AD/BELL 222/28 - Rotating Ring - Drive Pin Hole

The AD operates through three core regulatory levers: applicability (who and what parts), a mandatory inspection standard (how to check), and a mandatory corrective action (disposition when out of tolerance). Those levers are anchored to external technical material (BHTC Alert Service Bulletins) and to an earlier foreign regulator action (Transport Canada AD CF-2001-29).

Applicability. The AD lists precise part numbers and serial-number ranges. The affected rotating ring assemblies are P/N 222-010-403-005, -113 and -117 when equipped with drive pins P/N 230-010-402-101 or -103. The AD then enumerates helicopter serial-number ranges (222: 47008-47089; 222B: 47131-47156; 222U: 47501-47574; 230: 23001-23038). Spare assemblies with the same P/N and drive-pin combinations are also captured (Applicability: paragraphs 1-2).

Inspection procedure requirement. The AD does not set a new measurement methodology within the text; it mandates that operators "Inspect the radius at the inboard surface of the rotating ring drive pin hole, in accordance with the following applicable alert service bulletin dated 18 May 2001 or later revision approved by the Director, Aircraft Certification, Transport Canada" (Requirement). The AD therefore delegates technical method and detailed steps to the listed ASBs: 222-01-90 (222/222B), 222U-01-61 (222U) and 230-01-23 (230). The ASBs are the operative procedural references; the AD constrains compliance to the ASB(s) dated 18 May 2001 or a later revision that has Transport Canada approval.

Pass/fail criterion and disposition. The AD specifies the dimensional acceptance limits: "The radius should be 0.060 to 0.090 inch." If the radius measures outside that band, the AD mandates removal and scrapping of the entire rotating ring assembly, including drive pins. There is no alternative repair or rework authorised within the AD text (Requirement).

Timing. Compliance is immediate relative to the AD effective date. The AD instructs inspection "Before next flight after the effective date," and announces the effective date as 4 August 2005 (Compliance). That timing creates a one-flight-window only if an operator has already flown beyond the effective date; practically, operators must complete inspection prior to operating the aircraft again after 4 August 2005.

Reference to other regulator material. The AD draws technical provenance from BHTC ASBs and Transport Canada. It explicitly refers to the ASB date (18 May 2001) and to a Transport Canada AD (CF-2001-29). The signature block shows the AD was issued under CASA authority by a delegate (James Coyne) on 18 June 2005. The structure therefore integrates manufacturer-issued ASBs and a foreign civil aviation regulator action into a CASA AD.

Narrow carve-outs. The AD includes a single explicit exemption: rotating ring assemblies P/N 222-010-403-117 identified with serial "TI XXX" are not affected (Note 1). There are no other exemptions, alternatives, or special flight permits referenced in the AD text.

In short, the AD combines technical prescription (radius limits), a procedural hook (follow the ASB), precise scope by part and serial number, destination action for non-conformance (scrap), and an immediate compliance deadline. The AD does not itself describe enforcement penalties, record-keeping obligations, or authorised repairs beyond scrapping, and it does not specify who bears replacement costs.

The AD identifies multiple classes of affected actors, defined by ownership or control of specified hardware and by operational status.

Operators and owners of affected helicopters. Any operator or owner of BHTC Model 222, 222B, 222U or 230 helicopters that fall within the enumerated serial-number ranges is directly affected. The Applicability section lists those ranges: Model 222 S/N 47008-47089; 222B S/N 47131-47156; 222U S/N 47501-47574; Model 230 S/N 23001-23038 (Applicability: 1(a)-(d)). Operators of aircraft within those ranges must perform the mandated inspection before the aircraft next flies after the effective date.

Maintenance organisations and maintenance personnel. The inspection is a physical measurement of the radius at the inboard surface of the rotating ring drive pin hole "in accordance with" the specified ASBs (Requirement). That places the task within the remit of certificated maintenance organisations or suitably authorised maintenance personnel who can perform ASB-directed inspections and carry out removal and scrapping where necessary. The ASBs will define the technical steps; compliance therefore requires access to the ASB and equipment capable of measuring a radius specified in inches to the hundred-thousandth place (0.060-0.090 inch).

Owners of spare parts and parts custodians. The AD explicitly captures spare rotating ring assemblies P/N 222-010-403-005, -113 and -117 equipped with drive pins P/N 230-010-402-101 or -103 (Applicability: 2). Parties that hold inventory of such spares for installation or sale are obliged to inspect those spares under the same criteria, because spares are within applicability. The presence of driven pin part numbers in the applicability means stock-holders must check both the rotating ring assembly P/N and the pin P/N associated with the assembly.

