AD/ECUREUIL/119 Amdt 2 - Engine Controls - Twist Grip Assembly

Scope and identification: the AD applies to EUROCOPTER EC 130 B4 helicopters fitted with twist-grip assemblies having specific part numbers (P/N) and serial-number (S/N) ranges. The relevant part numbers are 350A27520900, 350A27520901, 350A27520902, 350A27520903 (pilot’s side) and 350A27521201 (co‑pilot’s side), with S/N cut‑offs described in the Applicability box: pilot assemblies with S/N below 64; co‑pilot assemblies P/N 350A27521201 with S/N below 11 and between 22 and 66 (inclusive); and co‑pilot assemblies P/N 350A27521201 with S/N from 11 to 21 (inclusive) and no letter “V” on the lever base. The AD therefore uses the combination of part number and serial‑number filtering, plus a physical marking check (presence or absence of letter “V” on the lever base), to define the affected hardware.

Failure mechanism and safety objective: the Background discloses the causal finding that a bonded attachment between the control pinion and the drive tube failed due to non‑compliant surface preparation, producing a scenario where the twist grip did not perform as expected in autorotation training and the engine remained at idle despite the twist grip being put into the flight position. The AD’s corrective measures target that bonding interface by replacing drive tubes on a subset of assemblies and by requiring bonding checks before installation of other assemblies. The objective is to remove items with an unacceptable or unverified bonding condition from service or to verify and remediate bonding before fitting.

Prescriptive compliance via manufacturer documents: the AD prescribes compliance through specific Eurocopter documentation: EUROCOPTER EC 130 ASB No. 76A002 (paragraphs 2.B. and its subparagraphs) for replacement, marking, and related actions; and EUROCOPTER EC 130 ASB No. 76A001 Revision 1 for bonding checks prior to installation. The AD states “The use of later approved revisions of these documents is acceptable for compliance with the requirements of this AD,” which makes the ASBs normative but allows later approved revisions to stand in for the cited revision.

Operational limitation for training: the AD contains an operational requirement text that, in the context of autorotation training, “the manoeuvre must be carried out until the helicopter touches down (full autorotation).” That sentence is presented in the Requirements block and alters training conduct for affected helicopters pending or in connection with the corrective actions.

Installation prohibition and pre‑installation verification: the AD prohibits installation of specified twist grip assemblies unless the bonding check or drive‑tube replacement required by the AD has been performed. This creates a pre‑installation compliance obligation for maintenance organisations and operators that install spare twist‑grip assemblies.

Time limits and staging: the AD sets a staged compliance timetable. For the drive‑tube replacement obligation (Requirement 1) the interval is within 110 flight hours or 9 months after the AD’s effective date, whichever occurs first. Other requirements specify “pending replacement” or “after the effective date” or “before installation on a helicopter after the effective date,” creating discrete time windows and an interim constraint on use and installation of affected parts.

Interplay with EASA and previous ADs: the AD explicitly refers to EASA AD 2008‑0184 and states that it supersedes EASA AD 2006‑0079. That situates the CASA AD in a chain of regulatory documents addressing the same root issue and links Australian requirements to European findings and corrective actions, via the Eurocopter ASBs.

Primary affected parties: the direct economic actors required to act under this AD are operators and owners of EUROCOPTER EC 130 B4 helicopters that have the identified twist‑grip assemblies fitted. The AD addresses assemblies both on the pilot’s and co‑pilot’s side; the applicability specification requires checking both part numbers and serial numbers and a visual marking (presence/absence of letter “V” on lever base) to determine whether a given twist grip falls within the AD’s scope. Therefore any operator with EC 130 B4 airframes must inspect serial numbers and lever markings on installed twist grips to determine applicability.

Maintenance organisations and installers: repair stations, maintenance organisations and any party that installs twist‑grip assemblies are directly affected because the AD forbids installation of particular part/serial‑number combinations “unless the bonding between the control pinion and the drive tube has been checked” or “unless the drive tube has been replaced and the collective lever marked” in accordance with the referenced ASBs. Those organisations are required to perform the checks, carry out replacements, and apply the marking specified in EUROCOPTER ASBs before allowing installation.

