AD/CONVAIR/2 - Elevator and Rudder Hinge Pins and Bushings

Hinge pins and bushings: the rotating components that attach the elevator and rudder to the airframe and allow control surface movement. Wear or improper hardness can lead to excessive play, binding, or failure.

Detailed visual inspection: a method defined in the referenced General Dynamics/Convair Alert Service Bulletin 640 (340D) A55‑7 and Service Bulletin 640 (340D) 55‑5. It requires the removal of the elevators and rudder so that the pins, bushings, bearing plate assemblies and bearings can be examined for cracks, wear, chattering, looseness, dryness, or binding. The AD does not reproduce the bulletin content but makes compliance with its procedures mandatory.

Hardness test to determine equivalent strength: a non‑destructive test (likely Rockwell or Brinell) performed in accordance with normal maintenance procedures , the AD does not prescribe a specific standard, leaving the method to the operator’s discretion provided it determines whether the pin or bushing meets the minimum strength values. The type‑design strengths are specified in ksi: for pin assemblies with part number 240‑2010908‑1, the pin must be 170‑195 ksi and the bushing 240‑2010903‑7 must be 120‑145 ksi; for pin assembly 240‑2010908‑3, the pin must be 170‑195 ksi and bushings (340‑2015903 or Allison 9015192) must be 125‑145 ksi. Parts with the original Convair etched mark “CVSD” are excluded from the hardness‑test requirement , the regulator assumes those parts already meet the design strength.

Suspected unapproved part: the AD’s background attributes the FAA’s concern to the possibility that non‑conforming or counterfeit components could have been installed. The concept is well known in aviation regulation; parts lacking traceability or original manufacturer markings are treated as suspect.

Repetitive inspection interval: after the initial compliance, every 2,000 hours or 2 years (whichever comes first) the operator must repeat requirements 1 and 3: remove the control surfaces, inspect, and reinstall ensuring proper mating of tapered surfaces. The interval is based on time in service, not calendar time, so utilisation affects how often the work recurs.

Serviceable parts: any replacement pin or bushing must come from a source that can certify the part meets the type‑design strength. The AD does not specify what documentation is required, but normal maintenance rules would require a release note or authorised release certificate.

The primary duty holders are the registered owners or operators of Convair 340 and 440 series aeroplanes, including any that have been modified with turbopropeller engines. In Australia, this fleet is small , possibly a handful of aircraft used for cargo, charter, or specialised operations. Each affected aircraft must have the work done by an appropriately authorised maintenance organisation (a Part 145 or equivalent approved facility). The AD indirectly affects the businesses that depend on these aircraft: charter companies, freight forwarders, regional operators, and the maintenance shops that service them. A single aircraft grounded for the initial inspection could lose revenue for days if parts need to be ordered from overseas, which is a real risk given that the AD became effective on 11 May 2006 and required compliance by 30 June 2006 , a window of only 50 days. Operators who had not already carried out the FAA‑mandated equivalent (per AD 92‑06‑06) would have to scramble to schedule downtime, procure parts, and engage labour. The cost of a replacement pin or bushing may be modest, but the labour hours for removal, inspection, hardness testing, reassembly, and the need for specialist tooling can add up. If the hardness test reveals a sub‑standard part and a replacement is not immediately available, the aircraft cannot fly until a serviceable part is fitted. For an operator with a single revenue‑earning airframe, that delay can be economically significant. The AD also affects the maintenance provider’s liability: any error in performing the hardness test or in visually inspecting the bearing plate could result in a missed defect and, ultimately, an accident. The AD imposes no fee or levy, but the opportunity cost of compliance is borne entirely by the private operator.

Duty to inspect: the operator must cause the elevator and rudder to be removed and a detailed visual inspection performed on the hinge pins, bushings, bearing plate assemblies, and bearings. The inspection must follow the procedures in the specified Alert Service Bulletin and Service Bulletin.

Duty to test: a hardness test must be conducted on every pin and bushing (except those bearing the Convair etched mark “CVSD”) to verify that the equivalent strength meets the type‑design strength table in the AD. If any pin or bushing falls below the minimum ksi value, it must be replaced before further flight.

Duty to replace: if any cracked bearing plate assembly, worn pin or bushing, or defective bearing is found during the visual inspection, a serviceable part must be fitted before further flight. The replacement must be accomplished in accordance with the applicable Service Bulletin.

Duty to reinstall correctly: after inspection and any replacement, the elevator and rudder must be reinstalled and the proper mating of the pin and bushing tapered surfaces verified per the Alert Service Bulletin.

Duty to repeat: the inspection and reinstallation (requirements 1 and 3) must be accomplished again within 2,000 hours or 2 years after the previous compliance, and thereafter at those intervals.

