AD/S-PUMA/65 - Main Servo-Control Attachment Bolts

The AD rests on three technical concepts and two documentary cross-references. The technical concepts are: torque and condition inspection; a quantitative discard criterion for wear (0.05 mm differential wear between specified areas); and age/usage gating of inspection timing (the 500 operating hours threshold and the 15 flying hour window). The documentary cross-references are: EUROCOPTER ASB No. 67.00.36 paragraph 2.B (and paragraph 2.B.2 for spares) and any later DGAC approved revisions of that ASB; and EASA AD 2006-0306-E as a related foreign regulator reference.

Torque and condition inspection: Requirement 1 invokes a torque and condition check of three specific bolts that attach the main servo-controls to the non-rotating swash-plate. The AD does not itself prescribe the torque value or the specific inspection technique; rather, it directs compliance "in accordance with paragraph 2.B of the EUROCOPTER Alert Service Bulletin No. 67.00.36 or later DGAC approved revisions." That designates the ASB paragraph as the source of the technical methodology and acceptance criteria, other than the 0.05 mm wear criterion and the crack outcome which are stated directly in the AD.

Quantitative discard criterion: The AD supplies a single measurable discard threshold: "if there is a crack in the bolts or if the differential wear on the diameter of the bolts, between the areas defined in paragraph 2.B of EUROCOPTER ASB No. 67.00.36, is more than 0.05 mm, scrap the bolts." That is the only numeric tolerance given in the AD text. The measurement must be made between areas that the ASB defines, but the AD establishes the 0.05 mm threshold as determinative of mandatory scrapping.

Usage gating and timing: The AD distinguishes older/used bolts by reference to logged operating hours. Bolts that have logged 500 operating hours or more must have the inspection completed within 15 flying hours. The AD also sets an immediate, pre-flight requirement tied to discovery of defects: if the bolt is cracked or the wear exceeds 0.05 mm, it must be scrapped before further flight after the AD’s effective date. For spares with logged hours, compliance with paragraph 2.B.2 of the ASB is mandated before installation. These time elements create both a scheduled-window obligation and an immediate action obligation.

Documentary cross-reference risk: The AD does not reproduce the full inspection instructions. It compels adherence to Eurocopter ASB paragraph 2.B and allows later DGAC approved revisions to satisfy the requirement. This makes the ASB and any later DGAC-approved changes integral to compliance. The AD also notes the EASA AD reference, situating the Australian requirement within a network of manufacturer and foreign regulator documentation.

Risk basis: The AD’s Background states the immediate safety justification: an attachment bolt failure on the main rotor servo-control was observed, and the AD asserts that failure of the servo-control/swash-plate attachment in flight will lead to a catastrophic situation. The AD therefore prescribes preventive inspection and disposal to prevent recurrence.

Delegated decision points: The AD identifies multiple decision sources outside the AD text itself. Eurocopter provides the ASB procedures; the French DGAC (Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile) is the approving authority for revisions referenced by the AD; and EASA AD 2006-0306-E is a related regulatory document. The AD itself is issued by a CASA delegate, but the substantive inspection method and certain definitional matters come from the Eurocopter ASB and DGAC approvals.

The AD applies to owners, operators, maintenance organisations and maintenance personnel responsible for Eurocopter AS 332 C, C1, L, L1 and L2 helicopters, as expressly stated under "Applicability". The directive targets three specific attachment bolts: those that attach the main servo-controls to the non-rotating swash-plate. Practically, the affected parties will include helicopter operators (commercial, private, government, emergency services) that operate the named AS 332 variants; aircraft maintenance organisations contracted to perform inspections and replacements; supply-chain actors that provide spare bolts; and fleet maintenance planners responsible for airworthiness compliance.

Operators: The AD imposes tasks that operators must ensure are carried out on aircraft in their custody. The obligations include determining which bolts have logged operating hours of 500 or greater, scheduling the checks within the required 15 flying hour window, and ensuring that any cracked or over-worn bolts are scrapped prior to further flight. The AD also requires that spares with logged operating hours be inspected per ASB paragraph 2.B.2 before installation, which shifts an explicit pre-installation duty onto whoever installs or certifies installations.

