Full age and full capacity are the key constructs. Section 3(1) deems a person who attains 18 to have attained both. "Full age" means the legal status of being an adult, no longer subject to the disabilities of infancy. "Full capacity" means the ability to perform juristic acts: make contracts, hold property, give receipts, sue and be sued, marry without parental consent where that is otherwise required, make wills, and exercise all other legal rights and powers that were previously conditioned on reaching 21. The Act adopts a unified age threshold: one age for all purposes of the laws of the State, subject to the savings and exceptions in ss 6-8.

The appointed day is the date set by proclamation under s 1(2). It functions as the cut-off for transitional treatment. Persons already 18 but under 21 on that day are immediately deemed adults. Persons who turn 18 after that day become adults at 18. Persons who are under 18 on the appointed day remain minors until they turn 18.

Enactment and instrument are defined in s 2. "Enactment" covers Acts (including Imperial Acts applying in the State), regulations, rules, by-laws, orders, proclamations, and other documents made under an Act or Imperial Act provision. "Instrument" covers all other documents, whether executed or made, that are not enactments and not Commonwealth laws or documents under them. This includes wills, trusts, deeds, contracts, powers of attorney, marriage settlements, and any private legal document. The Act applies to both categories, but the savings provisions draw distinctions based on when the document was executed or made and when the testator died.

Contrary intention is a crucial qualifier. Section 3(2) says the Act applies "in the absence of a definition or of an indication of a contrary intention". If a statute says "adult means a person who has attained 21 years", that is a definition that overrides the Act. If a trust deed says "beneficiaries shall receive their share upon attaining 25", that is an indication of a contrary intention as to the age at which the share vests or is payable, and the Act does not convert it to 18. The Act sets a default, not a compulsory override.

Savings (s 6) is a cluster of exceptions that preserve pre-existing rights, obligations, and constructions. These cover testamentary capacity and wills made before the appointed day (s 6(1)(a)); revocation of wills before that day (s 6(1)(b)); construction of wills of testators who died before that day (s 6(1)(c)); confirmation of earlier wills by later codicils (s 6(2)); trustee powers to pay income or capital for maintenance, education, advancement or benefit under wills of testators dying on or after the appointed day but executed before it (s 6(3)); trustee powers to pay to a person who has turned 18 where the instrument authorised payment to a parent or guardian (s 6(4)); distribution of intestate estates of persons dying before the appointed day (s 6(5)); court orders for control of minors' money in force before the appointed day (s 6(6)); estates, rights or interests in property to which a person became absolutely entitled before the appointed day (s 6(7)); liability to pay alimony or maintenance under orders or agreements in force before the appointed day (s 6(8)); time for bringing proceedings for causes of action that arose before the appointed day (s 6(9)); construction of enactments incorporated into instruments whose construction is unaffected by the Act (s 6(10)); and conditions of employment, industrial awards, orders, determinations, and apprenticeship instruments (s 6(11)).

Trustee discretion is a concept that appears in ss 7 and 8. The Act gives administrators, trustees, and trustees of minors' money a limited power to refuse to comply with a beneficiary's direction or to pay money to a minor who has turned 18, if they consider it prudent or in the minor's best interests to wait until a higher age (up to 21). This preserves a safeguard for cases where the beneficiary lacks maturity or where the funds are substantial and the trustee fears the beneficiary will waste them. The beneficiary can challenge the refusal by originating summons.

The Act directly affects all natural persons who are under 21 years of age in the State at the time of its commencement or who turn 18 after commencement. For persons aged 18 to 20 on the appointed day, the Act gives them full legal capacity immediately, without any application, court order, or administrative process. For persons under 18 on the appointed day, it means they will attain full capacity at 18 rather than 21. The Act does not affect persons already 21 or over on the appointed day; they were already adults.

Parents and guardians are indirectly affected. Before the Act, parents had legal authority and responsibility for children up to age 21. The Act reduces that period to 18, shortening the duration of parental authority, parental liability for children's torts, and the right to control a child's earnings and property. Guardians appointed by will or court order will have their responsibilities end at 18 instead of 21, unless the terms of appointment specify a different age.

Trustees and administrators are affected because ss 7 and 8 give them a statutory discretion to refuse directions from, or payment to, a beneficiary who has turned 18 but whom the trustee considers insufficiently mature to manage the property. This imposes a decision-making burden and potential litigation risk on trustees who must assess a beneficiary's financial sophistication and exercise judgment about whether paying at 18 would be prudent. The trustee must give written reasons for refusal and may face an originating summons from the beneficiary.

