AD/DAUPHIN/99 - Fuel Crossfeed High Level Switches

The Directive explicitly targets operators of Eurocopter SA 365 N and SA 365 N1 helicopters, all serial numbers, except those aircraft that have incorporated modification kit 365A087690.00 or modification 0728B17. The immediate economic burden and operational change fall on those operators because the AD requires maintenance action and a change to operational information (the placard) affecting flight crew behaviour.

Primary affected parties, as identifiable from the text:

• Registered helicopter operators and owners of SA 365 N and SA 365 N1 airframes without the specified modifications. They must arrange and pay for the mechanical disconnection and, where required, the placard installation. The compliance requirement is time-limited, so operators must prioritise the work within the 10 hours time in service or 30 day window after the AD’s effective date.

• Maintenance organisations and certifying engineers responsible for carrying out the disconnection and placard installation in accordance with Eurocopter AS365 ASB 01.00.63 (paragraphs 2.B.1 and 2.B.2). The AD prescribes that the work be done “in accordance with” those ASB paragraphs, thereby directing the technical method to the manufacturer’s procedures and any later EASA-approved revisions.

• Flight crews and ground crews operating affected helicopters. Disconnecting the high level switches inhibits a cockpit high level warning that advises flight crew of overflow risk. For helicopters lacking the crossfeed between filler necks, the placard creates a new operating constraint: fuel transfers into a receiving tank group must be limited to when that receiving tank group contains less than 300 litres. Crews therefore have to modify fuel transfer practices, increase manual monitoring, and comply with placard instructions.

• Regulators and aviation safety delegates. The AD is issued under the authority of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (signature by James Coyne, Delegate of CASA). The AD also references EASA Emergency AD 2009-0109-E and allows later EASA-approved revisions of the Eurocopter ASB, implicating international regulatory coordination.

• Aircraft that have already received the specified modifications. If an aircraft has incorporated modification kit 365A087690.00 or modification 0728B17, the AD does not apply. That exemption benefits operators who invested in or benefited from those modification pathways prior to this Directive.

Costs and responsibilities flow mainly to operators and maintenance providers who must schedule the work, source any required materials, retain compliance evidence, and implement procedural changes for flight crews. The Directive imposes a concrete change to on-aircraft equipment and to operational documentation (placard), and it imposes a short deadline that concentrates compliance work in a small time window.

The AD specifies precise duties and limited rights as follows, drawn directly from the document text.

Duties:

• Verify applicability: Operators must determine whether the helicopter is an SA 365 N or SA 365 N1, and whether it has incorporated modification kit 365A087690.00 or modification 0728B17. The AD applies to all serial numbers of SA 365 N and N1 helicopters except those with the specified modifications.

• Disconnect the fuel high level switches: Requirement 1 mandates disconnection of the fuel high level switches “in accordance with the instructions of paragraph 2.B.1 of Eurocopter AS365 Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 01.00.63.” The duty is mechanical and procedural, and the operator/maintenance organisation must follow the manufacturer’s ASB instructions.

• Install a placard where required: Requirement 2 requires, on helicopters not equipped with a crossfeed between the fuel filler necks, the installation of a placard near the fuel panel in accordance with paragraph 2.B.2 of ASB 01.00.63 dated 5 May 2009. The placard must limit transfers into a receiving tank group to cases where that receiving group contains less than 300 litres (240 kg or 529 lbs).

• Meet the compliance timeline: Both Requirements 1 and 2 must be completed within 10 hours time in service or 30 days after the effective date of the Directive, whichever is first. The Directive became effective on 8 May 2009.

• Use of compliant ASB revisions: Operators must follow ASB 01.00.63 as dated 5 May 2009, unless they choose to follow later revisions, in which case those revisions must be approved by EASA. The AD explicitly accepts later EASA-approved revisions of the ASB for compliance.

Rights and limits to discretion:

• Right to use later EASA-approved ASB revisions: The AD affords operators some procedural flexibility in that later revisions of the manufacturer’s ASB are acceptable for compliance, provided those revisions are approved by EASA. That permits the use of updated manufacturer guidance where EASA has validated it.

• No applicability where modifications already remove the switches: The AD does not apply to helicopters that incorporate modification kit 365A087690.00 or modification 0728B17, which remove the two high level switches. Aircraft with those modifications are outside the AD’s requirements.

• Temporary measure: The AD explicitly identifies itself as a temporary measure and signals that further rulemaking is likely. That frames the duties as immediate interim requirements rather than necessarily final design fixes.

The document does not stipulate procedural filing steps, recordkeeping details, or sanctions in the text. It prescribes technical actions to be performed “in accordance with” specified ASB paragraphs and fixes a compliance window. The AD places operational constraints on flight crews by removing a warning system and replacing it with a placard-imposed restriction on fuel transfer operations where the receiving tank may approach capacity.

