AD/ERJ-190/1 - Air Data Smart Probes

The AD turns on a short set of technical and administrative concepts that operators must understand and act upon:

• Applicability by aircraft model and part number: The AD applies to ERJ-190 model aeroplanes equipped with Air Data Smart Probes having P/N 2015G2H2H-4( ), -5( ), -6( ) or -7( ). That list defines the universe of affected aircraft; if an aeroplane does not have these part numbers installed, the AD's requirements do not apply to it as written.
• Detailed inspection: Note 1 supplies a formal definition of "detailed inspection." It is not a cursory check. The AD quotes the definition: "An intensive examination of a specific item, installation or assembly to detect damage, failure or irregularity. Available lighting is normally supplemented with a direct source of good lighting at an intensity deemed appropriate. Inspection aids such as mirrors, magnifying lenses, etc., may be necessary. Surface cleaning and elaborate access procedures may be required." That sets an operational standard for how the inspection is to be performed and implies material resource and time requirements beyond a quick visual check.
• Repetitive interval and terminal action: The AD sets a repetitive inspection interval , 600 hours TIS , measured from "the first issue of an Australian Certificate of Airworthiness" and then repeated at intervals not exceeding 600 hours TIS until the probe is replaced by P/N 2015G2H2H-8( ). The AD also defines a clear terminal action: installation of the P/N-8 probe per Embraer SB 190-34-0008 terminates the need for further repetitive inspections on that probe.
• Prohibition on reinstallation of pre-existing part numbers: Requirement 2 explicitly bars reinstalling older P/Ns as replacements for the P/N-8 replacement probe. The AD states: "Air data smart probes part number ... may not be reinstalled on any aeroplane as a replacement for probe P/N 2015G2H2H-8( )." This creates a one-way upgrade pathway: once a P/N-8 is installed, operators cannot revert to the listed earlier P/Ns as replacements.
• Reference to manufacturer documentation and foreign authority approvals: The inspection and replacement actions are to be carried out "in accordance with Embraer Service Bulletin 190-34-0003, original issue, dated 2 December 2005 or further revisions approved by the Brazilian Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (ANAC)." Likewise, the terminating SB reference is SB 190-34-0008, original issue 19 September 2006 or ANAC-approved revisions. The AD therefore conditions compliance on specific manufacturer procedures and on an approving role for ANAC regarding later revisions.
• Safety rationale: The AD records ANAC's reports that moisture in the pneumatic passage may freeze and block pressure sensors, producing erroneous Air Data System inputs. That causal statement is the operational hazard the AD seeks to address.

These concepts structure the compliance obligations: which aircraft are covered, how to perform the inspection, how often, what counts as terminal action, and what installations are forbidden. The AD delegates procedural detail to Embraer SBs and reserves ANAC as the acceptance authority for later revisions of those SBs.

The directive names the affected parties and, implicitly, those who will bear costs and compliance responsibilities:

• Operators and owners of ERJ-190 aeroplanes that are fitted with Air Data Smart Probes P/N 2015G2H2H-4( ), -5( ), -6( ) or -7( ). The AD is explicitly applicable to "ERJ-190 model aeroplanes, equipped with Air Data Smart Probes part number ...", so owners/operators of such aeroplanes are the primary obliged parties to perform the inspections and, if chosen, effect the probe replacement.
• Maintenance organisations and technicians engaged by those operators. The AD requires a "detailed inspection" as defined in Note 1; that definition prescribes use of lighting, mirrors, magnification, surface cleaning and potentially "elaborate access procedures." Those tasks will typically fall to licensed maintenance personnel or approved maintenance organisations retained by the operator.
• Embraer, as the manufacturer of the probes and author of the referenced Service Bulletins, plays a procedural role: the AD requires adherence to Embraer SB 190-34-0003 for inspection and provides Embraer SB 190-34-0008 as the means to effect the terminating action. The AD also conditions compliance on "further revisions approved by ANAC," thus involving Embraer's cooperation with ANAC for any later SB revisions.
• The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) via its delegate who signed the AD (David Punshon), and ANAC. The AD was issued under CASA authority and it repeatedly references ANAC approvals. CASA enforces Australian airworthiness standards and has issued the directive; ANAC is cited as the approving authority for SB revisions and as the source of the safety reports prompting the AD.
• Other parties with logistical or spare parts roles, such as spare parts suppliers or overhaul shops, will be indirectly affected: the AD forbids reinstalling older probe part numbers as replacements for P/N-8 and thereby constrains acceptable spares.

