Aircraft Offences Act 1971

The Act defines key concepts that govern its scope. Aircraft is defined in s 3(1) as “any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air”. This is a broad, technology-neutral definition that would cover aeroplanes, helicopters, gliders, and balloons. It does not explicitly include drones or unmanned aerial vehicles, though the words “any machine” could be read to include them if they derive support from air reactions. The definition does not limit the size or purpose of the aircraft.

Flight is defined in s 3(2) by its commencement and end. A flight commences at the closing of the last external door before the aircraft first moves for take-off, or if that is not applicable, when the aircraft first moves for take-off. A flight ends at the opening of the first external door after the aircraft comes to rest after its next landing, or if that is not applicable, when it comes to rest after landing. If the aircraft is destroyed or the flight is abandoned earlier, the flight ends at that destruction or abandonment. This definition is critical because the application of Part 2 (which extends all SA criminal law onto the aircraft) is limited to aircraft “engaged in a flight within the State” (s 4). Once the flight has ended, Part 2 no longer applies. Part 3, by contrast, applies to aircraft that are either within the State or engaged in a flight within the State (s 6), so Part 3 offences can be committed both during flight and while the aircraft is stationary on the ground in SA.

Flight within the State is defined in s 3(4). A flight is taken to be within the State where the flight commences in the State and ends, or is intended at commencement to end, in the State, “whether or not the aircraft may or will, in the course of the flight, go outside the State.” This is an expansive jurisdictional claim. It means that an aircraft that takes off from Adelaide, flies over New South Wales, and returns to Adelaide is still a “flight within the State” for the purposes of the Act, even though it physically left SA airspace. This provision addresses the obvious difficulty that an aircraft in flight may cross state borders, but allows SA courts to exercise jurisdiction over offences occurring anywhere on that journey as long as the flight starts and finishes in SA. The provision raises potential constitutional questions about extraterritorial application, but it is a standard approach used to extend the reach of state criminal law to aircraft registered in the state or operating wholly within its economic boundary.

Dangerous goods in s 14(3) includes firearms, ammunition, weapons, explosive substances, and substances or things that by their nature or condition may endanger the safety of an aircraft or persons on board. This is a broader category than the dangerous goods defined in transport regulations, because it also covers items that are dangerous by condition (e.g., leaking batteries, flammable liquids) even if not classified as dangerous goods by regulators.

Member of the crew is defined simply as “a person having duties or functions on board the aircraft”. This includes not only pilots and flight attendants but also any other person with assigned duties on board, such as loadmasters or security personnel.

The Act also defines the Commonwealth Act as the Crimes (Aircraft) Act 1963 (Cth) as in force from time to time, and the Air Navigation Regulations as the Commonwealth regulations under the Air Navigation Act 1920 (Cth). These references are now outdated, as the Commonwealth Act was repealed and replaced by the Crimes (Aviation) Act 1991 (Cth), and the Air Navigation Regulations have been substantially amended and supplemented by the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Cth). The note at the end of the Act warns that references to other legislation may be obsolete.

The Act directly affects any person who is on board an aircraft that is the subject of Part 2 or Part 3, or who commits an offence under Part 3 while on the ground. This includes passengers, crew, and any other individual present on the aircraft.

Passengers are affected because all SA criminal law applies to their conduct on board during a flight within the State (s 5). A passenger who steals another passenger’s belongings, assaults someone, or possesses an illicit drug on board can be charged as if the offence occurred at the airport or in the street. Passengers are also subject to the specific Part 3 offences: they cannot take control of the aircraft, assault crew, endanger safety, carry dangerous goods without consent, or make threats about bombs or hijacking. The s 15 offence of making a false statement about threats to an aircraft is a low-threshold provision; even a joke about having a bomb could lead to a prosecution for an indictable offence carrying two years’ imprisonment.

Crew have duties and rights under the Act. The “person in command of the aircraft” (which will usually be the pilot or captain) has extensive powers under Part 4. Section 17 allows that person to arrest without warrant any person whom he finds committing or reasonably suspects of having committed or attempted an offence under Part 2 or Part 3. He may also hold the arrested person in custody until they can be brought before a justice of the peace or other proper authority. Further, the person in command may place a person under restraint or in custody to prevent an offence or to avoid danger to safety, and if the aircraft is not in flight, may remove a person from the aircraft (s 17(2)). These powers are exercisable with such assistance as necessary. Section 18 gives the person in command (and any person authorised in writing for the purposes of s 26 of the Commonwealth Act) the power to search the aircraft, any person, luggage or freight on board, and in the case of a Part 3 aircraft not in flight, any person about to board and luggage/freight about to be placed on board. This confers a significant summary power that bypasses the usual requirement for a search warrant. The power is triggered by a reasonable suspicion that an offence against Part 2 or Part 3 has been, is being, or may be committed.

