AD/S-PUMA/68 Amdt 1 - Jettisonable Window Panel Seal and Cabin Trimming

This AD is built around a small set of technical and administrative concepts. The directive uses manufacturer and regulatory cross‑references as the source of technical procedure, sets a numeric clearance threshold, and defines a temporal compliance obligation.

Scope and applicability: the AD applies to specific aircraft types and delivery dates (models AS 332 C, C1, L, L1, L2, "all serial numbers, delivered before 1 September 2006"). That delivery‑date cutoff is an eligibility filter in place of serial‑number exclusions or component serial‑number lists. The AD's Amendment 1 reduces scope further by specifying that only jettisonable window panels identified as "emergency exits" are to be inspected and reworked ("Amendment 1 is issued ... which limits the applicability ... to those cabin jettisonable window panels identified as 'emergency exits' only").

Technical trigger and metric: the AD sets a specific metric to guide the remedial decision: a measured gap of less than 5 mm between the window panel seal and cabin trimming constitutes a failure that must be corrected before further flight ("If the measured clearance is less than 5 mm, before further flight, rework..."). The AD does not itself supply measurement technique or tooling; instead it directs operators to paragraph 2.B of Eurocopter AS 332 Alert Service Bulletin No. 25.01.80 Revision 1, or later EASA‑approved revisions, for the inspection and rework procedures. Thus the AD is a regulatory wrapper that makes compliance with a specified part of a manufacturer’s service bulletin mandatory.

Reference and dependency model: this AD depends on external documents. It refers to a Eurocopter Alert Service Bulletin and to an EASA Corrected AD (2006‑0340 R1). The AD requires that the procedures be followed "in accordance with paragraph 2.B of Eurocopter AS 332 Alert Service Bulletin No. 25.01.80 Revision 1, or later EASA approved revision." That conditional phrasing ties the operator’s obligations to the version of the service bulletin that is approved by EASA: the AD’s technical prescription is not self‑contained.

Compliance timing and grounding rule: the AD sets a compliance window of 375 flight hours from the effective date (27 September 2007). The AD creates an operational nexus between inspection results and flightworthiness: a failed measurement (clearance <5 mm) requires rework "before further flight". The AD therefore permits continued operation pending inspection results (since the inspection need only be completed within 375 flight hours), but mandates grounding for any individual helicopter whose affected window fails the clearance test until the rework is completed.

Safety rationale: the background expressly ties the rule to passenger evacuation capability. The AD records that EASA received a report of interference that could impede access to the seal’s "pull‑out key", which is necessary to remove the seal and jettison the window panel. The AD reproduces the safety claim: "If this clearance does not exist, the jettisoning of the window panel could be jeopardised in the event of an emergency evacuation." That safety concern is the proximate basis for the inspection metric and the remedial requirement.

Amendment logic: Amendment 1 is a scope‑narrowing response to a revision of the corresponding EASA AD. The AD’s own text records that the amendment limits the required action to panels marked "EXIT" and thereby reduces the number of panels subject to inspection and rework compared with the original requirement to inspect all jettisonable windows.

Administrative provenance and dating: the AD is dated 10/2007, effective 27 September 2007, and signed by David Villiers, Delegate of CASA, on 14 August 2007. The AD explicitly notes that it becomes effective on 27 September 2007 and that compliance is required within 375 flight hours after that date unless already accomplished.

In short, the main concepts are: an applicability filter by model and delivery date; a scope limitation to windows marked "emergency exits" (Amendment 1); a measurement‑based pass/fail criterion of 5 mm; externally maintained technical instructions (Alert Service Bulletin paragraph 2.B and EASA approvals); a time window for compliance (375 flight hours); and a grounding obligation where clearance is insufficient. The AD therefore delegates technical detail to the manufacturer/EASA documents while imposing mandatory outcomes and timelines on operators.

The AD designates a precise set of obligated parties by aircraft type and delivery date. Primary affected parties are operators and owners of Eurocopter AS 332 Super Puma helicopters of the listed models,AS 332 C, AS 332 C1, AS 332 L, AS 332 L1 and AS 332 L2,whose units were delivered before 1 September 2006 ("Applicability: Model AS 332 C, AS 332 C1, AS 332 L, AS 332 L1, and AS 332 L2 helicopters, all serial numbers, delivered before 1 September 2006."). The AD states "all serial numbers" for the listed models, but the delivery date is a gating criterion; aircraft of those models delivered on or after 1 September 2006 are outside the prescribed scope.

