What it does
This Airworthiness Directive (AD), identified AD/DHC-8/128 and dated 9/2006, mandates inspection and corrective work on the left and right wing-root electrical cable harnesses on certain Bombardier DHC-8 (Dash 8) aeroplane models and serial numbers. The AD requires a visual inspection for chafing or damage of specific harness assemblies and mandates repair where damage is found, in accordance with Bombardier Service Bulletin (SB) 8-24-83, Revision A, dated 2 August 2005, or later revisions approved by the Chief, Continuing Airworthiness, Transport Canada. It also requires modification of the wing root to fuselage aft seal assemblies by incorporating Bombardier ModSum 8Y122031 (or an earlier ModSum IS8Q2400005 if already installed), to create physical clearance between the electrical cable assemblies and the edge of the fairing panel.
The AD specifies the exact cable harness part numbers and their locations: left harness 82440073-001 (Models 100/200) or 82440073-301 (Model 300) attached to aft seal assembly 85350712-001 at station Yw43.00; right harness 82440074-001 (Models 100/200) or 82440074-301 (Model 300) attached to aft seal assembly 85350711-001 at station Yw43.00. Applicability is limited to DHC-8 Models 102, 103, 106, 201, 202, 301, 311, 314 and 315 with serial numbers 003 through 606.
The compliance window set by the AD is within 6 000 hours time in service after the effective date (the AD becomes effective on 31 August 2006). The directive states that prior inspections and seal-assembly modifications done before the effective date in accordance with the original issue of Bombardier SB 8-24-83 satisfy the AD requirements, and that incorporation of ModSum IS8Q2400005 prior to the AD’s effective date is equivalent to ModSum 8Y122031.
Transport Canada is referenced as the approving authority for later SB revisions, and a note points to Transport Canada AD CF-2006-15 for related material. The AD is signed by a delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, James Coyne, and includes a background narrative explaining that the directive follows an incident involving an un-commanded propeller feathering caused by chafing through wires associated with the auto-feather system where the wing-to-fuselage aft seal assembly chafed wiring.