Aircraft operators and owners are affected indirectly. Section 14(2)(a) provides an exception to the dangerous goods offence where the act is done with the consent of the owner or operator of the aircraft given with knowledge of the nature of the goods concerned. This means an operator must decide whether to consent to carriage of dangerous goods, and must have actual knowledge of their nature. The operator may also be liable for the conduct of crew members who exercise the powers under s 17 or 18, and must ensure crew are trained in the limits of those powers. There is no statutory immunity for operators if a search or arrest is later found to be unlawful.

State prosecutors and courts must deal with these offences as indictable offences (s 21), meaning they cannot be dealt with summarily unless some other SA law permits that. This imposes procedural requirements for committal and trial on indictment, which increases cost and time.

Commonwealth authorities are also affected because the Act overlaps with Commonwealth aviation offences. The double jeopardy provision in s 20 prevents a person from being convicted under both this Act and a Commonwealth law for the same act or omission. In practice, the Commonwealth Act (now the Crimes (Aviation) Act 1991) is more comprehensive and covers international and interstate flights; the SA Act is a backup for purely intrastate flights. However, the SA Act’s broad definition of “flight within the State” (s 3(4)) means it may apply even to flights that briefly cross state borders, creating potential jurisdictional overlap. The person in command of the aircraft may have to decide whether to invoke SA powers or wait for Commonwealth police, and may face conflicting legal advice.

The Act imposes clear duties on all persons and confers specific rights on the person in command.

Duties are primarily prohibitory. Under Part 2, the duty is not to commit any act or omission that would be an offence against a law of the State if done in the State. This is effectively a duty to obey all SA criminal law while on board a Part 2 aircraft. Under Part 3, the duties are: not to take or exercise control of an aircraft without lawful excuse (s 7), which is aggravated if another person (not an accomplice) is on board, and further aggravated if done by force, violence, threat, trick or false pretence; not to wilfully destroy an aircraft (s 8); not to destroy an aircraft with intent to kill or with reckless indifference to life (s 9); not to do an act capable of prejudicing safe operation with intent to prejudice it (s 10); not to do such an act with additional intent to kill or reckless indifference (s 11); not to assault, intimidate or threaten crew on board so as to interfere with their functions or lessen their ability (s 12); not to do an act likely to endanger the aircraft’s safety while on board (s 13); not to carry, place, deliver or possess dangerous goods on board without the consent of the owner/operator or permission under the Air Navigation Regulations (s 14); and not to make threats or false statements about destroying, damaging or endangering the aircraft or killing or injuring persons on board (s 15).

The lawful excuse defence in s 7 is not defined. The common law would govern what constitutes a lawful excuse; for example, a pilot taking control in an emergency might have a lawful excuse. The burden of raising evidence of lawful excuse would likely fall on the accused, with the prosecution bearing the ultimate burden of negating it beyond reasonable doubt.

Rights are conferred primarily on the person in command. Section 17(1) gives that person a right to arrest without warrant anyone whom he finds committing or reasonably suspects of having committed or attempted a Part 2 or Part 3 offence. This is exercisable on board the aircraft with necessary assistance. The person in command may hold the arrested person in custody until they can be brought before a justice of the peace or other proper authority. Section 17(2) gives a right to place a person under restraint or in custody, and if the aircraft is not in flight, to remove a person from the aircraft, where the person in command considers it necessary to prevent an offence or avoid danger. This is a preventive power that does not require reasonable suspicion of a completed offence.

Section 18 gives a right to search: the person in command or any person authorised in writing for the purposes of s 26 of the Commonwealth Act may search the aircraft, any person, luggage or freight on board, and for a Part 3 aircraft not in flight, any person about to board and luggage/freight about to be placed on board. The power requires reasonable suspicion that an offence against Part 2 or Part 3 has been, is being, or may be committed. Section 18(2) provides that a female must not be searched except by a female. This is a specific protection.

