What it does
This instrument is an airworthiness directive styled "AD/CESSNA 550/25 Amdt 1", issued by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority as recorded by a CASA delegate on 19 June 2007, and effective 2 August 2007. It imposes mandatory corrective and preventative wiring work on Cessna Model 550, 551 and S550 aeroplanes as identified in the directive and the associated Cessna Service Bulletins. The core mandatory actions are twofold.
First (labelled Requirement 1 in the Directive), if the original actions of the initial Directive have not already been accomplished, the operator must install identification sleeves on the wires for the positive and negative terminal studs of the engine fire extinguishing bottles, re‑connect the wires to the correct studs, test the connection and, as necessary, re‑connect and re‑test until the connection tests correctly, in accordance with Cessna SB550‑26‑05 or SBS550‑26‑02 as applicable (Requirement 1). The Directive sets a compliance window for that action: within 100 hours time in service or 60 days after the effective date of the Amendment, whichever occurs first (Compliance).
Second (Requirement 2), the Directive prohibits the installation of fire extinguisher bottles, as replacement spares, on any Cessna Model 550, 551 or S550 aeroplane unless the identification sleeves described in Requirement 1 have been installed on the wires for the positive and negative terminal studs (Requirement 2). That prohibition is effective "as of the effective date of this Amendment" (Compliance).
The Directive expressly ties compliance to specific Cessna Service Bulletins: SB550‑26‑05 for Models 550 and 551, and SBS550‑26‑02 for S550, each dated 1 April 2005 (Applicability table). It also accepts later revisions of those SBs only where they have been approved by the United States Federal Aviation Administration as an Alternate Method of Compliance to FAA AD 2007‑11‑17; such FAA‑approved revisions are "considered acceptable for compliance with the equivalent Requirements of this Directive" (later revisions/AMOC note). The Directive reproduces the safety rationale supplied by the FAA, namely that mis‑wired bottles had been reported, creating the risk that circuit breakers could trip when discharge was attempted and that an engine fire might remain unextinguished because flammable fluid could be supplied during a fire (Background).