Parts suppliers and inventory managers: suppliers and parts pools holding spare twist‑grip assemblies that fall into the affected part/serial‑number ranges must either arrange for the required bonding check or replacement before sale/installation, or mark and segregate stock to avoid contravening the AD’s installation prohibitions. The AD’s “before installation on a helicopter after the effective date” requirement places an operational constraint on parts distribution and supply chains for these assemblies.

Pilots and flight training providers: the AD changes a training operational requirement by stating that, in autorotation training “the manoeuvre must be carried out until the helicopter touches down (full autorotation).” That change affects pilot conduct in training sessions for affected helicopters. Training organisations and flight instructors must incorporate that instruction into training practice for affected aircraft pending or following the remedial actions, and record adherence as required by their own operational documentation.

Regulator and delegate: CASA, represented by the Delegate who signed the AD, is the issuer and holder of authority to mandate the AD; the AD lists the effective date and amendments. While the AD itself does not articulate enforcement or penalty mechanisms, the regulator is the decision maker that set the obligations and compliance windows. The AD also references EASA ADs and Eurocopter ASBs, so importers, lessors and operators with multinational operations must consider interaction with the European directives noted.

Aircraft owners' budgetary exposure: owners of affected helicopters bear the direct cost of inspections, drive‑tube replacements, bonding checks, marking, potential part purchases, and associated aircraft downtime. Where the AD requires replacement within 110 flight hours or 9 months, owners must schedule maintenance slots and allocate funds for parts and labour within that period.

Duties imposed by the AD (textual sources: Requirement and Compliance table):

• Identify applicability: operators must determine whether their EC 130 B4 helicopter has twist‑grip assemblies with the relevant part numbers and serial numbers as set out in the Applicability section. This duty is a precondition to all other obligations in the AD.

• Replace drive tube for certain co‑pilot assemblies (Requirement 1): for co‑pilot twist grip assemblies P/N 350A27521201 with S/N from 11 to 21 (inclusive) and no letter “V” on the lever base, the AD requires replacement of the drive tube in accordance with paragraph 2.B. of EUROCOPTER EC 130 ASB No. 76A002.2. The Compliance table sets the interval for this action at within 110 flight hours or 9 months after the AD’s effective date, whichever occurs first.

• Training conduct for autorotation (Requirement 2, as presented): the AD contains an instruction that, in autorotation training, the manoeuvre must be carried out until the helicopter touches down (full autorotation). The AD presents this text as part of the Requirements block; operators and instructors must apply this instruction in affected aircraft and training scenarios “pending replacement of the twist grip drive tube as detailed in Requirement 1” (Compliance table entry for Requirement 2).

• Installation prohibitions unless remediation performed (Requirements 3 and 4): Requirement 3 states “Do not install a twist grip assembly P/N 350A27521201 with S/N from 11 to 21 (inclusive) and no letter ‘V’ on the lever base on a helicopter, unless the drive tube has been replaced and the collective lever marked in accordance with paragraphs 2.B.2. and 2.B.3. of EUROCOPTER EC 130 ASB No. 76A002.” Requirement 4 states “Do not install twist grip assemblies P/N 350A27520900, 350A27520901, 350A27520902 and 350A27520903 with S/N below 64 on the pilot's side or twist grip assembly P/N 350A27521201 with S/N below 11 and between 22 and 66 (inclusive) on the co‑pilot’s side, unless the bonding between the control pinion and the drive tube has been checked in accordance with paragraph 2.B.3. of EUROCOPTER EC 130 ASB No. 76A001 Revision 1 before installation on a helicopter.” The Compliance table requires compliance for these installation prohibitions “after the effective date” and “before installation on a helicopter after the effective date,” respectively.

• Use of later approved revisions: the AD explicitly allows “The use of later approved revisions of these documents” (the referenced ASBs) to be acceptable for compliance. This provides an explicit channel for complying with later revisions of the Eurocopter ASBs once they are approved.

Rights and procedural aspects evident in the text:

• Right to comply via manufacturer ASBs: the AD sets out that compliance is accomplished by following Eurocopter ASBs (specified paragraphs), and that later approved revisions are acceptable. In practice, this grants operators a defined compliance pathway through the manufacturer’s bulletins rather than requiring bespoke procedures.