The Directive text does not specify civil or criminal penalties, nor does it set out an enforcement regime in granular terms. The only enforcement-related material present in the document are the formal elements that give the Directive effect: the AD’s effective date of 8 May 2009, the compliance requirement that Requirements 1 and 2 be completed within 10 hours time in service or 30 days after that effective date, and the signature block showing the AD was issued by James Coyne, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.

Consequently, the AD establishes mandatory compliance obligations, but it does not enumerate sanctions, fines, or administrative enforcement procedures within its own text. The document leaves out any procedural description of how compliance will be audited, how non-compliance will be handled administratively, or whether documentation proving compliance must be submitted to the regulator. The AD does, however, make two elements clear which have enforcement relevance in practice and in the AD’s own terms:

• Compliance is time-limited: both required actions must be completed within 10 hours time in service or 30 days of the AD becoming effective, creating a short, determinative window for operators to act.

• The AD prescribes specific procedural compliance: the disconnection and placard must be done “in accordance with” specific paragraphs of Eurocopter AS365 ASB 01.00.63, dated 5 May 2009, or later EASA-approved revisions. This ties compliance to a particular source of technical instructions.

Because the Directive does not set out enforcement mechanisms or penalties, the document itself cannot be used as a standalone statement of the regulator’s sanctions regime. The AD’s legal force and potential penalty consequences, if any, are not described in the text provided. Any enforcement or sanctioning practice would therefore derive from external regulatory or statutory frameworks not contained in this AD document. The AD does, however, function as a formal regulatory instrument that establishes mandatory technical and operational duties within a defined timeframe, which in typical aviation regulatory practice triggers expectations of regulatory oversight and possible consequences for failure to comply, but such oversight mechanisms and consequences are not specified in this AD text.

The Directive references and interacts with two external regulatory or technical instruments within its own text: the Eurocopter AS365 Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 01.00.63 and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Emergency AD 2009-0109-E. The AD permits later revisions of the ASB only if they are approved by EASA, which creates a hierarchical link between the CASA-issued AD and EASA’s approval role for ASB revisions.

Specific interactions spelled out by the AD:

• Requirement dependence on manufacturer ASB: The AD delegates the detailed method of compliance to Eurocopter AS365 ASB 01.00.63, citing paragraph 2.B.1 for disconnection and paragraph 2.B.2 for placarding. By tying required actions to the ASB, the AD makes compliance contingent on following manufacturer-prescribed procedures. The AD also accepts later ASB revisions provided the revisions receive EASA approval, indicating that EASA approval affects what procedural versions satisfy the AD.

• Reference to EASA Emergency AD: The AD’s note says “EASA Emergency AD 2009-0109-E refers.” That cross-reference indicates the CASA AD is aligned with, or follows from, a corresponding EASA emergency action. The AD therefore reflects an interaction between national regulator action and an EASA emergency directive, positioning this CASA AD within an international safety response.

• Carve-out for specific modifications: The AD’s applicability carve-out for helicopters that have incorporated modification kit 365A087690.00 or modification 0728B17 illustrates interaction with prior modification approvals or design-change pathways. If those modifications have been applied, they effectively satisfy the safety objective addressed by this AD, and the AD’s duties do not apply to those aircraft.

What is not in the AD:

• The document does not mention other domestic legislation, civil aviation regulations, or enforcement statutes in the AD text itself. It does not cite Civil Aviation Act provisions, civil penalty schedules, or administrative procedures. Therefore, any interaction with broader domestic regulatory powers, mandatory reporting requirements, airworthiness certificate conditions, or civil penalties is not addressed in the AD text.

• The AD does not specify recordkeeping, mandatory reporting of compliance to CASA, or procedures for approval of alternative methods of compliance within its own wording. The only method of compliance explicitly accepted other than the dated ASB is later EASA-approved ASB revisions.

In short, within its text the AD creates direct procedural interaction with the Eurocopter ASB for method, and with EASA for acceptance of later ASB revisions and as an originating reference (EASA Emergency AD 2009-0109-E). Any broader legal interactions, such as enforcement under domestic aviation statutes or the effect on airworthiness certificates, are not described in this document and would need to be identified from other regulatory texts.

The AD text itself contains limited sequencing and amendment information. From the document we can extract the following timeline and amendment-relevant elements:

• ASB reference and date: The AD requires compliance in accordance with Eurocopter AS365 ASB 01.00.63, dated 5 May 2009. That ASB date is the baseline technical instruction the AD points to.

• Effective date of the AD: The AD states that it becomes effective on 8 May 2009. The compliance window is then fixed relative to that effective date: the required actions must be completed within 10 hours time in service or 30 days, whichever occurs first, after the effective date.