Who pays: the source implies that operators bear the costs , inspections every 600 hours TIS until replacement, removal of moisture if found, and the cost of purchasing and installing P/N-8 probes if they elect the terminating action. Who decides operationally: the AD prescribes the obligations, but operators decide when to schedule inspections subject to the 600-hour TIS interval and whether to procure P/N-8 probes to end the repetitive inspections. Who certifies compliance: the AD specifies compliance with Embraer service documentation or ANAC-approved revisions; CASA issued the AD and is the issuing authority, but the AD does not, in its text, describe the administrative mechanics of verification or record-keeping. The AD's applicability is strictly limited to the specified ERJ-190s with the listed probe P/Ns; aeroplanes without those probes are not captured by this instrument as written.

The AD imposes a short list of specific duties and creates one clear operational right (the option of terminal action). All are set out in the instrument text:

Duties:

• Perform detailed inspections of the four Air Data Smart Probes drain hole and remove any accumulated moisture. This is labelled Requirement 1 and must be done "in accordance with Embraer Service Bulletin 190-34-0003, original issue, dated 2 December 2005 or further revisions approved by ANAC." The AD defines "detailed inspection" in Note 1, setting the expected standard of examination: augmented lighting, inspection aids, surface cleaning and possibly elaborate access procedures.
• Observe the inspection interval and triggers. The AD sets the compliance timeline for Requirement 1 precisely: the initial inspection must be carried out "either within the next 600 hours time in service (TIS) after the first issue of an Australian Certificate of Airworthiness and thereafter, at intervals that do not exceed 600 hours TIS until the Air Data Smart Probe is replaced by a probe P/N 2015G2H2H-8( )." That ties the inspection cadence to the aircraft's time-in-service metric and to the first issue of an Australian Certificate of Airworthiness for initial timing.
• Adhere to the prohibition on reinstalling certain probe part numbers. Requirement 2 provides: "Air data smart probes part number (P/N) 2015G2H2H-4( ), ... -5( ), -6( ) or -7( ) may not be reinstalled on any aeroplane as a replacement for probe P/N 2015G2H2H-8( )." Requirement 2 is effective from the AD's effective date.

Rights and options:

• Operators have one explicit right: the AD permits an optional installation of probe P/N 2015G2H2H-8( ) per Embraer SB 190-34-0008 to serve as terminating action to the repetitive inspections. The AD states this as an option: "The optional installation ... constitutes terminal action to the repetitive inspections."

Procedural specifications and cross-references:

• The AD conditions compliance actions on the Embraer service documentation and on ANAC approvals for later revisions. Both Requirement 1 and the terminal-action SB reference permit "further revisions approved by the Brazilian Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (ANAC)." That effectively gives ANAC an acceptance role for SB changes that operators may rely upon.
• The AD does not itself prescribe how inspections are to be recorded, submitted to CASA, or audited. It does supply an explicit definition of the level of inspection effort required (Note 1), which sets an implicit minimum standard for maintenance records to demonstrate compliance when required.

Operationally, the duties oblige operators to schedule and resource regular maintenance checks every 600 hours TIS, to perform detailed inspections to the specified standard, and to prevent reinstalling older probes as replacements for P/N-8 once that replacement path is used. Operators also have the right to remove the recurring inspection burden by electing to install P/N-8 probes following the specified Embraer SB.