The right to not be convicted twice (s 20) is also a right: a person convicted of an offence under this Act or a corresponding Commonwealth offence cannot be convicted of the other.

The Act does not confer any right on passengers to refuse search or arrest. The powers under s 17 and s 18 are coercive and do not require consent. However, the common law and the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities (if applicable in SA) would impose limits on use of force. SA does not have a human rights charter, so the limits are those of the common law (reasonable force, reasonable suspicion) and the SA Criminal Law Consolidation Act (self-defence, duress).

The Act prescribes a graduated scale of penalties for Part 3 offences, all expressed as terms of imprisonment. No monetary fines are provided. All offences are indictable (s 21), meaning they must be tried on indictment in the District Court or Supreme Court unless some other SA law permits summary trial (which is unlikely given the sentence maxima). The penalties are:

• s 7(1) (taking control without others on board): 7 years imprisonment.
• s 7(2) (taking control with another person on board, not an accomplice): 14 years.
• s 7(3) (taking control by force, violence, threat, trick or false pretence with another on board): 20 years.
• s 8 (wilful destruction): 14 years.
• s 9 (destruction with intent to kill or reckless indifference): life imprisonment.
• s 10 (act capable of prejudicing safe operation with intent): 14 years.
• s 11 (act capable of prejudicing safe operation with intent to kill or reckless indifference): life imprisonment.
• s 12 (assaulting crew): 14 years.
• s 13 (endangering safety): 7 years.
• s 14 (dangerous goods): 7 years.
• s 15 (threats and false statements): 2 years.

These penalties are severe relative to equivalent Commonwealth offences under the Crimes (Aviation) Act 1991 (Cth), which carries up to 20 years for hijacking, and up to 10 years for threats, etc. The SA Act’s life imprisonment for destruction or prejudicing with intent to kill reflects the maximum possible under state law.

Enforcement is primarily through the arrest and search powers in Part 4, as well as general police powers. The person in command of the aircraft is the front-line enforcer. Section 17(1) allows arrest without warrant on board the aircraft. The power is triggered when the person in command “finds” a person committing an offence or reasonably suspects past offending or attempt. The arrest power is broad but is subject to the common law requirement that the arrest be for the purpose of bringing the person before a proper authority. The person in command may hold the arrested person in custody only until they can be brought before a justice of the peace or other proper authority. This may mean that if the aircraft is delayed on the tarmac, the person must be handed over to police as soon as practicable; there is no power to hold for questioning or for an indefinite period.

Section 18 provides search powers without warrant, triggered by reasonable suspicion. The search can extend to the aircraft itself, persons, luggage, and freight. For an aircraft that is not in flight but to which Part 3 applies (i.e., an aircraft within the State), the power extends to persons about to board and luggage/freight about to be placed on board. This is a significant pre-boarding search power that mirrors the authority commonly exercised by airport security, but is here conferred on the person in command. The limitation that females may only be searched by females (s 18(2)) is a practical constraint that requires the person in command to ensure a female crew member or other female is available.

No civil remedies are provided for unlawful arrest or search; any remedy would lie in tort (assault, battery, false imprisonment) or under the common law for abuse of power. The Act gives no statutory indemnity to the person in command.

The Act expressly states in s 19 that it “is not intended to exclude or limit the operation of any other law of the State”. This means that all other SA criminal laws, such as the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935, the Summary Offences Act 1953, and any other statute, continue to apply concurrently. A person could be charged under both this Act and another state law for the same conduct, but the common law rule against double jeopardy and the principle of autrefois convict would prevent double punishment for the same act. The Act does not create an exclusive code.

The interaction with Commonwealth law is more specific. Section 20 provides that if an act or omission constitutes an offence under this Act and also under a law of the Commonwealth, and the person is convicted of either, they are not liable to be convicted of the other. This is a double jeopardy bar that applies only after conviction, not before. It means that if a person is acquitted under Commonwealth law, they could still be tried under the SA Act; the bar only arises after conviction. The reference to “a law of the Commonwealth” catches the Crimes (Aviation) Act 1991 (Cth) and any other Commonwealth statute with aviation-related offences (e.g., the Criminal Code in relation to terrorism offences). The practical effect is that prosecutors will need to choose which jurisdiction to proceed in, or risk the second proceeding being barred.

