AD/S-PUMA/56 Amdt 2 - Hoist Plate Front Attachment

This airworthiness directive uses a common regulatory template: identify affected equipment, prescribe inspection and modification actions, set compliance timeframes, and refer to manufacturer technical publications for the details of the required work. The AD’s main concepts are therefore applicability, corrective action, compliance timing, and reference incorporation.

Applicability. The scope is model‑based and parts‑based: models AS 332 C, C1, L, L1 and L2; all serial numbers; and only helicopters equipped with the single or dual hoist plate part numbers listed in paragraph 1.A.2 of Eurocopter ASB AS 332 No. 25.01.56, or later EASA approved revision. There is a narrow exemption carved out: helicopters that have MOD 0726405 installed are not within applicability. This creates a simple on/off applicability rule tied to physical configuration and a discrete modification mark.

Corrective action and inspections. The AD prescribes three classes of action: immediate checks (safetying and nut tightness checks in Alert Telex paragraphs 2.B.2 and 2.B.3), a required modification of the front hoist plate and associated ground functional testing per ASB paragraph 2.B., and amendment of spare parts in accordance with ASB paragraph 2.B.5 prior to installation. The AD does not recapitulate the detailed procedures; it incorporates them by reference to specified Eurocopter technical documents and to “later EASA approved revision” of the ASB, establishing a dynamic incorporation mechanism whereby future EASA‑approved revisions of the ASB become acceptable compliance methods.

Compliance timing. The AD sets multiple, non‑concurrent deadlines. Notably, Requirement 1 had a retroactive‑style deadline: within 10 flight hours after 1 December 2004. Requirement 2 establishes a continuing obligation “after compliance with Requirement 1, and thereafter at each ALF‑check” until the modification is completed. Requirement 3 requires modification of installed hoist plates “within 3 months after 27 September 2007” unless already done. Requirement 4 places the onus on those holding spare parts to modify them before installation and no later than three months after 27 September 2007. The AD explicitly states that the compliance times for Requirements 1 and 2 remain unchanged by this amendment, signalling continuity with the previous amendment.

Reference to EASA material and error correction. The AD cross‑references EASA AD 2007‑0105 (corrected 14 June 2007) and explains Amendment 2 was issued in response to the corrected EASA AD, which had corrected a typographical error in a service bulletin number. That ties the Australian AD to EASA action and places the manufacturer’s ASB and telexes as the normative technical methods, provided they are EASA approved.

Root cause and immediate safety trigger. The Background records a concrete failure mode: a reported loss of the front hoist plate attachment, discovered in flight when the hoist was not in use, traced to inadequate safetying of the nut with the lockwasher. The AD’s remedial steps respond directly to the three risk vectors identified: securing the nut, modifying the front plate assembly, and ensuring spare parts comply. The AD therefore operates as a corrective, retrospective, and preventive measure.

Legal instrument features. The AD uses the word “Requirement” to label binding actions, sets explicit compliance windows, and is signed by a CASA delegate with an effective date. It does not, within the text provided, reproduce detailed penalty or enforcement provisions; it functions as an operational, prescriptive instrument that imports detailed technical content through the ASB and Alert Telex documents.

The AD identifies a set of concrete actors who bear obligations or who are directly implicated by its content.

Aircraft owners and operators. The primary burden is on the owners and operators of Eurocopter AS 332 C, C1, L, L1 and L2 helicopters that are fitted with the specified hoist plate part numbers (as listed in ASB AS 332 No. 25.01.56 paragraph 1.A.2 or later EASA approved revision) and that do not have MOD 0726405 installed. Those operators must perform the safetying and nut tightness checks (Requirement 1), continue retesting at each ALF‑check until modification (Requirement 2), arrange and complete the hoist front plate modification and ground functional testing within specified deadlines (Requirement 3), and ensure spare hoist plates held in stock are modified before installation and within the spare parts compliance window (Requirement 4).

