AD/ERJ-170/10 Amdt 2 - Firewall Hydraulic Shutoff Valves

The AD centres on a few discrete technical and regulatory concepts as stated in the text.

• Applicability and affected hardware. The AD applies to Embraer ERJ-170 aircraft fitted with firewall hydraulic shutoff valves P/N 975287-3 or P/N 975287-5 (Applicability). Amendment 1 is recorded as having added an additional part number to the applicability, although the requirement did not change (Background).

• Operational check. The AD requires an operational check in accordance with Embraer Service Bulletin No. 170-29-0013, original issue dated 12 December 2006, or subsequent revisions approved by ANAC (Requirement). The AD provides its own definition of “operational check”: a task to determine that an item is fulfilling its intended purpose, not requiring quantitative tolerances, and characterised as a failure-finding task (Requirement). That definition clarifies that the check is qualitative rather than a precision measurement.

• Suitable/serviceable valve. The AD defines “a suitable FWSOV” as either a firewall hydraulic shutoff valve P/N 975287-3 or P/N 975287-5 that has passed the operational check in the Embraer service bulletin, or the replacement of these valves by others bearing a new part number (Requirement). The AD also uses the term “serviceable FWSOV” when directing replacement if necessary (Requirement). The interplay of “suitable” and “serviceable” in the text indicates that passing the operational check renders the valve acceptable, and that acceptable replacement valves can bear a new part number.

• Recurrence interval. The compliance requirement uses a flight-hour interval: initial check within 600 flight hours after 7 June 2007, then repeating at intervals not to exceed 600 flight hours (Compliance). The interval is anchored to a specific date (7 June 2007) rather than to calendar days or cycles.

• Source documents and approvals. The AD requires compliance with an Embraer service bulletin, but only the original issue or later revisions that are ANAC-approved. The AD also refers to an ANAC AD: AD No. 2007-02-01R2 dated 17 July 2009 (Requirement; Note). This imports external documents and an approval gate into the AD’s compliance regime.

• Amendment history. The AD is presented as having an original issue and at least two amendments. Amendment 1 added a part number to applicability while leaving requirements unchanged; Amendment 2 (this instrument) removes the requirement to replace the FWSOV with one bearing the same P/N (Background; amendment note).

These concepts define what operators must do (run failure-finding operational checks, replace failing valves), which valves are in scope, how often checks must occur, which external technical documents control the method, and which oversight authority’s approvals are required for subsequent revisions of the service bulletin (ANAC). The AD’s textual definitions shape inspection tolerances (qualitative) and acceptable replacements (either passing check or carrying a new P/N).

The AD affects a clearly defined group and a set of upstream and downstream stakeholders as stated in the text.

• Aircraft operators and owners. Any operator or owner of Embraer ERJ-170 aircraft fitted with FWSOV P/N 975287-3 or P/N 975287-5 falls within the Applicability. They bear the direct operational and financial responsibility for compliance: scheduling and performing the mandated checks at the 600 flight-hour intervals and replacing any valves that fail.

• Maintenance organisations and engineers. Licensed maintenance organisations and personnel who conduct the operational check per Embraer SB No.170-29-0013 and perform valve replacements are directly affected (Requirement). They must be familiar with the Embraer service bulletin’s procedures and with the AD’s definition that an operational check is failure-finding and qualitative.

• Parts suppliers and manufacturers. Suppliers of FWSOVs, including providers of parts bearing the specified P/Ns and any “new P/N” replacement valves, are implicated because the AD accepts replacement with valves bearing a new part number provided they meet the “suitable” definition (Requirement). The removal of the like-for-like replacement requirement (Amendment 2) modifies the demand profile for specific P/Ns.

• Certifying and regulatory authorities. CASA is the issuer (signature block). The AD explicitly cross-references ANAC and requires ANAC approval for later service-bulletin revisions (Requirement; Note). That creates an interaction between CASA directives and ANAC approvals in practice.

• Fleet planners and compliance officers. Because the cadence is flight-hour based and anchored to 7 June 2007, compliance scheduling, record-keeping, and fleet utilisation planning must take the flight-hour interval into account (Compliance). Those responsible for continuing airworthiness must factor the checks into maintenance cycles.

• Insurers and lessors. While not named in the text, those who underwrite or lease ERJ-170 aircraft will be affected practically because an AD requirement bears on airworthiness and thus on operational risk profiles. The AD itself does not specify insurer or lessor obligations, but the parties’ contractual or insurance frameworks commonly require compliance with ADs.

