AD/SUPP/1 Amdt 3 - Breeze Hoists

This instrument contains several discrete safety and maintenance concepts that govern hoist operation and maintenance.

• Applicability and scope. The directive states applicability explicitly: "Breeze model BL16600 hoists" (Applicability line). It notes that these hoists are used with supplementary equipment kits for Bell, Agusta Bell and Hughes helicopters, and may be used by other manufacturers. That confines the mechanical instructions to a defined equipment model, but recognises cross‑platform fitment.

• Functional safety testing. Para 1 instructs a set of mechanical and functional checks centred on the down limit switch: extend the cable fully to check operation; set the down limit switch collar end float in a small specified range (.25 mm to .38 mm); verify spring engagement and collar lock screw security; and ensure a minimum of three full turns of cable stay on the drum when the down limit switch operates (Para 1(a)-(c)). These are explicit, measurable thresholds and actions.

• Redundancy and human reliance. The document requires marking the inner 3 metres of cable in a contrasting colour and inserting an amendment to the flight manual warning pilots not to rely solely on the down limit switch, instructing cessation of cable extension when the painted cable is visible from the hoist (Para 1(d)-(e)). That creates a human‑in‑the‑loop secondary cue to stop extension.

• Operational checks and cautions. Para 2(a)-(b) lays out preflight and post‑flight checks designed to identify visible defects, verify electrical leads and limit switch function, check hook security and safety catch, and exercise the hoist through small‑range operation. The post‑flight check requires two persons and prescribes the technique for paying out to the full‑out stop, maintaining a 5-10 kg pull while reeling in to test the up limit switch, and inspecting for cable damage. Specific instructions address the risk of entrapment during operation of the hoist assembly.

• Periodic internal inspection and electrical shielding continuity. Para 2(c) directs periodic removal of the hoist top cover, inspection of visible hoist components and wiring, and specific attention to shielded electrical cables and the plug/socket hoist electrical disconnect. The directive states the shielding braid must pass electrically unbroken through the disconnect combination for adequate protection against accidental cable cuts (Para 2(c)(ii) Note). This elevates cable shielding continuity to a critical check item.

• Mechanical adjustment sensitivity. The periodic inspection notes that excessive tightening of the nuts securing the front of the top cover may change the adjustment of the full out limit switch(es). That identifies a maintenance‑induced risk: torqueing practices can alter switch settings (Para 2(c)(v) Note).

• Environmental maintenance. Where hoist operation occurs near salt water, the hoist and cable should be flushed with fresh water (Para 2(b)(v)). This prescribes a corrosion‑mitigation action.

• Compliance timetable. The document sets specific deadlines for carrying out Para 1 prior to continuing operation after 5 May 1980, preflight checks before first flight of the day, post‑flight checks after the last flight of the day in which the hoist was used, and a periodic inspection prior to 31 January 1985 and thereafter at intervals not exceeding six months (Compliance block).

These concepts combine technical measurement (clearance .25-.38 mm, three wraps, 3 metres marked), procedural human actions (two‑person post‑flight, flight manual amendment), and maintenance regime (six‑monthly inspections, internal checks, shielding continuity). The directive mixes preventative maintenance, active checks, and human cautionary procedures to reduce the risk of component failure and consequent personnel injury, noting that hoist component failures have led to injury (Background 2). The document also notes an amendment linkage to AD/SUPP/7 (Background 1), indicating that this directive operates in a broader set of supplementary directives.

The directive names the affected equipment and, by implication, identifies the parties who must act. The explicit applicability is "Breeze model BL16600 hoists" (Applicability). The note clarifies that these hoists are used with supplementary equipment kits for Bell, Agusta Bell and Hughes helicopters and may be used by other manufacturers. From those textual points, the directive affects:

• Aircraft operators and owners that have Breeze BL16600 hoists installed on helicopters, including but not limited to operators of Bell, Agusta Bell and Hughes helicopters where the hoist is part of a supplementary equipment kit. The directive applies to the installed hoist irrespective of the helicopter manufacturer where the hoist model is the Breeze BL16600.