Maintenance organisations and certifying staff. Any organisation performing these inspections, modifications or ground functional testing must follow the Accomplishment Instructions in paragraph 2.B. of ASB AS 332 No. 25.01.56, or later EASA approved revision. Those performing the checks per paragraphs 2.B.2 and 2.B.3 of the Eurocopter Alert Telex must adhere to those technical steps. Maintenance contractors, approved maintenance organisations and certifying engineers involved in executing and signing off the tasks are therefore directly affected.

Spare parts holders and supply chain. Entities holding hoist plate parts as spares are subject to Requirement 4: parts held as spares must be modified in accordance with ASB paragraph 2.B.5 before being installed, and no later than three months after 27 September 2007. That places compliance obligations on parts management staff and procurement/supply units to ensure spares are modified prior to use and to manage inventory accordingly.

Design authority and manufacturer. Eurocopter is implicated because the AD refers to its ASB and Alert Telex documents as the technical method of compliance, and the background references a manufacturer investigation that identified the failure cause. The AD’s reliance on the ASB and telex positions the manufacturer as the source of the technical solution that operators must implement.

Regulatory bodies. The AD is the instrument of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), signed by a delegate (David Villiers). It also refers to EASA AD 2007‑0105 (corrected 14 June 2007), creating a trans‑jurisdictional technical linkage. Entities that interact with EASA processes, such as custodians of the ASB, are therefore incidentally implicated because the ASB must be EASA approved for its later revisions to be acceptable.

Excluded parties. Helicopters fitted with MOD 0726405 are explicitly outside the AD’s applicability. Holders of other helicopter types, or AS 332 helicopters not fitted with the specified hoist plate part numbers, are not covered by these requirements as drafted.

In practical terms, the costs, scheduling and logistics of meeting the AD will be borne by operators and maintenance organisations: they must schedule the checks within the defined flight‑hour and calendar windows, secure the technical documentation (ASB and Alert Telex), allocate maintenance hours for modification and testing, and ensure spares inventory is appropriately modified or quarantined until modification is complete. The AD’s text places these operational obligations directly on the affected operators and supply‑chain actors via the “Requirement” clauses.

Duties. The AD sets out the operator’s and maintainer’s principal duties in four enumerated Requirements.

• Requirement 1 (inspection and nut check). Conduct checks of the hoist plate assembly for correct safetying in accordance with paragraph 2.B.2 of Eurocopter Alert Telex No. 05.00.64.2, and check the hoist plate nut for correct tightness in accordance with paragraph 2.B.3 of Eurocopter Alert Telex No. 05.00.64.3. This must be completed within 10 flight hours after 1 December 2004.

• Requirement 2 (retesting until modification). After performing Requirement 1, repeat the checks thereafter at each ALF‑check until the hoist plate has been modified in accordance with Requirement 3 or 4, as applicable. The AD expressly keeps the compliance times for Requirements 1 and 2 unchanged by this Amendment.

• Requirement 3 (modification of installed parts). Modify the hoist front plate and perform ground functional testing of the hoist installation in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions in paragraph 2.B. of ASB AS 332 No. 25.01.56, or later EASA approved revision. This must be done, unless already accomplished, within three months after 27 September 2007.

• Requirement 4 (modification of spares). Modify parts held as spares in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions in paragraph 2.B.5 of ASB AS 332 No. 25.01.56, or later EASA approved revision, before installation on a helicopter, but no later than three months after 27 September 2007.

These duties are mandatory within the AD’s text: each action is labelled “Requirement” and associated with a compliance timeframe.

Rights and procedural flexibility. The AD confers limited procedural flexibility in two ways that amount to rights of choice about method:

• Dynamic incorporation of revisions. The AD allows compliance using ASB AS 332 No. 25.01.56 “or later EASA approved revision.” That means operators may use subsequent EASA approved versions of the ASB to meet the AD, rather than being strictly limited to the specific ASB revision current at the AD’s issuance. The operator’s right here is to use later EASA‑approved methods, provided those revisions are accepted by the relevant authority.

