What it does
This Airworthiness Directive (AD), AD/EMB-120/46, addresses fuel system and critical design configuration control limitations for the Embraer EMB-120 (Brasilia) series aeroplanes. It requires three core actions of operators. First, operators must revise their approved system of maintenance to incorporate specific fuel system limitation tasks (tasks 15 to 18 of Section 6, Part E) as shown in the Temporary Revision 22-1 of the Maintenance Review Board Report (MRBR) dated 18 November 2005, or a later MRBR revision approved by the Brazilian Agência Nacional de Aviação Civil (ANAC) (Requirement 1). Second, operators must carry out the functional checks (FNC) and detailed visual inspections (DET) required by those tasks 15 to 18 of Section 6, Part E, as shown in the Temporary Revision 22-1 MRBR, or later ANAC-approved revision (Requirement 2). Third, operators must revise their approved system of maintenance to include items 1 and 2 of Section 6, Part D: Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) as shown in Revision 22 of the MRBR dated 22 March 2005, or a later ANAC-approved revision (Requirement 3).
The AD prescribes compliance windows. Requirement 1 and Requirement 3 must be completed within 30 calendar days after the AD’s effective date (Compliance: For Requirement 1; For Requirement 3). Requirement 2 must be completed within 4 000 hours time in service or 48 calendar months after the AD’s effective date, whichever occurs first, and thereafter repeated at the intervals specified in the MRBR (Compliance: For Requirement 2). The AD becomes effective on 29 June 2007 (This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 29 June 2007). The AD applies to all EMB-120( ) Brasilia aeroplanes (Applicability).
The AD also contains regulatory cross-references and direction on approvals. The revision or variation of an operator’s system of maintenance must be approved by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) under Civil Aviation Regulation 42R (Note 1). The document refers operators to ANAC documents and an ANAC AD (Note 2: ANAC AD 2007-05-02 Amdt 39-1183 refers). The AD was issued by a CASA delegate, David Punshon, on 14 June 2007 (signed). The AD states the safety rationale: ANAC advised that previous MRBR revisions did not fully comply with CDCCL and FSL requirements intended to preclude ignition sources in the fuel system, as required by RBHA E88/United States SFAR 88, and that this condition affects flight safety and requires corrective action (Background).