What it does
This Airworthiness Directive (AD/ERJ-190/20), effective 7 May 2009, requires operators of certain Embraer ERJ-190 series aeroplanes fitted with specific outboard slat skew sensors to perform a recurring operational check and to replace any sensor found failed by that check before further flight. The Directive applies only to aeroplanes "equipped with the outboard slat skew sensor part number (P/N) 1702286A or 1702288A" and lists the affected models as ERJ 190-100 ECJ, ERJ 190-100 IGW, ERJ 190-100 LR, ERJ 190-100 STD, ERJ 190-200 IGW, ERJ 190-200 LR and ERJ 190-200 STD.
Mechanically, the AD mandates:
- Requirement 1: perform an operational check (OPC) of the outboard slat skew sensor in accordance with Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) Task 27-83-01-710-801-A, titled "Outboard Slat Skew Sensor - Operational Test".
- Requirement 2: if the Requirement 1 OPC finds a sensor failure, replace the failed sensor with a serviceable one, where the Directive defines a "serviceable sensor" as one that has passed the Requirement 1 OPC.
Timing and recurrence are explicit. For Requirement 1, operators must initially perform the OPC, if not already done, within the next 1,320 hours time in service (TIS) after the Directive's effective date and thereafter at intervals that do not exceed 1,320 hours TIS. For Requirement 2, replacement is required "before further flight after the Requirement 1 OPC is accomplished." The Directive provides specific definitions for the operational check, noting that an OPC is "a task to determine if an item is fulfilling its intended purpose" and that, as a "failure finding task", it "does not require quantitative tolerances."
The Directive cites a Brazilian ANAC AD (ANAC AD 2009-02-03) as relevant background and grounds the safety justification in ANAC's advisory that occurrences of outboard slat skew sensor failure in open or closed position have been found. The background explains the hazard chain that motivates the mandated checks: a failed closed sensor, combined with an outboard slat actuator structural rupture and an adjacent actuator torque limiter failing high, may allow a slat surface to detach and possibly strike the horizontal stabilizer and elevator, with potential effects on controllability. The document is signed by James Coyne, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, dated 26 March 2009.