AD/ERJ-190/12 Amdt 1 - Hydraulic Shutoff Valves

Applicability: The AD applies to Embraer ERJ-190( ) aircraft that are equipped with firewall hydraulic shutoff valves having P/N 975287-3 or P/N 975287-5 (Applicability). The AD’s scope is therefore limited to those ERJ-190 aircraft that actually carry those specified part numbers; aircraft without those P/Ns are not within the stated applicability.

Operational check: The central mandated task is an “operational check” of the firewall hydraulic shutoff valve, as defined in the AD: “A task to determine that an item is fulfilling its intended purpose. The check does not require quantitative tolerances. This is a failure finding task.” The AD ties the way the operational check is to be performed to Embraer Service Bulletin No. 190-29-0008 (original issue), or later revisions approved by ANAC (Requirement). The SB therefore supplies the step-by-step instructions and criteria to be followed, subject to ANAC approval of any revisions.

Replacement options: If an operational check reveals a faulty valve, the AD provides two replacement pathways. An operator may replace the faulty valve with (a) a valve bearing the same P/Ns 975287-3 or 975287-5 that has passed the operational check, or (b) a valve bearing a new P/N that has been approved as a replacement valve (Requirement). Amendment 1 was issued specifically to reflect the change (in Brazilian AD revision 2) that removed a previous requirement to install the same P/N when replacement was necessary; the AD now allows installation of an approved replacement P/N (Background).

Compliance interval: The AD sets a recurring inspection interval: initial inspection within 600 flight hours from 27 August 2007 (unless already done), and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 600 flight hours (Compliance). The AD’s effective date is 25 August 2014 (Compliance).

Source documents and approvals: The AD mandates compliance in accordance with Embraer SB No. 190-29-0008 (original issue) or further revisions approved by ANAC (Requirement). The AD also cross-refers to ANAC AD 2007-02-02R2 (dated 17 July 2009) (Note). The presence of the Embraer SB and ANAC approval as the procedural references means that the technical method for compliance is externally authored (by the manufacturer’s SB) and that regulatory acceptance of any SB revisions rests with ANAC. The AD itself is issued by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) and signed by Pieter van Dijk, Delegate of CASA (signature block and date).

Safety rationale: The Background explains the safety case recorded in the instrument: periodic operational checks performed during routine maintenance revealed a failure rate for the firewall hydraulic shutoff valve significantly higher than expected, and dormant failures, if combined with further failures such as engine fire, could lead to an unacceptable reduction of safety margins (Background). That stated safety evidence underpins the requirement for recurring failure-finding checks and replacements.

Terminology and limits: The AD’s operational check is classed as a failure-finding task without quantitative tolerances; the AD does not prescribe numeric performance thresholds in the text itself but relies on the Embraer SB for instructions and procedures (Requirement). The AD also limits its mandate to the specified P/Ns and to replacement valves that either are the same P/N and have passed the check, or are an approved new P/N.

Aircraft operators and maintenance organisations: The AD directly affects operators of Embraer ERJ-190 series aeroplanes that are equipped with firewall hydraulic shutoff valves P/N 975287-3 or 975287-5 (Applicability). Those operators carry the recurring obligation to perform the operational check within the prescribed 600 flight-hour schedule and to replace any faulty valves per the AD’s options (Requirement; Compliance). Maintenance organisations that perform the operational check, and that carry out replacements, will be the agents performing the mandated tasks and documenting compliance in the applicable maintenance records; the AD requires the operational check be accomplished in accordance with Embraer SB No. 190-29-0008 original issue or further revisions approved by ANAC, so maintenance providers must obtain and follow that SB.

Parts suppliers and manufacturers: Embraer, as the SB author, is implicated because the AD references Embraer SB No. 190-29-0008 as the source of instructions and procedures (Requirement). Suppliers of the specific P/Ns (975287-3 and 975287-5) and any new replacement P/Ns approved by ANAC are stakeholders because replacements are permitted either with the listed P/Ns that have passed the operational check or with an ANAC-approved replacement P/N (Requirement; Background).