• Operators of derivative fleets. If aircraft are retrofitted or have differing configurations, operators must determine whether their aircraft are “fitted with” the specified P/Ns. The AD’s applicability language obliges operators to verify part-number installation.

The text shows the locus of decision costs is with operators and maintenance providers, who must perform the checks and replace failing valves. The AD’s reference to ANAC approval for SB revisions places a gate on what methods are acceptable; that affects service-provider procedures and which service bulletin revision an operator may rely on.

This AD prescribes a set of duties and defines limited acceptability criteria; it does not, in the source text, create procedural rights or set out enforcement steps. The operative duties and definitional rights in the AD are:

• Duty to inspect. Operators must perform an operational check of the firewall hydraulic shutoff valves P/N 975287-3 or P/N 975287-5 in accordance with Embraer Service Bulletin No.170-29-0013 original issue 12 December 2006, or further ANAC approved revisions (Requirement). The operational check is mandatory within specified intervals (Compliance).

• Duty to replace failing valves. If a valve fails the operational check, the AD requires replacement with a serviceable FWSOV (Requirement). The text provides the acceptability criteria for what constitutes a “suitable FWSOV” (Requirement).

• Definition of acceptable replacement. The AD defines a suitable FWSOV as either the same part number that has passed the operational check, or “the replacement of these valves by others bearing a new P/N” (Requirement). Amendment 2 explicitly removes the previous requirement that replacement valves bear the same P/N (Background; amendment note). This creates a duty to ensure replacement valves meet the AD’s suitability condition, rather than strictly matching original P/Ns.

• Duty on scheduling. The AD requires the initial check within 600 flight hours after 7 June 2007 and thereafter at intervals not exceeding 600 flight hours (Compliance). The AD thereby imposes a recurring scheduling obligation tied to flight hours.

• Right to rely on ANAC-approved revisions. The AD permits use of later revisions of the Embraer SB only if they are ANAC-approved (Requirement). That is a procedural constraint on an operator’s choice of procedural guidance: operators must ensure the version of the service bulletin they follow has ANAC approval.

• Definition rights. The AD supplies its own operative definitions, notably defining “operational check” as a failure-finding task that does not require quantitative tolerances (Requirement). This defines the scope and nature of the inspection that operators must perform.

The AD text does not articulate rights to waivers, alternative means of compliance, or appeals within its body. The AD also does not specify record-keeping requirements or a process for approval of replacement parts with new part numbers beyond the “suitable” definition. The only approval gate the AD explicitly mentions is ANAC approval for service bulletin revisions.

Who decides compliance method. The AD assigns method authority to Embraer SB No.170-29-0013 (original issue or ANAC-approved revisions) as the controlling procedure for the operational check. That gives Embraer’s service bulletin the operative role for how to perform the check, subject to ANAC’s approval of later revisions.

In short, the duties are to inspect at the flight-hour intervals, to replace failing components with serviceable/suitable valves, and to use only ANAC-approved SB revisions. The instrument specifies what counts as a suitable valve and what counts as the operational check; it does not elaborate on administrative processes for variances or enforcement in the text provided.

The AD text supplied does not include express penalty provisions, enforcement measures, or administrative sanctions. The document is an airworthiness directive issued by CASA (signature by James Coyne, delegate), but the AD itself sets out technical and compliance requirements without stating the consequences of non-compliance within its printed text (no penalty clause or enforcement procedure appears in the source).

What the text does provide that is relevant to enforcement:

• Mandatory operational and replacement duties. The AD prescribes mandatory actions (operational check, replacement of failing valves), and specifies the methods and intervals (Requirement; Compliance). Those technical mandates are, in practice, enforceable by the issuing aviation authority under its broader regulatory powers; however, the text does not spell out the enforcement instruments or penalties.

• Delegation and issuing authority. The AD is signed by a CASA delegate, James Coyne, and dated 14 August 2009, indicating that the directive is issued under CASA’s delegated authority (signature block). The presence of a CASA delegate signature links the AD to CASA’s regulatory framework, which is the usual vehicle for enforcement, but the AD does not itself reproduce CASA’s enforcement provisions.

• Cross-reference to other authorities. The AD notes an ANAC AD that it refers to (Requirement, Note). That cross-reference may create coordination in oversight between CASA and ANAC, but the AD’s text does not specify enforcement responsibility allocations.