The Act incorporates by reference the Commonwealth Act (Crimes (Aircraft) Act 1963) in the definition in s 3(1) and in the search power under s 18 (referring to persons authorised under s 26 of the Commonwealth Act). The Commonwealth Act has been repealed and replaced by the Crimes (Aviation) Act 1991 (Cth). The references are therefore arguably obsolete. The note appended to the Act states that “references in the legislation to other legislation or instruments or to titles of bodies or offices are not automatically updated as part of the program for the revision and publication of legislation and therefore may be obsolete.” This creates a real risk that the search power in s 18 may be inoperative because there is no longer any person authorised under s 26 of a repealed Act. A court would likely read the reference as a reference to the equivalent provision in the current Commonwealth Act, but that is not certain. The better view is that the person in command can still search under s 18(1) because the power is independently given to him; the reference to s 26 of the Commonwealth Act is an additional grant to those authorised persons, not the sole basis for the power. The wording “the person in command of the aircraft or any person authorised in writing for the purposes of section 26 of the Commonwealth Act” suggests two separate classes of persons with the search power. So the person in command’s power survives even if the authorised class has disappeared.

The Act also references the Air Navigation Regulations (Commonwealth). Section 14(2)(b) provides that the dangerous goods offence does not apply to carrying or placing firearms or ammunition on board with permission granted under those regulations. The Air Navigation Regulations have been replaced by the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (Cth), which contain their own provisions on carriage of firearms. Again, the reference is obsolete but a court would likely read it as a reference to the current regulations.

The Act does not interact with international treaties directly, but it is part of a wider framework of aviation security. The Tokyo Convention 1963 (on offences on aircraft) is implemented in Australia through the Crimes (Aviation) Act 1991 (Cth). The SA Act does not reference the Tokyo Convention, but the Commonwealth Act does. Because the SA Act only applies to flights within the State (which are domestic flights by definition), the Tokyo Convention’s jurisdiction rules are less relevant.

The Act does not create any interaction with the Fair Work Act, Work Health and Safety Act, or industrial laws, except that crew members who are assaulted or threatened may also have remedies under those laws. The Act is purely criminal, so it does not affect employment rights or safety duties directly.

The Aircraft Offences Act 1971 (SA) was originally assented to on 18 March 1971 and commenced on the same day. It has been amended only twice in over 50 years.

The first amendment was the Aircraft Offences Act Amendment Act 1983 (No 52 of 1983), assented to and commenced on 16 June 1983. That amendment deleted s 3(3) and amended s 3(4). The deletion of s 3(3) suggests it removed a definition or provision that was considered obsolete; the exact content of the repealed subsection is not preserved in the current text. The amendment to s 3(4) modified the definition of “flight within the State”; the pre-amendment version likely did not include the phrase “whether or not the aircraft may or will, in the course of the flight, go outside the State”. That addition broadened the jurisdictional reach of the Act, allowing SA courts to assert jurisdiction over flights that leave SA airspace as long as they commence and end in SA.

The second amendment was via the Criminal Law Consolidation (Felonies and Misdemeanours) Amendment Act 1994 (No 59 of 1994), which amended ss 9 and 11. This amendment was consequential to the abolition of the distinction between felonies and misdemeanours in SA criminal law, which took effect on 1 January 1995. Sections 9 and 11 originally referred to “felony” or similar terminology; the amendment removed those references and replaced them with the language now seen: “shall be guilty of an offence and liable to be imprisoned for life.” The amendment schedule simply says the provisions were amended. The effect was purely stylistic: the substance of the offences remained the same.

In addition, s 2 of the Act was omitted under the Legislation Revision and Publication Act 2002. Section 2 would have been the usual definition section that is now captured in s 3. The omission was a renumbering exercise under the revision program, not a substantive change.

The legislative history shows that the Act has been virtually untouched since 1994. No amendments have been made to account for the rise of drones, cybersecurity threats, or modern aviation security practices. The note to the legislative history warns that references to other legislation may be obsolete, which is a significant practical concern. The Act’s stability could be read as either a sign of robustness or of legislative neglect. For a field of law governing conduct with high potential consequences (hijacking, threats), the lack of modernisation leaves gaps and uncertainties.

The Act itself does not cite any cases. Research (which we are not permitted to invent) would likely reveal very few reported decisions under this Act. The Act is rarely used in practice because Commonwealth aviation offences under the Crimes (Aviation) Act 1991 (Cth) cover the same conduct and offer more modern provisions, broader jurisdiction, and specialised enforcement mechanisms. Commonwealth agencies such as the Australian Federal Police handle most aircraft-related offences, and they tend to charge under Commonwealth law to avoid the complexities of state jurisdictional limits.

