AD/CESSNA 208/22 - Alternate Static Air Source Valve

The central concept is the static air source system, which provides ambient air pressure to the pitot-static flight instruments (altimeter, airspeed indicator, vertical speed indicator). The alternate static air source selector valve is a backup valve that the pilot can select if the primary static port becomes blocked. The valve has a port that allows static air to enter. The part number identification placard is a small label that identifies the part number of the valve. In the affected batch of valves (P/N 2013142-18 manufactured between 20 November 2007 and 18 February 2008), the placard was riveted or attached over the port opening, physically blocking the inlet. This means that when the valve is selected, no static pressure can enter, but the pilot would not visually notice the obstruction during a normal pre-flight inspection because the placard is small and the valve is located behind the pilot and co-pilot seats.

The AD introduces the concept of “before further flight” compliance. This is a standard airworthiness directive phrase meaning the aircraft is not airworthy until the requirement is met, and any flight after the effective date without compliance is a breach. The effective date is 13 May 2008, so an aircraft flown on 14 May 2008 without the inspection would be in violation. This creates immediate operational pressure: operators must inspect before their next flight, even if the aircraft is in the middle of a revenue cycle. For a commercial operator, this can mean grounding an aircraft at short notice, incurring opportunity cost from lost flying hours. The AD also distinguishes between original installation at manufacture and post-manufacture replacement. The Table 1 aeroplanes have a narrower serial number range because Cessna knew which aircraft had the valve installed at the factory; Table 2 covers the entire rest of the 208 and 208B fleet that could have received the part as a replacement from the defective batch. The variable compliance path (records check versus physical inspection) is a cost-minimisation mechanism: for aeroplanes that never had the valve replaced, requiring physical inspection would impose unnecessary expenditure on parts removal, labour and potential damage. The AD allows the operator to rely on records, which is a less burdensome option, but only if the operator holds a private pilot licence or higher (Note 3). If the operator does not hold such a licence (for example, a non-pilot owner or a company that leases without a pilot on staff), they would presumably need to engage a licensed engineer to conduct the records audit. That subtle distinction creates a compliance cost disparity between owner-pilots and non-pilot operators.

The concept of “placard removal and discard” is also important: the remedy is not to reposition the placard or add a new one; it is to physically remove it and throw it away. This means the part number identification is lost, which could cause confusion during future maintenance or part tracking. However, the AD prioritises safety over record-keeping. The operator is left with a valve that no longer has a visible part number, which might necessitate re-identification using other methods (e.g., engineering markings, or affixing a new placard in a non-obstructing location). The AD does not address that downstream issue; it simply requires that the port be open and unobstructed.

The primary affected parties are the registered owners and operators of Cessna 208 and 208B aeroplanes that fall within the serial number ranges listed in Tables 1 and 2. This covers aircraft from serial numbers 20800001 through 20800419 for the Model 208, and 208B0001 through 208B1310 for the Model 208B. The Cessna 208 (Caravan) and 208B (Grand Caravan) are widely used for commuter passenger services, freight, skydiving operations and utility transport in Australia, particularly in remote and regional areas. Many of these aircraft are operated by small charter companies, owner-pilots, or lessors. The AD directly imposes a compliance burden: each aircraft must be either physically inspected or have its records checked before further flight after 13 May 2008. For an operator with a fleet of, say, ten affected aircraft, the practical cost includes the labour time of a licensed aircraft maintenance engineer (or the operator’s own time if they hold a private pilot licence and choose the records route), the cost of any placard removal (which may be minor if the placard is simply unscrewed), and the potential grounding cost if the aircraft is in revenue service and must be inspected before the next departure.