The AD text itself does not set out penalty provisions, sanctions, or the procedural enforcement mechanisms that CASA may use. The document records the mandatory requirements and the effective date , "This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 27 March 2008" , and is signed by David Punshon, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, but it does not include any express penalty schedule or enforcement process within the text provided.

From the instrument's terms, enforcement implications can be drawn in limited form from what the AD does state:

• Mandatory nature: The AD sets out mandatory requirements ("Carry out a detailed inspection ...", "Air data smart probes ... may not be reinstalled ..."). The inclusion of specific "Requirement" and "Compliance" language indicates obligations that the issuing authority intends to be complied with by affected operators; the AD's effective date fixes when those obligations begin.
• Effective date and immediate prohibition: Requirement 2's compliance is stated to be "As of the effective date of this Directive." The AD's effective date is specified as 27 March 2008. The immediate effective prohibition creates a contemporaneous obligation from that date onward.

What the AD does not say or specify:

• The AD does not identify who will monitor compliance, what evidence will satisfy the regulator that compliance has occurred, or what civil or criminal penalties may flow from non-compliance. The AD also does not prescribe rectification timeframes beyond the 600-hour TIS inspection interval for Requirement 1. It does not detail administrative processes such as mandatory reporting to CASA, forms to be completed, or the mechanism for CASA to approve alternate methods of compliance.
• The AD does not give any timetable or process for ANAC approvals of later SB revisions; it simply conditions the permissibility of SB revisions on ANAC approval.

In practice (not stated in the AD text), airworthiness directives are instruments that regulators use within their civil aviation oversight frameworks to ensure continuing airworthiness. However, the document at hand contains only the affirmative obligations, the compliance intervals, the references to service documentation and ANAC approval, and the effective date. Any enforcement steps, sanctions or remedial procedures would need to be identified in CASA's broader regulatory framework, enforcement policy, or other administrative instruments; those are not present in the source provided. The AD does, nonetheless, convert the safety concern reported by ANAC into clear operational duties with specified timing and an identified terminating action.

The AD references and interacts with a small set of external instruments and administrative facts; the source itself names only a few, and the AD conditions compliance upon them. These interactions, as stated in the AD, are:

• Australian Certificate of Airworthiness: The compliance timing for the initial inspection is tied to "the first issue of an Australian Certificate of Airworthiness." The AD sets the initial inspection obligation as occurring "either within the next 600 hours time in service (TIS) after the first issue of an Australian Certificate of Airworthiness and thereafter, at intervals that do not exceed 600 hours TIS ...". That explicitly links the AD's timing to the domestic certification milestone.
• Embraer Service Bulletins: The AD makes compliance contingent on procedures in Embraer Service Bulletin 190-34-0003 for the inspection and SB 190-34-0008 for the optional terminating action. Both SBs are referenced with their original issue dates (2 December 2005 and 19 September 2006 respectively) and the AD allows "further revisions approved by ANAC." Thus, the AD requires operators to follow manufacturer-prescribed procedures, subject to ANAC's approval of later revisions.
• ANAC AD and ANAC approvals: The AD explicitly refers to ANAC in two ways: first, the AD cites ANAC as the authority which received the safety reports that prompted the AD, stating "The ANAC has received reports of moisture ..." and noting ANAC AD 2006-05-08R1 as a related item. Second, the AD repeatedly conditions the permissibility of later SB revisions on "approval by the Brazilian Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (ANAC)." This creates a cross-jurisdictional interaction: CASA's Australian AD requires that any later SB revisions relied upon for compliance be approved by the Brazilian authority.
• Manufacturer instructions as incorporated standards: By incorporating Embraer SBs by reference, the AD makes those SBs a de facto part of the compliance regime for the affected aircraft in Australia. The AD therefore interacts functionally with the contractual and regulatory space in which manufacturer service documentation sets maintenance standards.