The alternative verdict provisions in s 16 suggest the drafters anticipated jury trials and the possibility that evidence might not support the highest charge. The provisions allow a jury to convict of a lesser included offence under s 7 (e.g., s 7(2) instead of s 7(3)), s 8 instead of s 9, or s 10 instead of s 11. This indicates that the Act was modelled on common law principles of alternative verdicts and was intended to be tried on indictment.

There is no provision in the Act for any appeal or review rights; the general criminal appeals process under the SA Criminal Law Consolidation Act would apply.

Given the age of the Act and its narrow scope, litigation history is likely sparse. Any decided cases would probably involve jurisdictional disputes under s 3(4) (whether a flight that went outside SA still counts as a flight within the State) or the application of the double jeopardy bar in s 20. The lack of modern judicial interpretation creates uncertainty for practitioners advising clients on the scope of offences such as “prejudicing the safe operation of an aircraft” (ss 10-11) which could be interpreted broadly to include tampering with equipment, interfering with navigation systems, or even distracting the pilot.

The Act’s definition of “lawful excuse” in s 7 has not been judicially considered in any publicly available SA decision. This leaves open the question of whether necessity, duress, or self-defence constitute a lawful excuse. Under general criminal law principles, they should, but the specific statutory defence of lawful excuse may be narrower. The burden of proof on lawful excuse is not specified; it is likely an evidential burden on the accused with the legal burden on the prosecution to negate.

1. Part 2 applies only to aircraft “engaged in a flight within the State”. If the aircraft is on the ground with doors open and passengers boarding, Part 2 does not apply. A theft during boarding would therefore not be covered by s 5; it would be simply a theft under the ordinary criminal law. Practitioners must check the flight phase carefully.

2. The definition of “flight within the State” in s 3(4) is extremely broad. It catches flights that go outside SA. This means a passenger who assaults a crew member while the aircraft is physically over New South Wales during a return flight from Adelaide to Adelaide can be charged under SA law. This extraterritorial claim may be constitutionally valid but is surprising, and could lead to jurisdictional arguments.

3. The search power under s 18 does not require a warrant and is triggered by reasonable suspicion of an offence “having been, being or may be committed”. The phrase “may be committed” allows a search based on future potential offending, which is a very low threshold. A person in command could search all passengers if they suspect a future offence, such as a possible hijacking, even without specific evidence. The only limit is that the suspicion must be reasonable.

4. The double jeopardy bar in s 20 only operates after conviction of either the state or Commonwealth offence. If a person is acquitted under Commonwealth law, they can still be prosecuted under this Act. This creates potential for double trial and harassment, though the SA Director of Public Prosecutions would likely exercise discretion to avoid it.

5. The reference to the Commonwealth Act in s 18 is likely obsolete. The Crimes (Aircraft) Act 1963 has been repealed. Persons authorised under s 26 of that Act no longer exist. Relying on that limb of the search power is risky. The person in command’s own power may be the only reliable source of authority.

6. The Act does not specify the jurisdictional basis for offences committed over the sea or over another state. The s 3(4) definition asserts jurisdiction over flights that go outside SA, but the practical ability of SA police to investigate and prosecute a hijacking that occurs over Victoria may be limited by interstate policing agreements.

7. The provision in s 17(1) that the person in command may arrest “whom he finds committing … an offence” does not distinguish between summary and indictable offences. But s 21 says all offences under the Act are indictable. However, Part 2 offences are not offences “under this Act” but offences under other SA laws; those could be summary offences. The arrest power in s 17(1) refers to “an offence referred to in that Part” (Part 2 or Part 3). For Part 2, the offence referred to is any offence against a law of the State. That could include a summary offence like common assault (which is a summary offence under the Summary Offences Act). The person in command therefore has power to arrest for summary offences on board. But s 21 only applies to offences “under this Act”, not to the underlying offences under other laws. So there is no requirement that those underlying offences be indictable. This is a potential trap: a person in command might arrest for a minor summary offence and later be challenged that the arrest was unlawful because the power was intended only for serious offences. The wording, however, is clear: the power extends to any offence under Part 2 (which includes any state offence if committed on the aircraft).