Purchasers and lessees. Where an affected helicopter is leased or otherwise operated under third-party control, the lessee as the operator who seeks to fly the aircraft before the inspection is responsible for ensuring compliance "before next flight" after the effective date. The AD does not allocate cost or responsibility between owner and lessee; it imposes an obligation on the operator to comply.

Regulatory authorities and delegates. The AD is issued by CASA and signed by a delegate, James Coyne, indicating an administrative pathway for issuance and enforcement. The AD also ties technical approval and process to Transport Canada, by making the ASB procedure effective only if it is "dated 18 May 2001 or later revision approved by the Director, Aircraft Certification, Transport Canada" (Requirement). That links the compliance standard to Transport Canada approvals.

Manufacturers and suppliers. BHTC (the manufacturer) and suppliers of drive pins P/N 230-010-402-101 and -103 are indirectly implicated. The background identifies "reports of interference between the new pin P/N 230-010-402-101 and the rotating ring drive pin bore." That statement signals that manufacture, design changes, and aftermarket part provisioning are part of the incident chain.

Other parties not directly named but affected by operational consequences. Where inspections find assemblies out of tolerance and require scrapping, operators may need replacement assemblies or parts, creating downstream procurement, logistics and potential aircraft downtime costs. The AD does not name replacement suppliers or permitted repairs, so the pathway to restore airworthiness is operationally consequential for owners, maintainers and lessees.

Notably absent in the AD text are mentions of exemptions, special flight permits or administrative fee arrangements. The AD also excludes rotating ring assemblies P/N 222-010-403-117 identified with serial number "TI XXX" from applicability (Note 1), so custodians of parts bearing that serial designation are not required to act under this AD.

In short, the AD affects aircraft operators and owners of the listed serial numbers, maintenance organisations tasked with inspection and removal, spare-parts holders matching the stated P/N and drive-pin combinations, and indirectly manufacturers and suppliers of the implicated components.

This AD defines compulsory duties for operators, maintainers and parts custodians; it does not set out explicit rights or administrative appeals within the text. The key duties flow from the Requirement and Compliance paragraphs.

Primary duty to inspect. Operators and responsible maintenance personnel must "Inspect the radius at the inboard surface of the rotating ring drive pin hole" following the procedures in the appropriate BHTC Alert Service Bulletin dated 18 May 2001 or a later revision approved by the Director, Aircraft Certification, Transport Canada (Requirement). The ASB referenced is the operative technical procedure. For 222 and 222B the ASB is 222-01-90; for 222U it is 222U-01-61; for 230 it is 230-01-23 (Requirement, table).

Duty to apply numerical acceptance criteria. Parties performing the inspection must measure and apply the AD's acceptance band: "The radius should be 0.060 to 0.090 inch" (Requirement). The AD imposes a clear pass/fail standard to be enforced at inspection.

Duty of mandatory disposition when non-conforming. If the radius is outside the 0.060-0.090 inch band, the AD mandates that "the rotating ring assembly, including the drive pins, must be removed and scrapped." There is no textual allowance for repair, machining, or temporary corrective action within the AD itself (Requirement).

Timing duty. The inspection must be completed "Before next flight after the effective date." The AD's effective date (4 August 2005) sets the compliance perimeter (Compliance). That creates an immediate duty effectively limiting any further flight of affected helicopters until the inspection is completed.

Duty regarding spares. Spare rotating ring assemblies matching the P/Ns and fitted with the enumerated drive pins are within scope and therefore present the same duties for whoever holds or intends to use those spares (Applicability: 2).

Procedural duty to follow approved ASB revisions. The AD requires following an ASB "dated 18 May 2001 or later revision approved by the Director, Aircraft Certification, Transport Canada." That places a duty on operators to ensure the ASB revision used is Transport Canada-approved; it ties compliance to a combination of manufacturer guidance and foreign regulator approval.

Rights and limitations within the AD text. The AD text does not include explicit provisions creating rights such as appeals, variation applications, or transitional aircraft-specific derogations. It does not state alternatives to scrapping, nor does it provide for special flight permits to move aircraft for maintenance. It does not specify record-keeping, but operators will necessarily need to create and retain inspection evidence to demonstrate compliance to regulators on request. The AD does not set out who bears costs for replacement parts or scrapped assemblies.