• Reference to manufacturer telexes and EASA AD. The AD prescribes following the specified Alert Telex paragraphs for the checks and the ASB paragraphs for modifications; this ties the operator’s method rights to those documents. If a later EASA approved ASB revision changes methods or adds steps, the operator may adopt it. However, the AD does not articulate an alternative compliance pathway within the instrument itself, such as an approved equivalent procedure from CASA. The instrument therefore grants method flexibility only through the explicit “EASA approved revision” channel.

Allocation of burden among parties. The AD assigns different duties to different parties: operators must perform inspections and arrange modifications; maintenance organisations must carry out the technical work per the referenced ASB and telex procedures; spare parts holders must ensure modification before installation or within the spare parts deadline. The AD’s text does not allocate financial responsibility in explicit terms; it lists actions that must be done and leaves cost allocation to contractual and commercial arrangements among owners, operators and maintenance providers.

Information and documentation obligations implicit in the AD. The AD incorporates the ASB and Alert Telex as the source of detailed steps. While the directive itself does not reproduce record‑keeping obligations, compliance will necessarily require operators and maintainers to consult, implement and document the steps in those referenced documents for the purpose of satisfying the AD’s “Requirement” labels. The AD also references a corrected EASA AD, which suggests that procedural correctness of the referenced documents matters to compliance.

No express waiver or exemption process is specified in the AD text. The AD does carve out helicopters fitted with MOD 0726405 from applicability, which is an explicit exemption based on configuration. The instrument does not, within the supplied text, articulate an administrative process for seeking relief from the Requirements.

The AD document supplied contains no express penalty provisions, civil sanctioning schedule, or criminal offence statements. It sets out mandatory “Requirements” and compliance dates, and it is signed by a CASA delegate (David Villiers) with an effective date of 27 September 2007, but it does not include enforcement mechanisms or explicit consequences for non‑compliance within its text.

What the document does make enforceable is the directive format: labelled “Requirement” and tied to specified compliance times and technical documents for execution. By its form, the AD functions as an airworthiness directive that prescribes conditions for continued operation of affected aircraft. The text does not say in this document what actions CASA staff will take to enforce compliance, nor does it spell out administrative sanctions such as grounding, prohibition of flight, fines, or other penalties. The AD likewise does not include a process for reporting compliance, nor does it state the record retention or audit procedures to be used by CASA to verify compliance.

Because the AD incorporates Eurocopter Alert Service Bulletin AS 332 No. 25.01.56 and Eurocopter Alert Telex No. 05.00.64.2/64.3 by reference, the enforceability of the specified technical steps will depend in practice on CASA’s regulatory framework and enforcement practice (not reproduced in this document). The AD’s text shows the following formal features that are relevant to enforcement mechanics, even though penalties are not specified:

• Scope and applicable configuration are specified (see Applicability), which creates an identifiable universe of affected helicopters for inspectors and auditors.

• Discrete, dated compliance windows are set for actions, enabling a verifier to determine whether an operator met a stated deadline (for example, within 10 flight hours after 1 December 2004 for Requirement 1; within three months after 27 September 2007 for Requirement 3 and 4).

• The AD requires following specific technical paragraphs in the referenced Alert Telex and ASB documents. These references provide objective standards that an enforcement reviewer can use to assess whether the technical work was completed in accordance with the directive.

Absence of explicit enforcement language in the AD means that any consequences for non‑compliance would have to be derived from the broader regulatory framework under which CASA issues airworthiness directives. That broader framework is not reproduced in the supplied text, so the AD itself does not disclose the enforcement tools, penalty levels, process for notifications, or the means by which CASA would verify and, if necessary, compel compliance.

Given the AD’s background description of an actual loss of the front hoist plate attachment and the remedy’s safety rationale, the AD’s Requirements are framed as safety critical. From an operational perspective, those conducting inspections and modifications should treat the Requirements as mandatory for the continued safe certification and operation of the specified aircraft, and prepare documentation that evidences the timing and content of the checks and modifications in anticipation of verification or audit, even though the AD text does not itself specify the exact enforcement process or sanctions.

The AD, as supplied, references and interlocks with external technical and regulatory documents; it does not formally reproduce broader statutory enforcement provisions or other domestic laws. The principal cross‑document interactions apparent from the AD are with Eurocopter technical publications and a related EASA airworthiness directive.