Employers and industrial relations participants are specifically carved out by s 6(11). Conditions of employment, rights and obligations arising from employment, and the construction of industrial awards, orders, determinations, and instruments under them are not affected by the Act. This means that if an award set a lower wage for employees under 21, that provision continues to operate, and the Act does not convert it into an adult wage at 18. The Act deliberately leaves employment conditions to the industrial relations system.

Marriage celebrants and parties to marriage are affected. The Act reduces the age at which a person can marry without parental consent (if the marriage Act in the State uses the age of majority as the threshold for independent consent). Similarly, the age at which a person can consent to medical treatment, join the armed forces (subject to Commonwealth law), vote in State elections, serve on a jury, make a will, and enter contracts is reduced to 18, unless specific legislation sets a different age.

Financial institutions are affected because they must accept receipts and discharges from 18 year olds for investments, bank accounts, insurance proceeds, and other financial products. Before the Act, a minor's receipt was often invalid, and institutions needed receipts from parents or guardians or court orders. The Act simplifies that but also increases risk for institutions dealing with younger customers who may be less financially literate.

Courts and tribunals are affected because the Act changes procedural capacities. A person who turns 18 can sue or be sued in their own name, without a next friend or guardian ad litem. This reduces court administrative burdens but may increase litigation involving younger parties.

Right to full legal capacity at 18. The core right is stated in s 3(1): a person who attains 18 is deemed to have full age and full capacity for all purposes of the laws of the State. This includes the right to own property absolutely, to make enforceable contracts, to sue and be sued, to give valid receipts and discharges, to assign or dispose of property, to disclaim rights or property, to make a will, to marry without parental consent (where that is the law), to consent to medical treatment, and to exercise all other legal capacities previously conditional on reaching 21.

Right to have "minor" and "infant" construed downwards. Section 3(2) provides that in enactments and instruments made after commencement, the terms "infant", "infancy", "minor", and "minority" refer to a person under 18, unless a contrary intention appears. This is a right of the person not to be treated as a minor after 18. It is also a duty on drafters and interpreters to apply the new default.

Duty on courts and tribunals to apply the Act as a default rule. The Act does not override express statutory definitions or indications of contrary intention. But where a statute or document is silent or uses the generic terms "adult", "full age", "minor", or similar, the Act supplies the age of 18 as the threshold. This is a duty of interpretation that applies to all State laws and to instruments executed after the appointed day.

Right to a fixed time for attaining age. Section 4(1) provides that a person attains a particular age at the commencement of the relevant anniversary of their birth. This gives certainty about the exact time when capacity arises. For example, a person born on 1 January 2005 attains 18 at midnight on 1 January 2023, not at 3:00 pm (their birth time). This right can be displaced by an express provision in an enactment or instrument (s 4(2)(b)), but in the absence of such provision, the rule applies.

Duty of trustees and administrators to consider best interests. Sections 7 and 8 impose a duty on trustees and administrators to exercise judgment when a beneficiary who has turned 18 gives directions or demands payment of money held on their behalf. The trustee is not obliged to comply if they consider it would be imprudent or not in the minor's best interests. If they refuse, they must give written notice stating reasons (s 7(2), s 8(2)). This duty is subject to challenge by originating summons, giving the beneficiary a right to judicial review of the refusal.

Right of a beneficiary to challenge a trustee's refusal. Sections 7(3) and 8(3) give a beneficiary who has been refused a direction or payment the right to apply to the Supreme Court by originating summons. The proceeding is returnable before a judge in chambers and follows the equitable jurisdiction procedure (ss 7(4), 8(4)). This is a substantive right of access to court, but it imposes costs risk on the beneficiary.

Right of a trustee to refuse to act on a direction where not all beneficiaries join. Section 7(1)(a) gives a trustee the right to refuse to comply with a direction from one beneficiary unless all beneficiaries have joined in the direction. This protects the trustee from acting on the instruction of one beneficiary to the potential detriment of others, and it protects the other beneficiaries from having their interests dealt with without their consent.

Savings preserving existing rights. The Act does not divest vested rights. Section 6(7) preserves any estate, right, or interest in property to which a person became absolutely entitled before the appointed day. If a person turned 18 before the Act and was entitled to property under a trust that vested at 21, the Act does not accelerate that vesting. Section 6(8) preserves liability for alimony or maintenance under orders or agreements in force before the appointed day. Section 6(9) preserves limitation periods for causes of action that arose before the appointed day.