• No penalties or enforcement language included in the AD text: the AD does not itself specify penalties, sanctions, or the enforcement mechanism within its text. The AD sets mandatory technical and procedural duties with specific timelines and installation prohibitions, but does not delineate the enforcement process or legal consequences for non‑compliance within the document.

Who bears what steps in practice:

• Operators/owners are required to identify applicability, schedule and fund the required drive‑tube replacements, ensure training conduct conforms to the autorotation instruction, and ensure that no prohibited installations occur without the prescribed checks or replacements.

• Maintenance organisations and installers must perform the bonding checks (as described in the referenced ASB), carry out the drive‑tube replacement work per Eurocopter procedure, apply the collective lever marking as specified in the ASB, and document or otherwise ensure traceability for installation decisions. The AD makes the performance of those steps a precondition to legal installation on the helicopter (for the assemblies covered by the prohibition language).

Documentation references that become operative obligations:

• EUROCOPTER EC 130 ASB No. 76A002 (paragraph 2.B. and subparts) for drive‑tube replacement and marking requirements.

• EUROCOPTER EC 130 ASB No. 76A001 Revision 1 (paragraph 2.B.3) for bonding checks prior to installation of certain assemblies.

• EASA AD 2008‑0184 is referenced in the AD as contained in the note; the AD also states it supersedes EASA AD 2006‑0079.

Compliance timing and sequencing: the AD divides obligations into near‑term replacement (110 flight hours or 9 months), pending operational restrictions during replacement, immediate application to installation after effective date, and a prohibition on installing affected assemblies unless checks/replacements are performed. Operators must therefore coordinate identification, parts availability, maintenance scheduling and training changes within those staging constraints.

The AD text supplied does not specify statutory penalties, administrative sanctions or the enforcement mechanisms to be applied in the event of non‑compliance. The document sets mandatory technical requirements, compliance time frames and installation prohibitions, but it contains no explicit section detailing fines, grounding procedures, certificate suspension, or specific enforcement processes. The only administrative attribution present in the text is the signature block, indicating the AD was issued by James Coyne, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, dated 6 November 2008, and the AD’s effective date is stated as 18 December 2008.

Consequences evident in the content:

• The AD creates operative obligations with explicit timing (e.g., within 110 flight hours or 9 months for the drive‑tube replacement). Those requirements are prescriptive: the AD’s language is framed as duties (“Replace the drive tube…”, “Do not install… unless…”). That wording indicates compulsory action for the parties listed in the Applicability section, and sets preconditions to installation of listed parts.

• The AD references and relies on Eurocopter ASBs for procedural compliance. The AD states that “The use of later approved revisions of these documents is acceptable for compliance with the requirements of this AD,” which provides a compliance pathway but does not create or enumerate enforcement processes.

What is not in the AD text:

• There is no description of how CASA will monitor or audit compliance, nor any administrative penalty schedule or criminal sanction for non‑compliance contained within the AD. The document also does not state whether non‑compliant aircraft will be subject to immediate grounding or removal from service under the AD itself.

Implications for affected parties given the absence of explicit penalties in the text:

• Although penalties and enforcement mechanisms are not enumerated in the AD, the document establishes binding technical requirements and explicit installation prohibitions. Affected parties must therefore treat the AD as mandatory and implement the specified actions and checks to avoid regulatory risk; any further enforcement or penalty consequences would arise from the regulator’s broader enforcement framework and processes, which are not set out in the AD text supplied.

• The AD’s effective dates and compliance intervals create compliance risk in two dimensions: (1) a short‑term operational constraint, because affected parts cannot be installed after the effective date unless the checks / replacements are completed; and (2) a medium‑term maintenance scheduling and funding obligation, because drive‑tube replacement must occur within the stated flight‑hour or calendar time window.

For practical purposes, operators and maintenance organisations should assume the AD’s mandatory wording will be enforced through routine regulatory oversight, although the AD itself does not state the enforcement particulars. The document’s silence on penalties means that any enforcement action and sanctioning would be governed by the regulator’s wider legal and enforcement instruments rather than this AD alone.