• Pilots and flight crew who operate helicopters equipped with these hoists. Para 1(e) requires an amendment to the hoist operating procedures section of the flight manual, placing a caution in the manual relevant to flight crew: "Caution, do not rely on cable down limit switch. Cease cable extension when painted cable visible from hoist." That adds a crew action during hoist operation and is to be observed by flight crew.

• Maintenance personnel and technicians responsible for preflight, post‑flight and periodic inspections and mechanical adjustments. The directive specifies detailed inspection and test steps including internal inspection behind the hoist top cover, adjustment of the down limit switch collar clearance, inspection of springs and microswitches, replacement of defective parts, and marking the hoist with the date for the next six‑monthly inspection (Para 1; Para 2(a)-(c)). Those tasks fall to maintainers with access to the hoist assembly and the skills to adjust microswitch collars and inspect electrical shielding.

• Ground personnel and other staff involved in post‑flight checks. The post‑flight inspection requires "Two persons" and one of the two must provide a light tension on the hook and cable assembly while another operates controls (Para 2(b)). That imposes a staffing and coordination requirement on operators or maintenance teams.

• Organisations responsible for aircraft flight manuals and operating procedures. Para 1(e) requires "Add approved amendment to hoist operating procedures section of flight manual", so the organisation that produces or holds responsibility for the flight manual must incorporate the prescribed wording. The directive uses the term "approved" but does not specify the approving authority in the text.

• Safety and compliance staff within the operator who must schedule the initial and periodic inspections according to the compliance dates and six‑monthly interval requirement, and who must ensure marking of the 3 metre cable and the hoist with the next inspection date (Para 1(d); Para 2(c)(vi) and (ix)).

The directive does not name regulatory enforcement agencies, maintenance organisations, or approval authorities in the text. It does, however, impose precise actions on operators and maintenance staff, and requires an amendment to flight manuals that affects flight crew behaviour. The compliance timetable creates obligations on operators to perform the initial modification and ongoing inspections at the defined times: the initial Para 1 actions before further operation after 5 May 1980; preflight checks prior to first flight of day; post‑flight checks after last flight of day in which the hoist was used; and periodic inspection prior to 31 January 1985 and thereafter at intervals not exceeding six months (Compliance block). Those dates and intervals define the monitoring and scheduling duties of the affected parties.

Key duties flow from the numbered requirements and cautions in the directive. The text sets out affirmative maintenance and operational duties rather than enumerated rights. The main duties are:

• Perform the initial inspection, test and modification steps for all Breeze BL16600 hoists fitted with a single down limit switch, before further operation of the hoist after 5 May 1980 (Para 1 Compliance). That initial duty comprises the detailed tasks in Para 1(a)-(e): extend the cable fully to check down limit switch operation; inspect and adjust down limit switch collar clearance to maintain end float between collar and spring sleeve within .25 mm to .38 mm; ensure satisfactory engagement of the spring in the arm and collar; check the collar lock screw for security; verify that when the down limit switch operates a minimum of three full turns of cable remain on the drum; mark the 3 metres of cable nearest the drum with a clearly visible colour; and add the prescribed caution to the flight manual.

• Conduct preflight inspections prior to the first flight of the day in which the hoist will be used (Para 2(a) Compliance). Preflight duties include: check hoist date for periodic inspection due; visually inspect hoist components, wiring and electrical leads for condition and security; check cable cutter electrical leads for secure connections; cycle hoist operation paying out and reeling in approximately 1 metre of cable; check operation of full‑in limit switches; and check hook attachment and safety catch (Para 2(a)(i)-(vi)).

• Conduct a post‑flight inspection after the last flight of the day in which the hoist was used (Para 2(b) Compliance). The post‑flight inspection duties are specific: two persons must perform the check with one operating controls and the other applying light tension to prevent the hook from contacting the ground (Para 2(b) opening). Specific steps include paying out until full‑out limit switch automatically stops hoist operation while ensuring a minimum of three inactive wraps remain on the drum; visually inspect drum and flanges for defects; maintain a 5-10 kg pull while reeling in to verify up limit switch operation and inspecting cable for kinks, frays and breaks; inspect level wind; inspect visible electrical connections and accessible components; and flush hoist and cable with fresh water if operated near salt water (Para 2(b)(i)-(v)).

