGPA Act also governs the establishment and operation of special accounts, which are referenced in s 12 of this Act.

The Acts Interpretation Act 1901 is engaged through s 4, which declares portfolio statements relevant documents under s 15AB. This allows courts and decision‑makers to have regard to those statements when interpreting ambiguous provisions of this Act, giving the budget papers quasi‑interpretative status.

The primary interaction is with the Appropriation (Parliamentary Departments) Act (No. 1) 2023‑2024. This Act is a supplement to that one. The advance mechanism in Part 3 directly modifies the operation of s 11 of the No. 1 Act by disregarding earlier determinations and adjusting the available caps. The total effective appropriation for each department for 2023‑2024 is the sum of the No. 1 and No. 2 appropriations, minus any adjustments under s 11(2) of this Act.

The Parliamentary Service Act 1999 and related Acts govern the employment and operations of the Parliamentary Departments, but this Act does not amend them.

The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 and other electoral laws are not directly affected.

Because this Act is an appropriation, it also interacts with the Constitution - s 83 of the Constitution requires that no money be drawn from the Treasury except under an appropriation made by law. This Act satisfies that requirement for the additional $10.273 million.

The Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 was replaced by the PGPA Act and is no longer relevant.

Future appropriations Acts will supersede this Act after 2023‑2024, and the repeal date of 1 July 2026 ensures that no money remains legally available more than two years after the end of the financial year.

This Act was enacted on 8 April 2024 (assent date) and is a standalone, unamended piece of legislation. It is the second appropriation Act for the Parliamentary Departments for the 2023‑2024 financial year, following the No. 1 Act which would have been passed earlier in the financial year (likely in June or July 2023). Because this Act is designed as a supplementary measure, it has not been amended since commencement. Its structure mirrors standard appropriation Acts: Parts 1‑4, plus Schedule 1. The only substantive provision unique to this Act is the advance reset in s 11(1), which is not replicated in any earlier appropriation Act.

The Act will be repealed automatically on 1 July 2026 (s 14). It will not be further amended; if additional appropriations are needed for the same financial year, a No. 3 Act would be required. Amendment history for similar Acts typically involves only repeal or minor technical corrections, none of which apply here.

The Schedule 1 figures reflect the specific additional funding decided by the government and passed by Parliament as part of the Additional Estimates process. The Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements, referenced in the definitions, were tabled in February 2024, and the Bill passed both houses in March 2024, receiving Royal Assent on 8 April. No amendments were made to the Bill during its passage, according to the available text.

There is no reported litigation specifically concerning this Act. Appropriation Acts are rarely the subject of judicial review because they are considered political documents that do not confer rights on individuals. The High Court has in the past considered challenges to Commonwealth spending (e.g., Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 248 CLR 156 regarding executive spending without statutory authorisation), but that case concerned expenditure without appropriation, not a challenge to an appropriation Act itself. The Court has generally held that appropriation Acts are not justiciable for their policy choices; they authorise spending but do not create substantive rights.

If a dispute were to arise under this Act, it would most likely involve an allegation that money was spent for a purpose not covered by an item, thereby contravening the Constitution. For example, using departmental items for purposes that are not departmental expenditure might be challenged. However, the broad definition of “expenditure” in s 3 (payments for expenses, acquiring assets, making loans or paying liabilities) combined with departmental discretion makes such challenges difficult.

The advance mechanism (s 11) could theoretically be litigated if a Presiding Officer exceeded the cap or if the advance was used for an unauthorised purpose. But given the political accountability of Presiding Officers to their respective chambers, litigation is improbable.

No cases citing this Act appear in Australian law reports as at 2025. The Act is too recent and too routine.

1. Notional transactions can conceal real appropriation consumption. s 5 treats a “payment” between two non‑corporate entities as a real transaction that debits the appropriation, even though no money leaves the Consolidated Revenue Fund. This means a department could exhaust its departmental item through internal re‑charges without any external cash outflow. Officers must track these notional transactions carefully or risk exceeding the appropriation limit unintentionally.

2. The outcome breakdowns in Schedule 1 are not binding. The Schedule shows departmental amounts allocated against specific outcomes (e.g., “Advisory and administrative services” for the House of Representatives). However, the definition of departmental item (s 3) and the note make clear that those outcome allocations are “notional”. The only legal limit is the total departmental item for each department. This could mislead readers into thinking expenditure is legally capped by outcome, when it is not.