The Age of Majority Act 1973 does not create any criminal offences, civil penalties, or regulatory enforcement mechanisms. It is a status-defining and capacity-defining Act. Its enforcement is indirect, through the operation of the general law.

The primary enforcement mechanism is through the courts. If a person who is 18 but under 21 is treated as a minor contrary to the Act, they can bring proceedings for a declaration of their legal capacity or for an order that a refusal by a trustee or administrator to recognise their capacity is invalid. Sections 7(3) and 8(3) provide a specific originating summons procedure for challenging a trustee's refusal to pay money or act on a direction. The court can order the trustee to comply, and failure to comply with a court order would be contempt of court, punishable by fine or imprisonment under the general law.

For private actors, such as a financial institution that refuses to accept a receipt or discharge from an 18 year old on the ground of minority, the 18 year old could sue for conversion, for debt, or for declaratory relief. The institution's refusal would be a breach of contract or a wrongful detention of property if the Act gives the person full capacity to give a valid receipt. The court could award damages, order delivery of the property, or grant a declaration that the receipt is valid. There is no specific penalty under the Act itself.

For public actors, such as a government department that refuses to recognise a person's capacity to consent or to enter into a transaction, the person could seek judicial review of the decision as legally unreasonable or based on an error of law (the error being that the Act lowered the age of majority). The court could quash the decision and order the department to reconsider according to law.

The Act's enforcement depends entirely on private litigation or judicial review. There is no regulator, no inspector, no power to issue infringement notices, and no criminal sanction for non-compliance. The practical deterrent against ignoring the Act is the risk of adverse costs orders and damages in civil proceedings.

The time limits for bringing proceedings are preserved by s 6(9), which says the Act does not affect the time for bringing proceedings in respect of a cause of action that arose before the appointed day. For causes of action arising after the appointed day, the ordinary limitation periods apply. A person who turns 18 on or after the appointed day has full capacity to sue from that moment, and their limitation periods run from the date of the cause of action, without the former suspension during minority.

The originating summons procedure under ss 7(4) and 8(4) is a summary procedure conducted before a judge in chambers, reflecting the equitable jurisdiction that existed before the Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932. This suggests the legislature intended a relatively efficient and low-cost mechanism for resolving disputes about trustee refusals, without the need for a full trial.

The Act applies "for all the purposes of the laws of the State" (s 3(1)). This is broad but not universal. It does not apply to Commonwealth laws or to documents made under Commonwealth laws, because the State cannot amend Commonwealth legislation. For Commonwealth laws that use "age of majority" or "adult" or "minor", the Commonwealth's own age of majority provisions govern, not this Act.

The Act interacts with the general law of contract. Before the Act, a contract made by a minor was voidable at the minor's option. The Act abolishes that rule for persons 18 and over. A person who turns 18 can make binding contracts from that moment. This affects the law of sale of goods, credit, hire-purchase, insurance, and every other commercial transaction. However, the Act does not affect the common law doctrines of undue influence, unconscionable dealing, or capacity based on mental impairment. A contract with an 18 year old who lacks mental capacity is still voidable, because s 3(4) preserves the effect of insanity, mental infirmity, and any other factor distinct from age.

The Act interacts with the law of wills and succession. Section 6(1) preserves the pre-appointed-day law for wills made before commencement, wills revoked before commencement, and wills of testators who died before commencement. Section 6(2) provides that a pre-commencement will is not treated as made on or after commencement merely because it is confirmed by a post-commencement codicil. This prevents the Act from retroactively changing the effect of existing testamentary dispositions. Section 6(3) preserves trustee powers to pay income or capital for maintenance, education, advancement or benefit under pre-commencement wills of testators who die on or after commencement. Section 6(5) preserves the pre-Act distribution rules for intestate estates of persons who died before the appointed day, subject to s 7 which allows a beneficiary who has turned 18 to give directions but with trustee override powers.

The Act interacts with the Limitation of Actions Act 1836 and the Mercantile Law Act 1935, which are specifically amended by s 5 (though the amendments are incorporated into those Acts and not reproduced). The practical effect is that limitation periods that used to be suspended until age 21 are now suspended only until age 18.