• Carry out periodic inspections together with the post‑flight inspection at intervals not exceeding six months, with an initial periodic inspection to be completed prior to 31 January 1985 (Para 2(c) Compliance). The periodic inspection duties include loosening and removing the hoist top cover to inspect visible components and wiring; ensure the shielding braid passes electrically unbroken through the plug/socket hoist electrical disconnect; inspect roller springs and cam roller bracket operation; manually activate each microswitch lever to verify full‑out limit switch function during reel out; replace defective switches or springs; re‑paint the 3 metre cable marking as required; and mark the hoist with the date by which the next six monthly inspection is due (Para 2(c)(i)-(ix)).

• Observe stated cautions during operation and inspection. The directive instructs personnel to exercise extreme care to prevent entrapment during hoist operation in the specified checks (Para 2 opening caution). It specifies not to exceed 10 degrees cable fleet angle and not to allow cable or hook to contact the ground during inspection (Separate Caution items).

• Replace defective parts if any switch malfunctions or a spring is defective (Para 2(c)(viii)).

Rights or implied procedural elements in the directive are limited. The text requires adding an "approved amendment" to the flight manual (Para 1(e)), which implicitly recognises an approval function but does not identify the approver or the process for approval. Similarly, while the directive requires that the hoist be "prominently mark[ed] on the hoist the date by which the next six monthly inspection is due" (Para 2(c)(ix)), it does not prescribe the format or recordkeeping beyond that marking.

The directive prescribes who must carry out tasks and when; it does not specify enforcement mechanisms, penalties, or appeal rights in the text. It does impose specific technical tolerances (.25 mm to .38 mm for collar end float), minimum physical quantities (minimum of three full turns of cable remaining on the drum), and inspection techniques (5-10 kg pull with a clean lint free cloth while depressing the up button) that bind maintenance practice to measurable standards. The procedural duties create scheduling obligations on operators and maintenance personnel to ensure adherence to preflight, post‑flight and periodic inspection windows.

The directive itself sets compliance timing and mandatory actions but does not include any express penalty provisions, enforcement authority details or sanction mechanisms in the text provided. The Compliance block specifies deadlines and intervals: actions in Para 1 must be completed before further operation of the hoist after 5 May 1980; preflight and post‑flight inspections are tied to the first and last flight of the day in which the hoist is used; and the periodic inspection must be carried out prior to 31 January 1985 and thereafter at intervals not exceeding six months. Those compliance dates and intervals create de jure obligations for operators and maintainers, but the document does not, within the supplied text, state consequences for failing to comply.

Operationally, the directive implements inspection, adjustment and marking requirements that, if not complied with, expose operators to the risk factors the directive identifies, including hoist component failure and personnel injury (Background 2). The directive also prescribes operational limits and cautions such as not exceeding a 10 degree cable fleet angle and not permitting the cable or hook to contact the ground during inspection. Failure to observe those cautions would leave the operator exposed to the operational hazards the checks are designed to address.

Because the directive requires modification of the flight manual to include a specified caution ("Caution, do not rely on cable down limit switch. Cease cable extension when painted cable visible from hoist"), non‑compliance would mean flight crew lack the mandated procedural warning. The directive does not set out inspection recordkeeping, mandatory reporting of non‑compliances, or civil or criminal penalties in the document text provided.

The document does include instructions that create de facto enforcement levers: technical tolerances and procedural checks are specified, and many items are immediate preflight and post‑flight duties. Operators must schedule and complete the stated periodic inspection at six‑monthly intervals and are required to "Prominently mark on the hoist the date by which the next six monthly inspection is due" (Para 2(c)(ix)). Those marking and scheduling duties create a traceable maintenance regime that an operator can demonstrate. However, the text supplied does not state which authority will verify compliance or what formal actions flow from demonstrable non‑compliance.