• Acceptance of later EASA-approved ASB revisions: The AD explicitly allows later revisions of ASB 01.00.63 to be used for compliance, but only if those later revisions are approved by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). This creates an explicit channel for technical amendments to be accepted for regulatory compliance: if Eurocopter issues a revised ASB and EASA approves it, the revision is acceptable as alternative compliance to the AD’s original ASB reference.

• Temporary status and further rulemaking: The AD states that it is considered temporary and that further rulemaking is likely to follow. This signals that the AD is an interim regulatory instrument and that additional directives, modifications, or a permanent design correction may be expected at a later date.

What the AD does not contain about amendment history:

• It does not record any prior or superseded CASA ADs on the same subject. The document does not list amendments to the AD itself or provide a revision history for the AD. No later CASA amendments or supersessions are present in the text.

• It does not document subsequent CASA actions taken after the effective date, nor does it list later ASB revisions or EASA approvals that might have been accepted after 8 May 2009. The AD only permits such later EASA-approved ASB revisions, it does not record them.

• The AD makes a direct cross-reference to EASA Emergency AD 2009-0109-E, but it does not incorporate that EASA AD textually or state any amendment history arising from EASA actions beyond that cross-reference.

Taken together, the AD establishes a narrow amendment pathway: compliance may use the ASB dated 5 May 2009, or later EASA-approved ASB revisions. The AD itself is dated effective 8 May 2009 and is described as temporary, with further rulemaking likely. The document contains no record of post-issue amendments, supersessions, or revocations within its own text.

The AD text contains no information about litigation, challenges, or legal proceedings. It does not reference any judicial decisions, administrative appeals, or disputes arising from its issuance. The document is silent on whether any party sought review, injunction, or judicial relief against the AD, and it provides no indication of any contested enforcement action.

Because the AD provides only the directive text, compliance requirements, and background technical rationale, and does not document subsequent legal activity, there is no litigation history recorded in this instrument. Any litigation, appeals, or legal processes that might have arisen from this AD would have to be identified from external court or administrative records; none are contained or referenced in the AD text provided.

The AD contains several technical and operational traps for operators, maintenance providers, and flight crews; each is evident from the wording of the Directive and the ASB cross-references.

• Disconnecting a warning system: The AD mandates disconnection of the fuel high level switches. The Directive explicitly notes that disconnecting the switches “inhibits the high (fuel) level warning system which normally informs the flight crew of the risk of fuel overflowing from the tank vents.” The operational consequence is that the aircraft no longer has that automatic alert. Operators must understand that they are being required to remove a cockpit warning and replace it with procedural mitigations. Failure to appreciate that disconnecting the switches reduces automated warning may lead to inadequate additional controls.

• Placard requirement applies only to certain aircraft: The AD requires installation of a placard only “on helicopters not equipped with a crossfeed between the fuel filler necks.” That means an operator must correctly classify whether the particular airframe has a crossfeed between filler necks. Misidentifying the aircraft (installing or failing to install a placard incorrectly) risks either non-compliance or a continued unmitigated hazard.

• Precise transfer limitation: The placard must limit transfer to cases where the receiving tank group contains less than 300 litres (240 kg or 529 lbs). The AD gives a specific numeric threshold. Operators and crews must implement procedures and monitoring to ensure the receiving tank group is below that threshold before transfer, and must have credible methods to measure or determine tank contents.

• Short compliance window: Required actions must be completed within 10 hours time in service or 30 days after 8 May 2009, whichever occurs first. That short window concentrates maintenance demand and may be operationally challenging if helicopters are scheduled for immediate deployments.

• Applicability carve-out requires verification: The AD excludes helicopters incorporating modification kit 365A087690.00 or modification 0728B17. Operators must verify modification status for each aircraft. A failure to document the modification or a misunderstanding of whether the modification fully removes the switches could cause incorrect application of the AD.

• Reliance on ASB and EASA approval: The AD requires compliance “in accordance with” specific paragraphs of ASB 01.00.63 dated 5 May 2009. Operators who attempt to apply alternative disconnection methods must ensure those alternatives are either within the ASB or in a later ASB revision approved by EASA. The AD’s acceptance of later ASB revisions is conditional on EASA approval; using an unapproved ASB revision would not satisfy the Directive as written.

• Interim nature: The AD states it is a temporary measure and that further rulemaking is likely. Operators should be wary of treating this AD as a permanent fix; further changes to the aircraft configuration or procedures may be mandated later. Investing in interim modifications that could later be superseded may represent avoidable cost if a permanent design correction is issued.