Maintenance organisations and maintenance personnel are functionally affected because the AD mandates inspection "in the area between the seal of the jettisonable window panel and the cabin trimming" and, where needed, rework "in accordance with paragraph 2.B of Eurocopter AS 332 Alert Service Bulletin No. 25.01.80 Revision 1, or later EASA approved revision." The technical tasks and acceptance criteria are determined by the manufacturer’s service bulletin paragraph, so organisations that provide maintenance for the affected fleet must have access to that document and any later EASA‑approved revision.

Regulatory actors and document approvers are implicated indirectly: the AD ties the acceptable method to EASA‑approved revisions of the Eurocopter Alert Service Bulletin and refers to EASA Corrected AD 2006‑0340 R1. That means the enforceable technical method is the one approved by EASA; CASA’s enforcement of the AD relies on that external approval process to validate revisions of the service bulletin.

Passengers and flight planners are indirectly affected because the AD relates to emergency evacuation capability. The AD’s safety claim is that interference could "jeopardise" jettisoning of the window panel in an evacuation; remediation therefore serves passenger safety objectives. Operators scheduling flights with affected units face operational effects because vehicles with failed clearances must be reworked "before further flight."

Less directly affected are owners, lessors, and insurers. The AD imposes maintenance obligation and potential downtime on the owner/operator. If a leased helicopter falls within the applicability window, the contractual party responsible for operational airworthiness (typically the operator) will need to discharge the inspection and rework. The AD does not discuss allocation of cost among lessors and lessees; it simply imposes the technical obligation on the operator/owner of the aircraft.

Supply‑chain parties,Eurocopter (the manufacturer) and parts suppliers,are affected in that the AD references procedures (inspection, rework) that are specified in the manufacturer’s Alert Service Bulletin and approved by EASA. Operators will need access to the service bulletin and potentially parts or modification kits to perform any required rework. The AD does not list parts or estimate time to perform the rework; it simply points to the manufacturer paragraph 2.B for that information.

Finally, the AD affects only those jettisonable windows identified as "emergency exits" due to Amendment 1. Operators of helicopters with jettisonable windows that are not labelled "EXIT" are, per the AD as amended, outside the required inspection and rework scope.

In practical terms, the parties who "pay" for inspection and rework are the operators and owners of the affected helicopters delivered before 1 September 2006. The decision‑makers as to the method of inspection and rework are constrained to follow paragraph 2.B of the referenced Eurocopter Alert Service Bulletin and any later EASA‑approved revision. The AD creates a direct compliance obligation; it does not allocate fiscal responsibility among contractual parties, nor does it provide exemptions other than the delivery‑date cutoff and the Amendment 1 scope limitation to "emergency exits".

Duties

• Identify applicability: Operators must first determine whether their helicopters fall within the AD’s scope. The AD states the applicability precisely: models AS 332 C, AS 332 C1, AS 332 L, AS 332 L1, and AS 332 L2, "all serial numbers, delivered before 1 September 2006" (Applicability). The Amendment 1 text narrows the actionable items to panels labelled as "emergency exits."

• Perform inspection per the specified procedure: The AD requires an inspection "in the area between the seal of the jettisonable window panel and the cabin trimming", and that inspection must be performed "in accordance with paragraph 2.B of Eurocopter AS 332 Alert Service Bulletin No. 25.01.80 Revision 1, or later EASA approved revision" (Requirement). The AD therefore imposes an obligation to follow the manufacturer’s specified inspection technique as approved by EASA.

• Measure the clearance and compare against the 5 mm threshold: The AD specifies a pass/fail threshold: "If the measured clearance is less than 5 mm" then action is required. Operators must measure and evaluate.

• Rework where clearance is deficient, before further flight: If the measured clearance is below 5 mm, the operator must "before further flight, rework the affected cabin jettisonable window panel and trimming to have a functional clearance all around the edge of the windows" and must do that "in accordance with paragraph 2.B of Eurocopter AS 332 Alert Service Bulletin No. 25.01.80 Revision 1, or later EASA approved revision" (Requirement). This creates a grounding requirement for any affected helicopter that fails the clearance test until rework is complete.

• Meet the compliance timeframe: Unless the technical requirements have already been accomplished, the inspection and any required rework must be performed "within 375 flight hours after 27 September 2007" (Compliance). That creates a limited compliance window during which the inspection must be scheduled and completed.