8. The penalty for s 15 (threats and false statements) is only two years imprisonment. Despite being an indictable offence, it carries a relatively low maximum. This may reflect an understanding that false bomb threats, while serious, are less severe than actual interference. However, because it is indictable, it must go to the superior courts, which is disproportionate to the seriousness.

9. The Act does not provide any guidance on what constitutes “reckless indifference to the safety of the life of a person” in ss 9 and 11. The common law meaning of recklessness (foresight of probability of death) would apply, but there is no statutory definition. This could lead to jury confusion.

10. There is no provision for corporate liability under the Act. Only natural persons can commit these offences. If a corporation owns the aircraft and instructs its employees to carry dangerous goods without consent, the corporation may not be directly liable under this Act, though the employees would be. Corporate criminal liability would arise under the general SA law (e.g., the Criminal Law Consolidation Act).

For aircraft operators and owners the primary obligation is to ensure that the dangerous goods provision in s 14 is not breached. Operators should have clear policies on what items are prohibited on board and ensure that passengers and crew are aware. If the operator intends to allow the carriage of firearms or dangerous goods, they must give consent with knowledge of the nature of the goods (s 14(2)(a)). That consent should be in writing and documented. Firearms require permission under the Air Navigation Regulations (now the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations), which have their own processes. Operators should also ensure that crew are trained in the arrest and search powers under Part 4, and understand the limits: arrest only on reasonable suspicion of a Part 2 or Part 3 offence; search only on reasonable suspicion; use of reasonable force; and for females, only female searchers. Operators should also have a protocol for handing over arrested persons to police as soon as possible after landing, and for documenting any searches or arrests to avoid civil claims.

For crew, especially the person in command (pilot), compliance requires knowing when Part 2 applies (only in flight) and when Part 3 applies (in flight or on ground). If the aircraft is engaged in a flight within the State, the pilot must be aware that all SA criminal law applies on board. If a passenger commits a crime (e.g., assault), the pilot may arrest under s 17(1). The pilot should consider whether the conduct can be dealt with by warning or restraint without formal arrest, and should only arrest if necessary to prevent further offending or to ensure the person is brought before a court. The pilot may also search under s 18 if there is reasonable suspicion of an offence. The pilot must ensure that any search of a female is conducted by a female crew member or passenger. If no female is available, the search may be unlawful, and the pilot should consider landing and involving police who can arrange a female officer.

For passengers, compliance is straightforward: do not commit any act that would be an offence under SA law while on board, and do not breach any of the specific Part 3 prohibitions. In particular, do not make jokes about bombs or hijacking (s 15). Do not interfere with crew or aircraft systems. Do not carry weapons or dangerous items without authorisation. If a passenger witnesses an offence, they should report it to the pilot in command.

For legal practitioners, compliance in advising clients involves careful jurisdictional analysis. Determine whether the aircraft was engaged in a flight within the State under s 3(4). Check whether the flight commenced and ended in SA. If it went outside SA, confirm whether the flight was intended to end in SA. If the client is charged under both State and Commonwealth law, ensure the double jeopardy protection in s 20 is raised if a conviction is recorded on the first charge. Challenge the validity of any search under s 18 if it was conducted by a person authorised only under the now-repealed Commonwealth Act, or if the search was not based on reasonable suspicion. Consider arguing that Part 2 does not apply if the aircraft was not in flight at the time of the conduct (e.g., during boarding or after landing). For offences under s 7, consider whether the client had a lawful excuse, which could be duress, necessity, or authorised emergency control. For s 14, check if the owner or operator gave consent with knowledge. For s 15, check if the statement was true or if the client did not know it was false.

For prosecutors, compliance with procedural fairness and disclosure obligations is paramount. All offences under the Act are indictable, so the matter must go through committal unless the defence consents to an expedited trial. The alternative verdict provisions in s 16 should be considered when charging: if the evidence may not prove the highest charge, include the lesser charge in the alternative. Ensure that no conviction has already been recorded under Commonwealth law for the same act, as s 20 would then bar the SA prosecution.

For airport security and police, remember that the Act’s powers are on the aircraft itself. On the ground, police have their own powers under the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act or similar. The Act does not give airport security any powers unless they are the person in command of the aircraft. Therefore, a ground-based security officer cannot use s 18 to search a passenger before boarding unless they are acting on behalf of the pilot and with the pilot’s authorisation.