Regulators: CASA is the issuing authority for this AD; it has exercised its delegate authority in signing the AD (signature block). The AD also relies on ANAC for approval of SB revisions and cross-refers to ANAC AD 2007-02-02R2 dated 17 July 2009, so ANAC is a regulator whose prior action and approvals are incorporated into the AD (Requirement; Note).

Finance and scheduling functions within operators: Operators will need to budget for recurring inspections every 600 flight hours from a baseline date and for possible replacements of faulty valves. The AD’s compliance interval and replacement options create direct operational and financial impacts for the aircraft operator, its maintenance planning and parts-procurement functions.

Who does not have to act: ERJ-190 aircraft not fitted with the specified P/N 975287-3 or 975287-5 firewall hydraulic shutoff valves are outside the applicability clause and so are not subject to these specific obligations (Applicability).

Timing and legacy aircraft: The compliance requirement sets the initial inspection counting from 27 August 2007. That baseline means that aircraft which have not performed the required operational check since that baseline date must have an initial inspection within 600 flight hours from that date unless it was completed previously (Compliance). The AD’s effective date is 25 August 2014; the AD is an amendment (Amdt 1) to the earlier AD and was signed by a CASA delegate on 18 August 2014 (signature block, Background).

In short, the obligations fall on operators and their maintenance agents, with interaction required between the operator/maintenance organisation, Embraer’s service bulletin, and ANAC for any SB revisions.

Primary duty to inspect: Operators of applicable Embraer ERJ-190 aircraft have a mandatory duty to perform an operational check of firewall hydraulic shutoff valves P/N 975287-3 or 975287-5 within the scheduled intervals. The AD sets an initial inspection within 600 flight hours from 27 August 2007 unless already completed, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 600 flight hours (Compliance). This duty is expressed in mandatory language in the Requirement and Compliance paragraphs.

Duty to follow the approved SB: The AD requires the operational check to be performed “in accordance with Embraer Service Bulletin (SB) No. 190-29-0008 original issue, or further revisions approved by the ANAC.” That gives the SB (as issued by Embraer) and ANAC approvals a central procedural role. Compliance is therefore not satisfied by an ad hoc internal procedure unless that procedure mirrors the SB and any SB revisions have ANAC approval where required (Requirement).

Duty to replace faulty valves: If the operational check identifies a faulty firewall hydraulic shutoff valve, the operator must replace it. The AD prescribes two replacement options: (a) replace with a valve bearing P/N 975287-3 or 975287-5 that has passed the operational check, or (b) replace with a valve bearing a new P/N that has been approved as a replacement valve (Requirement). The textual record indicates Amendment 1 was issued to reflect that installing a new P/N valve is possible where approved (Background).

No numeric tolerance in operational check: The AD’s definition of the operational check explicitly states that “The check does not require quantitative tolerances. This is a failure finding task.” That shapes the duty: inspectors are performing a qualitative failure-finding task rather than a quantitative performance measurement, and they must follow the SB procedures for how to conduct that failure-finding task (Requirement).

Right to rely on SB and ANAC approvals: The AD provides that compliance is to be accomplished using Embraer SB No. 190-29-0008 original issue or further revisions approved by ANAC. That allocates to Embraer and ANAC the role of producing and approving the detailed procedures; operators and maintenance organisations are entitled to rely on those documents for compliance, subject to the AD’s mandatory timelines and replacement criteria (Requirement; Note).

Documentation and record-keeping (implied): While the AD text does not itself specify record-keeping requirements, compliance necessarily requires that the operational checks and any replacements be demonstrable to a regulator or auditor. The AD’s reliance on the SB for “instructions and procedures to accomplish this AD” (Requirement) implies that documentation practices will follow the SB and the applicable regulatory maintenance-record obligations; those practices are part of the mechanics of complying with the AD.

No granted exemptions or alternatives within the AD text: The AD does not include an explicit mechanism within its own text for alternative methods of compliance (AMOCs) or exemptions. It does, however, allow for SB revisions approved by ANAC and for replacement valves of a new P/N approved as a replacement valve (Requirement; Background). Any additional relief would require approval by the appropriate regulatory authority, but the AD itself does not set out an AMOC process.