Delegated authority. The AD is issued by CASA and signed by a named delegate, which indicates an administrative chain for issuance. The AD also integrates Transport Canada’s approval process for ASB revisions, which constrains permissible inspection procedures to those having Transport Canada approval.

Operational constraints created by duties. The timing and disposition duties, combined, may ground aircraft until inspection and, if scrapping occurs, until replacement assemblies or repairs are procured and installed. The AD does not outline permitted interim operating measures.

In summary, the AD imposes an explicit inspection duty, an explicit measurement standard, an obligatory scrapping requirement if out-of-tolerance, a strict timing obligation, and a requirement to use the manufacturer ASB subject to Transport Canada approval. It does not specify administrative remedies, cost allocations, or authorised repairs beyond removal and scrapping.

The AD text itself does not enumerate specific monetary or criminal penalties, nor does it prescribe enforcement procedures; what it does do is establish normative legal obligations under CASA's airworthiness regulatory framework by an instrument signed by a CASA delegate.

Legal status of the AD. The document is an Airworthiness Directive issued by CASA and signed on 18 June 2005 by James Coyne, identified as "Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority." The AD states "This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 4 August 2005." The issuance and effective-date language indicate that the AD is an enforceable regulatory instrument within CASA’s airworthiness oversight regime, rather than merely guidance (signature and effective-date paragraph).

Absence of explicit penalties in the AD text. The AD does not specify penalties, fines, or enforcement mechanisms in the text provided. It does not cite specific enforcement provisions, statutory penalty sections, administrative infringement notices, or suspension powers. The AD’s mandate,that inspections must be completed and non-conforming parts scrapped,creates obligations whose enforcement will follow whatever statutory or regulatory enforcement machinery CASA ordinarily applies; that machinery is not described or defined in this AD text.

Implication for enforcement practice. Because the AD imposes an inspection "Before next flight after the effective date" and requires scrapping where out of tolerance, recognised means of enforcement likely include CASA’s standard oversight actions: audits, airworthiness certificate checks, ramp inspections, and orders restricting operations pending compliance. The AD itself, however, does not specify those instruments or the procedural steps CASA will take to verify or enforce compliance.

Record evidence and inspection verification. The AD requires following an ASB-approved procedure and applying a numeric radius limit. Practically, enforcement will depend on demonstrable compliance: operators would be expected to retain inspection records, measurement readings, and disposition evidence (removal/scrapping records) to show they met the AD’s requirements. The AD text does not specify the record-retention period or form of evidence, but the presence of a precise measurement criterion implies an evidentiary expectation in enforcement scenarios.

Interplay with Transport Canada and manufacturer documentation. The AD requires referencing an ASB "dated 18 May 2001 or later revision approved by the Director, Aircraft Certification, Transport Canada." This cross-reference can be relevant in enforcement: CASA will expect operators to have used an approved ASB procedure. The AD also references a Transport Canada AD CF-2001-29 (Note 2). Enforcement action could involve comparing operator practices against the ASB and the Transport Canada AD, but the AD text itself does not state enforcement process or penalties.

Practical enforcement consequences not stated in the AD. The AD requires scrapping of non-conforming rotating ring assemblies and drive pins. While the AD does not state penalties, the practical consequence of non-compliance is that an aircraft with an uninspected or non-conforming rotating ring assembly would be operating contrary to the AD and so would likely be regarded by regulators as unairworthy for the purposes of that AD. The AD does not provide an alternative path such as a flight permit for relocation.

In summary, the AD establishes mandatory inspection and disposition obligations and is presented as an effective regulatory instrument as of 4 August 2005, but it does not itself set out penalty provisions or step-by-step enforcement procedures. Enforcement will therefore rest on CASA’s broader statutory powers and oversight mechanisms outside the text of this AD, and compliance evidence will be an important locus of enforcement activity.

This AD is an instrument within the aviation regulatory ecosystem and expressly interacts with manufacturer service bulletins and a Transport Canada AD. The text does not recite other domestic statutes or regulations, but it does create dependencies that are relevant to legal and regulatory compliance.

Reference to foreign regulator material. The AD mandates compliance "in accordance with the following applicable alert service bulletin dated 18 May 2001 or later revision approved by the Director, Aircraft Certification, Transport Canada" (Requirement). It thus imports a procedural standard that must either (a) be the ASB dated 18 May 2001, or (b) a later revision that has been approved by Transport Canada’s Director, Aircraft Certification. This creates a legal dependency between CASA’s AD and Transport Canada’s technical approval process: operators must ensure the ASB revision they use has the requisite Transport Canada approval.