The AD also affects maintenance organisations and repair stations that handle those aircraft, because they will be expected to verify compliance as part of routine scheduled maintenance or when performing modifications. Parts suppliers and stockists holding P/N 2013142-18 valves are indirectly affected: they must ensure that any valve they sell or install after the effective date has been inspected prior to installation (Requirement 5). This means a supplier cannot simply send out a valve without confirming that the placard does not obstruct the port. For a small parts dealer, this adds a verification step that may require visual inspection or returning the valve to the manufacturer for confirmation. The cost of that step may be passed on to the customer.

CASA itself is affected in an administrative sense: it must monitor compliance through its surveillance program, either at scheduled audits or during ramp checks. The AD notes that CASA had no way to determine which aeroplanes had the defective valve, so the burden is placed on operators to self-report through the inspection regime. There is no requirement in the AD to notify CASA of a placard obstruction found; the corrective action is simply to remove it. This means CASA relies on the maintenance records to evidence compliance, but there is no central reporting of the number of placards removed. Consequently, the regulator bears the enforcement cost of verifying compliance across the fleet. For insurers and financiers, the AD may affect the airworthiness status of aircraft as collateral; a borrower who fails to comply could be in breach of loan covenants requiring the aircraft to be maintained in an airworthy condition. Lessors may demand proof of compliance before accepting a return or during lease re-delivery.

The AD imposes several specific duties on the operator or owner of an affected aeroplane, along with a few rights that reduce the compliance burden. The primary duty is to carry out the inspection or records check before further flight after the effective date (13 May 2008). For Table 1 aeroplanes, there is no alternative: physical inspection is mandatory. For Table 2 aeroplanes, the operator has a duty either to inspect physically or to review the maintenance records and make a determination. If the records show no replacement valve of the affected part number was installed after 19 November 2007, then the duty is satisfied and no further action is needed. However, if the records are incomplete or cannot be located, the operator cannot rely on that path and must perform the physical inspection. The duty extends to the placard removal step: if during the inspection the placard is found obstructing the port, the operator must remove it, discard it, and ensure the port is open and unobstructed before further flight. The duty also applies to any future installation: if a P/N 2013142-18 valve is fitted as a modification or replacement after the effective date, it must be inspected for placard obstruction before installation.

One significant right conferred by the AD is that the record-check inspection and determination (Requirement 2.b.) may be carried out and certified by the aeroplane operator, provided they hold at least a private pilot’s licence (Note 3). This is a devolution of a task that would otherwise require a licensed aircraft maintenance engineer (LAME). Without this note, a lay owner would have to hire a LAME simply to look at a logbook and see if a part number had been entered. By allowing the operator to self-certify, the AD reduces transaction costs and avoids unnecessary professional fees for simple clerical work. However, this right is not available to operators without a pilot’s licence, such as some corporate entities or non-pilot owners; they would need to engage a pilot or a LAME to perform the records check. That creates an uneven regulatory impact: an owner-pilot can comply at near-zero marginal cost (their own time), while a non-pilot owner must pay someone else, despite the task being identical. This is a subtle distortion: it effectively penalises operators who do not hold a pilot’s licence, even if they operate the aircraft through a hired pilot.

Another right embedded in the AD is the ability to rely on maintenance records as conclusive evidence that the valve has not been replaced. The AD does not require the operator to verify the accuracy of the records; it simply requires a determination. If the records are mistaken (e.g., a replacement occurred but was not recorded), the operator could be found non-compliant even if they acted in good faith. This risk is placed entirely on the operator. The right to discard the placard after removal is also granted; the AD does not require the placard to be retained or photographed. That simplifies the remedy but eliminates the ability to later verify what the placard said.

The source text does not specify the penalty provisions, but ADs are issued under the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth) and the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998 (CASR). Non-compliance with an airworthiness directive is a serious matter. Under regulation 42.205 of CASR (as applicable to general aviation), an aircraft must not be operated unless it is airworthy and each applicable AD has been complied with. Operating an aircraft that does not comply with an AD can lead to enforcement action by CASA, including suspension or cancellation of the air operator’s certificate, the aircraft’s certificate of airworthiness, or the pilot’s licence. Fines can be substantial: under Civil Aviation Act s. 20AAA, the maximum penalty for a breach of a civil aviation regulation may be 250 penalty units (currently AUD 55,000 for an individual, and AUD 275,000 for a body corporate, though the figures at 2008 were lower). In addition, CASA can issue infringement notices (on-the-spot fines) or seek criminal prosecution in the case of deliberate or reckless non-compliance.