Incorporation by reference of manufacturer material. The AD requires compliance with procedures set out in Eurocopter Alert Telex No. 05.00.64.2 and No. 05.00.64.3 (for safetying and nut tightness checks) and with the Accomplishment Instructions in paragraph 2.B. (and paragraph 2.B.5 for spares) of Eurocopter Alert Service Bulletin AS 332 No. 25.01.56, or later EASA approved revision. By requiring operators to follow those Eurocopter documents, the AD creates a direct operational interaction between the CASA directive and the manufacturer’s technical material. The AD thereby uses the ASB and telex as the method of compliance , their content becomes effectively incorporated into the obligations on operators. The AD’s allowance for “later EASA approved revision” means that an EASA approval process over time can alter the technical method by which an operator complies with the CASA AD, assuming the later revision is EASA approved.

Cross‑reference to EASA AD. The AD explicitly notes that EASA AD 2007‑0105 (corrected 14 June 2007) “refers.” The Amendment 2 text states it was issued in response to a corrected issue of the related EASA AD, which corrected a typographical error in the service bulletin number referenced in Requirements 3 and 4. This shows a direct interaction: the Australian AD is responsive to, and harmonised with, an EASA AD, and uses the EASA AD’s corrections to ensure the reference to the manufacturer’s bulletin is correct. The AD’s text thereby illustrates international regulatory interplay where CASA’s directive is linked to an EASA action and to EASA approval of ASB revisions.

Configuration exclusion by modification mark. The AD excludes helicopters “with MOD 0726405 installed” from applicability. This creates an interaction with the aircraft’s modification status and any approvals or certification records that record MOD 0726405. Proof of installation of that modification will be relevant to deciding whether the AD applies to a given helicopter, and operators must reconcile this AD with their maintenance/major mod records.

No explicit interaction with domestic statutory enforcement provisions within the AD text. The document does not reproduce the statutory basis under which CASA can issue airworthiness directives, nor does it specify how the AD aligns with other Australian aviation instruments, obligations or safety management system requirements. It does not mention interaction with, for example, maintenance release requirements, continuing airworthiness obligations, or civil penalties under other instruments. Therefore, while the AD is clearly a prescriptive airworthiness instrument, its specific legal interface with Australian statutory law and enforcement regime is not spelled out in the supplied text.

Practical consequence: to determine full legal obligations, affected parties will need to understand the AD together with CASA’s broader regulatory framework governing airworthiness directives, maintenance approvals and enforcement. The AD itself creates the operational obligations and ties them to Eurocopter and EASA documents; it does not in isolation define the full legal consequences or procedural mechanics for enforcement or appeals.

The document supplied is labelled “AD/S‑PUMA/56 Amdt 2” and contains an express account of prior action. The narrative in the Background and the header material provides the amendment timeline and the reasons for issuing Amendment 2.

Initial action and Amendment 1. The Background states that the manufacturer received a report of loss of the front attachment of a hoist plate. Investigation identified inadequate safetying of the nut with the lockwasher as the cause. It records that “Amendment 1 required modification of the hoist plate.” The AD text does not reproduce Amendment 1’s full content in this document, but it confirms that Amendment 1 already existed and had required a hoist plate modification.

Issuance of Amendment 2. This document is Amendment 2. The stated driver for Amendment 2 was a corrected issue of the related EASA AD (EASA AD 2007‑0105, corrected 14 June 2007). The corrected EASA AD fixed a typographical error in the service bulletin number referenced in Requirements 3 and 4. Amendment 2 therefore updates the Australian AD to align its reference numeration with the corrected EASA AD and with the correct service bulletin number. The AD notes explicitly that this Amendment 2 is issued in response to the corrected EASA AD.