Summary: the directive prescribes mandatory technical and procedural duties with explicit timing, but the supplied text contains no explicit penalty or enforcement mechanisms, nor does it identify the approving authority for the flight manual amendment or the agency responsible for monitoring compliance.

Within the supplied text, explicit cross‑references are limited. The Background notes state that "This Directive has been amended to reflect the requirements of AD/SUPP/7" (Background 1). That indicates an interaction or incorporation of requirements arising from another supplementary directive, AD/SUPP/7, but the text does not reproduce AD/SUPP/7 or state the content of those requirements. Consequently, the only direct interaction the document discloses is that its amendment status has been influenced by AD/SUPP/7.

Operationally, the directive requires an "approved amendment to hoist operating procedures section of flight manual" (Para 1(e)). That creates an intersection with the regime governing an aircraft's flight manual and its approved operating procedures. The text uses the word "approved" but does not specify who is the approver or the approval process. Therefore, while the directive mandates amendment of the flight manual, it leaves the approval link unspecified within the text.

The directive's inspection and maintenance prescriptions interact practically with standard maintenance programmes and the aircraft's maintenance schedule. It requires marking the hoist with the date by which the next six‑monthly inspection is due (Para 2(c)(ix)), insertion of a new caution into the hoist operating procedures, and regular preflight, post‑flight and periodic checks. Those requirements will need to be integrated into an operator's existing maintenance control system and flight crew operating procedures. The directive explicitly notes attention to the hoist electrical disconnect plug/socket and the requirement that the shielding braid be electrically unbroken through that disconnect (Para 2(c)(ii) Note). That interacts with any regime governing wiring standards, electrical terminations and shielding continuity within the aircraft installation but the directive does not reference any specific wiring standard or regulation.

No mention is made of civil aviation regulation names, certification parts, airworthiness directives beyond the AD/SUPP numbering, or criminal or civil law. The text also does not cite or incorporate manufacturer service bulletins, nor does it identify responsibility under the aircraft maintenance regulations for who signs off work. The only cross‑document link is to AD/SUPP/7 as an influencing factor for amendment.

Because the supplied text is an airworthiness‑style directive, operators will typically treat it as a mandatory technical requirement to be integrated with flight manual procedures and maintenance programmes. However, the directive itself does not specify the regulatory instrument by which it is mandated, nor does it specify approval channels, enforcement agencies or harmonisation requirements with other regulatory instruments in the document text. Any additional statutory or regulatory interaction must be inferred by operators from their broader regulatory obligations; those inferences are not set out in this document.

The document is labelled AD/SUPP/1 Amdt 3. The Background section states: "This Directive has been amended to reflect the requirements of AD/SUPP/7" (Background 1). That is the only explicit amendment history information recorded in the supplied text. The "Amdt 3" label indicates this is the third amendment to AD/SUPP/1, but the body of the text does not detail the content of prior versions or the precise changes made in this amendment. The Background notes give two justifications: the change was made to reflect AD/SUPP/7, and that hoist component failures have led to personnel injury (Background 2). Emphasis was placed on circuit shielding integrity (Background 3).

The compliance times include historical dates: Para 1 compliance "Before further operation of the hoist after 5 May 1980"; the periodic inspection must be "Inspect and test prior to 31 January 1985 and thereafter at intervals not exceeding 6 months." Those dates indicate the directive was operational as at, or prior to, those calendar dates and that the document is an amendment reflecting at least one prior iteration. The text does not include a chronology of earlier text, original issue date, dates of Amdt 1 or Amdt 2, or track changes. It also does not reproduce AD/SUPP/7 text or state the date when AD/SUPP/7 was issued or its contents.

Where the amendment introduces wording new to the flight manual, it requires an "approved amendment" to the hoist operating procedures (Para 1(e)). The directive does not state whether that flight manual amendment was part of the current amendment or existed previously. There is no listing of superseded paragraphs or explicit redline material.

In sum, the supplied text provides a label (Amdt 3) and a single background explanatory statement that links this amendment to AD/SUPP/7. It does not provide a full amendment trace, dates of prior amendments, or a redline of historic changes within the body of the text. The compliance dates supplied show the intended schedule of implementation relative to past calendar dates, but they do not themselves elaborate an amendment timeline.