The AD explicitly cross‑references external regulatory and manufacturer documents, and thereby creates an interaction layer between the CASA directive and those documents. The AD cites EASA dispositions and Eurocopter service bulletins as the operative methods to achieve compliance. Concretely:

• Reference to EASA ADs: the AD contains a note referring to “EASA AD 2008‑0184 dated 6 October 2008” and states the AD supersedes “EASA AD 2006‑0079.” That places the CASA AD in an international regulatory context: the CASA measure tracks or incorporates corrective actions also reflected in EASA’s directives. The AD’s note and supersession statement identify prior European regulatory instruments as related material and indicate that the technical problem has been considered in EASA instruments.

• Reliance on Eurocopter ASBs: the AD mandates procedural and mechanical work by reference to EUROCOPTER EC 130 Alert Service Bulletins No. 76A002 and No. 76A001 Revision 1 (specific paragraphs are named: 2.B., 2.B.2., 2.B.3., and paragraph 2.B.3 of Rev 1). The AD states that use of later approved revisions of those ASBs is acceptable for compliance. The AD therefore makes these manufacturer documents integral to compliance and creates a legal link from the regulator’s directive to the manufacturer’s prescribed methods.

What the AD does not do in the supplied text:

• The AD does not explicitly cite or incorporate other Australian legislative instruments, civil aviation regulations, criminal statutes, or administrative enforcement provisions. There is no textual cross‑reference in the AD to the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations or to any Australian Act that would specify enforcement processes or penalties. Accordingly, the AD must be read alongside any relevant broader regulatory or statutory framework, but that framework is not part of the AD text provided.

Practical effects of these interactions, as stated in the AD:

• Compliance can be achieved by following the Eurocopter ASBs and their later approved revisions. This channels how operators and maintainers meet CASA’s requirements: they must follow the referenced ASB procedures (or later approved revisions).

• The AD’s reference to EASA ADs indicates that the same technical fixes and restrictions have been considered elsewhere and that operators with multinational operations or supply chains are likely to encounter harmonised requirements. The document also formally identifies that the CASA AD supersedes an earlier EASA AD (2006‑0079), and acknowledges a subsequent EASA AD (2008‑0184) as related, thereby documenting the chain of technical directives related to the same defect.

• The AD’s effective dates and compliance windows establish sequencing for obligations that can intersect with maintenance scheduling governed by other regulatory requirements (for example airworthiness release processes), though such processes are not described in the AD.

Limits on legal interpretation within this AD:

• The AD itself does not explain how it interacts with certificate holders’ legal obligations under other national statutes, or with safety management system obligations. Those interactions must be determined by consulting the broader legal and regulatory framework that governs Australian aviation operations, which is outside the AD text provided.

In sum, the AD binds operators and maintainers to manufacturer procedures approved by the regulator and positions CASA’s requirement alongside EASA ADs; it does not set out broader statutory enforcement mechanisms within its own text.

The AD text contains an internal amendment history and effective‑date metadata. The chronology and corrections recorded in the supplied document are:

• Original issue: The Background states that “The original issue of this AD became effective on 6 July 2006.” That marks the earliest effective date for this AD in its original form.

• Amendment 1: The Background reports that “Amendment 1 corrected a typographical error in Requirement 3 of this AD. The statement should have read ‘paragraph 2.B.3’ instead of ‘paragraph 2.8.3’. There were no changes to the compliance periods. This amendment requires the replacement of certain twist grips and to check other twist grips before installation. Amendment 1 of this AD became effective on 3 August 2006.” The amendment was therefore corrective and editorial in nature with no change to compliance timing.

• Current amendment (Amdt 2): The AD title indicates “AD/ECUREUIL/119 Amdt 2” and the Compliance box states “This Amendment becomes effective on 18 December 2008.” The signature block is dated 6 November 2008. The AD therefore underwent a subsequent amendment leading to the December 2008 effective date. The AD also states it supersedes EASA AD 2006‑0079 and references EASA AD 2008‑0184 dated 6 October 2008.

Noted corrections and content change:

• Amendment 1 addressed a typographical error in the original AD's Requirement 3 (a paragraph reference), substituting the correct reference to “paragraph 2.B.3” of the Eurocopter ASB. The Background emphasises that Amendment 1 did not alter compliance periods.