What the AD does not specify regarding interactions:

• It does not reference CASA enforcement policy, the Australian Civil Aviation Regulations, or specify the legal mechanism whereby failure to comply affects the validity of certificates. The AD is self-contained in its technical requirements and cross-references to Embraer SBs and ANAC approvals, but it does not itself reproduce or restate broader statutory enforcement mechanisms.
• The AD also does not articulate how an operator might seek an alternate means of compliance (AMC) from CASA, or whether ANAC approval is sufficient for CASA to accept a revised SB as compliant. It simply allows "further revisions approved by ANAC" as the acceptable standard in place of the original SBs.

In short, the AD interacts directly with: (1) the administrative fact of the Australian Certificate of Airworthiness for initial timing; (2) Embraer service documentation, made mandatory for the technical execution of the inspections and replacements; and (3) ANAC, both as the originator of the safety reports and as the approving authority for SB revisions that CASA accepts for compliance. The AD does not, in the text provided, reference other Australian legal instruments or administrative processes by which compliance is certified or enforced.

The AD text identifies a limited amendment-related trail, but it does not provide a multi-versioned history in full. The textual elements that are relevant to amendment history are:

• Document identifiers: The AD is labelled AD/ERJ-190/1 and carries the marker "5/2008 DM." Those markings indicate issuer, AD number and an internal dating/version element, but the AD does not include a prior Australian AD version within the text supplied.
• References to earlier foreign AD and service bulletin issues: The AD refers to Embraer Service Bulletin 190-34-0003, original issue dated 2 December 2005, and Embraer SB 190-34-0008, original issue dated 19 September 2006. It also references ANAC AD 2006-05-08R1. These references show that the technical issue and manufacturer guidance pre-date this 2008 Australian Directive, and that ANAC and Embraer had previously acted or published materials dealing with the condition.
• Provision for later revisions: The AD repeatedly allows "further revisions approved by the Brazilian Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (ANAC)" in place of the original SB issues. That wording provides a mechanism for later SB revisions to be incorporated as compliant actions without needing a new Australian AD for each SB revision. It functions as an amendment-by-reference hook rather than as a direct amendment of the AD text.
• Effective date and signature: The AD states "This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 27 March 2008." It was signed on 12 March 2008 by David Punshon, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. The dates show the timeframe of issuance and start of legal effect.

What the AD does not contain about amendment history:

• The AD does not include a revision log of multiple versions of the Australian AD itself; the source provides only the single text as issued in 2008.
• It does not list subsequent amendments, revocations or superseding Australian ADs. The AD does allow for later ANAC-approved SB revisions to be used for compliance, but it does not itself record any changes made after its issue.

For users tracking amendment status, the AD's allowance for ANAC-approved SB revisions is the key mechanism by which the technical instructions may evolve without reissuing the AD in Australia. However, the AD as supplied offers no AUS-specific amendment or consolidated history beyond its original issue and effective date, and it points operators to the manufacturer SBs and ANAC for updates to the technical procedures.

The AD text contains no litigation history. It does not reference any judicial decisions, contested administrative proceedings, or enforcement actions related to this AD. The document is technical and administrative in character and contains only the safety rationale, the requirements, compliance provisions and reference materials.

What can be stated from the source:

• There are no cited cases, appeals, or legal proceedings embedded in the AD document. It makes no mention of litigation before or after its issuance.
• The AD references ANAC AD 2006-05-08R1 and Embraer SBs as antecedent documents; none of those references include or cite litigation in the text provided.

Implications and practical considerations for legal practitioners or researchers:

• Absence of litigation references in the AD does not necessarily imply that the AD has not been the subject of later administrative review or court proceedings; it simply means the AD itself does not describe any such history.
• For anyone seeking the enforcement record, disputes over interpretation, or precedent on how CASA enforces ADs in Australia, the AD text will not be sufficient. One would need to consult CASA administrative records, enforcement summaries, tribunal or court dockets and decisions, or public registers that track AD compliance disputes , none of which are included in the source provided.
• Similarly, if a party wished to challenge the technical basis of the AD or to seek an alternate means of compliance, that procedural history (whether requests were made and accepted or refused) is not recorded in the AD text.