• Potential for inadvertent transfer restrictions: Because the placard limits fuel transfer based on receiving tank contents, flight crews may alter normal fuel management routines. That could have knock-on effects on range planning, weight and balance, or refuelling practice. Operators should test and document operational changes to ensure they do not create other safety or commercial problems.

• Documentation and proof of compliance: The AD does not state what records must be retained or submitted to CASA, yet compliance likely requires maintenance records attesting to removal and placard installation. Operators should ensure maintenance logs clearly reflect the actions required by the AD, and that flight crews are issued with the placard and operational guidance.

• Interplay with other modifications: If an operator has installed modifications that partially address the issue, they must verify whether those modifications match the two specific modifications listed as exclusions. Partial or different modifications are not listed as satisfying the AD.

Each of these “gotchas” flows directly from the AD’s text, timing, and referenced ASB. Operators must interpret the AD strictly, follow the specified ASB paragraphs, verify modification status, and implement crew-facing mitigations to replace the disabled warning system.

The AD sets out a narrow procedural path to compliance. Follow these steps, each grounded in the AD text and the referenced ASB paragraphs, to meet the Directive’s requirements.

1. Confirm applicability and modification status:

   • Identify each helicopter to confirm it is an SA 365 N or SA 365 N1 airframe.
   • Check whether modification kit 365A087690.00 or modification 0728B17 has been incorporated. If either modification is present, the AD does not apply to that helicopter. If not, proceed.

2. Obtain the applicable ASB:

   • Acquire Eurocopter AS365 Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 01.00.63 dated 5 May 2009. The AD requires compliance in accordance with paragraph 2.B.1 for the disconnection and paragraph 2.B.2 for the placard.
   • If a later revision of ASB 01.00.63 exists that you prefer to use, verify that the revision is approved by EASA; the AD accepts later revisions only if EASA has approved them.

3. Schedule and perform the mechanical disconnection:

   • Arrange maintenance to disconnect the fuel high level switches in accordance with paragraph 2.B.1 of the ASB. Ensure the maintenance organisation follows the manufacturer guidance precisely, and that a suitably qualified certifying mechanic signs off the work according to the operator’s normal maintenance release procedures.
   • Record the work in the aircraft maintenance log, noting the ASB paragraph followed and the date and time in service at which the work was accomplished.

4. Determine whether placarding is required:

   • Determine whether the helicopter is equipped with a crossfeed between the fuel filler necks. If it is not equipped with the crossfeed, the placard installation is required.
   • If placarding is required, follow paragraph 2.B.2 of ASB 01.00.63 dated 5 May 2009 for the placard’s precise text, size, and placement. The AD describes the substantive content: the placard must limit transfer to cases where the receiving tank group contains less than 300 litres (240 kg or 529 lbs). Ensure the placard is visible near the fuel panel for flight and ground crews.

5. Complete actions within the compliance window:

   • The AD became effective on 8 May 2009. Requirements 1 and 2 must be completed within 10 hours time in service or 30 days after the effective date, whichever occurs first. Schedule maintenance and placarding to meet that deadline.

6. Update operational documentation and crew briefing:

   • Because the disconnection inhibits the high level warning system, revise fuel transfer procedures and brief flight and ground crews on the operational change. Emphasise the placard’s transfer limitation (less than 300 litres in the receiving tank group) and any new manual checks required prior to transfer.
   • Ensure the placard is present and legible in accordance with the ASB.

7. Recordkeeping and evidence:

   • Although the AD does not spell out documentation to be submitted to CASA, record all maintenance and placard installation entries in the aircraft maintenance log. Include the ASB reference and paragraph numbers used, the sign-off name and signature, and the hours time in service when the work was completed.
   • Retain copies of the ASB revision used for compliance, and if a later ASB revision was used, retain evidence of EASA approval for that revision.

8. Monitor for subsequent rulemaking:

   • The AD states it is temporary and further rulemaking is likely. Monitor for subsequent directives or manufacturer notices that may mandate a design correction or different mitigation. If a later ASB revision or a CASA or EASA AD supersedes this AD, follow the updated instructions.

9. Verify placard and operational compliance prior to flight:

   • Ensure the placard remains present and legible at the fuel panel. Train flight crews to check placard presence and to apply the 300-litre rule before any fuel transfer into a receiving tank group.

10. Consider longer-term modification:

• If operators prefer not to operate under the temporary conditions imposed by this AD, evaluate whether installation of modification kit 365A087690.00 or modification 0728B17 is feasible; aircraft incorporating either of those modifications are not subject to this AD, as the modifications remove the two high level switches.

These steps follow the AD’s explicit instructions and the referenced ASB paragraphs. Because the AD ties compliance to manufacturer ASB procedures and permits later EASA-approved ASB revisions, maintain documentary evidence of the exact ASB revision relied upon and any EASA approvals that support its use for compliance.