Effectivity and dates. The AD notes three temporal markers in its compliance section and header. It indicates Requirement 1 must be done “within 10 flight hours after 1 December 2004.” It also sets a compliance window of three months after 27 September 2007 for Requirements 3 and 4 if the modification has not already been accomplished. The instrument states, “This Amendment becomes effective on 27 September 2007.” The AD is signed by a CASA delegate and dated 14 August 2007, with the effective date given as 27 September 2007. The EASA AD that is referenced includes a correction dated 14 June 2007; this sequence explains why the Australian amendment was issued in response to a corrected EASA AD and why the effective date is set in late September 2007.

Statement about unchanged compliance times. The compliance section includes an explicit statement that “The compliance times for Requirement 1 and 2 remain unchanged by this issue of the Directive.” That indicates that Amendment 2 only altered the reference numbers in Requirements 3 and 4 (and possibly clarified the ASB reference), but did not alter the earlier, time‑sensitive inspection and retesting obligations established in prior iterations of the directive.

Documented signatory and authority. The AD is signed off by David Villiers, a delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. The signature and the effective date recorded in the text constitute the formal amendment instrument for Amendment 2.

No other amendments recorded in the supplied text. The AD does not list an earlier AD number or provide the full text of Amendment 1, nor does it provide a recorded history beyond noting Amendment 1 and the reason for Amendment 2. The document therefore presents a snapshot of the AD’s status as at Amendment 2, effective 27 September 2007, in relation to the prior Amendment 1 and the corrected EASA AD.

The AD text contains no references to litigation, legal proceedings, appeals, judicial reviews, administrative tribunals, or enforcement actions arising from this directive. The supplied document provides a Background that describes a manufacturer investigation and the corrective measures adopted in Amendment 1; it does not mention any legal challenges, notices of dispute, or contested enforcement outcomes.

Consequently, within the bounds of the supplied material, there is no recorded litigation history related to AD/S‑PUMA/56 Amdt 2. The AD’s text does not reference any court decisions, administrative determinations, consent orders, or formal disputes arising from either Amendment 1 or Amendment 2. The instrument also does not record any stay, suspension, or variance of its Requirements under administrative law.

Practical implications of the absence of litigation in the record. The lack of litigation references in this document means that any questions about the legal validity, scope, or enforceability of the AD would need to be researched outside this specific text by consulting CASA records, tribunal decisions or court files. The AD itself provides the operative Requirements, compliance times and technical references; it does not provide any history of judicial interpretation or legal challenge.

What is available within the AD for dispute or verification. Even without an attached litigation history, the AD contains objective elements that would be central to any compliance dispute:

• Clear applicability criteria (models, part numbers, MOD 0726405 exclusion).

• Specific procedural references (Alert Telex paragraphs and ASB paragraph numbers).

• Discrete compliance timeframes (10 flight hours after 1 December 2004; three months after 27 September 2007).

• A stated effective date and authorship by a CASA delegate.

Those elements could be used by parties to frame compliance positions or to defend a position in a regulatory or legal proceeding, but the AD text itself contains no record of such proceedings or outcomes.

If a reader requires litigation history, the AD as supplied will not satisfy that need; the reader must consult external sources such as CASA enforcement records, court registers, or industry bulletins for any disputes or enforcement actions that may have arisen from this AD or its prior amendment.

The AD’s concise text embeds several practical pitfalls and operational traps that operators, maintainers and parts holders should notice. These “gotchas” arise from timing, document referencing, configuration exclusion, and the importation of technical methods by reference.

Retroactive‑style timing. Requirement 1 must be done “within 10 flight hours after 1 December 2004.” That establishes a narrow window that, on its face, predates both the Amendment 2 effective date (27 September 2007) and the date of the AD’s signature (14 August 2007). If an operator has not performed the check and the AD is being read after the effective date, there is a risk of confusion about the operator’s continuing obligations. The AD mitigates this by retaining the earlier compliance times “unchanged” for Requirements 1 and 2, but the operator must ensure records exist to demonstrate whether the 10‑flight‑hour check was completed in the original window. Failure to have completed a retroactive check may leave an operator with the need to perform overdue checks and to account for any operations performed in the interim.