Rights and constraints (as expressed in the AD)

• Right to follow later EASA‑approved revisions: The AD explicitly allows the use of a "later EASA approved revision" of the referenced paragraph 2.B. Operators may use a subsequent EASA‑approved revision of the manufacturer’s service bulletin in lieu of Revision 1. The AD requires EASA approval of such revisions, thereby constraining permissible procedures to those approved through the EASA process.

• No automatic exemption for non‑emergency windows: Amendment 1 records that the AD's scope is limited to panels identified as "emergency exits" only. The AD therefore excludes jettisonable windows that are not so identified, but only through the Amendment 1 limitation; this is a scope decision rather than an exemption process. The AD does not provide for case‑by‑case exemptions or alternative means of compliance within its text; it simply prescribes the method in accordance with the manufacturer’s paragraph and EASA approval.

• No detailed procedural freedom: The technical method is not at the operator’s discretion; operators must follow the service bulletin paragraph specified. The AD defers to the manufacturer and EASA for the precise means of measurement and rework.

• Timing constraint/operational impact: The AD permits continued operation until the inspection is completed within the 375 flight hour window, but a failed measurement requires rework before further flight. Practically, this means an operator can continue to fly while planning the inspection, but a failing result yields immediate grounding until corrective action is performed.

• Duty to regard earlier accomplishment: The Compliance clause includes the conditional "Unless the technical requirements of this Directive are already accomplished", which means operators who have already completed the inspection and any necessary rework in conformity with the specified procedure are not required to repeat it. The AD therefore recognises prior conformity with its technical requirements.

What the AD does not state (limitations in the text)

• The AD does not specify penalties or enforcement mechanisms in its text. It mandates inspection and rework and sets time limits; it does not list fines, suspension mechanics, or administrative steps for non‑compliance within the text supplied.

• The AD does not list the specific measurement technique, allowable measurement variance, or tooling; these specifics are delegated to paragraph 2.B of the Eurocopter Alert Service Bulletin and to EASA approvals.

• The AD does not allocate financial responsibility among owners, operators and lessors; it imposes the physical and temporal duty to inspect and rework on the operator/owner.

• The AD does not specify record‑keeping or reporting procedures for compliance within its own text; it only prescribes the technical actions and the deadline.

In summary, the primary duties are the inspection per manufacturer/EASA procedure, measurement against a 5 mm clearance threshold, and mandatory rework before further flight where the threshold is not met, all to be completed within 375 flight hours after 27 September 2007 unless already done. The AD constrains operators to follow EASA‑approved versions of the manufacturer’s paragraph 2.B, and Amendment 1 limits the obligation to windows marked "emergency exits".

The text of AD/S‑PUMA/68 Amdt 1 supplied here does not set out penalties, fines, or an enforcement process. The directive prescribes mandatory technical actions (inspection and rework) with a compliance deadline and an operational requirement that any rework necessary after failing the 5 mm clearance test be done "before further flight." Beyond that, the AD text itself is silent on specific enforcement mechanics or penalty regimes.

What the AD does provide in enforceable form is a clear technical and temporal obligation: inspections in accordance with paragraph 2.B of Eurocopter AS 332 Alert Service Bulletin No. 25.01.80 Revision 1 (or later EASA‑approved revision), measurement against a 5 mm clearance threshold, rework before further flight when the measured clearance is less than 5 mm, and completion of the technical requirements within 375 flight hours after 27 September 2007 unless already accomplished. These requirements, as written, create a compliance obligation that CASA can rely on as the safety standard for the aircraft types and deliveries enumerated.

Because the AD defers technical procedure to a manufacturer service bulletin as approved by EASA, enforcement will require a regulator or inspector to confirm that the specified paragraph of the service bulletin (or an EASA‑approved later revision) was followed and that the measured clearance meets or exceeds 5 mm, or that rework was done to achieve "a functional clearance all around the edge of the windows." The AD includes a grounding rule of practical enforcement effect,if clearance is under 5 mm the aircraft must not be flown until rework is completed ("before further flight"),which gives regulators a clear criterion for taking operational enforcement action.

The AD makes no mention of the administrative process by which an operator might seek an alternative method of compliance (AMOC), nor does it state an appeals mechanism within the text supplied. It also does not set out surveillance, reporting, or documentary substantiation requirements for the inspection or the rework. The AD does explicitly permit the use of "later EASA approved revision[s]" of the service bulletin, which implies that changes to the manufacturer’s procedure authorised by EASA are acceptable without an additional CASA amendment, but the AD does not describe procedural formalities for accepting or documenting such revisions in the operator’s compliance record.