Operator choice constrained by approvals: Operators have limited choices: they must carry out the operational check per the specified SB and replace a failed valve with either a passed valve of the listed P/N or an ANAC-approved replacement P/N. The AD therefore constrains replacement choices to valves with the listed P/Ns that have passed the check or to ANAC-approved replacement P/Ns; an operator cannot, under the AD text alone, select an unapproved alternative replacement P/N.

Regulatory enforcement rights: The AD was issued by CASA (signed by a delegate). The text records that the effective date of the AD is 25 August 2014 and that the instrument is AD/ERJ-190/12 Amdt 1 (Compliance; signature). The AD thus confers upon the regulator the right to expect and require compliance consistent with the AD’s terms.

The AD text itself does not set out specific civil or criminal penalties in monetary terms or imprisonment; it is an instrument imposing mandatory airworthiness requirements and specifying the actions required for compliance. The AD is issued by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and was signed by a delegate, Pieter van Dijk, with an effective date of 25 August 2014 (signature block; Compliance). As an AD, it functions as a regulatory requirement within the aviation safety framework and therefore operates as an enforceable direction by CASA to affected operators.

Mechanism of enforcement implied by the instrument: The AD prescribes precise maintenance actions and intervals (Requirement; Compliance). Compliance with those actions is a condition of continuing airworthiness and, by implication, legal operation. The AD directs operators to carry out operational checks and to replace defective valves; failure to comply would mean the aircraft would not meet the AD’s airworthiness requirements. The AD text does not itself enumerate the enforcement mechanisms used by CASA (suspension of operations, grounding, notices of non-compliance, administrative penalties), but because the AD is a formal CASA instrument and sets mandatory measures, CASA’s standard regulatory enforcement practices would be the practical means to secure compliance. The AD does not, in its text, specify an appeals process or alternative methods of compliance.

Role of ANAC approvals: The AD ties procedural compliance to Embraer’s SB and to any further revisions approved by ANAC (Requirement). Enforcement therefore may involve scrutiny of whether the operator followed the SB or an ANAC-approved revision when performing the operational check. If an operator followed an unapproved procedure and an inspection or investigation revealed non-compliance with the AD’s requirement to use the SB or ANAC-approved revisions, enforcement action could follow; the AD itself does not state the enforcement procedures but makes the approval status of SB revisions a material compliance requirement.

Timing and retrospective baseline: The compliance baseline is 27 August 2007 for the initial inspection, with recurring inspections every 600 flight hours thereafter (Compliance). Although the AD’s effective date is 25 August 2014, the compliance schedule counts from the earlier baseline date, which places an obligation on operators to ensure their maintenance histories meet the AD’s requirement. The AD does not itself specify transitional enforcement provisions for operators who, as of the effective date, had exceeded the 600 flight-hour interval without having performed the check; the AD wording (“within 600 flight hours from 27 August 2007, unless previously accomplished”) creates a clear retroactive baseline for determining whether an inspection is required or overdue (Compliance).

No monetary penalties in the document: The AD does not list monetary fines or specific statutory penalties within its text. It is a prescriptive safety instrument. The usual consequence for AD non-compliance is that the aircraft would be considered non-compliant with airworthiness directives and thereby potentially unfit to fly legally; the AD text itself does not include a schedule of monetary penalties or criminal sanctions.

Reference to external airworthiness actions: The AD notes AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE AVIAÇÃO CIVIL - BRAZIL AD 2007-02-02R2 dated 17 July 2009 (Note). That reference indicates that the Australian AD aligns with prior Brazilian regulatory action and that the AD’s requirements may be enforced in concert with the certification and approval history that ANAC records. For enforcement purposes, regulators will likely treat the AD and its referenced ANAC actions and Embraer SB as the compliance baseline.

In sum, the AD sets mandatory maintenance tasks and intervals enforceable by CASA; the AD itself does not list specific monetary or criminal penalties but creates an enforceable compliance obligation tied to the SB and ANAC approvals.

Reference to ANAC actions and Embraer SB: The AD explicitly references Embraer Service Bulletin No. 190-29-0008 (original issue) and “further revisions approved by the ANAC” as the procedural documents for accomplishing the operational check and any follow-on work (Requirement). It also notes AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE AVIAÇÃO CIVIL - BRAZIL AD 2007-02-02R2 dated 17 July 2009 as a related instrument (Note). That places the CASA AD in a regulatory and technical relationship with both the manufacturer’s service documentation and the Brazilian regulator’s prior AD action.