• The second amendment (Amdt 2) does not have a line‑by‑line record of textual changes in the supplied document, but the document header and “This Amendment becomes effective on 18 December 2008” language indicate the AD has been reissued with an updated effective date and possibly updated applicability or requirements as reflected in the present text. The AD also includes a note that “EASA AD 2008‑0184 dated 6 October 2008 refers. This AD supersedes EASA AD 2006‑0079.” That indicates the AD has been aligned with subsequent EASA actions.

Document provenance and signature:

• The AD is signed by James Coyne, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, with the signature block dated 6 November 2008. The AD includes the date when the amendment becomes effective (18 December 2008), which creates the operative timeline for compliance.

Implications of the amendment history for operators and maintainers:

• Operators must pay attention to the AD version and effective date because the compliance windows are measured from the effective date specified in the AD. The AD explicitly permits the use of later approved revisions of the Eurocopter ASBs, but the AD’s own amendment history shows that earlier typographical errors may have existed and were formally corrected. Operators should therefore use the AD text in force (Amdt 2, effective 18 December 2008) and ensure they apply the current referenced ASB revisions or later approved revisions.

• The AD’s supersession of prior EASA AD 2006‑0079 means that operators who had earlier compliance actions under that EASA AD should reconcile their records against the current AD’s stated requirements and time frames.

The supplied AD document does not record or reference any litigation, court proceedings, or administrative appeals related to the AD or to the underlying safety issue. The Background discusses the factual basis for the AD (an in‑service event and subsequent analysis of the twist‑grip drive tube and control pinion bonded attachment failure), and the amendment history notes a typographical correction, but there is no mention of judicial or tribunal challenges, enforcement actions, or precedent decisions in the text.

What the absence of litigation references in the AD means, based on the document:

• The AD is presented as a safety directive grounded in a technical finding; the document focuses on corrective measures and compliance requirements rather than any legal contestation. The absence of litigation history in this AD text does not mean litigation cannot arise; it simply means the AD itself does not include any record of legal proceedings.

• Because the AD refers to EASA ADs and Eurocopter ASBs, any disputes concerning the technical content, applicability, or procedural steps would more likely be addressed through regulatory processes, service‑provider channels, or civil commercial remedies, none of which are documented in the AD text supplied.

For practitioners needing to research potential litigation or contested enforcement around this AD:

• The AD text does not provide case citations or references to decisions. To determine whether any legal challenges or enforcement proceedings followed issuance of this AD, one must consult external enforcement records, tribunal decisions, or court files; such material is outside the AD text supplied and therefore not reflected in this document.

Precise applicability criteria, ambiguous numbering, and reliance on external documents create multiple practical pitfalls for operators, maintainers, and parts suppliers. The AD’s own text suggests the following concrete areas where mistakes or compliance gaps can arise:

• Narrow serial‑number ranges and mixed part‑number applicability: the AD’s Applicability uses several discrete ranges and combinations. For pilot’s side: P/N 350A27520900/901/902/903 with S/N below 64. For co‑pilot: P/N 350A27521201 with S/N below 11 and between 22 and 66 (inclusive), plus P/N 350A27521201 with S/N from 11 to 21 inclusive and no letter “V” on the lever base. These overlapping ranges plus the additional visual check (letter “V” presence) mean that a simple part‑number scan is insufficient; maintainers must identify and record exact serial numbers and visually inspect the lever base marking to determine whether a given assembly falls within the AD’s net.

• Visual marking nuance (letter “V”): the presence or absence of a small marking (letter “V” on the lever base) determines whether assemblies with the same P/N and overlapping S/N ranges are treated differently. Misreading or inconsistent assessment of that marking could lead to incorrect conclusions about applicability. The AD requires particular action for assemblies “with S/N from 11 to 21 (inclusive) and no letter ‘V’ on the lever base.” If the marking is smudged, repainted, corroded or otherwise ambiguous, the operator must treat the ambiguity consistently with the AD , the AD text does not provide a tie‑breaker rule in such cases.

• Requirement numbering and textual clarity: the Requirements block in the supplied text shows misnumbering and condensed phrasing (Requirement 1, then an in‑line sentence “In autorotation training, the manoeuvre must be carried out until the helicopter touches down (full autorotation).3. Do not install…”). The AD’s Background records that Amendment 1 corrected a typographical error in Requirement 3’s paragraph reference. That history shows the document has had typographical and formatting problems previously. Users of the AD must therefore read the text and the referenced ASBs carefully, and where the AD’s own numbering is unclear, rely on the ASB paragraphs cited for precise procedural steps.