The Act interacts with industrial law through s 6(11), which expressly preserves conditions of employment, rights and obligations from employment, and the construction of industrial awards, orders, determinations, and apprenticeship instruments. This means that if an award sets a wage rate for "juniors" defined as under 21, that definition survives the Act. The Act does not convert any employee under 21 into an adult for wage purposes.

The Act interacts with family law. The age at which a person can marry without parental consent (if the marriage legislation uses the age of majority) is reduced to 18. However, if the marriage Act specifies 18 as the minimum age for marriage without consent and also requires parental consent for those under 18, the Act does not alter that; it only alters the threshold if the marriage Act uses "age of majority" or "adult" without specifying a number.

The Act interacts with the law of trusts. Section 6(4) expands the power of a trustee who is authorised to pay income to a parent or guardian of a person under a pre-commencement instrument or enactment: the trustee can now pay that income directly to the person if the person has attained 18. This is a permissive provision, not mandatory. Section 6(6) and s 8 deal with court orders for control of minors' money in force before the appointed day. The order is read as if references to 21 are references to 18, but the trustee may still refuse to pay until a higher age (up to 21) if it is in the minor's best interests.

The Act interacts with the law of property. Section 6(7) preserves property rights vested before the appointed day. If a trust vested at 21 and the beneficiary was 19 on the appointed day, the Act does not accelerate vesting; the beneficiary must wait until 21 to become absolutely entitled, unless the trust instrument provides otherwise.

The Act was originally enacted in 1973. The version provided to me shows that the Act has been amended by S.R. 1977 No. 200, s. 3 and Schedules I and II. The amendment is in the form of subordinate legislation (S.R. refers to Statutory Rules, which are a form of delegated legislation). The amendment appears to have made changes to s 2 (Interpretation), s 3(2), and the marginal notes of ss 6, 7, and 8. Specifically, S.R. 1977 No. 200 amended s 2 by inserting or substituting references in the definition section, and amended s 3(2) by substituting "sui juris" for an earlier formulation. It also made minor amendments to the marginal notes of s 6(4) and s 8(1) and the heading of Schedule 1.

The Act itself is short, and the amendment history is correspondingly minimal. The only substantive amendment recorded is the 1977 amendment, which appears to have been a clean-up or clarification amendment rather than a major policy change. The gap between the original 1973 enactment and the minor 1977 amendment suggests the legislature considered the Act largely settled after its initial enactment.

There is no evidence of later amendments. The Act as provided appears to be an authorised version current as at 2026. The fact that the Act has remained largely unamended for nearly five decades suggests that the reduction of the age of majority from 21 to 18 has been uncontroversial in its operation. The transitional provisions have long since expired in practical effect, though they remain on the statute book for the rare case of an estate or trust that still operates under pre-commencement rules.

The Schedule 1 amendments (to the Limitation of Actions Act 1836 and the Mercantile Law Act 1935) are described as having been "incorporated into the authorised version" of those Acts. This means the text of the amendments is not reproduced in this Act; one must look at the amended Acts to see the changes.

The source material does not cite any case law, and I cannot invent cases. However, the structure of the Act, particularly ss 7 and 8 with their originating summons procedures, indicates that the legislature anticipated litigation over trustee refusals to recognise a beneficiary's capacity at 18. The provision for a judge in chambers hearing suggests these disputes were expected to be relatively contained, but they would involve questions of construction: whether the trustee's opinion was genuinely held, whether it was reasonable, and whether the trustee had properly considered the beneficiary's best interests.

The originating summons procedure under ss 7(3) and 8(3) mirrors the equitable jurisdiction that existed before the Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932. This is a somewhat archaic reference, but it indicates that the legislature intended these applications to be heard in the equity division of the Supreme Court, applying equitable principles.

The Act has likely been considered in litigation about the meaning of "minor" or "adult" in other statutes. For example, if a statute uses "adult" without definition, s 3(2) of this Act supplies the meaning of 18. Cases construing such terms would necessarily consider this Act. Similarly, cases about contractual capacity of 18 year olds, or about the validity of marriage without parental consent, would rely on this Act as the foundational provision.

The savings provisions have also been fertile ground for interpretation. Section 6(1)(c) (construction of wills of testators who died before the appointed day), s 6(5) (distribution of pre-commencement intestate estates), and s 6(7) (vested rights) would have generated litigation in the transitional period after commencement. The question of what constitutes an "indication of a contrary intention" in an instrument would also be litigated. For example, if a trust deed provided income to a beneficiary "until he attains 25", does that indicate a contrary intention that the beneficiary is not of full capacity until 25, or is it simply a condition for payment of income? The former interpretation would mean the Act does not apply; the latter would mean the beneficiary attains full capacity at 18 but the trust defers payment.