Delegation and issuer authority: The AD is issued by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and signed by Pieter van Dijk, Delegate of CASA (signature). The AD’s authority derives from CASA’s statutory airworthiness powers (as the issuing instrument within the provided text), and the instrument invokes the Embraer SB and ANAC approvals as the technical means of compliance. The text thus shows how CASA integrates manufacturer SBs and foreign regulator approvals into Australian ADs.

Procedural dependence on SB and ANAC approvals: The AD’s requirement that checks be performed in accordance with the Embraer SB or ANAC-approved revisions creates a procedure where CASA’s AD relies on the manufacturer for technical steps and on ANAC for approval of any SB revisions. This interdependence means that operators must follow a set of documents that span manufacturer guidance and foreign regulator approvals, as incorporated by reference in the CASA AD (Requirement; Note).

Amendment alignment with Brazilian AD revision: The AD’s Background states that Amendment 1 was issued to “fully reflect the details and requirements of revision 2 of the Brazilian AD which was issued to remove the requirement to install the same P/N valve where replacement is found necessary. Installation of a new P/N valve is now possible.” That records a direct substantive alignment between CASA’s AD amendment and the change effected in the Brazilian AD, demonstrating regulatory coordination or harmonisation on this point (Background).

No express interaction with domestic statutes in the text: The AD does not itself cite Australian legislative provisions, Civil Aviation Regulations, or other domestic statutes in its text. The instrument operates as a CASA AD: it was signed by a CASA delegate and sets mandatory airworthiness measures. Within the single document provided, specific legislative citations to enabling Acts or regulations are not included.

Cross-referencing safety evidence: The Background provides the safety evidence the AD used: periodic operational checks in routine maintenance revealed a failure rate significantly higher than expected, and the AD records the safety consequence , that dormant failures, possibly combined with other failures such as engine fire, may reduce safety margins (Background). That safety rationale is recorded in the AD and serves as the connection between the technical findings underlying other regulators’ actions (ANAC) and CASA’s decision to mandate inspections and replacements.

Practical implication for maintenance standards and approvals: The AD’s incorporation of the Embraer SB and of ANAC approvals implies a workflow where the operator and maintenance organisation must obtain or reference the SB and track ANAC-approved revisions for compliance. The AD therefore interacts operationally with manufacturer documentation and with foreign regulator approval processes.

No mention in the AD of interactions with commercial law, procurement rules or insurance: The provided AD text does not address how the mandated inspections and replacements intersect with contractual procurement obligations, insurance terms, or supplier warranties. Those commercial interactions will be practical issues for operators to manage, but they are not discussed or governed directly within the AD text.

In summary, the AD interacts with manufacturer service documentation and with prior Brazilian AD action and ANAC approvals; it is issued by CASA and reflects a coordinated regulatory posture with the foreign regulator and the manufacturer, as recorded in the AD text.

Amendment identifier and timing: The instrument is labelled AD/ERJ-190/12 Amdt 1 and is dated in the signature block 18 August 2014, with an effective date of 25 August 2014 (header, signature, Compliance). The AD’s amendment status is explicit: it is Amendment 1 to AD/ERJ-190/12.

Reason for Amendment 1: The Background states that Amendment 1 was issued “to fully reflect the details and requirements of revision 2 of the Brazilian AD which was issued to remove the requirement to install the same P/N valve where replacement is found necessary. Installation of a new P/N valve is now possible.” That records the substantive change effected by the amendment: earlier iterations required replacement with the same P/N; Amendment 1 allows for an approved new P/N to be installed in place of the original P/N where replacement is necessary (Background).

Cross-reference to Brazilian AD revision 2: The AD expressly notes AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE AVIAÇÃO CIVIL - BRAZIL AD 2007-02-02R2 dated 17 July 2009 (Note). The Background links Amendment 1 to that Brazilian AD revision and records that the Amendment reflects the details and requirements of the Brazilian revision. This identifies the Brazilian AD revision 2 as the antecedent source for the change to replacement options.