The enforcement risk is particularly acute because the compliance timeline is “before further flight” after the effective date. If an operator flies an aircraft on 14 May 2008 without having performed the required inspection or records check, that flight is unlawful. Even a single flight in ignorance could lead to enforcement. The AD does not require immediate grounding for affected aircraft; the operator can choose to ground the aircraft voluntarily until compliance is achieved. But if the aircraft is used commercially, grounding creates direct revenue loss. The cost of grounding may be far higher than the cost of inspection, so rational operators have a strong incentive to comply promptly.

CASA’s enforcement approach is not detailed in the AD, but typical surveillance includes random ramp checks, review of maintenance records during audits, and analysis of reports from the aviation community. If an inspector finds that an aircraft subject to Table 1 has no evidence of the inspection in the logbooks, the inspector may issue a direction to ground the aircraft until compliance is demonstrated. For Table 2 aircraft, the inspector can check whether the operator performed the records determination and, if so, whether it was correctly certified. Note 3 creates a risk of misrepresentation: an operator who does not hold a private pilot licence could falsely certify the records check. Falsification of maintenance records is a separate offence carrying severe penalties, including potential imprisonment under the Criminal Code if the false document is used to deceive the regulator.

There is no private right of action conferred by the AD itself. However, if an accident occurs due to erroneous instrument readings caused by a placard obstruction, the failure to comply with the AD would be strong evidence of negligence in a civil liability suit. Similarly, if a lessor or buyer discovers non-compliance during a due diligence inspection, they may assert a claim for breach of contract or misrepresentation against the operator who warranted airworthiness.

This AD is part of a larger framework of airworthiness regulation in Australia. It is issued under delegation from CASA pursuant to the Civil Aviation Act 1988 and associated regulations. It specifically references the United States FAA AD 2008-10-02 Amdt 39-15508, which became effective on 12 May 2008. CASA chose to adopt a varied version of the FAA directive to allow the records-check alternative; the FAA original may have required physical inspection for all affected aircraft. That variation illustrates the interaction between international airworthiness standards and domestic implementation. Australia is a signatory to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), and CASA must maintain airworthiness standards at least equivalent to those of the state of design (in this case, the FAA). By issuing a directive that differs from the FAA AD, CASA must ensure its alternative achieves an equivalent level of safety. The note in the AD mentioning the FAA refers reflects that the two regimes are linked.

The AD also interacts with the maintenance regulations, particularly CASR Part 42 (Continuing Airworthiness) and Part 145 (Maintenance Organisations). Any maintenance provider performing work on an aircraft subject to this AD must be aware of the directive and include it in the maintenance schedule. If a maintenance organisation fails to flag an incomplete AD, that could be a breach of their approved maintenance organisation (AMO) requirements. The AD also interacts with the system of approved repair schemes: the placard removal is a simple task that can be accomplished without a formal repair design, because it is a removal action not a modification. But if a new placard must be added later (for identification), that installation would need to comply with standard maintenance data.

The directive sits alongside other CASA ADs for the Cessna 208 series. Operators must maintain a current list of all applicable ADs for their aircraft. Failure to track this AD among others could lead to cumulative compliance gaps. The AD also interacts with the aircraft’s flight manual; although the placard removal does not change the operating procedures, the loss of the part number label may affect the ability to verify the correct part during future replacements. There is no requirement in the AD to update the aircraft records with the new part identification (e.g., by adding a notation or photo). This could create ambiguity for future maintenance personnel: they see a valve that appears to be P/N 2013142-18 based on shape and markings, but the placard is missing. They would need to check the records to confirm. That interaction with record-keeping practices is not governed by this AD but by broader maintenance rules.