3. The advance reset creates a false impression of fresh money. s 11(1) disregards previous advance determinations, effectively giving Presiding Officers a new cap of up to $1 million (for DPS) without further parliamentary approval. But s 11(2) then reduces the appropriation under this Act by any amount already advanced for the same expenditure. So the net effect is that the advance is counted against the new appropriation, not a free bonus. However, if the advance was for expenditure not covered by this Act’s items, the cap remains fresh - a nuanced result.

4. The Act appropriates zero for administered items and equity injections, yet includes those headings. Schedule 1 lists columns for Administered, Administered Assets and Liabilities, and Equity Injections, all showing dashes for additional appropriation. But the definitions of those items remain operative. If the responsible Presiding Officer (or the department) mistakenly believes those zero amounts are open‑ended, they could attempt to spend under those items, which is unauthorised. The inclusion of zero‑value items may cause confusion.

5. Repeal on 1 July 2026 is after the financial year end. The Act is repealed more than two years after the financial year it covers. This means unspent appropriations lapse on that date, not earlier. This could create perverse incentives to spend down balances before the repeal, even if the expenditure is inefficient, because otherwise the money returns to the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

6. Portfolio statements are legally relevant but not publicly available as part of the Act. They are incorporated by reference. A person relying on the Act alone may not know exactly what expenditure is authorised. s 4 declares them relevant documents for interpretation, meaning a court could use them to restrict spending that contradicts the statements. Practitioners must read the portfolio statements to understand the full scope of each item.

7. No additional money goes to the Senate or PBO, but the Act still imposes obligations. Even though those departments receive zero additional funds, the definitions and advance mechanism apply to them. Their Presiding Officers can still make advances up to $300,000 from the No. 1 Act caps (as reset). They also must account for notional transactions and special accounts.

8. s 12 crediting to special accounts might allow money to be moved out of annual appropriation scrutiny. If a special account’s purpose is covered by an item, the amount can be credited to that account and then spent under the special account’s rules, which may have different controls. This reduces parliamentary oversight because the money is no longer subject to the annual appropriation limit once credited, although the PGPA Act applies.

For officers of the Parliamentary Departments managing these appropriations, compliance steps include:

1. Identify the total departmental item for your department from Schedule 1. The figure is the legal maximum for departmental expenditure for the remainder of 2023‑2024. For the House of Representatives, $273,000; for DPS, $10,000,000; for Senate and PBO, $0 (but still subject to No. 1 Act limits).

2. Monitor expenditure against the total item, not against outcome breakdowns. The outcome allocations in Schedule 1 are notional and do not restrict spending. However, if portfolio statements tie particular activities to outcomes, using those activities for a different outcome may raise interpretive issues if the item is challenged. Prudent compliance involves documenting that expenditure serves the department’s functions broadly.

3. Record notional transactions under s 5. If your department receives services from another non‑corporate entity (e.g., the Department of Finance provides accounting services), treat that as a real payment that reduces the appropriation. Ensure your financial system captures notional journal entries.

4. If using the Advance (s 11), record the determination date and amount accurately. The s 11(1) reset means that any advance determined under the No. 1 Act before 8 April 2024 is disregarded for the purpose of the caps remaining. However, s 11(2) reduces the appropriation by that advanced amount for the same expenditure. So before spending under this Act, check if an advance was already made for that expenditure and reduce the available appropriation accordingly.

5. Ensure special account debits align with item coverage. If you plan to credit an appropriation to a special account (s 12), verify that the special account’s purpose falls within the scope of the item. The item does not need to name the special account, but the purpose must be covered.

6. Comply with portfolio statements. Read the Portfolio Additional Estimates Statements and Portfolio Budget Statements to understand how the government described the intended use of the appropriation. While not legally binding for departmental items, they could be used in judicial review to argue that expenditure was unauthorised if it contradicts those statements.

7. Plan for repeal. The Act is repealed on 1 July 2026. Ensure that all obligations under the appropriation are finalised before that date. Any unspent funds will lapse and cannot be carried forward without a new appropriation.

8. Coordinate with the Department of Finance. Standard appropriation processes under the PGPA Act apply. Submit required reporting under the PGPA framework, including annual reports and financial statements.

9. Train staff on the distinction between departmental and administered items. Since this Act only appropriates departmental items, staff should not use the appropriation for administered purposes (such as grants to third parties), as that would be unauthorised.

10. Document the source and purpose of all expenditure to demonstrate compliance if audited by the Australian National Audit Office.