Rights: the operator has the right to rely on parts that are already marked with the Convair etched mark (CVSD) as being excluded from the hardness‑test requirement. The operator also has the right to accomplish the initial requirements before the 30 June 2006 deadline and have those actions count as compliance with earlier FAA AD 92‑06‑06 (per Note 1). There is no explicit right to extend the compliance time, but an operator could apply to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority for an alternative means of compliance or an extension under general aviation regulations , the AD itself does not provide that mechanism.

The AD itself does not set out penalty amounts. Enforcement arises from the parent aviation legislation , the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth) and the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (CASR). Operating an aircraft that does not comply with an applicable Airworthiness Directive is a breach of the continuing airworthiness obligation. In Australia, contravention can attract civil penalties of up to several hundred thousand dollars per offence for an individual, and significantly higher amounts for a body corporate, plus potential grounding orders and suspension of airworthiness certificates. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) can issue a direction to ground the aircraft until the AD is complied with. Deliberate or reckless non‑compliance can lead to criminal prosecution under the Criminal Code. Because this AD concerns critical flight‑control components, regulators treat it as high priority. An operator who fails to meet the 30 June 2006 deadline without having applied for an extension is immediately exposed. The practical enforcement risk: if an incident occurs and non‑compliance is found, insurance policies may be voided, and the operator faces not only regulatory penalties but also civil liability from third parties. The AD carries a note about FAA AD 93‑24‑06, suggesting that the US FAA also enforces similar requirements internationally. For an Australian operator, the real penalty is the cost of grounding and lost revenue rather than the statutory fine, but the legal risk is nonetheless real. Maintenance organisations that certify the work incorrectly may also face action under maintenance regulations.

The AD explicitly references two earlier FAA Airworthiness Directives: AD 92‑06‑06 and AD 93‑24‑06. Note 1 states that compliance with requirements 1 and 3 of this AD satisfies the corresponding requirements in FAA AD 92‑06‑06. This means that an operator who had already accomplished the inspections under the earlier FAA directive would have already met the Australian AD’s initial requirements if done before 30 June 2006. The AD does not mention any Australian‑specific predecessor directive, so it appears to be the first standalone Australian AD for this issue. The AD also interacts with the broader continuing airworthiness framework under Part 42 of the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998, which requires operators to maintain their aircraft in an airworthy condition and to comply with all applicable ADs. The aircraft’s maintenance schedule or approved inspection programme would need to incorporate this repetitive task. The AD is likely also linked to the Airworthiness Bulletin system and to the requirement that any replacement part must be eligible under Part 21 of CASR (certification of parts). The hardness test procedure described as “in accordance with normal maintenance procedures” invokes the standards set out in the maintenance regulations and in the manufacturer’s instructions. Additionally, the AD’s reference to the Convair mark “CVSD” as an exclusion from hardness testing implies that parts lacking that mark must be treated as suspect and tested; that aligns with the general rules on unapproved parts in Subpart 21.A of CASR. The AD does not override any other law, but it creates a hierarchy of mandatory action , the AD prevails over any inconsistent manufacturer’s recommendation for less frequent inspection.

The document itself is AD/CONVAIR/2, labelled with the number 5/2006. It is signed by David Villiers as Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority on 29 March 2006 and becomes effective on 11 May 2006. The AD does not state what AD/CONVAIR/1 contained or whether any previous Australian directive on the same subject existed. Given the numbering, “AD/CONVAIR/2” suggests it is the second Australian directive for the Convair type, but the source provides no detail on AD/CONVAIR/1. The AD references FAA AD 92‑06‑06 (effective 1992) and FAA AD 93‑24‑06 (effective 1993), indicating that the Australian requirement was promulgated later. The source shows no subsequent amendments; it is a single‑issue directive. In practice, Airworthiness Directives are sometimes amended or superseded by later ADs. This AD may have been superseded by a more recent directive, but that is not included in the source. The compliance notes refer to “including Addenda I, II, and III, all dated April 15, 1991” of the Supplemental Inspection Document, meaning those addenda are incorporated by reference as part of the requirement for repetitive inspections. The AD does not state any revision history of its own text. For the purposes of this deep dive, the only amendment history visible is that this AD harmonises Australian law with the US FAA’s earlier actions, and it effectively “adopts” the FAA framework for Convair hinge‑pin inspections with a delayed effective date.

The source document does not mention any litigation, either pending or decided. Airworthiness Directives are legislative instruments made under delegated powers, and they are rarely challenged in court because the cost of litigation for a single small operator is prohibitive compared to the cost of compliance. Any challenge would typically be on procedural grounds , for instance, that the AD was made outside the scope of the enabling power, or that the regulator failed to follow consultation requirements. In Australia, the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) could be used to seek review of the decision to issue the AD, but the grounds would be narrow: error of law, irrelevant considerations, or unreasonableness. As a practical matter, no court case concerning AD/CONVAIR/2 is known in the public record. The AD is a direct adoption of a US FAA action, which itself was based on an alert service bulletin from the original manufacturer. The background does not allege any accident or incident that directly led to the AD; it says the FAA requires the inspections “to prevent the loss of an elevator or rudder, resulting from the installation of a suspected unapproved part.” That suggests a generic risk rather than a specific crash. Without a precipitating event, litigation against the AD itself is unlikely. However, if a defect were missed despite compliance, a personal injury or property damage claim could arise against the maintenance provider or the operator for negligence. The AD would then become evidence of the standard of care. But that is speculative. The source contains no case citations.