• Dependence on Eurocopter ASB paragraphs: the AD does not contain the step‑by‑step procedures internally; it obliges compliance through specific paragraphs of Eurocopter ASBs (for example, paragraph 2.B. of ASB No. 76A002, paragraph 2.B.3 of ASB No. 76A001 Rev 1, paragraphs 2.B.2 and 2.B.3 for marking and replacement). If the referenced ASBs are not available, or an operator reads an earlier or different revision, the AD does permit later approved revisions, but does not define “approved” within its text. Operators should therefore ensure they use the exact named ASB revisions, or formally approved later revisions, and retain documentation of which revision they followed.

• Installation prohibition timing: Requirement 4’s compliance timing is “Before installation on a helicopter after the effective date of this AD.” That means spare assemblies cannot be fitted after the effective date without prior bonding checks or replacements. If parts are fitted without those checks because of operational urgency or oversight, that will run contrary to the AD’s express instruction. The AD does not provide administrative derogations or carryover allowances.

• Operational training instruction: the AD’s instruction that autorotation training must be carried out until touchdown (full autorotation) may conflict with existing training syllabi or local operating procedures that call for different termination points for training exercises. The AD frames this as a requirement in the Requirements block and as applying “Pending replacement of the twist grip drive tube as detailed in Requirement 1” (Compliance table). Training organisations must therefore reconcile this instruction with their own operational risk assessments and document the changed training steps for affected helicopters.

• Parts pool and supply chain risk: parts suppliers may hold assemblies subject to the AD. The AD’s installation prohibition “before installation on a helicopter after the effective date” requires confirmatory action prior to any installation. If a parts pool moves inventory between jurisdictions, differences between national AD application timing or recordkeeping could create gaps. The AD itself places the obligation on the installer/operator to ensure the checks or replacements have been done.

• Effective‑date arithmetic and compliance windows: Requirement 1 must be completed within 110 flight hours or 9 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first. Operators must therefore track both flight hours and calendar time from the effective date (18 December 2008 for this amendment) and not assume that because flight hours are low the calendar time allowance removes urgency. Miscalculating these windows can leave an aircraft non‑compliant.

• Supersession and harmonisation with EASA ADs: the AD states that it “supersedes EASA AD 2006‑0079” and refers to EASA AD 2008‑0184. Operators with cross‑jurisdictional fleets must ensure they apply the CASA AD correctly in Australia while being aware that related EASA ADs may have been differently worded or timed elsewhere.

• Documentation of compliance: the AD mandates actions but does not specify recordkeeping format or retention periods within its text. Operators should therefore ensure that their maintenance records clearly document serial numbers inspected, presence/absence of letter “V”, the drive‑tube replacement or bonding check performed, the ASB revision used, dates, and responsible maintenance staff , otherwise it may be hard to demonstrate compliance under regulatory audit, particularly given the AD’s prohibitions on installation.

The AD prescribes compliance pathways by reference to specified Eurocopter ASBs and sets explicit timing and preconditions for installation. The following concrete steps, grounded in the AD text, set out a compliance‑oriented checklist for operators, maintainers and parts suppliers:

1. Identification and inventory

• Immediately identify all EUROCOPTER EC 130 B4 helicopters in your fleet.

• For each helicopter, inspect installed twist‑grip assemblies for part number (P/N) and serial number (S/N) and record these precisely. The AD’s Applicability lists P/Ns 350A27520900/901/902/903 (pilot’s side) and 350A27521201 (co‑pilot’s side) with specific S/N ranges. Do not rely on part number alone; record the S/N and verify whether the lever base bears the letter “V” where applicable.

• Segregate or flag aircraft and spare parts that fall into any of the specified groups so they are readily traceable.

2. Follow the Eurocopter ASBs cited in the AD

• Obtain EUROCOPTER EC 130 ASB No. 76A002 and EUROCOPTER EC 130 ASB No. 76A001 Revision 1. The AD requires compliance with paragraphs 2.B., 2.B.2., 2.B.3. of ASB No. 76A002 and paragraph 2.B.3 of ASB No. 76A001 Rev 1 for the respective actions.