The Act's interaction with employment law (s 6(11)) would have been the subject of industrial tribunal decisions. The question of whether a particular award term is a "condition of employment" or a "right or obligation arising from employment" would be fact-specific.

Because the Act is now decades old and the transitional period long past, most litigation would now be about the interpretation of older instruments that still operate and that use age references. Wills made before the appointed day by testators who died recently, or trusts that commenced before the appointed day but continue, could still raise issues under the Act.

The major trap for practitioners is assuming the Act automatically overrides every age reference. It does not. Section 3(2) applies only "in the absence of a definition or of an indication of a contrary intention". If a statute or instrument defines "adult" as 21, the Act does not change that. If a trust deed says "beneficiaries shall receive their share upon attaining the age of 25 years", the Act does not reduce that to 18. The Act is a default rule, not a compulsory override. Practitioners must check every relevant enactment and instrument for express age definitions or contrary indications.

A second trap is the employment carve out in s 6(11). Employers who assume that an 18 year old employee is an adult for all purposes, including wages and award conditions, may be surprised if the applicable industrial award defines "junior" or "adult" using ages above 18. The Act does not override industrial awards, orders, determinations, or apprenticeship instruments. An employee who is 18 but under 21 may still be a junior for award purposes and entitled to a lower wage. An employer who pays adult rates to an apprentice may be overpaying, but an employer who pays junior rates to an 18 year old without checking the award risks underpayment claims.

A third trap is the interaction with Commonwealth laws. The Act applies only to "laws of the State". It does not affect Commonwealth age-of-majority provisions. For example, the Social Security Act 1991 (Cth) defines "young person" and "dependent child" differently; the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) has its own definitions. An 18 year old may be an adult for State law purposes but still a child for Commonwealth purposes. Financial planners, lawyers, and social workers need to check the applicable Commonwealth legislation.

A fourth trap is testamentary capacity. Section 6(1)(a) preserves the pre-appointed-day law relating to testamentary capacity for wills made before the appointed day. If a testator made a will before the appointed day when they were 18 but under 21, the validity of that will is determined by pre-Act law. Under pre-Act law, an 18 year old might not have had capacity to make a will. The Act does not retroactively validate that will.

A fifth trap is s 6(2), which prevents a pre-commencement will from being treated as made on or after commencement merely because it is confirmed by a post-commencement codicil. This means a testator cannot inadvertently upgrade the legal regime governing their will by adding a codicil after commencement. If they want the Act's age rules to apply to their will, they must execute a new will after commencement.

A sixth trap is the trustee discretion provisions in ss 7 and 8. A trustee who pays money to an 18 year old beneficiary without considering whether doing so is prudent may face liability if the beneficiary wastes the money and other beneficiaries or remaindermen suffer loss. Conversely, a trustee who refuses to pay may face an originating summons from the beneficiary. The trustee must exercise genuine judgment and document their reasons. The section allows the trustee to withhold until age 21, but only if the trustee forms an opinion that it would not be in the beneficiary's best interests to pay earlier.

A seventh trap is the time for attaining a particular age under s 4. The Act says the person attains the age at the commencement of the relevant anniversary. This means a person born on 1 March 2005 attains 18 at midnight on 1 March 2023, not on 2 March. For a will or trust that uses the birthday as the date of vesting or payment, this rule determines when the beneficiary is entitled. A trustee who pays on 2 March instead of 1 March has not paid late, but a beneficiary who acts on 1 March thinking they have capacity is correct.

An eighth trap is the interaction with the Limitation of Actions Act 1836 and the Mercantile Law Act 1935, which are amended by s 5. The amendment is not reproduced in this Act. Practitioners must look at the current text of those Acts to see the changes. The amendment likely substituted 18 for 21 for the purposes of limitation periods and mercantile law provisions, but the precise effect depends on the text.

A ninth trap is the scope of "enactment" in s 2. It includes Imperial Acts that apply in the State. If an Imperial Act that was received into State law uses "infant" to mean under 21, the Act converts that to under 18, unless a contrary intention appears. This is a trap because practitioners may overlook Imperial Acts that have not been expressly amended.