Practical implication from the text’s silence. Because the instrument as provided does not state penalties or enforcement mechanisms, users of the AD should not assume this document alone describes the full compliance and enforcement regime. The AD sets mandatory technical duties; any named or implicit enforcement powers would be found in the broader statutory and regulatory framework that empowers CASA to issue and enforce ADs, which is not reproduced in this AD text.

Therefore, a compliance-minded recipient should treat the AD’s substantive obligations as mandatory operational requirements and consult CASA’s wider regulatory instruments or legal advice for information on statutory penalties, administrative sanctions, or enforcement processes applicable in cases of non-compliance. The AD itself does not contain those enforcement details.

The AD explicitly cross-references and relies upon external regulatory and technical documents, creating a network of interactions rather than standalone legal provisions.

• Embraer Service Bulletin as technical standard. The AD makes Embraer Service Bulletin No.170-29-0013 (original issue 12 December 2006) the operative technical standard for the required operational check (Requirement). It then allows later revisions of that SB only if those revisions are ANAC-approved. That means the AD’s technical compliance methodology depends on an external manufacturer document and an approving authority’s endorsement.

• Role of ANAC. The AD requires ANAC approval for “further” revisions of the Embraer service bulletin to be acceptable under the AD (Requirement). The AD also references an ANAC Airworthiness Directive (AD No. 2007-02-01R2 dated 17 July 2009) in a note (Requirement, Note). This indicates cross-jurisdictional or cooperative regulatory interaction between CASA and ANAC. The AD makes explicit that only ANAC-approved revisions of the service bulletin can be used as compliant methods, thereby importing ANAC’s approval processes into the CASA AD’s compliance path.

• CASA issuance and domestic effect. The AD is issued under CASA authority and signed by a CASA delegate (signature block). While the document does not set out CASA’s underpinning statutory powers, the presence of CASA’s delegate signature and the formatting as an AD indicates it functions as CASA’s mandatory technical direction to affected operators. The AD does not itself reference other domestic statutory instruments or the specific legislative source of CASA’s powers.

• Part-number control versus interchangeable parts. The AD initially (prior to Amendment 2) required replacement valves to bear the same P/N; Amendment 2 removes that requirement (Background). The AD then defines acceptable replacements either by passing the operational check or by being another valve “bearing a new P/N” (Requirement). This creates an interaction between AD mandates and supplier part-numbering processes; it permits parts with different P/Ns to be acceptable so long as they are “suitable” under the AD. Any statutory or contractual obligations regarding parts interchangeability or certification are not described in the AD itself.

• Referenced international correspondence. By explicitly referring to an ANAC AD and requiring ANAC approvals for SB revisions, the AD creates a legal-technical link to Brazilian airworthiness directives and approvals. The AD thus operates in a networked compliance environment where domestic CASA directives can be operationalised only through manufacturer documentation and foreign authority approvals.

The AD text does not mention other domestic laws, civil aviation regulations, commercial contracts, lease agreements, or insurance policies. Those instruments frequently interact with ADs in practice; the AD as drafted incorporates interoperability with manufacturer service bulletins and ANAC approvals but does not, in the text provided, address other legal instruments. Parties should therefore view this AD as a technical obligation that must be integrated with broader regulatory and contractual frameworks outside the document.

The AD contains a concise chronology of its issuance and amendments in the source text.

• Original AD. The original issue of this AD became effective on 7 June 2007 (Background; Compliance). The original AD required periodic operational checks of the FWSOV and specified the initial compliance interval referenced to that date (within the next 600 flight hours after 7 June 2007, and thereafter at intervals not exceeding 600 flight hours) (Compliance; Background).

• Amendment 1. Amendment 1 of this AD became effective on 25 October 2007 (Background; amendment note). The text records that Amendment 1 added an additional part number valve to the applicability section with no change to the requirement section (Background). The AD as supplied does not reproduce the full text of Amendment 1, but it expressly notes the limited scope of that amendment: addition of a P/N to applicability only.

• Amendment 2 (this instrument). This document is Amendment 2 and became effective on 24 September 2009 (header; signature block). The text identifies the mechanical change made by Amendment 2: it removes the requirement to replace the FWSOV with one bearing the same part number (Background; amendment note). Amendment 2 retains the original compliance intervals and the operational check requirement; the principal substantive change is the relaxation of the replacement-by-same-P/N obligation.