• Where later approved revisions of those ASBs are available, obtain and confirm approval status, because the AD expressly permits use of later approved revisions for compliance. Document which revision you used for the work.

3. Time‑bound replacement for specific co‑pilot assemblies

• For co‑pilot twist grip assemblies P/N 350A27521201 with S/N from 11 to 21 inclusive and no letter “V” on the lever base, replace the drive tube in accordance with paragraph 2.B. of ASB No. 76A002.2.

• Complete this drive‑tube replacement within 110 flight hours or 9 months after the effective date of the AD, whichever occurs first. Use the effective date listed in the AD (for this amendment, 18 December 2008) when calculating the calendar compliance deadline.

4. Interim operational training requirement

• For affected helicopters, during autorotation training, carry the manoeuvre out until the helicopter touches down (full autorotation). The AD places this instruction in the Requirements block and the Compliance table links it to the period “Pending replacement of the twist grip drive tube as detailed in Requirement 1.” Ensure training syllabi for affected aircraft are updated to reflect this instruction and that instructors are briefed.

5. Installation preconditions for specific assemblies

• Do not install co‑pilot twist grip assemblies P/N 350A27521201 with S/N from 11 to 21 inclusive and no letter “V” on the lever base unless the drive tube has been replaced and the collective lever marked in accordance with paragraphs 2.B.2 and 2.B.3 of ASB No. 76A002.

• Do not install pilot twist grip assemblies P/N 350A27520900/901/902/903 with S/N below 64, or co‑pilot twist grip assemblies P/N 350A27521201 with S/N below 11 and between 22 and 66 inclusive, unless the bonding between the control pinion and the drive tube has been checked in accordance with paragraph 2.B.3 of EUROCOPTER EC 130 ASB No. 76A001 Revision 1 before installation.

• Ensure that any installation performed after the AD’s effective date is accompanied by the required checks or replacements and that documentation of the action is retained.

6. Marking and documentation

• Where ASB No. 76A002 is cited for marking of the collective lever (paragraphs 2.B.2 and 2.B.3), follow the ASB’s instructions precisely and apply the marking as required. Record the marking action alongside the serial number and details of the drive‑tube replacement.

• Maintain records of the ASB revision used, the date of action, the identity of the maintenance organisation and personnel performing the work, and any test or inspection results. Although the AD does not specify recordkeeping requirements, traceable records will be essential to demonstrate compliance and to support airworthiness release processes.

7. Parts management

• For spare parts holdings and inventories, do not permit sale or installation of parts covered by the AD without the required checks or drive‑tube replacement and marking. Tag and quarantine suspect assemblies until either the bonding check has been performed in accordance with ASB No. 76A001 Rev 1 or the required drive‑tube replacement and marking has occurred.

• Inform your procurement and parts managers about the AD’s installation preconditions to avoid inadvertent supply of unverified assemblies.

8. Cross‑reference EASA and prior ADs where applicable

• Note the AD’s cross‑references: the AD refers to EASA AD 2008‑0184 and states it supersedes EASA AD 2006‑0079. If your operations, fleet movements or parts supply cross jurisdictions, reconcile actions taken under those EASA ADs with the CASA AD’s requirements and effective dates.

9. Audit and implementation plan

• Create an implementation schedule that addresses: parts identification, procurement or availability of replacement drive tubes, booking of maintenance slots, application of the collective lever marking, conduct of autorotation training consistent with the AD, and final verification of installations.

• Ensure maintenance release documentation aligns with the ASB procedures used and that the aircraft’s logbooks and maintenance records reflect the actions required by this AD.

10. Use later approved ASB revisions only when formally accepted

• If applying a later revision of a Eurocopter ASB, confirm that the revision is approved for compliance with this CASA AD. Keep written evidence or regulatory approval references that show a later revision was accepted for compliance, and document the specific paragraphs followed to maintain an audit trail.

By following these steps, operators and maintainers align their work with the specific requirements and compliance windows set out in the AD while preserving records to demonstrate compliance. The AD’s obligations are defined by the combination of its Applicability, the Requirement block and the Compliance table; the detailed procedures themselves are located in the referenced Eurocopter ASBs and their later approved revisions.