The supplied text contains no references to litigation, judicial decisions, administrative appeals, or enforcement actions relating to this directive. The Background records that "Hoist component failures have led to personnel injury" (Background 2), but it does not reference any legal proceedings, claims, or adjudications arising from those failures. There are no case names, no citations to tribunal or court determinations, and no mention of contested enforcement of this directive in the text provided.

Because the document is an amended safety directive labelled AD/SUPP/1 Amdt 3 and references AD/SUPP/7, it is possible that other administrative records or legal files outside this text may record disputes or enforcement history, but the directive text itself does not record any litigation history or outcomes. Users seeking information about litigated disputes, enforcement actions, or judicial interpretation would need to consult administrative records, court archives or regulatory enforcement files; those sources are not reproduced in this document.

Within the provided text there are no procedural references to appeal pathways, review mechanisms, or dispute resolution processes either. The directive mandates technical actions, operational cautions and inspection timetables, but does not include any litigation‑related clauses, such as rights of review or directions on challenging the directive.

Therefore, the directive text supplies no litigation history and contains no material that would support citing specific judicial or administrative decisions.

The directive text contains several concrete items that can be sources of non‑compliance, inadvertent misadjustment, operational error, or maintenance‑induced failure if operators do not pay attention to the precise instructions.

• Reliance on the down limit switch. The flight manual amendment mandated in Para 1(e) states explicitly: "Caution, do not rely on cable down limit switch. Cease cable extension when painted cable visible from hoist." The directive requires painting and marking the inner 3 metres of cable (Para 1(d)), and instructs crew to cease extension when that painted cable is visible. The gotcha is an operator relying solely on the down limit switch rather than observing the painted cable mark as the required secondary cue. The directive itself frames the down limit switch as insufficiently reliable to be the sole control.

• Specified clearance tolerance. Para 1(b) gives a tight clearance tolerance for the down limit switch collar end float: ".25mm to .38mm is considered satisfactory clearance". Maintenance personnel that do not measure or adjust within this band risk improper switch operation; conversely, excessive tightening of the hoist top cover nuts is noted to change full out limit switch adjustments (Para 2(c)(v) Note). The risk is two‑way: misadjustment during maintenance or cover refit can alter limit switch performance.

• Minimum wraps requirement. Both Para 1(c) and Para 2(b)(i) require that when the down/full out limit switch operates, a minimum of three full turns or three inactive wraps of cable must remain on the drum. Failure to ensure this minimum could leave insufficient wraps on the drum, affecting mechanical security of the cable.

• Two‑person post‑flight requirement. The post‑flight inspection (Para 2(b)) mandates two persons for the check, with one operating the hoist and the other providing light tension and preventing hook contact with the ground. Performing the post‑flight inspection with a single person could result in the hook contacting the ground or improper test conditions when exercising limit switches.

• Handling during inspection and risk of entrapment. The directive emphasises "Exercise extreme care to prevent hands or clothing from becoming entrapped in the mechanism when operating the hoist assembly during the following operations." The specified checks require manual intervention around moving parts, including using a clean lint free cloth between hand and cable while maintaining a 5-10 kg pull (Para 2(b)(iii)). The need to physically hold cable under tension while operating controls imposes an entrapment and injury risk unless operators strictly follow the procedures.

• Electrical shielding continuity at the hoist disconnect. Para 2(c)(ii) Note states the shielding braid must pass electrically unbroken through the disconnect combination for adequate protection against accidental cable cuts. The gotcha is at manufacture or maintenance time where the shielding braid is not electrically continuous at the plug/socket, leading to reduced protection and a risk of cable cuts or electrical exposure.

• Torque and cover removal effects. Para 2(c)(i) and (v) require loosening the four outside nuts securing the hoist top cover and caution that excessive tightening of the nuts securing the front of the top cover may change the adjustment of the full out limit switch(es). The potential maintenance‑induced error is altering switch setting by incorrect torqueing practice or by failing to note original fastener positions.