A tenth trap is the definition of "instrument" in s 2. It includes "a document of whatever nature" that is not an enactment, Commonwealth law, or document under those laws. This is extremely broad and includes wills, trusts, deeds, contracts, powers of attorney, marriage settlements, and any other private document. The Act applies to any such document executed or made on or after the appointed day. But the Act does not apply to documents executed before the appointed day, subject to the savings provisions. The cut-off date is the execution date, not the date of effect.

Compliance with the Age of Majority Act 1973 is largely automatic for most individuals and organisations. The Act reduces the age of majority to 18, and the general law adjusts accordingly. However, for specific compliance obligations, the following steps apply.

For trustees and administrators: When a beneficiary turns 18, the trustee must determine whether to recognise the beneficiary's capacity to give directions (s 7) or to receive money (s 8). The trustee should review the trust deed, will, court order, or other governing instrument to see if it contains an express age definition or an indication of a contrary intention. If it does, the Act does not change that age. If it is silent or uses generic terms like "adult" or "full age", the Act applies and the beneficiary attains full capacity at 18. The trustee must then decide whether to pay or act on directions. If the trustee considers it imprudent or not in the beneficiary's best interests to pay or comply, they may refuse but must give written reasons. The trustee should document the reasons carefully, including any evidence of the beneficiary's financial immaturity, the amount of money involved, and the risk of dissipation. The trustee should also consider whether all beneficiaries have joined in a direction (s 7(1)(a)) and if not, may refuse on that ground alone. The trustee should be prepared for a possible originating summons from the beneficiary.

For financial institutions: When an account holder or customer turns 18, the institution should update its records to reflect that the person has full capacity. The institution should no longer require a parent or guardian to co-sign or guarantee transactions. The institution should accept receipts and discharges from the 18 year old as valid. However, if the account is held under a trust or court order with terms specifying a higher age, the institution should comply with those terms, not the Act. The institution should review its customer identification and age-verification procedures to ensure that it does not discriminate against 18 year olds by requiring them to transact through a guardian.

For employers: Employers should review industrial awards, enterprise agreements, and employment contracts that classify employees as "junior", "apprentice", or "adult" and that use the age of majority as a threshold. If the award or agreement uses 21 as the threshold for adult wages or conditions, the Act does not change that (s 6(11)). The employer must continue to apply the award or agreement terms. If the award or agreement uses "adult" without definition, the Act supplies 18. The employer should consult the industrial instrument and seek advice if there is ambiguity. Employers should also review their policies on parental consent for employment, liability for employees under 21, and insurance requirements, noting that 18 year olds are now adults for most purposes but not for industrial law purposes if the award says otherwise.

For parents and guardians: Parents should be aware that their legal authority over a child ends at 18, unless a court order or guardianship appointment specifies a different age. Parents should review any wills, trusts, or insurance policies that name them as guardians or trustees for a child. If the instrument uses "minor" or "infant" without definition, the Act ends the guardianship or trust at 18. If the instrument specifies a higher age, the parents retain authority until that age.

For drafters of wills, trusts, and contracts: When drafting documents after the appointed day, drafters should expressly state the age they intend for any age-related provision. If the drafter wants the beneficiary to have full capacity at 18, they can simply use "adult" or "full age" and rely on the Act. If the drafter wants a different age, they should state it explicitly, for example: "For the purposes of this trust, 'adult' means a person who has attained 25 years of age." This qualifies as an "indication of a contrary intention" and overrides the Act. The same applies to contracts: if the contract requires a party to be of full age, specify the age or use "18 years" to avoid ambiguity.

For courts and legal practitioners: When interpreting a statute or instrument that uses "minor", "infant", "adult", "full age", or similar terms, practitioners should first check whether the statute or instrument contains an express definition. If it does, apply that definition. If it does not, apply the Act's default of 18. Practitioners should also check whether the statute or instrument was made before or after the appointed day and whether the instrument was executed before or after the appointed day, because the Act's application to instruments made before the appointed day is limited by the savings provisions.

For government agencies: Agencies should review all legislation, regulations, policies, and forms that use age-of-majority terms. Where the term is used without definition, it now means 18. Forms that ask for parental consent or require a guardian should be updated to reflect that persons 18 and over do not need such consent. Agencies should also ensure that their service delivery to persons 18 and over is consistent with full adult capacity, including issuing licences, permits, and benefits without requiring parental authorisation.