• Service bulletin timeline. The AD directs compliance with Embraer Service Bulletin No.170-29-0013 original issue dated 12 December 2006, or further ANAC-approved revisions (Requirement). That provides a fixed baseline technical procedure (original SB) and leaves room for later revisions to be used if ANAC approves them. The AD therefore ties its operative method to a service bulletin issued before the original AD’s effective date.

• ANAC cross-reference. The AD includes a note referring to ANAC Airworthiness Directive AD No. 2007-02-01R2 dated 17 July 2009 (Requirement, Note). That date sits between Amendment 1 and Amendment 2, suggesting coordination or mutual reference to Brazilian airworthiness actions.

These entries are the extent of the amendment history as set out in the AD text. The chronology shows an initial technical direction in June 2007, an early narrowing/expansion of applicability in October 2007 (Amendment 1), and in September 2009 a substantive change limited to replacement part-number obligations (Amendment 2). The AD’s compliance interval language was not altered by the amendments as recorded in this instrument (Compliance; Background).

The source text contains no litigation history. It does not cite any court proceedings, appeals, or judicial interpretations concerning the AD or its requirements. There is no mention in the AD of prior disputes, enforcement actions that resulted in litigation, or case law construing the instrument.

What the text does include that is relevant to potential review or challenge, but not to litigation history, is the procedural and approval gate via ANAC for service bulletin revisions and the administrative signature by a CASA delegate (signature block). Those features could, in principle, be relevant to administrative or judicial review in other contexts, but no such proceedings are recorded or mentioned in the document itself.

Therefore, based on the supplied AD text alone, there is no litigation history to report. Any litigation or administrative review record would need to be sought in external sources, which are not part of the present instrument.

The AD contains several technical and procedural details that can produce practical pitfalls for operators and maintainers. These are drawn strictly from the text and its definitions.

• Flight-hour anchoring. The compliance interval is anchored to an historical date: initial checks must have been completed within the next 600 flight hours after 7 June 2007, and thereafter every 600 flight hours (Compliance). That means the AD’s schedule is flight-hour based rather than calendar-time based and is anchored to a date in the past. Operators must interpret where each airframe sits against that anchor; depending on current records, an operator could already be out of compliance if checks were not performed to that schedule. The AD’s text retains the original timing language; Amendment 2 did not alter it (Compliance; Background).

• Operational check is qualitative. The AD explicitly defines the operational check as a “failure finding task” that “does not require quantitative tolerances” (Requirement). Some organisations expect inspection tasks to include measurement tolerances; this AD’s definition removes that expectation. The practical effect is that acceptance criteria are qualitative pass/fail rather than numeric. Maintenance personnel must apply the Embraer SB procedures within that qualitative frame.

• ANAC approval requirement for later SB revisions. The AD permits only the original Embraer service bulletin or later revisions that are ANAC-approved (Requirement). If an operator wishes to use a later Embraer SB revision issued after 12 December 2006, they must confirm ANAC approval. Failure to check the approval status could render the procedure non-compliant with the AD.

• “Suitable” versus “serviceable” language. The AD uses both “serviceable FWSOV” (require replacement with a serviceable FWSOV) and defines a “suitable FWSOV” as one that has passed the operational check or a replacement bearing a new P/N (Requirement). The two terms may create interpretive friction about whether a valve bearing a new P/N is automatically “serviceable” or only “suitable” if it meets additional criteria. The safest reading from the text is that a valve bearing a new P/N is acceptable where it meets the AD’s suitable criteria (Requirement).

• Removal of like-for-like replacement requirement. Amendment 2 removes the prior requirement to replace a failed valve with one bearing the same part number (Background). That change broadens replacement options but also shifts the burden to ensure that alternative P/Ns fall within the AD’s suitability definition. Operators must ensure that any replacement bearing a different P/N is acceptable under the AD (Requirement).

• Cross-jurisdiction approvals. The AD imports approval authority from ANAC for service bulletin revisions. Operators must coordinate approvals or confirm ANAC approvals even when following a CASA AD. That creates an administrative step that could delay access to a later SB revision if ANAC approval is not current or documented.

• Absence of enforcement text. The AD does not include explicit penalty, records, or enforcement procedures (Penalties and enforcement). This is a practical gotcha because operators cannot rely on the AD text alone to know enforcement consequences; they need to consult CASA’s wider regulatory framework to understand enforcement risk and remedies.