In practice (not stated in the AD text), a regulator enforcing this kind of AD would typically check maintenance records, conformity with the referenced service bulletin paragraph, and evidence of rework where necessary. However, the AD text itself does not specify documentary evidentiary standards, enforcement penalties, or processes for CASA to follow in the event of non‑compliance. The AD’s enforcement function is therefore expressed as mandatory technical actions and a deadline, leaving implementation of regulatory enforcement and any associated sanctions to the broader statutory or regulatory framework under which CASA operates, none of which are reproduced in the text provided.

To summarise: the AD imposes mandatory technical and timing obligations and a before‑flight grounding rule for failed measurements, but it does not specify in its own text penalties, a compliance reporting regime, or an AMOC/appeal process. The instrument’s enforceable content is the inspection, measurement threshold, mandatory rework where necessary, and the 375 flight‑hour compliance window.

The AD explicitly cross‑references two external regulatory and manufacturer instruments, thereby creating an interactional dependency rather than an isolated rule. First, it directs operators to follow "paragraph 2.B of Eurocopter AS 332 Alert Service Bulletin No. 25.01.80 Revision 1, or later EASA approved revision." Second, it includes the note "EASA Corrected AD 2006‑0340 R1 refers." These cross‑references mean the AD's technical obligations are to be exercised in concert with those external documents.

Interaction with manufacturer guidance: The AD does not itself contain the detailed inspection procedures or the rework method; it requires compliance with the manufacturer’s specific paragraph. The practical effect is that the AD elevates the manufacturer’s paragraph 2.B into a regulatory requirement, but only to the extent that that paragraph has been approved by EASA. Thus the AD interacts with manufacturer guidance by making that guidance mandatory and enforceable for the specified operators, and by requiring operators to use the version of the guidance that has EASA approval.

Interaction with EASA decisions and approvals: The AD conditions acceptable revisions on EASA approval ("or later EASA approved revision"). That makes the AD reliant on EASA’s approval process: a later Eurocopter revision will be acceptable only if EASA has approved it. The AD also explicitly refers to an EASA Corrected AD (2006‑0340 R1), thereby establishing a conformity pathway with EASA’s airworthiness directives. The AD therefore creates a regulatory chain: CASA’s mandatory directive operates in alignment with EASA’s ADs and approved service bulletin revisions.

Interaction with national airworthiness requirements: The AD does not itself quote broader civil aviation legislation, maintenance record obligations, or penalties, but as an AD issued by CASA it sits within the national airworthiness regime. Although the supplied text does not reproduce the broader law, the AD’s requirements (inspection, rework, timeframe) are intended to be applied within the operator’s national compliance obligations. The AD’s silence on enforcement mechanisms and record‑keeping does not remove the operator’s obligation to ensure airworthiness; rather, it delegates the technical steps that must be taken for these aircraft types.

Interaction with operational status and flight rules: The AD creates an operational constraint: where measured clearance is under 5 mm, the aircraft must be reworked "before further flight." This interacts with operational rules for fitness to fly: an aircraft with an affected window that fails the clearance measurement is precluded from continued flight until remedied. The AD does not define relief mechanisms for temporary operations or special flight permits; any such mechanisms would need to be sought through the applicable regulatory regime, which is not set out in the AD text.

Interaction with contractual relationships (leases, warranties): The AD does not discuss contracts, allocation of costs, warranty claims or indemnities. It imposes a technical duty on the operator/owner. In practice, the AD will affect contractual arrangements because it imposes maintenance tasks that may require downtime and parts, but those contract interactions are outside the explicit text of the AD.

In essence, the AD interacts directly with the manufacturer’s technical guidance (Eurocopter Alert Service Bulletin paragraph 2.B) and with EASA ADs and approvals. It operates within the framework of national airworthiness regulation (CASA), but the document does not itself restate or reproduce other laws, enforcement rules, or contractual effects. The AD therefore acts as an enforceable node that connects the owner/operator to EASA‑approved manufacturer instructions and to CASA’s national airworthiness mandate.

The document provided is Amendment 1 (Amdt 1) to AD/S‑PUMA/68 and carries the date 10/2007. The AD text contains an explicit note explaining the reason for Amendment 1: "Amendment 1 is issued in response to a revision of the related EASA AD, which limits the applicability of the required inspection and rework to those cabin jettisonable window panels identified as 'emergency exits' only." That is the only amendment detail provided in the text.