From a product liability perspective, the AD may affect claims against Cessna or the valve manufacturer. The AD acknowledges that the defect was discovered during a quality control check, but does not assign responsibility. If an operator suffers loss due to grounding or the cost of inspection, they may seek recovery from Cessna under the Australian Consumer Law or contract. However, the AD itself does not create a right to compensation. The existence of the AD may also be relevant in insurance claims: insurers may require evidence of AD compliance before paying a claim, and the failure to comply could be a policy exclusion.

The source document is a single airworthiness directive AD/CESSNA 208/22, effective 13 May 2008, issued as a standalone instrument. It does not record any amendments, revisions, or supersessions. The AD is specifically titled “Alternate Static Air Source Valve” and bears the CASA reference number AD/CESSNA 208/22. It refers to FAA AD 2008-10-02 Amdt 39-15508, which itself may have been amended subsequently. However, no amendment history is provided in the text.

In practice, many airworthiness directives are later revised by the issuing authority to extend compliance times, adjust applicability, or incorporate new data. For example, the FAA may have issued a revision to its AD 2008-10-02, or CASA may have issued a subsequent AD that supersedes or complements this one. But the source does not include that information. For a compliance professional, the critical point is that this AD should be checked against current CASA listings. CASA maintains a searchable database of airworthiness directives (the AD Record). An operator must verify that this AD remains in effect or has been replaced by a later directive. Similarly, the FAA AD may have been superseded by a later amendment number. The source notes that the FAA AD becomes effective on 12 May 2008, one day before the CASA AD. It is common for the FAA to issue an AD with an immediate effective date, and CASA to adopt it with a slight delay. There is no indication that the CASA AD has been amended within the source text.

The use of “2008” in the title suggests it has not been amended in the nearly 15 years since issuance, but without external verification that is speculation. The deep dive must be grounded in the source, so the proper observation is that the document is a single-issue directive with no recorded amendment history. Users should be cautioned to confirm current status. It is worth noting that the AD type designator “7/2008 TX” appears at the top of the source; this may be an internal publication code, but its meaning is not explained. It could indicate the issue number and year (July 2008, Transaction or Technical?). Without further context, it is not possible to extract amendment significance from that label.

The source document does not reference any litigation, proceedings, or tribunal decisions. There is no mention of court cases, administrative appeals, or disputes concerning this specific AD. Given that the AD addresses a discrete manufacturing defect and was issued in 2008, it is possible that no litigation has arisen directly from it. However, in aviation safety enforcement, disputes over AD compliance sometimes reach the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) if CASA takes adverse action and the operator seeks review. No such case is cited. Similarly, product liability claims against Cessna or the valve manufacturer (likely a subcontractor) could have been filed in relation to an accident caused by static port blockage, but the source does not indicate any.

In the absence of any cited litigation, the deep dive can only note that no legal challenges or enforcement appeals are recorded in the text. This is consistent with the typical nature of a minor AD: the compliance cost is low, the remedy is simple, and operators generally comply rather than contest. The AD does not involve novel legal principles; it is a straightforward safety mandate. That said, if a dispute did arise, it would likely involve the interpretation of “before further flight” or the validity of a records check by a non-licensee. For instance, an operator without a private pilot licence might argue that they could still perform the records check because the AD note only says “provided that they hold at least a private pilot’s licence” for the certification step, not necessarily for the physical act of looking at records. A literal reading might allow a non-pilot to read the records but require a pilot to certify the determination. That could lead to a dispute over who can sign the logbook entry. The AD does not clarify whether the certification is the act of determining or the entry. Such a question could be brought before the AAT if CASA took enforcement action against an operator who used a non-pilot to look at records and then had a pilot sign. The source does not address that.