Original AD and timeline: The AD requires inspections within 600 flight hours from 27 August 2007 unless already accomplished, and this baseline date appears in the Compliance paragraph (Compliance). The AD’s effective date and the amendment signature are in August 2014. The AD, as amended, therefore sets inspection intervals counting from 2007 and formalises a continuation of that requirement with a fresh effective date in 2014. The AD text does not, within the provided material, state when the original AD was first issued in Australia, other than that this instrument is Amendment 1 to AD/ERJ-190/12.

Document references and tracing: The AD makes the Embraer SB No. 190-29-0008 original issue and further revisions approved by ANAC the operative technical documents for accomplishing the AD (Requirement). Amendment 1’s alignment with Brazilian AD revision 2 indicates a document-trace chain: the Brazilian AD revision implemented a change (removal of the same-P/N requirement) and CASA’s Amendment 1 adopted that revision’s content into the Australian AD.

No further amendments recorded in the provided text: The document provided contains Amendment 1 and notes to the Brazilian AD revision. The AD text does not list further amendments beyond Amdt 1 or any subsequent changes; for the provided instrument, Amdt 1 is the recorded amendment.

Signature and issuer record: The AD is signed by Pieter van Dijk, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, dated 18 August 2014 (signature block). The effective date is noted as 25 August 2014 (Compliance). These dates and the signature establish the formal amendment procedure and its administrative record in the AD text.

In short, the AD’s amendment history recorded in the text is focused: Amendment 1 was issued in August 2014 to reflect Brazilian AD revision 2 (dated 17 July 2009) that permitted installation of an approved new P/N when replacement is required. The AD’s compliance schedule retains a baseline date of 27 August 2007 for the initial inspection.

The AD text provided does not record any litigation history. There are no references within the instrument to court decisions, proceedings, appeals, or legal challenges related to AD/ERJ-190/12 or its Amendment 1. The document contains the technical requirement, the compliance timing, the background safety rationale, a cross-reference to the Brazilian AD 2007-02-02R2 dated 17 July 2009, and the administrative signature block (Requirement; Note; Background; signature). It does not include any mention of administrative appeals, judicial review, or litigation outcomes.

Accordingly, based solely on the text supplied, there is no litigation history to summarise; the AD itself is a regulatory safety instrument and the text does not purport to narrate legal challenges or dispute outcomes.

If a practitioner needs to know whether any legal challenges, compliance disputes, or enforcement actions have arisen in practice concerning this AD, those details are not contained in the instrument as provided and would require searching regulatory enforcement records, administrative appeal records, or court dockets beyond the AD text.

Counting baseline and retrospective initial inspection: The AD requires an initial inspection “within 600 flight hours from 27 August 2007, unless previously accomplished” (Compliance). The effective date of the AD is 25 August 2014. That timing creates an important compliance artefact: the initial inspection interval is counted from a date well before the AD’s effective date. Operators must therefore check their maintenance history dating back to 27 August 2007 to determine whether an initial inspection was already completed and whether an inspection is currently due or overdue. The AD text does not provide transitional relief text; it simply sets the baseline date and interval (Compliance).

Operational check definition is qualitative: The AD states the operational check is “A task to determine that an item is fulfilling its intended purpose. The check does not require quantitative tolerances. This is a failure finding task” (Requirement). This qualitative framing means the operator cannot rely on numeric tolerances specified in the AD; instead, the operational check is a failure-finding process to be executed per the Embraer SB. Interpretation risk arises because a qualitative, failure-finding check may be subject to differing interpretations between maintenance providers unless the Embraer SB procedures are precise and followed verbatim (Requirement).

Dependence on Embraer SB and ANAC approvals: The AD mandates the operational check be performed “in accordance with Embraer Service Bulletin (SB) No. 190-29-0008 original issue, or further revisions approved by the ANAC” (Requirement). This creates dependence on the SB for methods and on ANAC for approval of revisions. If the applicable SB copy is not available in an operator’s records, or if an operator has a later SB revision that has not been ANAC-approved, there could be compliance uncertainty. Operators must ensure they have the correct SB edition and track ANAC approvals for any SB revisions referenced by the AD.