ALF‑check recurrence ambiguity. Requirement 2 requires repeating the safetying and nut tightness checks “after compliance with Requirement 1, and thereafter at each ALF‑check until modified.” The AD uses the term “ALF‑check” without definition in the text supplied. That term is commonly used in maintenance literature to denote an inspection interval, but this document does not define it or reference where it is defined. Operators must therefore identify the controlling maintenance schedule that defines ALF‑checks for their fleet and ensure the repeated checks occur at those intervals. Misidentifying the ALF interval could lead to non‑compliance.

Dependency on external documents and their revisions. The AD requires following specific paragraphs in the Eurocopter Alert Telex and the ASB AS 332 No. 25.01.56, but compliance is allowed “or later EASA approved revision.” This creates a dependency: the technical steps are not contained within the AD, but are instead in the manufacturer’s documents. A practical risk is the potential mismatch between the version of the ASB or telex that an operator possesses and the version approved by EASA, or reliance on an unapproved revision. Operators must ensure they are working from the correct, EASA‑approved revision of the ASB referenced by the AD.

Typographical error correction and cross‑references. Amendment 2 was issued to respond to a corrected issue of the related EASA AD which corrected a typographical error of the service bulletin number in Requirements 3 and 4. The gotcha here is that earlier or alternate copies of the AD or of the EASA AD might contain the incorrect service bulletin number; operators relying on those copies could be directed to a wrong or non‑existent document paragraph. Confirming the ASB paragraph numbers and EASA reference is therefore essential.

Spare parts installation deadline. Requirement 4 requires parts held as spares to be modified “before installation on a helicopter, but no later than 3 months after 27 September 2007.” That means an operator may have modified installed hoist plates but still have unmodified spares in inventory. If unmodified spares are fitted after 3 months post‑27 September 2007, that would run contrary to the AD. Maintenance planners and parts managers must ensure spares are either modified or quarantined and labelled to prevent inadvertent installation.

Exclusion by MOD 0726405. The applicability clause excludes helicopters “without MOD 0726405 installed.” The double negative in the applicability sentence could be misread. Clarify: the AD applies only to helicopters without MOD 0726405; helicopters fitted with MOD 0726405 are not affected. Operators must confirm MOD 0726405 installation status in their technical records before assuming the AD does or does not apply.

Operational impact of ground functional testing. Requirement 3 mandates ground functional testing after modification. Ground functional testing implies operational checks that may require specific facilities, trained personnel, or additional equipment to exercise the hoist under load or simulated conditions. Operators should plan for required resources and scheduling; failure to provide the correct test environment or technician competence could lead to incomplete compliance.

Record evidence. The AD does not itself stipulate the exact records to be kept, but the compliance windows, repeat inspection requirement, and spare parts modification deadline create a need for traceable records showing when Requirement 1 checks were completed, when ALF‑checks included the safetying checks, when modifications and ground tests were completed, and when spares were modified. Lack of such records will expose operators to scrutiny.

International harmonisation nuance. The AD ties compliance to EASA approvals. If an operator is in Australia and the ASB is later revised and EASA approves the revision, that revised ASB becomes acceptable for compliance. However, reliance on later revisions requires operators to track EASA approvals and ensure their maintenance instructions align. Confusion can arise if an operator uses a manufacturer’s revision that is not yet EASA‑approved.

In summary, the primary operational pitfalls are mismatched document versions, retroactive or back‑dated compliance windows, ALF interval ambiguity, spare parts quarantine failures, and ensuring ground testing resources and records are in place.

The AD specifies the methods and timing for compliance and cross‑references the Eurocopter Alert Telex and ASB as the operative technical instructions. A stepwise operational compliance checklist, drawn directly from the AD text and the referenced paragraph numbers, is below. This checklist assumes the operator has confirmed the AD applies to their helicopter (i.e., model is AS 332 C/C1/L/L1/L2, the hoist plate part number appears in ASB paragraph 1.A.2, and MOD 0726405 is not fitted).

1. Confirm applicability and configuration. Check the aircraft type (AS 332 C, C1, L, L1 or L2) and serial number. Confirm whether the helicopter is equipped with a hoist plate whose part number is listed in paragraph 1.A.2 of Eurocopter ASB AS 332 No. 25.01.56 (or later EASA approved revision). Verify whether MOD 0726405 has been installed; if it has, the AD’s Requirements do not apply per the Applicability clause.