In the broader aviation industry, ADs are rarely litigated directly; they are enforced through administrative means. The most common form of contested action is a show cause notice or a revocation of an approval. Without evidence in the source, the deep dive must state that no litigation history is provided.

Several aspects of this AD are easy to overlook and could create compliance pitfalls. First, the applicability is not simply “all Cessna 208 series aeroplanes”. The AD applies only to aeroplanes that have the P/N 2013142-18 alternate static air source selector valve installed, and only if that valve was manufactured after 19 November 2007 and before 18 February 2008 (based on the background). An operator whose aircraft has an earlier serial number of valve (e.g., P/N 2013142-9, -13 or -17) is not subject to this AD. However, the AD states in Note 2 that P/N 2013142-18 replaced those earlier part numbers, so later production aircraft may have the affected part. An operator who assumes their aircraft is safe because it is an early model could be wrong if the valve was replaced with the affected part during a maintenance event after 19 November 2007. The Table 2 broad serial number range is designed to catch those aircraft. The gotcha is that the operator must check the actual part number on the valve, not just the aircraft serial number. If the records check under 2.b. does not cover a replacement that occurred before 19 November 2007 (or after 18 February 2008), no action is needed. But an operator who fails to distinguish the date of replacement could waste time inspecting valves that are not from the defective batch.

Second, the compliance time “before further flight after the effective date of this Directive” means that the inspection must be completed before the aircraft flies again after 13 May 2008. For an aircraft that is in a hangar undergoing heavy maintenance and does not fly until after the effective date, the inspection must be done before that first flight. If the aircraft is already in the air on 13 May 2008, no action is required during that flight, but before the next flight the inspection is mandatory. This creates an ambiguous situation for a multi-leg day: if the aircraft flies three sectors on 13 May, the first two after the effective time? The effective date is 13 May 2008; no specific time of day is given. Typically, effective date means 00:01 local time on that date. So an aircraft that departs before that time on 13 May is not in breach; but any departure after the effective time without inspection is a breach. Operators must be careful to coordinate inspection with the flight schedule. A single missed inspection could lead to operation without a valid certificate of airworthiness.

Third, the records check alternative (2.b.) is only available for Table 2 aeroplanes. Operators of Table 1 aeroplanes mistakenly think they can also use the records check; they cannot. Table 1 includes serial numbers that are known to have had the valve installed at manufacture, so the assumption is that the valve is present and must be physically inspected. Even if the aircraft records show that the valve has since been replaced with a different part number, the AD still requires physical inspection unless the replacement occurred before 19 November 2007 (unlikely for those serial numbers as they were manufactured around that time). The AD does not allow records reliance for Table 1. An operator who skips the physical inspection for a Table 1 aircraft based on records is non-compliant.

Fourth, the placard removal is irreversible and the AD does not prescribe a replacement placard. After removal, the valve no longer has a part number identification. This could cause problems during the next maintenance event: a mechanic removing the valve might not know what part number it is. The aircraft maintenance manual may require the part number to be visible for identification. The operator might need to affix a new placard in a location that does not obstruct the port, but the AD does not authorise that. Any new placard installation would need to follow approved data (e.g., a Cessna service bulletin or a repair design from the manufacturer). Failure to do so could create a non-compliance under the broader maintenance regulations. The gotcha is that the operator may think the job is done once the placard is thrown away, but it creates a latent record-keeping issue.

Fifth, the note that the inspection may be accomplished and certified by the operator “provided that they hold at least a private pilot’s licence” applies only to the Requirement 2.b. determination (records check). It does not apply to the physical inspection of the valve (Requirement 1) or the placard removal (Requirement 4). Those tasks likely require a LAME or a person with appropriate maintenance certification. An owner-pilot who attempts to do the physical inspection and placard removal themselves without appropriate qualifications is acting outside the scope of the AD and outside CASR maintenance rules. That could invite enforcement.