In short, the source provides no litigation history. Any analysis of disputes, appeals, or judicial review would require external sources outside the AD text supplied.

The AD contains several specific technical and administrative features that can have operational consequences if overlooked. The following points derive directly from the AD text and its built-in definitions:

• Applicability is part-number specific. The AD applies only to ERJ-190 aeroplanes "equipped with Air Data Smart Probes part number (P/N) 2015G2H2H-4( ), 2015G2H2H-5( ), 2015G2H2H-6( ) or 2015G2H2H-7( )." Aircraft with different probe part numbers are not covered by the AD as written. Failing to check installed P/Ns could mean applying the wrong compliance regime.
• Timing tied to "first issue of an Australian Certificate of Airworthiness." The initial inspection window is "within the next 600 hours TIS after the first issue of an Australian Certificate of Airworthiness." For imported aircraft or newly certificated assets, the counting anchor is the first Australian Certificate of Airworthiness. Operators must be clear whether the aircraft has passed that milestone and how many hours TIS have accrued since, in order to determine the initial inspection due date.
• Definition of "detailed inspection" increases labour and access needs. Note 1 defines "detailed inspection" with several operational requirements: augmented lighting, inspection aids (mirrors, magnifying lenses), surface cleaning, and possibly elaborate access procedures. That is not a quick check; it implies additional tools, time and possibly removal of components or access panels, which increases maintenance burden and aircraft on-ground time.
• Recurrent inspections until replacement: The inspection obligation repeats "at intervals that do not exceed 600 hours TIS until the Air Data Smart Probe is replaced by a probe P/N 2015G2H2H-8( )." That means operators who do not elect the terminal action must budget for ongoing recurring checks. The AD does not provide an end date for these inspections other than the replacement; the only way to end the recurring inspections is installation of P/N-8 per SB 190-34-0008.
• Prohibition on reinstalling older probes as replacements for P/N-8. Requirement 2 forbids reinstalling older probe P/Ns "as a replacement for probe P/N 2015G2H2H-8( )." This is a one-way upgrade constraint: if an operator installs P/N-8 probes, they cannot later replace a failed P/N-8 with the older P/Ns. The AD does not address whether older P/Ns may be reinstalled in aircraft that have never received a P/N-8 upgrade; the prohibition is cast specifically as "as a replacement for probe P/N 2015G2H2H-8( )."
• Reliance on ANAC approvals for SB revisions. The AD allows substitute or later SB revisions only if "approved by the Brazilian Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (ANAC)." Operators must confirm the approval status of any revised SBs with ANAC; CASA acceptance appears in the AD to depend on ANAC approval, so assuming that a later SB is usable without verifying ANAC approval could be a compliance mistake.
• The AD provides no administrative mechanics in its text. There are no specific instructions in the AD on required record-keeping, reporting of findings, or whom to notify if moisture is found or if probes are replaced. The AD also does not set out who verifies compliance or the form of evidence to be kept. Operators should therefore anticipate that maintenance records consistent with Note 1's level of inspection will be necessary to demonstrate compliance in any audit or oversight review.
• Effective date versus signature date. The AD is signed on 12 March 2008 but becomes effective on 27 March 2008. Operators should not conflate signature date with the effective date; Requirement 2 is "as of the effective date of this Directive." That means the prohibition takes effect on 27 March 2008.
• The AD does not prescribe permissible alternative means of compliance in its text. If an operator believes an equivalent inspection technique or alternate hardware would be appropriate, the AD itself does not describe the process to obtain regulator acceptance of an alternate method; the operator will need to consult CASA processes outside the AD text.

Each of these points is drawn from the AD wording. Overlooking any of them can create scheduling, parts-sourcing or compliance gaps. The AD's explicit definition of inspection, the link to certification milestones and the one-way prohibition on reinstalling older probes are particularly likely to generate implementation frictions unless proactively managed.