Replacement valve P/N options hinge on approvals: The AD allows replacement with the existing P/N valves that have passed the operational check, or with a new P/N that has been approved as a replacement valve (Requirement). The availability of an approved new P/N depends on approval processes external to the AD text. Operators cannot, under the AD, simply source and fit an alternative valve P/N without the required approval; doing so would risk non-compliance.

Interpretation of “passed the operational check”: The AD permits replacement with a valve bearing P/N 975287-3 or 975287-5 “that has passed the operational check” (Requirement). Practically, that raises questions about what documentation is required to show a valve has passed the operational check (e.g. historical maintenance records, traceability to the SB procedure). The AD itself does not specify the form of evidence or record-keeping required; the SB likely addresses documentation, but operators should not assume any particular record format unless the SB or CASA guidance prescribes it.

No AMOC procedure included in text: The AD does not set out an alternative methods of compliance process in its text. Where operators might seek to use a different inspection method or replacement part, the AD ties acceptable methods to Embraer SB or ANAC-approved revisions. Any alternative compliance would therefore need to be pursued through the relevant regulatory approval channels outside the AD’s text.

Interaction with prior Brazilian AD: The AD records that it reflects revision 2 of the Brazilian AD (Background) and specifically references AGÊNCIA NACIONAL DE AVIAÇÃO CIVIL - BRAZIL AD 2007-02-02R2 dated 17 July 2009 (Note). Operators should be attentive to the content of that Brazilian AD and any associated approvals, because Amendment 1 was issued to match that revision’s removal of the same-P/N replacement requirement. Understanding the lineage of approvals and the content of the Brazilian AD will therefore be useful in interpreting permissible replacement options.

Potential parts availability and logistics: The AD’s replacement options depend on either reusing valves with the specified P/Ns that have passed the operational check or installing an approved replacement P/N. If valves with the specified P/Ns that have passed the operational check are not readily available, operators may need to source an ANAC-approved replacement P/N or manage aircraft downtime while obtaining a compliant part. The AD text does not address supply-chain reality, but the replacement options and approval condition create practical procurement points.

No explicit documentation or enforcement mechanisms included: The AD does not itself enumerate enforcement steps, civil penalty amounts, or the precise documentation form required to demonstrate compliance. While these are typical features of regulatory enforcement, the AD text does not provide this level of administrative detail. Operators should therefore treat the AD’s procedural requirements as mandatory and ensure they can evidence compliance as part of their airworthiness records.

In short, the key “gotchas” are the retroactive baseline date for the first inspection, the qualitative nature of the operational check, dependence on the Embraer SB and ANAC approvals, the need for clear documentation that a valve “has passed” the operational check, and the absence in the AD text of an AMOC procedure or explicit enforcement mechanics.

Step 1 , determine applicability: Review the aircraft configuration to confirm whether the aircraft is an Embraer ERJ-190 series aeroplane equipped with firewall hydraulic shutoff valves P/N 975287-3 or 975287-5. The AD’s Applicability clause limits the AD to those aircraft fitted with those specific part numbers (Applicability). If the aircraft does not have either P/N fitted, this AD’s requirements do not apply in respect of firewall hydraulic shutoff valves.

Step 2 , check maintenance history against baseline date: For applicable aircraft, verify whether an operational check of the firewall hydraulic shutoff valve has already been performed since the baseline date. The AD requires an initial inspection “within 600 flight hours from 27 August 2007, unless previously accomplished” (Compliance). Operators should examine maintenance records dating from 27 August 2007 forward to determine whether the initial inspection required by this AD has already been performed; if not, the operator must schedule the initial operational check within the 600 flight-hour window measured from that baseline.

Step 3 , obtain and follow the Embraer SB and ANAC-approved revisions: Acquire Embraer Service Bulletin No. 190-29-0008 (original issue) and check whether any subsequent revisions have been issued. The AD requires that the operational check be performed in accordance with Embraer SB No. 190-29-0008 original issue, or “further revisions approved by the ANAC” (Requirement). Follow the SB’s instructions and procedures precisely for the operational check; if relying on a later SB revision, ensure that the revision is approved by ANAC as required by the AD.