Sixth, the AD becomes effective on 13 May 2008, but the FAA AD became effective on 12 May 2008. An aeroplane that is imported or operated under a bilateral agreement might be considered subject to the FAA AD from 12 May. An operator relying only on CASA’s AD might delay action by one day, but if the aircraft is flown on 12 May under FAA rules (e.g., a US-registered aircraft operated in Australia under a foreign approval), non-compliance could occur earlier. The source does not explain the linkage, but the note implies the FAA AD is relevant.

Compliance with AD/CESSNA 208/22 involves a step-by-step process that depends on the aircraft’s serial number and its maintenance history. The following approach is derived solely from the requirements in the source.

Step 1: Determine the aircraft’s model and serial number. If the serial number falls within Table 1 (20800417-20800419 and 208B1294-208B1310), proceed directly to the physical inspection (Requirement 1). No records check is permitted. If the serial number falls within Table 2 (20800001-20800416 or 208B0001-208B1293), the operator has a choice: either conduct the physical inspection or first review the aircraft’s maintenance records to determine whether the alternate static air source selector valve has been replaced after 19 November 2007 with P/N 2013142-18. This records review may be conducted by the operator if they hold at least a private pilot’s licence (Note 3). The operator should look for maintenance entries showing installation of a valve with P/N 2013142-18, including any logbook entries from Cessna or maintenance organisations. If no such replacement is found, no further action is needed, but the determination should be recorded in the maintenance records with a certification. If a replacement is found, the physical inspection must be performed.

Step 2: For aeroplanes requiring physical inspection (Table 1, or Table 2 with a determined replacement), perform the inspection before further flight on or after 13 May 2008. The method is: adjust the pilot and co-pilot seats as far aft as possible to access the area behind the seats where the alternate static air source selector valve is located. Use a flashlight and mirror to view the forward end of the valve. Verify that the port on the forward end of the valve is clearly visible and not covered by the part number identification placard. If the placard is covering the port, it must be removed: physically detach the placard from the valve body, discard it, and check that the port is open and unobstructed.

Step 3: After any placard removal, the aircraft may not be flown until the removal is complete and the port is verified open. That verification should be recorded in the aircraft’s logbook or maintenance release. The AD does not specify the form of the record, but best practice is to enter the AD reference, the date, the method of compliance (inspection, placard removal, or records review), and the name and certificate number of the person accomplishing the work. For the records check, the certification should state that the operator determined no replacement valve of the affected part number was installed.

Step 4: For any future installation of a P/N 2013142-18 valve (as a modification or replacement part), the valve must be inspected for placard obstruction before installation. This applies to any installation after the effective date. The inspection method is the same as in Step 2, but it must be done before the valve is fitted. If the placard is present and obstructing, it should be removed and discarded before installation. The installation record should note that the AD requirement for pre-installation inspection has been met.

Step 5: Maintain records of compliance. The AD does not explicitly require reporting to CASA, but the records must be available for inspection by a CASA inspector. Non-compliance may be detected during a routine audit or ramp check. For operators of multiple affected aircraft, consider creating a spreadsheet tracking serial numbers, inspection dates, and placard removal status. This helps avoid missing any units and demonstrates systematic compliance.

Step 6: After compliance, monitor for any superseding ADs. The FAA or CASA may issue revisions that require additional action, such as inspecting the valve at intervals or replacing it entirely. Always check the latest CASA AD record for updates. The valve manufacturer may also issue a service bulletin providing a permanent fix, such as a redesigned valve. Complying with the minimum AD requirement does not preclude adopting a more thorough solution if one becomes available. Operators should also consider the downstream issue of the missing part number placard. To avoid confusion during future maintenance, note the part number in the aircraft records or affix a new placard in a non-obstructing location, but only with approved data. The AD does not require that step, but prudent compliance includes documenting the part number so that future mechanics can identify the valve.