From the supplied material the amendment history can be summarised as follows:

• Original AD context: There was an earlier AD (AD/S‑PUMA/68) requiring inspection and rework of jettisonable window panels. The supplied text does not reproduce the original AD's full content, but Amendment 1 modifies the existing AD rather than creating an entirely new directive.

• Amendment 1 content: The amendment narrows the scope of the inspection and rework to cabin jettisonable window panels that are specifically identified as "emergency exits." The AD states that Amendment 1 was issued "in response to a revision of the related EASA AD", implying that EASA revised its own AD and CASA's amendment matches that revision by narrowing applicability.

• Effective date and signature: Amendment 1 is dated 10/2007 and the AD text records that "This Amendment becomes effective on 27 September 2007." The AD is signed by David Villiers, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, 14 August 2007. The compliance timeframe is counted from the effective date (27 September 2007), with inspections to be completed "within 375 flight hours after 27 September 2007" unless already accomplished.

• Reference to EASA Corrected AD: The AD text includes a "Note: EASA Corrected AD 2006‑0340 R1 refers." This indicates that the Amendment 1 reflects changes at the EASA level (including a corrected EASA AD) and that the CASA amendment is responsive to EASA’s revision.

The supplied text contains no other amendment records, no earlier or later amendments, and no history of serial minor edits. It does not include the original AD/S‑PUMA/68 text before amendment, nor does it list versions beyond Amdt 1. The amendment narrative is concise: CASA limited applicability by issuing Amendment 1 in response to EASA’s revision, effective 27 September 2007.

Absent in the text: the AD does not provide a chronological list of prior amendments, nor does it describe a process for future amendments, nor does it include redline changes. It does not record any commentary or regulatory impact statements associated with the amendment. The only explicit amendment history element contained in the document supplied is that Amdt 1 restricts applicability to jettisonable windows marked "emergency exits", and that this was done in response to a related EASA AD revision and EASA Corrected AD 2006‑0340 R1.

The supplied text contains no litigation history. It does not name any judicial proceedings, disputes, appeals, or legal challenges concerning AD/S‑PUMA/68 or Amendment 1. There are no references to court orders, injunctions, administrative appeals, enforcement proceedings, or case citations in the document provided.

The AD does contain references to EASA documents and to the Eurocopter Alert Service Bulletin, but it does not record any contestation of those documents, nor any legal disputes arising from them. The only administrative provenance recorded is the signed certification by David Villiers, Delegate of CASA, with a date of signature (14 August 2007), and an effective date for the amendment (27 September 2007).

In the absence of litigation material in the supplied instrument, a user focused on litigation would need to seek external sources,court records, regulator enforcement logs, or industry bulletins,to determine whether the AD gave rise to enforcement actions, compliance disputes, or challenges. The AD text itself contains no litigation references or history.

Because the instruction set for this deep dive is to base claims only on the supplied source, this section states the plain fact that the AD text includes no litigation history and provides no information about any disputes or judicial or administrative proceedings relating to this AD.

The AD’s brevity and reliance on external documents create several practical points where operators, maintenance organisations, and compliance advisers can misstep. Here are the concrete pitfalls, grounded in the AD text.

1. Applicability is delivery‑date specific, not only model‑based. The AD applies to the listed models "delivered before 1 September 2006". It therefore excludes identical airframes delivered on or after that date. Operators should not assume that identical model numbers automatically trigger action; the delivery date is an express gating criterion. This is explicit in the Applicability clause.

2. Amendment 1 narrows scope to panels marked "emergency exits" only. The AD’s Amendment 1 text states that the required inspection and rework are limited to "those cabin jettisonable window panels identified as 'emergency exits' only." A common mistake would be to inspect every jettisonable window rather than only those labelled "EXIT". Operators must verify the marking before applying the inspection requirements.

3. The AD does not provide inspection technique or rework instructions in full; it delegates them to paragraph 2.B of a manufacturer’s Alert Service Bulletin and to EASA‑approved revisions thereof. The AD requires compliance "in accordance with paragraph 2.B of Eurocopter AS 332 Alert Service Bulletin No. 25.01.80 Revision 1, or later EASA approved revision." If an operator does not possess or cannot access that specific paragraph or an EASA‑approved later revision, they cannot demonstrate compliance as required by the AD. The AD’s technical content is therefore not self‑contained.