• Salt water exposure. Para 2(b)(v) instructs flushing hoist and cable with fresh water if operated near salt water. Failure to flush can leave salt deposits and increase corrosion risk, potentially leading to mechanical or electrical failure.

• Visibility and repainting of the 3 metre cable mark. Para 1(d) requires marking the three metres nearest the drum with a clearly visible colour, and Para 2(c)(vi) requires inspection of that paint marking and re‑painting as required. If the mark fades or is not visible, the flight manual caution becomes ineffective, and crew may not notice the painted cable when extending, undermining the manual cue.

• Fleet angle limit. The directive cautions not to exceed a 10 degree cable fleet angle during hoist operation. Exceeding the fleet angle can increase wear on the cable and drum, but the directive gives no measurement method; operators must ensure procedural or installation controls to keep the fleet angle within limits.

• Undefined approving authority for flight manual amendment. Para 1(e) requires "Add approved amendment to hoist operating procedures section of flight manual" but does not identify the approver. That creates an administrative ambiguity: implementers must determine the appropriate approver under their regulatory or organisational processes to insert the caution.

Each of these issues is explicit or implicit in the supplied text and represents a concrete procedural or technical risk area that operators, maintainers and flight crew must manage. The document prescribes steps to address some of these risks, but successful mitigation depends on faithful execution of the specified checks, correct adjustments, and attention to maintenance details such as shielding continuity and torque.

Compliance requires carrying out the specified initial modification and inspection, and then adopting the preflight, post‑flight and periodic inspection routines and ancillary measures exactly as described. The directive provides explicit sequencing and thresholds; follow these steps drawn directly from the text.

1. Initial inspection, test and modification (Para 1), to be completed before further operation after 5 May 1980:

   • Fully extend the hoist cable to check operation of the down limit switch (Para 1(a)).
   • Inspect and adjust the down limit switch collar so that end float between collar and spring sleeve is kept to a minimum consistent with free operation of the switch roller arm; the directive states ".25mm to .38mm is considered satisfactory clearance". Also check satisfactory engagement of the spring in the arm and the collar and check the collar lock screw for security (Para 1(b)).
   • With the cable extended until the down limit switch operates, ensure a minimum of three full turns of cable remain on the drum (Para 1(c)).
   • With the cable extended, mark the 3 metres of cable nearest the drum with a clearly visible colour, for example orange or red (Para 1(d)).
   • Add the following approved amendment to the hoist operating procedures section of the flight manual: "Caution, do not rely on cable down limit switch. Cease cable extension when painted cable visible from hoist" (Para 1(e)). Note the directive uses the term "approved amendment"; you must follow your organisation's flight manual amendment approval process to insert this wording.

2. Preflight inspection (Para 2(a)), to be completed prior to the first flight of the day in which the hoist will be used:

   • Check the date on the hoist to ensure the periodic inspection is not due (Para 2(a)(i)).
   • Visually inspect hoist components for secure mounting and check all visible wiring and electrical leads for condition and security (Para 2(a)(ii)).
   • Check cable cutter electrical leads for secure connections (Para 2(a)(iii)).
   • Check hoist operation by paying out and reeling in approximately 1 metre of cable (Para 2(a)(iv)).
   • Check operation of full‑in limit switch(es) (Para 2(a)(v)).
   • Check the hook for secure attachment to the cable and operation of the safety catch (Para 2(a)(vi)).
   • Exercise caution to prevent entrapment during these operations (Para 2 opening caution).

