CTHIn ForceLegislation
AD/SF340/100 Amdt 1 - Fuel Tank Safety - Fuel Airworthiness Limitations
//
© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
AD/SF340/100 Amdt 1 - Fuel Tank Safety - Fuel Airworthiness Limitations
Start here
Turn the raw legal text into a practical explanation grounded in AD/SF340/100 Amdt 1 - Fuel Tank Safety - Fuel Airworthiness Limitations.
?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="no"?>
AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
On the effective date specified below, and for the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below revokes Airworthiness Directive (AD) AD/SF340/100 and issues the following AD under subregulation 39.001(1) of CASR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.SAAB SF340 Series Aeroplanes
| AD/SF340/100 Amdt 1 | Fuel Tank Safety - Fuel Airworthiness Limitations | 9/2007 TX |
|---|
| Applicability: | SF340A and 340B aeroplanes. |
|---|---|
| Requirement: | 1. Maintenance/Inspection Tasks - Maintenance and inspection tasks identified in SAAB Fuel Airworthiness Limitations (FAL) Document 340 LKS 009033 dated 14 February 2006 or later EASA approved revision are to be completed as specified in the FAL document and at the intervals specified in the FAL document.<br>Defined intervals specified in the FAL document are to start with effect from the effective date of this Directive.<br>2. Critical Design Control Configuration Limitations (CDCCL) - The operator shall ensure that their internal documentation is amended to reflect the data contained within SAAB FAL Document 340 LKS 9033 or later EASA approved revision and to provide appropriate text to highlight the existence of each CDCCL. The operator’s internal procedures and documentation ensuring management of control of CDCCL shall be fully implemented.<br>Note: EASA AD 2006-0221 refers. |
| Compliance: | For Requirement 1 - Within three months after the effective date of this Directive.<br>For Requirement 2 - Before 30 August 2007. |
| This Amendment becomes effective on 30 June 2007. | |
| Background: | Subsequent to accidents involving Fuel Tank System explosions in flight (Boeing 747-131 flight TWA800) and on the ground, the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) published Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88 (SFAR88) in June 2001. SFAR 88 required a safety review of the aircraft Fuel Tank System to determine that the design meets the requirements of FAR § 25.901 and § 25.981(a) and (b).<br>A similar regulation has been recommended by the European Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) to the European National Aviation Authorities in JAA letter 04/00/02/07/03-L024 of 3 February 2003. The review was requested to be mandated by European National Airworthiness Authorities using JAR § 25.901(c), § 25.1309. |
| In August 2005 the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) published a policy statement on the process for developing instructions for maintenance and inspection of Fuel Tank System ignition source prevention (EASA D 2005/CPRO, www.easa.eu.int/home/cert_policy_statements_en.html) that also included the EASA expectations with regard to compliance times of the corrective actions on the unsafe and the not unsafe part of the harmonised design review results. On a global scale the Type certificate (TC) holders committed themselves to the EASA published compliance dates (see EASA policy statement). The EASA policy statement was revised in March 2006 resetting the date of 31 December 2005 for the unsafe related actions to 1 July 2006.<br>Fuel Airworthiness Limitations are items arising from a systems safety analysis that have been shown to have failure mode(s) associated with an ‘unsafe condition’ as defined in FAA Memo 2003-112-15 ‘SFAR 88 - Mandatory Action Decision Criteria’. These are identified in Failure Conditions for which an unacceptable probability of ignition risk could exist if specific tasks and/or practices are not performed in accordance with the manufacturers’ requirements.<br>This Directive mandates the Fuel System Airworthiness Limitations comprising maintenance/inspection tasks and critical design control configuration limitations for SF340 and 340B aeroplanes, that resulted from the design reviews and the JAA recommendation and EASA policy statement mentioned above.<br>Amendment 1 is issued to extend the compliance date due to the delayed release of a service bulletin from SAAB. |
|---|
Image unavailable in extracted text David Punshon Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
28 June 2007