Maintenance organisations and technicians: The AD mandates inspection and measurement procedures "in accordance with paragraph 2.B" of the ASB, which operationally imports the ASB's procedural steps into the applicable maintenance task list. Technicians must be able to perform the torque checks, measure wear to a 0.05 mm tolerance where applicable, identify cracks, and follow torque reapplication steps where required by the ASB. The AD does not itself supply the torque values, measurement techniques, or allowable tooling tolerances, so maintainers must obtain ASB No. 67.00.36 (or later DGAC approved revisions) to know the precise methods to use.

Supply and spares managers: The AD explicitly addresses spares that have logged operating hours. Spares that are on hand but have logged hours must be treated under paragraph 2.B.2 of the ASB before being fitted. This requires traceability of operating hours for spare parts, and a decision chain about the acceptability of spares for installation. If spares cannot be shown to meet the ASB requirements they must be scrapped, implying procurement and inventory costs for operators.

Fleet planners and schedulers: The 15 flying hour inspection window for bolts with 500 or more operating hours creates a short notice inspection demand across affected fleets. Operators with multiple AS 332 helicopters must manage phased inspections to avoid concurrent downtime across aircraft relied upon for operations. The requirement for immediate scrapping before further flight if defects are found adds a potential for unexpected aircraft grounding and consequent operational disruptions.

Regulatory and approval entities: The AD grants regulatory weight to EUROCOPTER ASB No. 67.00.36 and any later DGAC approved revisions. That means DGAC decisions about revision approvals influence Australian compliance obligations. The AD also references an EASA AD; operators who operate across jurisdictions will need to reconcile the Australian AD with any ongoing EASA or DGAC actions.

Who pays: The document does not state who bears costs; the practical effect is that operators and their maintenance providers will incur direct costs for inspections, measurements, replacement bolts and scrapping of parts, and indirect costs from aircraft downtime. The AD does not provide for financial assistance or replacement parts supply; the source text contains no allocation of costs.

Duties established by the AD are explicit, limited and process-oriented. Rights, as such, are not enumerated in the text; rather, the AD prescribes technical duties and reference obligations. The operative duties are set out in the AD’s "Requirement" and "Compliance" blocks and are summarised as follows.

Duty to inspect: Requirement 1 directs that the torque and condition of the three bolts attaching the main servo-controls to the non-rotating swash-plate be checked "in accordance with paragraph 2.B" of EUROCOPTER ASB No. 67.00.36 or later DGAC approved revisions. Compliance timing for this duty is specified in the AD’s compliance table: "On attachment bolts having logged 500 operating hours or more, within 15 flying hours." The duty therefore applies only to those bolts that have reached or exceeded the 500 operating hours threshold. The text does not create a periodic inspection beyond that, nor does it require an initial inspection for bolts under 500 hours.

Duty to scrap defective bolts: Requirement 2 prescribes mandatory scrapping where a crack is present or where differential wear on the bolt's diameter, measured between areas defined in paragraph 2.B of the ASB, exceeds 0.05 mm. The adjacent compliance entry mandates "Before further flight after the effective date of this AD." That creates an immediate operational duty: any bolt found to meet the scrap criteria must not be retained for further flight operations after the AD is effective.

Duty regarding spares: Requirement 3 addresses bolts held as spares that have logged operating hours. The AD instructs that such spares must comply with the instructions in paragraph 2.B.2 of the ASB or later DGAC-approved revisions prior to installation on a helicopter. The compliance table states: "Before installation on a helicopter." Thus the duty is a pre-installation obligation for spares with logged hours.

Duty to follow referenced documents: The AD makes compliance contingent upon following paragraph 2.B (and 2.B.2 for spares) of the Eurocopter ASB No. 67.00.36 and any later DGAC approved revisions. So the AD effectively requires operators and maintainers to obtain and apply those external, referenced standards. The AD’s note that "EASA AD 2006-0306-E dated 10 October 2006 refers" also imposes an informational duty to be alert to related regulatory materials.

Rights and prescriptive limits in the AD text: The AD itself does not articulate procedural rights such as review, appeal, or deferral mechanisms, nor does it grant explicit exemptions or alternative compliance methods within the text provided. It does, however, incorporate the possibility of following "later DGAC approved revisions" of the ASB, which creates a limited, document-based pathway to updated technical instructions. The AD does not confer authority to deviate from the ASB methods absent DGAC-approved revisions being applied. The AD does not outline any auditable paperwork obligations, variances, or record retention requirements in its text.