3. Post‑flight inspection (Para 2(b)), to be completed after the last flight of the day in which the hoist was used; requires two persons:

   • One person depresses the down button on the pendant assembly and the other walks away from the aircraft, paying out the cable until the full‑out limit switch(es) automatically stop hoist operation. Confirm at least three inactive wraps of cable remain on the drum (Para 2(b)(i)).
   • Visually inspect exposed portions of drum and drum flanges for cracks, wear, abrasion and other defects (Para 2(b)(ii)).
   • Using a clean lint‑free cloth between the hand and cable, maintain a 5-10 kg pull on the cable while depressing the up button; manually activate the up limit switch(es) while reeling in to verify operation. During reel‑in inspect the cable for kinks, bends, frayed wires, breakage or any defect; if the cable snags, stop operation and carefully inspect the cable where the snag occurred (Para 2(b)(iii)). Check level wind for proper operation. Reel cable completely in until full‑in limit switch(es) automatically stop hoist operation.
   • Inspect all visible electrical connections and accessible components for secure mounting, damage and cleanliness (Para 2(b)(iv)).
   • If hoist has been operated near salt water, flush cable and hoist with fresh water (Para 2(b)(v)).
   • Observe the caution: do not exceed 10 degrees cable fleet angle and do not allow cable or hook to contact the ground during inspection.

4. Periodic inspection (Para 2(c)), to be carried out together with the Post‑Flight Inspection, initial periodic inspection was required prior to 31 January 1985 and thereafter at intervals not exceeding 6 months:

   • Loosen the four outside nuts securing the hoist top cover and remove the cover (Para 2(c)(i)).
   • Inspect visible hoist components, electrical connections and wiring for serviceability (Para 2(c)(ii)).
   • Pay particular attention to shielded electrical cables associated with the hoist installation, especially at the plug/socket hoist electrical disconnect; ensure the shielding braid passes electrically unbroken through the disconnect for adequate protection against accidental cable cuts (Para 2(c)(ii) Note).
   • Inspect roller spring(s) to ensure engagement in switch supports and cam roller bracket; check for corrosion or damage and test spring operation by rotating the cam roller bracket up and away from the cable drum approximately 12 mm and releasing (Para 2(c)(iii)).
   • Reel the hook and cable out by operating the down switch and manually activate each microswitch lever, one at a time, to assure proper functioning of each full out limit switch during reel out; with each microswitch operation the hoist must stop (Para 2(c)(iv)).
   • Replace the hoist top cover and tighten the four nuts; do not overtighten as excessive tightening may change full out limit switch adjustment (Para 2(c)(v) and Note).
   • Reel out the entire cable following post‑flight instructions until hoist shut‑off occurs indicating limit switch operation; a minimum of three inactive wraps must remain on the drum. Inspect condition of the paint marking the last 3 metres and repaint as required (Para 2(c)(vi)).
   • Begin reeling in and during initial reeling in operation, depress each full‑in limit switch by rocking the hook bumper ring up, contacting one switch at a time to assure proper functioning; with each limit switch operation the hoist must stop. Continue reeling in until normal shut off occurs when the hook bumper contacts the switch(es) (Para 2(c)(vii) and (viii)).
   • If any switch malfunctions or a spring is defective, replace defective part(s) (Para 2(c)(viii)).
   • Prominently mark on the hoist the date by which the next six monthly inspection is due (Para 2(c)(ix)).

5. Administrative and operational integration:

   • Insert and obtain approval for the flight manual amendment as required by Para 1(e). The directive does not specify the approver; follow your organisation's or regulator's flight manual amendment processes to formalise the warning: "Caution, do not rely on cable down limit switch. Cease cable extension when painted cable visible from hoist."
   • Ensure maintenance schedules reflect the six‑monthly periodic inspection interval and initial dates in the Compliance block. Mark the hoist visibly with the next inspection due date as required in Para 2(c)(ix).
   • Train flight crew and maintenance staff on the limitations of the down limit switch and the requirement to use the painted 3 metre cable mark as a manual cue to cease extension.
   • Ensure two‑person availability for post‑flight checks when the hoist has been used that day, and provide required tools and a clean lint free cloth for the 5-10 kg pull check.
   • Verify shielding continuity at the plug/socket hoist electrical disconnect during periodic inspections and any maintenance affecting the wiring.
   • Incorporate salt water flushing procedures into post‑operation checklists where operations occur near salt water.

Following the directive verbatim ensures technical tolerances, test methods and scheduling are met. The document prescribes what to measure, how to test, and when to act; compliance consists of executing those steps and recording the inspection due date on the hoist itself as required.