Compliance with the AD, as described in the source, requires a narrow set of concrete actions and verifications. The AD makes those actions explicit; the steps below paraphrase and sequence them as a compliance checklist based on the AD text.

1. Confirm applicability:

   • Verify whether the aeroplane is an ERJ-190 model aeroplane and whether it is equipped with Air Data Smart Probes P/N 2015G2H2H-4( ), -5( ), -6( ) or -7( ). The AD's applicability clause limits obligations to aircraft with those specific part numbers.

2. Establish the initial compliance timing:

   • Determine the date of the "first issue of an Australian Certificate of Airworthiness" for the aircraft and track hours time in service (TIS) from that date. The initial inspection must be carried out "within the next 600 hours TIS after the first issue" of that certificate. If the aircraft has already passed that milestone, confirm remaining hours and schedule accordingly.

3. Perform the mandated inspection per the stated standard:

   • Execute a "detailed inspection" of the four Air Data Smart Probes drain hole and remove any accumulated moisture in accordance with Embraer Service Bulletin 190-34-0003, original issue dated 2 December 2005, or a later revision approved by ANAC. Note 1 defines "detailed inspection" and prescribes necessary aids and procedures: augmented lighting, mirrors, magnifying lenses, surface cleaning and possibly elaborate access procedures. Ensure maintenance personnel are briefed to the Note 1 standard and that appropriate tools and access provisions are available.

4. Schedule and document recurrent inspections:

   • After the initial inspection, schedule and perform subsequent inspections at intervals that do not exceed 600 hours TIS until a terminal action is taken. Maintain records showing each inspection date, the hours TIS at inspection, the inspection findings, and any corrective actions taken (for example, removal of accumulated moisture).

5. Consider terminal action (optional):

   • If the organisation wishes to end the recurring inspection requirement, install Air Data Smart Probes P/N 2015G2H2H-8( ) in accordance with Embraer SB 190-34-0008, original issue dated 19 September 2006, or further revisions approved by ANAC. The AD explicitly provides that such installation "constitutes terminal action to the repetitive inspections." Confirm that the SB referenced is the correct issue and that any later revisions relied upon have ANAC approval.

6. Observe the prohibition on certain replacements:

   • From the AD's effective date (27 March 2008), ensure that older probe part numbers P/N 2015G2H2H-4( ), -5( ), -6( ) or -7( ) are not reinstalled "as a replacement for probe P/N 2015G2H2H-8( )." Practically, this requires parts control and change-record discipline so that a P/N-8 is not replaced with an older P/N once installed.

7. Verify ANAC approvals for SB revisions:

   • If relying on a later revision of SB 190-34-0003 or SB 190-34-0008, confirm that the revision has ANAC approval as the AD requires ANAC-approved revisions in lieu of the original SB versions.

8. Maintain demonstrable records commensurate with inspection definition:

   • Because Note 1 elevates the inspection standard, keep detailed maintenance records sufficient to demonstrate that a "detailed inspection" was performed. Records should identify tools used, any cleaning or access procedures performed, findings and corrective actions (moisture removal), and the hours TIS at which the inspection took place.

9. Coordinate with maintenance organisations and parts suppliers:

   • Ensure maintenance providers are familiar with the Note 1 inspection standards and Embraer SB procedures. For operators opting to install P/N-8 probes, confirm parts availability and that installation follows Embraer SB 190-34-0008.

10. Monitor related ANAC or Embraer communications:

    • Because the AD allows later SB revisions if ANAC-approved, operators should monitor Embraer and ANAC communications for revised SB issues and confirm approval status before relying on them for compliance.

The AD does not set out reporting channels, alternative methods of compliance, or specific proof-of-compliance documentation in its text. Therefore, in addition to the steps above, operators should be prepared to produce maintenance records consistent with the AD's inspection definition on regulator request and to engage with CASA or ANAC as necessary to confirm acceptance of revised service instructions. All steps above are directly traceable to the AD requirements, the compliance paragraph, and Note 1 in the source text.