Roles and responsibilities within maintenance: The AD assigns technical responsibilities to whoever is performing the inspection and installation tasks. It does not identify aircraft certifying staff roles or specify who within an organisation must sign off compliance. The lack of explicit sign-off or recordkeeping instructions in the AD text means that how compliance is evidenced will fall to the operator’s normal regulatory practices or to broader aviation safety law and standards outside the text. The AD, from its own content, focuses exclusively on the technical action and timing.

Delegation and external decision-making: The AD vests technical method selection to the Eurocopter ASB and DGAC approvals. That places a practical duty on operators and maintainers to follow those external documents, but those external documents determine detailed technical rights (for example, whether certain non-destructive inspection (NDI) techniques are acceptable) and the AD defers to their content.

The AD text as provided does not specify penalties, civil sanctions, or criminal consequences for non-compliance. The directive sets out mandatory technical requirements and compliance deadlines but contains no enforcement or penalty section within the document supplied. The AD does record its effective date, 17 October 2006, and is signed by James Coyne, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, which indicates the issuing authority. The source text does not reproduce the legislative or regulatory enforcement mechanics that might exist elsewhere under Australian aviation law, nor does it state how the AD will be policed, audited, or how contraventions will be treated administratively.

Because the AD does not set out enforcement provisions, readers of this directive must infer that its status as an Airworthiness Directive carries regulatory force under the broader statutory framework that empowers CASA to issue ADs. That inference is not contained in the text itself. The AD does not specify inspection, reporting, notification or certification steps to demonstrate compliance to the regulator, and it gives no timeline for any reporting obligations. There is no explicit mention of mandatory notification to CASA on completion of inspections, nor is there any requirement in the AD text to retain documentation or to present evidence to CASA on demand.

The AD also does not identify the enforcement instrument or mechanism for oversight of compliance, for example whether compliance will be enforced by airworthiness inspectors, through operator audits, or via routine maintenance release checks. There is no administrative penalty schedule, civil fine, or criminal provision reproduced in the AD text. Similarly, the AD does not state whether failure to comply will result in grounding of aircraft by the regulator or what remedial steps CASA might take.

The AD does, however, include an effective date and specific pre-flight compliance requirements that create immediate safety-critical obligations. The lack of explicit enforcement detail in the text increases operational reliance on operators' internal compliance systems and on any separate statutory enforcement regime outside this document. The AD’s absence of enforcement language also means that its practical legal effect for any enforcement action would have to be established by reference to the legal powers of the issuing authority beyond the text supplied.

The AD itself is a technical, safety-prescriptive instrument that explicitly incorporates external technical documentation and references foreign regulator instruments. The AD requires that the Eurocopter ASB No. 67.00.36 paragraph 2.B (and paragraph 2.B.2 for spares) be followed, and it allows later DGAC approved revisions of the ASB to substitute for the original. It also records that EASA AD 2006-0306-E dated 10 October 2006 refers. These references create direct cross-document dependencies: satisfying this AD requires access to, and reliance upon, EUROCOPTER’s ASB and the DGAC’s manner of approving ASB revisions, and awareness of any EASA ADs that are referenced.

Interoperability with manufacturer documentation: The AD makes the manufacturer's ASB the method-defining document. That means the AD’s substantive technical content is implemented by following a manufacturer document, as modified and approved by an external regulator. In practice, this creates a chain: the AD asserts that compliance is achieved by following the ASB paragraph 2.B or later DGAC approved revisions. Thus, the technical definitions, measurement points and inspection steps are not contained in the AD but incorporated by reference, and the DGAC has approval authority over later ASB revisions that the AD accepts as compliant.

Interplay with foreign regulatory instruments: The explicit note that "EASA AD 2006-0306-E dated 10 October 2006 refers" positions this Australian AD within a cluster of European regulatory action. The AD therefore acknowledges related action by EASA while making Australian compliance conditional on the referenced ASB and DGAC approvals, rather than importing EASA’s content. Operators who operate internationally or who are subject to multiple regulators will need to reconcile the Australian AD with applicable EASA or DGAC instruments, but the AD text does not resolve conflicts or give priority rules; it merely references the foreign documents.

Absence of explicit cross-reference to domestic legislation: The AD does not reproduce or cite the enabling statutory provision under which CASA issues ADs, nor does it cite the Civil Aviation Act or Civil Aviation Safety Regulations within this text. As a result, the AD stands as a technical direction with no in-text explanation of its statutory basis. Any interaction with the broader Australian legal framework, including enforcement, delegation, appeals, or interaction with operator certification requirements, must be sourced to other regulatory texts or statutes outside the AD.