Step 4 , perform the operational check as a failure-finding task: Conduct the operational check as defined in the AD: “A task to determine that an item is fulfilling its intended purpose. The check does not require quantitative tolerances. This is a failure finding task” (Requirement). Execute the SB-specified failure-finding procedures and document the finding. Because the AD frames the check as qualitative and failure-finding, it is important to adhere to the SB’s procedural steps and any criteria it sets for declaring a valve passed or failed.

Step 5 , replace faulty valves according to AD options: If the operational check reveals a faulty valve, replace it in accordance with the AD. Replacement options are: (a) a valve bearing P/N 975287-3 or 975287-5 that has passed the operational check, or (b) a valve bearing a new P/N that has been approved as a replacement valve (Requirement). Confirm whether a new replacement P/N has ANAC approval before fitting, and ensure any replacement valve has the requisite certification and traceability. For re-used or spare valves of P/N 975287-3 or 975287-5, confirm and document that the valve has passed the operational check.

Step 6 , schedule recurring inspections: After the initial inspection, schedule and perform subsequent operational checks at intervals not to exceed 600 flight hours (Compliance). Keep a proactive maintenance schedule aligned to the 600 flight-hour interval and document each operational check and any replacements, including reference to the Embraer SB revision used and any ANAC approvals relied upon.

Step 7 , record-keeping and traceability: While the AD does not prescribe the exact form of records, compliance necessarily requires maintenance records that demonstrate the operational checks were performed per the Embraer SB (or ANAC-approved revision), including dates, flight-hour counters at inspection, the outcome of the check, and details of any replacement valves installed (P/N, serial number, evidence of passing the operational check or evidence of ANAC approval for replacement P/N). Ensure maintenance records are auditable and retained in accordance with applicable airworthiness record-keeping standards (the AD references the SB for instructions and procedures to accomplish this AD) (Requirement).

Step 8 , manage parts procurement and approvals: If a replacement valve of a new P/N is to be used, confirm that it is “approved as a replacement valve” consistent with the AD (Requirement). That approval pathway is not detailed within the AD text itself; operators should confirm with the manufacturer and with ANAC (or the relevant authority) the approved replacement P/N list and the documentation required to demonstrate approval before installation.

Step 9 , coordinate with regulator where necessary: If there is uncertainty about whether an SB revision is ANAC-approved, or if an operator seeks to use an alternative inspection method or replacement part not explicitly permitted by the AD, approach CASA and/or ANAC as appropriate to seek clarification or approval. The AD ties procedural compliance to Embraer SB and ANAC-approved revisions, so cross-jurisdictional clarification may be required for certain alternative courses of action (Requirement; Note).

Step 10 , audit and internal compliance checks: Incorporate the AD’s inspection intervals into the operator’s continuing airworthiness management system. Regularly audit compliance with the 600 flight-hour interval and with Embraer SB procedures, and ensure that maintenance staff are trained on the SB’s operational-check procedures and on how to document a valve that has “passed the operational check” in a way that will stand up to regulatory inspection (Requirement; Compliance).

Practical checklist (grounded in the AD text):

• Confirm aircraft is subject to the AD (P/N 975287-3 or 975287-5 fitted) (Applicability).
• Verify initial inspection status against 27 August 2007 baseline and plan an initial inspection if not already completed within the 600 flight-hour window (Compliance).
• Obtain Embraer SB No. 190-29-0008 original issue and confirm whether later revisions are ANAC-approved (Requirement).
• Perform the operational check per the SB, noting that it is a failure-finding task without quantitative tolerances (Requirement).
• If failed, replace with (a) P/N 975287-3 or 975287-5 valve that has passed the operational check, or (b) an ANAC-approved replacement P/N valve (Requirement).
• Record all work done, with references to the SB revision and any ANAC approvals used (Requirement).
• Repeat inspections at intervals not to exceed 600 flight hours (Compliance).

Following these steps aligns operations with the AD’s mandatory requirements. The AD’s text emphasises reliance on Embraer SB instructions and ANAC approvals; ensuring access to those documents and to any approvals is a necessary practical step for compliant execution of the AD.