Several traps await the unwary operator. First, the exclusion from hardness testing only applies to parts that bear the original Convair etched mark “CVSD”. The mark must be etched on the top of the hinge pin and on the top of the bushing. A part that looks original but lacks the mark, or whose mark has been painted over or worn off, does not qualify; it must be tested. Second, the hardness test requirement applies even if the visual inspection finds no wear. Third, the repetitive inspection interval is “within 2,000 hours or 2 years after previous compliance, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 hours time in service or 2 years, whichever occurs first.” This is a dual limit: the operator cannot exceed either the hours or the calendar months. A lightly used aircraft might hit 2 years at, say, 150 hours; the operator cannot defer inspection until it reaches 2,000 hours. Conversely, a high‑utilisation aircraft might reach 2,000 hours in 10 months and must then be inspected. Fourth, the AD requires proper mating of tapered surfaces on reinstallation per the Alert Service Bulletin. Taper‑mating errors can lead to accelerated wear or premature failure even if new parts are installed. Fifth, the initial compliance date of 30 June 2006 leaves only 50 days from the effective date for operators who had not already performed the FAA‑mandated inspections. Logistically, scheduling the required work could be difficult, and parts might need to be sourced, leading to grounding beyond the deadline. An operator who misses the deadline but is still waiting for a replacement part cannot legally fly. Sixth, the AD does not define what constitutes “normal maintenance procedures” for the hardness test. An operator who uses an uncalibrated tester or the wrong conversion table may get false pass readings. Seventh, the AD incorporates by reference several external documents (Alert Service Bulletin 640 (340D) A55‑7, Service Bulletin 640 (340D) 55‑5, and the Supplemental Inspection Document) which the operator must obtain and follow exactly; failing to use the correct revision can mean non‑compliance. Eighth, the AD’s Note 2 states “FAA AD 93‑24‑06 Amdt 39‑8755 refers”; the operator must understand whether that AD also imposes separate requirements not duplicated here.

Compliance must be understood as a multi‑stage process. First, obtain the required documents: Alert Service Bulletin 640 (340D) A55‑7, Service Bulletin 640 (340D) 55‑5, and General Dynamics/Convair Division Supplemental Inspection Document Report No. ZS‑34‑1000, Revision 1, including Addenda I, II, and III, all dated 15 April 1991. These must be current at the time of compliance. Second, schedule the aircraft out of service. The initial actions must be completed before 30 June 2006. For each affected aeroplane:

1. Remove the elevators and rudder in accordance with Parts 2.A.1. and 2.B.1. respectively of the Alert Service Bulletin.
2. Perform a detailed visual inspection of the elevator and rudder hinge pins and bushings for wear (per Service Bulletin 640 (340D) 55‑5, Part 2.B.).
3. Perform a detailed visual inspection of the elevator and rudder bearing plate assemblies for cracks, and of the bearings for chattering, looseness, dryness, or binding (per Alert Service Bulletin Parts 2.A. and 2.B.).
4. If any cracked bearing plate, worn pin or bushing, or defective bearing is found, replace with serviceable parts in accordance with the applicable Service Bulletin before further flight.
5. Perform a hardness test on every elevator and rudder hinge pin and bushing (except those bearing the etched Convair mark “CVSD”). Compare the measured strength against the type‑design strength table: for pin assembly 240‑2010908‑1, the pin must be 170‑195 ksi and the bushing 240‑2010903‑7 must be 120‑145 ksi; for pin assembly 240‑2010908‑3, the pin must be 170‑195 ksi and bushings 340‑2015903 or Allison 9015192 must be 125‑145 ksi.
6. If any pin or bushing fails the hardness test (i.e., its equivalent strength is below the minimum), replace it with a serviceable part before further flight.
7. Reinstall the elevator and rudder, ensuring proper mating of the pin and bushing tapered surfaces per Alert Service Bulletin Parts 2.A.5. and 2.B.5.
8. Maintain records of the inspection findings, hardness test results, and all parts replaced.

After initial compliance, repeat steps 1, 2, 3, 4 (if defects found), 7, and 8 at intervals not to exceed 2,000 hours time in service or 2 years, whichever comes first. The hardness test (step 5) appears to be a one‑time requirement on each part; the AD only states it as part of the initial requirements, not in the repetitive paragraph. However, if a replacement pin or bushing is installed at a later inspection, that new part should also be hardness tested unless it bears the Convair mark. The operator should include this task in the aircraft’s approved maintenance schedule and track compliance in the continuing airworthiness record system. Any alternative means of compliance must be approved by CASA.