Reliance on external approval: Where the AD permits "later DGAC approved revisions" of the ASB to be followed, it creates a mechanism by which the technical content of the AD can be updated indirectly through the DGAC’s approval process for ASB revisions. The AD therefore intersects with DGAC processes and decisions, so that compliance obligations in Australia will track DGAC-approved changes to the manufacturer’s ASB insofar as they are captured by this AD’s allowance. The AD does not provide for Australian-specific revision approvals; it delegates the revision-approval function to DGAC approvals for the ASB.

Interaction with operational documentation and maintenance releases: The AD requires actions that will be reflected in maintenance records and releases to service. The AD itself does not include wording on maintenance release processes, sign-off criteria, or record retention. Those operational continuities will therefore need to be met by following standard maintenance and regulatory practices, but those practices are not stated in the AD text. In short, the AD is a focused technical directive that creates obligations by reference to manufacturer and foreign regulator documentation, yet it does not recite the broader legal or administrative framework that governs how those obligations are evidenced, enforced or appealed.

The AD text provided does not contain an internal amendment history. The header identifies the AD as AD/S-PUMA/65, dated "12/2006 TX" and the body records an effective date: "This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 17 October 2006." There is no record in the supplied text of prior versions, superseding ADs, or subsequent Australian amendments. The AD does, however, permit the use of "later DGAC approved revisions" of EUROCOPTER ASB No. 67.00.36, which functions as an indirect mechanism for technical updates affecting how the AD’s requirements can be met.

The absence of an explicit amendment log in the document means the AD, as supplied, should be treated as a single-version instrument with a single effective date. Any changes to the technical procedures that an operator may follow to comply are anticipated to come via DGAC-approved ASB revisions rather than via this AD itself being redrafted. In other words, the AD expects that future changes to the Eurocopter ASB that are DGAC-approved will be acceptable compliance methods without the AD itself being reissued; this is an embedded, permissive linkage to external updates.

The AD also references EASA AD 2006-0306-E dated 10 October 2006 as a related document. The presence of that reference suggests contemporaneous action in Europe, but does not represent an amendment to the Australian AD. If EASA or DGAC were later to change their ADs or ASB approvals, those changes could alter available compliance paths, but the supplied AD text does not document or record any such subsequent amendment events.

Finally, the AD contains no version control identifiers beyond its title block and date. It is signed by James Coyne, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, on 12 October 2006, which provides the issuer and timestamp for this instance. Operators and maintainers relying on the AD should therefore confirm whether any later Australian ADs, amendments, or explanatory documents were issued after this text; the AD as provided contains no such amendment record.

The AD text contains no litigation references, case mentions, or dispute decisions. The document's background cites a technical failure event (the failure of an attachment bolt securing the main rotor right hand servo-control to the non-rotating swash-plate) as the factual basis for the AD, and it characterises the potential outcome of such a failure as "catastrophic". The AD does not reference any court decisions, administrative appeals, or other adjudicative history that would indicate contestation of the AD’s issuance or interpretation.

Because no litigation history is included in the AD text, users cannot rely on any judicial interpretation or precedent being recorded within the instrument itself. Any legal questions about the AD's enforceability, its interaction with broader statutory obligations, or disputes about compliance would have to be resolved under the broader legal framework and by reference to external jurisprudence not contained in this document. The AD does not provide a record of challenges, nor does it record any determinations about the AD’s scope or effect by tribunals or courts.

Where parties require legal certainty about the meaning of particular terms (for example, how to interpret "logged operating hours", the precise measurement methodology for the "differential wear on the diameter" or the measurement points "defined in paragraph 2.B of EUROCOPTER ASB No. 67.00.36"), the AD itself delegates those technical definitions to the ASB and its DGAC-approved revisions. Any litigation arising from disputes over measurement technique or compliance timing would likely interrogate the ASB content and the operator's adherence to it. The AD does not supply adjudicatory guidance or dispute resolution pathways, and it contains no prior litigation record to help interpret the AD’s requirements.

In short, the supplied AD is a technical directive without any embedded record of litigation, appeals or legal contests. Any legal disputes about the AD’s interpretation or enforcement would therefore need to be traced to other legal materials and adjudicative records outside this document.

This AD contains a number of operationally significant details and potential traps for the unwary, many of which arise from its concise drafting and reliance on external documents.

