What it does
This Airworthiness Directive (AD/CL-600/108, dated 7/2009) requires targeted inspection and conditional replacement of the Air Driven Generator (ADG) power feeder harness on specified Bombardier (Canadair) CL-600 (Challenger) series aeroplanes. The directive (signed 18 May 2009 by James Coyne, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority) applies to three CL-600 model variants and specific serial number ranges (CL-600-1A11 serials 1004-1085; CL-600-2A12 serials 3001-3066; CL-600-2B16 serials 5001-5131). Mechanically, it directs the following sequence:
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An inspection, if not previously accomplished, of the ADG power feeder harness wire type in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions in Part A of Bombardier Service Bulletin (SB) 600-0737 or SB 601-0591, as applicable (both SBs dated 23 July 2007). The AD states: "If not previously accomplished, inspect the Air Driven Generator (ADG) power feeder harness for wire type, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions in Part A of Bombardier Service Bulletin (SB) 600-0737 or 601-0591 (as applicable), both dated 23 July 2007."
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A conditional replacement: "If the wire type is Kapton, replace the ADG power feeder harness in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions in Part B of SB 600-0737 or 601-0591 (as applicable)."
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A completion rule: if the wire type is not Kapton, executing the instruction in Part A completes compliance with the Directive.
The AD allows updated SB revisions to be used for compliance provided they are "approved by the Chief, Continuing Airworthiness, Transport Canada." It identifies compliance timing: the AD becomes effective on 2 July 2009 and requires compliance "Before 19 July 2011." The AD also cross-references Transport Canada AD CF-2009-18 and records the operational safety rationale: Transport Canada received two reports where the ADG failed to power the essential bus on in-flight deployment; investigation revealed chafing of Kapton wire on the backshell of connector P1XC, producing short circuit, wire damage and disconnection. The AD links that failure mode to the potential outcome of loss of emergency power to critical systems when coupled with dual generator failure, with adverse effects on aircraft controllability.