What it does
This instrument is an Airworthiness Directive (AD) issued by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) for specified Maule M-6 series aeroplanes. It prescribes two discrete mechanical and procedural interventions intended to reduce the risk of reversed elevator control rigging. Mechanically, the AD requires operators to colour-code, using yellow enamel paint, four specific control points: (a) the top of the rear elevator control horn; (b) the elevator control cable end attached to the top of the rear control horn; (c) the bottom of the forward elevator control horn; and (d) the elevator control cable end attached to the bottom of the forward control horn. The AD directs compliance with Maule Aerospace Technology, Inc. Mandatory Service Bulletin No. 30 dated 4 March 2008 as the means to implement the colour-coding (Requirement 1).
Procedurally, the AD requires insertion into the rigging procedure section of the FAA-approved maintenance program (for example, the maintenance manual) of a specific caution statement instructing maintenance personnel to check elevator operation after any elevator cable reconnection or installation of new cables. The exact text is: “CAUTION - BEFORE FLIGHT WHENEVER ELEVATOR CABLES ARE RECONNECTED OR NEW CABLES INSTALLED: Always check operation of elevators after a cable reconnect by pulling back on the control and ascertain that the elevators are in the UP position.” The AD specifies that this insertion may be achieved by inserting a copy of the AD or inserting the text located on the bottom of page 3 of Maule Mandatory Service Bulletin No. 30 into the FAA-approved maintenance program (Requirement 2 and the implementation note in the AD table).
The AD applies to specific M-6-180 and M-6-235 serial numbers listed in Table 1 of the AD; it does not purport to apply to other serials. Compliance must occur before the next time an elevator control cable is disconnected for any reason, or within 12 calendar months of the AD’s effective date (12 February 2009), whichever occurs first. The AD is explicitly motivated by two accident reports in which reversed elevator control rigging was a factor; CASA frames the interventions as intended to reduce the likelihood of a mechanic rigging the elevator controls backwards and thereby producing elevator movement opposite to control input, with the potential consequence of loss of control (Background).