1. Reliance on external ASB paragraph 2.B for procedural detail: The AD mandates checks "in accordance with paragraph 2.B" of EUROCOPTER ASB No. 67.00.36 (and for spares, paragraph 2.B.2). The AD does not replicate the ASB content. Operators must acquire and follow the exact ASB paragraphs and also be aware that the AD permits "later DGAC approved revisions" of that ASB to be followed. The practical effect is that the operator must determine which ASB version or DGAC-approved revision applies and ensure technicians use the correct, current procedures. Failure to use the approved ASB revision could create compliance gaps.

2. 500 operating hours gating and evidence of hours: The AD applies the 15 flying hour inspection window to "attachment bolts having logged 500 operating hours or more." The AD does not define how operating hours are to be recorded or evidenced. For bolts that have been part of multiple aircraft, or that are held as spares but have logged hours, traceability of hours is necessary. Lack of robust parts history records can impede determining whether a bolt falls within the 500-hour bracket, potentially exposing the operator to missed inspections or unnecessary removals.

3. Measurement tolerance and measurement points: The AD prescribes a 0.05 mm differential wear threshold "between the areas defined in paragraph 2.B" of the ASB. The AD does not identify the specific points on the bolt where measurements are to be taken, nor the measurement technique or allowable measurement uncertainty. Measurement to 0.05 mm is precise; therefore the AD implicitly requires proper measurement tools and technique as set out in the ASB. Operators without the proper measuring equipment or calibrated tools risk mis-measurement.

4. Immediate pre-flight scrapping obligation: The compliance block requires that bolts meeting the scrap criteria be scrapped "Before further flight after the effective date of this AD." This phrasing creates an immediate operational constraint: bolts identified as cracked or over-worn must be removed from service and scrapped prior to the next flight after 17 October 2006. This is safety-critical, but in practice can produce sudden grounding of aircraft if a defect is found during inspections performed within the 15 flying hour window.

5. Spares with logged hours: The AD does not treat spares as automatically serviceable; if a spare has logged operating hours it must comply with paragraph 2.B.2 of the ASB before installation. This creates inventory management risk. Spares must carry a clear operating hours history or be treated as suspect until proven acceptable.

6. No explicit maintenance release or documentation pathway: The AD does not specify how compliance must be recorded or reported. The absence of explicit recordkeeping and reporting requirements means that operators must rely on their normal maintenance records processes or other regulatory requirements not contained in this AD. That ambiguity can complicate audits or evidence of compliance if challenged.

7. DGAC approval pathway: The AD allows "later DGAC approved revisions" of the ASB to be used. While practically useful to adopt improved ASB instructions, this creates a dependence on DGAC approval processes. Operators will need to ensure they use DGAC-approved revisions and document which revision they used in case questions arise.

8. Interpretation of "within 15 flying hours": The AD states the inspection timing as "within 15 flying hours" for bolts with 500 or more operating hours. Does that mean 15 flight hours of the specific helicopter, the specific bolt, or the operator’s fleet? The AD does not define the denominator; practitioners will need to apply the obvious reading , the bolt’s next 15 flying hours , but the AD’s silence opens room for dispute.

9. No explicit alternative compliance method: The AD provides no provision for alternative inspection methods or temporary deferrals. If an operator wishes to adopt an alternative inspection technology or to defer for operational reasons, the AD supplies no in-text mechanism to do so. Any alternative approach would need to rely on regulatory processes outside the AD.

10. Short window for fleet-wide action: For fleets with multiple affected helicopters, the requirement to complete inspections for bolts with 500 or more hours within 15 flying hours may produce concentrated maintenance demand and operational bottlenecks. Operators must plan maintenance capacity accordingly.

In all of these points the solution path the AD envisions is to follow the authoritative procedures in EUROCOPTER ASB No. 67.00.36 paragraph 2.B (and 2.B.2) and any later DGAC approved revisions. The AD itself supplies the decision thresholds and timing constraints, but it delegates the execution details to the ASB.

Compliance with this AD requires operators and maintainers to follow the AD’s three identified requirements and their associated timing obligations, and to do so by using EUROCOPTER ASB No. 67.00.36 paragraph 2.B (and paragraph 2.B.2 for spares) or later DGAC approved revisions. The AD is concise; the following steps map the AD’s content into an operational checklist strictly grounded in the text.

