What it does
CASA Airworthiness Directive AD/CL-600/111 Amdt 1 (the AD) imposes a mandatory continuing airworthiness requirement on operators of certain Bombardier (Canadair) CL-600 series aeroplanes. Mechanically, it requires the inspection, and if necessary replacement or rework, of nose landing gear (NLG) selector valves and NLG door selector valves installed on the aircraft. The AD is issued under the Civil Aviation Act 1988 and the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (CASR) and has the force of law. Non-compliance renders the aircraft unairworthy and the operator potentially liable for enforcement action.
The AD specifies that the check must be performed by the earlier of: (a) within 250 flight hours after 30 July 2009, or (b) by the end of 30 January 2010. The compliance date is a real calendar deadline, not tied to aircraft cycles or calendar time alone. The AD became effective on 9 May 2014, which is the date of this amendment. However, the original AD (AD/CL-600/111) became effective on 30 July 2009. This amendment corrects a typographical error in the table of service bulletin references for the CL-600-2A12 (CL-601) model. The technical requirements and compliance times are unchanged from the original AD.
Crucially, the AD supersedes and cancels the earlier AD/CL-600/86. The note explains that the earlier AD’s affected valve serial number range was too narrow (upper limit S/N 0767) and has been expanded to S/N 2126. Because the exact location of the additional valves is unknown, all affected aircraft must be checked regardless of prior compliance with the earlier AD. This creates a fresh compliance obligation for any aircraft that may have been compliant under the previous directive.
The background describes the safety defect: a specific batch of NLG and NLG door selector valves, part number (P/N) 601R75146-1 (Kaiser Fluid Technologies P/N 750006000), may have had their end caps incorrectly lock-wired or incorrectly torqued during assembly. This can lead to the end cap backing off, causing seal damage and internal leakage. If electrical power is transferred or removed from the aircraft before the NLG safety pin is installed, residual pressure in the No. 3 hydraulic system can cause an uncommanded NLG retraction. Although no such cases were reported on the Challenger models, six cases were reported on CRJ aircraft, one of which resulted in NLG collapse at the departure gate. The AD is a preventive measure to mitigate that risk.