2. Obtain the referenced technical documents and approved revisions. Secure copies of Eurocopter Alert Telex No. 05.00.64.2 and No. 05.00.64.3 and ASB AS 332 No. 25.01.56. Confirm the ASB revision you will use is the ASB specified or a later EASA approved revision, as the AD permits “or later EASA approved revision.” Ensure the EASA approval status of any later ASB revision you intend to use.

3. Perform Requirement 1 checks within the prescribed window. Requirement 1 mandates checking the hoist plate assembly for correct safetying in accordance with Alert Telex paragraph 2.B.2, and checking the hoist plate nut for correct tightness in accordance with Alert Telex paragraph 2.B.3. The AD sets the compliance window as “within 10 flight hours after 1 December 2004” for Requirement 1. If those checks have not been previously completed in that window, perform them as soon as practicable and document the work and findings.

4. Establish recurring ALF‑check regimen per Requirement 2. After performing Requirement 1, repeat the safetying and nut tightness checks thereafter at each ALF‑check until modification is completed in accordance with Requirement 3 or 4. Determine the ALF‑check schedule applicable to your maintenance programme, and ensure checks are included and recorded in each ALF cycle.

5. Schedule and perform the hoist front plate modification and ground functional test per Requirement 3. Unless already accomplished, modify the hoist front plate and perform the ground functional testing of the hoist installation following the Accomplishment Instructions in paragraph 2.B. of ASB AS 332 No. 25.01.56, or later EASA approved revision. The AD sets a deadline of within three months after 27 September 2007 for completion if not already done. Arrange required personnel, tools, and test facilities in order to execute the instructions as written in the ASB.

6. Modify spares before installation per Requirement 4. For parts held as spares, modify them in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions in paragraph 2.B.5 of the ASB prior to installation. The AD also imposes a calendar deadline: ensure spares are modified no later than three months after 27 September 2007 if not already modified.

7. Document all work to establish compliance. Although the AD text does not specify recordkeeping details, the steps and timeframes it imposes require demonstrable records. For each completed Requirement, annotate the aircraft logbooks, maintenance releases, and parts inventories with the date, the specific ASB/telex paragraph followed, the modification batch or part numbers, and the name and signature of the certifying maintainer or engineer.

8. Integrate the AD actions into maintenance planning. Because Requirement 2 requires checks at each ALF‑check until modification, update maintenance schedules, parts procurement planning and hoist operation risk assessments. Ensure spares inventories are checked and modified or quarantined per Requirement 4. If a helicopter may require hoist operations before modification, ensure the safetying checks are current and documented.

9. Verify use of EASA approved ASB revisions. If adopting a later ASB revision, confirm the revision is EASA approved before relying on it for AD compliance. If any ASB revision differs materially from the steps in the AD’s originally referenced paragraphs, ensure the later EASA approved revision addresses those variations and provides equivalent or better mitigation.

10. Retain evidence of the initial checks that may have been due in 2004. Because Requirement 1 had an initial deadline referenced to 1 December 2004, operators should seek and retain evidence showing whether the 10 flight hour check was conducted within that window. If historical records are missing, document corrective steps taken now and be prepared to explain and justify the historical gap should an audit or inquiry occur.

11. Coordinate with supplier and manufacturer for parts modifications. If spares need modification, coordinate with the parts supplier or Eurocopter to ensure the correct procedure in paragraph 2.B.5 is followed and that any modification is traceable for compliance evidence.

12. Monitor for further amendments. Because the AD permits the use of later EASA approved revisions of the ASB, operators should monitor for future EASA ADs or ASB revisions that could alter the method of compliance or provide updated instructions.

Following these steps aligns operational activity with the AD’s Requirements as written. Because the AD does not itself specify enforcement mechanisms or recordkeeping formats, it is advisable to keep comprehensive, dated, and signed documentation of checks, modifications and tests that refer directly to the specific ASB and Alert Telex paragraph numbers used to complete the work.