4. The 5 mm threshold is a strict numerical trigger but the AD does not include measurement tolerances or permitted measurement tools. The AD says "If the measured clearance is less than 5 mm... rework... before further flight." It does not define measurement method, instrument calibration, or measurement points; those details are in the referenced paragraph 2.B. Operators who measure incorrectly or at the wrong point risk non‑compliance or unnecessary rework.

5. Rework must be completed "before further flight" when clearance is deficient. This creates an operational grounding requirement for affected aircraft. Operators should not presume a temporary operational dispensation; if a window measures less than 5 mm, the AD requires rework "before further flight." That practical consequence may require scheduling maintenance and could cause out‑of‑service time.

6. Compliance window expressed in flight hours: the AD requires accomplishment "within 375 flight hours after 27 September 2007." Operators must interpret "flight hours" in their maintenance planning correctly. Because the AD uses flight hours rather than calendar days, an operator with high utilisation may reach the deadline sooner than one who uses calendar scheduling. Failure to track flight hours precisely risks late compliance.

7. Prior accomplishment clause: "Unless the technical requirements of this Directive are already accomplished" means that prior inspections/reworks performed in line with the AD’s requirements are recognised. However, the AD does not state how operators must evidence prior accomplishment; without documentary proof aligned to the referenced paragraph 2.B, a regulator may not accept an assertion of prior compliance.

8. Reliance on EASA approvals: the AD permits "later EASA approved revision[s]" of the manufacturer’s paragraph to be used. This introduces dependency risk: if Eurocopter issues a revised paragraph that is not yet EASA‑approved, operators cannot rely on that revision until EASA approval is granted. Similarly, if EASA issues a corrected AD (as referenced), the acceptable method may change over time. Operators need to ensure they use the EASA‑approved revision version.

9. Ambiguity about parts and scope of "rework": the AD requires rework "to have a functional clearance all around the edge of the windows", but it does not specify replacement parts, modification kits, or the extent of structural work. Paragraph 2.B is the locus for that detail. Operators should not assume that rework is limited to simple trimming; the manufacturer’s procedure may call for more extensive work.

10. No procedural text on documentation or reporting: the AD does not itself require a report to CASA or EASA after compliance, nor does it specify maintenance log entries. Operators must be cautious in assuming that no documentation is necessary; while the AD is silent, enforcement will generally be satisfied by demonstrable maintenance records aligned to the service bulletin procedure. The AD text itself, however, does not set this out.

11. Misreading the note: The AD includes a note: "EASA Corrected AD 2006‑0340 R1 refers." This is a reference rather than an instruction. Operators should not mistake it for an additional requirement; rather it points to related EASA material relevant to the issue and to why the Amendment limited scope.

12. Timing of Amendment vs. signature: The AD is signed on 14 August 2007 but becomes effective 27 September 2007. Compliance timing starts from the effective date. Operators must plan based on the effective date (27 September 2007). Applying the deadline from the signature date would be a calendar miscalculation.

In short, the gotchas arise from the AD’s delegation of technical detail to an external service bulletin and EASA approvals, the delivery‑date gating, the scope limitation to "emergency exits", the strict 5 mm trigger with no measurement method inside the AD, the grounding requirement when clearance is deficient, and the flight‑hour compliance metric. Each of these is a concrete mechanism embedded in the AD text; failure to track them precisely can produce non‑compliance or unnecessary operational disruption.

The AD’s text prescribes a limited, specific set of actions. The following is an operator‑oriented, step‑by‑step compliance checklist strictly grounded in the AD text and the way the AD references external material.

1. Confirm applicability:

   • Verify whether your helicopter is one of the listed models: AS 332 C, AS 332 C1, AS 332 L, AS 332 L1, or AS 332 L2.
   • Confirm the delivery date of each airframe. The AD applies only to aircraft "delivered before 1 September 2006." If delivery occurred on or after that date, the AD, as amended, does not apply to that airframe.

2. Identify affected panels:

   • Locate cabin jettisonable window panels and identify which are labelled as "emergency exits" (i.e. those panels with an EXIT marking around the window). Amendment 1 limits the inspection/rework requirement to panels "identified as 'emergency exits' only."