• Potential ambiguity about “others bearing a new P/N”. The AD allows replacement by “others bearing a new P/N” but does not elaborate how a new P/N becomes acceptable beyond the operational check wording (Requirement). That leaves open questions about OEM approvals, certification, or traceability that the AD does not address. Operators must determine whether alternative P/Ns are acceptable for their configuration in practice, possibly requiring liaison with the manufacturer or regulatory authorities.

• Record implications not specified. The AD requires recurring checks but does not articulate record-keeping obligations within its text. Yet maintenance schedules are flight-hour based and will therefore impose practical record-keeping demands; operators should ensure their internal records can demonstrate compliance even though the AD does not state recordkeeping specifics.

These gotchas are concrete operational and administrative friction points derived from the AD’s text. Each creates an execution risk that operators and maintainers should resolve through internal procedures and liaison with the manufacturer and regulators.

The AD’s text prescribes a narrow set of steps to achieve compliance. Below is a practical, source-grounded sequence of actions drawn solely from the AD’s requirements and definitions.

1. Confirm applicability. Determine whether an aircraft is fitted with firewall hydraulic shutoff valves P/N 975287-3 or P/N 975287-5. The AD applies only to Embraer ERJ-170 aircraft fitted with those part numbers (Applicability). Note that Amendment 1 added an additional P/N to applicability (Background); verify that the aircraft’s installed P/Ns are among those enumerated.

2. Schedule inspections by flight hours. The AD mandates the initial operational check within the next 600 flight hours after 7 June 2007, and thereafter at intervals that do not exceed 600 flight hours (Compliance). Translate that flight-hour interval into your maintenance planning system for each airframe, anchored to the 7 June 2007 date or to the operator’s established initial compliance event if already carried out.

3. Use the correct inspection procedure. Perform the operational check in accordance with Embraer Service Bulletin No.170-29-0013 original issue dated 12 December 2006, or use a later revision only if it is ANAC-approved (Requirement). Confirm which version of the SB you will follow and check for ANAC approval status before relying on any revision beyond the original issue.

4. Apply the AD’s operational-check definition. The AD defines the operational check as a failure-finding task that does not require quantitative tolerances (Requirement). Follow the SB procedures as failure-finding operations. If your maintenance process typically requires numerical tolerances, ensure personnel understand that this AD’s operative definition is qualitative.

5. Determine serviceability and suitability. If the operational check is passed, the valve is acceptable. If the valve fails the operational check, the AD requires replacement with a “serviceable FWSOV” (Requirement). The AD defines a “suitable FWSOV” as a valve P/N 975287-3 or P/N 975287-5 that has passed the operational check, or replacement by others bearing a new P/N (Requirement). Therefore, acceptable replacements are either the specified P/N passing the check or an alternative valve with a new P/N that meets the AD’s suitability condition.

6. Source replacement parts appropriately. Given Amendment 2 removes the prior same-P/N replacement requirement (Background), operators may fit replacement valves bearing new P/Ns so long as they meet the AD’s suitability standard. Confirm traceability, provenance, and that the replacement performs the operational check successfully.

7. Coordinate approvals where necessary. If you intend to rely on a later revision of Embraer SB No.170-29-0013, obtain or confirm ANAC approval of that revision (Requirement). The AD’s text requires ANAC approval for later SB revisions to be acceptable.

8. Maintain auditable scheduling and maintenance records. Although the AD text does not specify record-keeping duties, the flight-hour cadence and the qualitative pass/fail nature of the checks create an evidentiary need to document when each check was performed, the result, and any replacement parts installed. Keep records that show the date, flight hours at check, the SB revision followed (and ANAC approval if applicable), and the serial/part number of replacement valves if fitted.

9. Monitor AD amendments and related ADs. The AD has a documented amendment history and references an ANAC AD (Requirement; Note). Track any further CASA or ANAC directives that might affect frequency, acceptable parts, or procedures.

10. Engage manufacturer or authority for borderline cases. If a proposed replacement bears a novel P/N or lacks clear documentary support, engage Embraer or the relevant authority to confirm acceptability under the AD’s criteria. The AD itself sets the acceptance standard (suitability via passing the operational check or new P/N), but it does not describe a formal approval mechanism for non-standard parts beyond the SB and ANAC approvals.

Following these steps aligns actions directly with the AD’s text: confirm applicability, perform the SB-prescribed failure-finding operational check at the 600 flight-hour intervals anchored to 7 June 2007, replace failing valves with serviceable or suitable valves as defined, and ensure SB revisions are ANAC-approved before use. Operators and maintainers should document compliance events and retain evidence that each check and replacement met the AD’s stated criteria.