1. Confirm applicability: Verify that the helicopter is an EUROCOPTER AS 332 C, C1, L, L1 or L2 model. The AD’s "Applicability" block lists these variants explicitly. If the helicopter is not one of these models, this AD does not apply as written.

2. Identify the three attachment bolts: The AD targets "the three bolts that attach the main servo-controls to the non-rotating swash-plate." Locate these bolts on the airframe in accordance with the ASB or aircraft maintenance manual, and confirm their identity before proceeding.

3. Determine logged operating hours: For each of the three bolts, determine whether the bolt has "logged 500 operating hours or more." The AD conditions the timing of Requirement 1 on this threshold. Use the best available parts-history records to ascertain operating hours. For spares, determine whether the spare bolt has any logged operating hours; if so, it falls under Requirement 3.

4. For bolts with >=500 operating hours: Perform torque and condition checks "in accordance with paragraph 2.B" of EUROCOPTER ASB No. 67.00.36 or later DGAC approved revisions, within 15 flying hours. The AD’s Compliance entry for Requirement 1 states: "On attachment bolts having logged 500 operating hours or more, within 15 flying hours." Obtain ASB No. 67.00.36 paragraph 2.B (or an acceptable DGAC-approved revision) prior to performing the check, because the AD defers procedural detail to that paragraph.

5. On inspecting, apply the scrap criteria: If during inspection a crack is present in any bolt, or if "the differential wear on the diameter of the bolts, between the areas defined in paragraph 2.B of EUROCOPTER ASB No. 67.00.36, is more than 0.05 mm", scrap the bolt. The AD sets the 0.05 mm threshold as the determinative discard measure. The Compliance entry for Requirement 2 states that scrapping must be done "Before further flight after the effective date of this AD." That means do not return the aircraft to flight with any bolt meeting the scrap criteria.

6. For spares with logged hours: Before installing any spare bolt that has logged operating hours, comply with the instructions in paragraph 2.B.2 of EUROCOPTER ASB No. 67.00.36 or later DGAC approved revisions. The AD’s Compliance entry for Requirement 3: "Before installation on a helicopter." Therefore, do not install used spares on the aircraft until the ASB-prescribed checks are completed.

7. Use the correct documentation version: The AD allows "later DGAC approved revisions" of ASB No. 67.00.36. Confirm whether any such DGAC-approved revision exists and whether it is applicable to the helicopter, and follow the latest approved revision where appropriate. The AD does not specify which revision is controlling, but permits DGAC-approved later revisions to be used.

8. Consider operational scheduling: The 15 flying hour window for inspection of bolts over 500 hours and the immediate pre-flight scrapping requirement on defective finding create scheduling constraints. Plan maintenance windows and spare parts procurement accordingly to avoid unplanned aircraft grounding.

9. Spare parts procurement and inventory: Because bolts that fail the ASB-defined checks or that exceed 0.05 mm differential wear must be scrapped, ensure availability of serviceable replacement bolts. Also, ensure spare bolts have traceable logged hours or will be subjected to the ASB paragraph 2.B.2 checks before installation.

10. Documentation and evidence of compliance: While the AD does not prescribe specific recordkeeping, maintain records showing date of inspection, which ASB paragraph and revision was followed, measurement results (including the differential wear measurement), identification of scrapped bolts, and any replacement parts installed. Retain these maintenance records per standard airworthiness practice, as the AD’s compliance will be determined by whether the required checks and scrapping were performed.

11. Note related documents: The AD’s "Note" references EASA AD 2006-0306-E dated 10 October 2006. While the AD does not require following that EASA AD, it is a related regulatory instrument that operators should be aware of for internationally consistent maintenance action.

12. Effective date awareness: The AD "becomes effective on 17 October 2006." For obligations that reference the effective date (for example, the pre-flight scrapping requirement), ensure inspections and scrapping decisions are aligned with that effective date.

13. Who to contact for ambiguity: The AD itself is silent on appeal or deferral processes and does not provide contact details. It is signed by James Coyne, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. For any uncertainty about interpretation, operators should consult their usual CASA guidance channels or the ASB issuer; however such external consultative steps are not specified within this AD text.

By following these steps, strictly as derived from the AD text, operators will meet the prescriptive obligations the AD sets out: the torque and condition check for relevant bolts, scrapping bolts that meet the AD’s defect thresholds prior to flight, and ensuring spares with logged hours are inspected per the relevant ASB paragraph before installation.