3. Obtain governing technical procedure:

   • Obtain Eurocopter AS 332 Alert Service Bulletin No. 25.01.80 Revision 1. The AD requires inspection and rework "in accordance with paragraph 2.B" of that document.
   • Check whether a later revision of the Alert Service Bulletin exists and whether it is EASA‑approved. The AD permits the use of "later EASA approved revision[s]" of the specified paragraph. Use only the version that is EASA‑approved.

4. Schedule inspection within the compliance window:

   • The AD requires completion "within 375 flight hours after 27 September 2007" unless the technical requirements are already accomplished. Calculate 375 flight hours from the effective date and schedule the inspection within that window. Ensure you track flight hours accurately against that deadline.

5. Perform the inspection exactly as specified:

   • Conduct the inspection "in the area between the seal of the jettisonable window panel and the cabin trimming" in accordance with paragraph 2.B of the referenced service bulletin. Follow the measurement method, points and tooling described in that paragraph.
   • Measure the clearance around the window seal as specified. The AD sets the pass/fail threshold at 5 mm: "If the measured clearance is less than 5 mm" remediation is required.

6. If clearance is adequate:

   • If the measured clearance is 5 mm or more at all required points, the AD does not require rework. The AD recognises prior accomplishment; if inspection has already been done to the same standard no further action is required.

7. If clearance is less than 5 mm:

   • The AD demands rework "before further flight." Do not operate the helicopter with an affected window that fails the clearance test.
   • Perform the rework "in accordance with paragraph 2.B of Eurocopter AS 332 Alert Service Bulletin No. 25.01.80 Revision 1, or later EASA approved revision." Use the EASA‑approved procedures specified there to achieve "a functional clearance all around the edge of the windows."

8. Verify post‑rework acceptance:

   • Re‑measure the clearance after rework per paragraph 2.B to verify that the functional clearance has been achieved all around the edge of the window.
   • Only return the helicopter to service if the post‑rework measurement satisfies the criteria specified in paragraph 2.B and meets the AD’s 5 mm threshold (or the acceptance criteria specified in the EASA‑approved revision).

9. Retain evidence of compliance:

   • The AD text does not specify documentation steps, but the AD includes a condition recognising prior accomplishment. Practically, to demonstrate compliance you will need to retain copies of the service bulletin paragraph used, records of the inspection results with measurements, and records of any rework carried out in accordance with the referenced paragraph (including date, personnel, and work order references). Keep these documents available for inspection by CASA or other relevant authorities.

10. Use EASA‑approved revisions where applicable:

    • If you plan to rely on a later revision of the Eurocopter Alert Service Bulletin paragraph 2.B, ensure that revision is EASA‑approved before using it to satisfy the AD requirement. The AD allows "later EASA approved revision[s]" but otherwise binds operators to the EASA‑approved version.

11. Coordinate with maintenance providers and parts suppliers:

    • Because the AD defers technical instructions to paragraph 2.B, ensure maintenance staff have access to that paragraph and any needed parts or tooling to perform rework as specified. If rework requires components or kits described in the service bulletin, ensure availability before scheduling.

12. Consider operational planning for grounding risk:

    • Because an affected helicopter failing the clearance test must be reworked "before further flight," plan maintenance scheduling to mitigate operational disruption. If multiple aircraft are in a fleet, stagger inspections where possible to preserve operational capability.

13. Note related documents:

    • The AD includes the note "EASA Corrected AD 2006‑0340 R1 refers." Review that EASA document for context and to ensure that your interpretation of the scope and method aligns with the related EASA AD.

14. Seek clarification if necessary:

    • If paragraph 2.B of the service bulletin is ambiguous, or if you require an alternative method of compliance, the AD text does not provide a mechanism for an AMOC. In that case, seek guidance from CASA or the EASA‑approved channels referenced. The AD states that later EASA‑approved revisions are acceptable; otherwise, the AD prescribes strict adherence to the referenced paragraph.

In short, compliance reduces to: (a) confirm your helicopter is in scope by model and delivery date, (b) identify EXIT‑marked jettisonable windows, (c) obtain and follow paragraph 2.B of Eurocopter AS 332 Alert Service Bulletin No. 25.01.80 Rev 1 or a later EASA‑approved revision, (d) measure the clearance, (e) where clearance is less than 5 mm, rework per paragraph 2.B before further flight, and (f) complete the technical requirements within 375 flight hours after 27 September 2007 unless already done. The AD ties compliance to specified technical documentation and an explicit numerical threshold; following that sequence is the straightforward path to compliance with the instrument as written.