Relation to Transport Canada AD. The AD includes a note: "Transport Canada AD: CF-2001-29 refers" (Note 2). That cross-reference is an explicit linkage to earlier regulatory action by another jurisdiction. The AD therefore forms part of a chain of inter-regulatory responses to the same safety concern, aligning CASA’s requirement with Transport Canada’s prior or contemporaneous actions.

Manufacturer service bulletins as technical specification. The AD does not rewrite the ASB procedure; it requires following the ASB as the technical method. ASBs are manufacturer-issued documents; by mandating adherence to a specific ASB (or approved revision), the AD elevates the manufacturer’s procedural guidance into an enforceable regulatory requirement. The operator’s legal duty under the AD therefore includes relying on manufacturer-specified technique, subject to the Transport Canada approval condition stated in the AD.

Absence of other statutory cross-references. The AD text does not cite or reproduce Australian Civil Aviation Regulations, standards, or penalty provisions. It does not expressly invoke provisions of the Civil Aviation Act or mention certificate suspensions, but as an AD it sits operationally within CASA’s statutory airworthiness regime. The AD’s legal force and enforcement would be exercised under CASA’s statutory powers, though those powers are not set out in this AD.

Implication for maintenance and parts law. The AD requires removal and scrapping of non-conforming rotating ring assemblies and drive pins. That action intersects with supply, warranty and parts procurement practices. For example, scrapping parts may engage warranty claims or supplier obligations outside the AD, but the AD text does not specify such commercial or contract-law interactions. Those interactions must be managed under ordinary commercial law and any separate agreements between operators and suppliers or manufacturers.

Operational regulatory interaction. Because the AD requires inspection "Before next flight after the effective date", the AD imposes an immediate operational constraint. That constraint will interact with operational regulations concerning airworthiness certificates, flight authorisations and maintenance release requirements. The AD text itself does not elaborate these interactions, but operators must ensure that aircraft are not flown in contravention of the AD, which in practice means coordination between maintenance scheduling and operational planning to meet AD timing.

In summary, the AD explicitly ties compliance to manufacturer ASBs and to a Transport Canada approval process, thereby creating an inter-regulatory linkage rather than standing alone. It implicitly interacts with CASA’s broader airworthiness oversight and with commercial law areas such as parts supply and warranty, though those areas are not addressed in the AD text.

The AD text provides limited amendment history within itself; it records issuance and effective dates, refers to earlier foreign regulatory action, and permits later approved revisions of the referenced ASBs.

Issuance and effective dates. The AD is dated in the signature block as signed 18 June 2005 by James Coyne, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. The AD states: "This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 4 August 2005." Those two dates are the only concrete temporal markers for this AD contained in the document.

Model and part-release chronology implied by ASB date. The AD requires inspections "in accordance with the following applicable alert service bulletin dated 18 May 2001 or later revision approved by the Director, Aircraft Certification, Transport Canada" (Requirement). That formulation makes the 18 May 2001 ASB date a baseline for the procedural content, and it explicitly permits later ASB revisions, but only where a later revision is approved by the Director, Aircraft Certification, Transport Canada. The AD therefore authorises the use of later ASB revisions once they have Transport Canada approval; however, any such later-revision authorisation is conditional and must be demonstrably approved.

Link to Transport Canada AD CF-2001-29. Note 2 states "Transport Canada AD: CF-2001-29 refers." That indicates prior related regulatory action by Transport Canada in 2001, which the CASA AD references as part of the background and technical chain. The AD itself does not reproduce Transport Canada AD CF-2001-29 nor supply any later amendment record beyond the reference.

No further amendments recorded in the text. The AD does not contain a history section showing prior amendments to the AD itself. It does not list superseding ADs or revocations. The AD does not state that it supersedes any previous CASA AD, nor does it show subsequent CASA amendments. There is no textual record in this document of later changes to the AD, nor of revocations or replacements.

Manufacturer bulletin series. The background notes that "BHTC has issued a series of alert service bulletins to provide instructions to inspect the drive pin to rotating ring joint." That language records manufacturer activity in the form of multiple ASBs, but the AD only cites specific ASB numbers (222-01-90, 222U-01-61, 230-01-23). The AD allows for "later revision approved by the Director, Aircraft Certification, Transport Canada", which implicitly allows ASB evolution, but does not list any revisions or dates beyond the 18 May 2001 baseline.

In short, the AD records its own issue and effective dates (18 June 2005 signature; 4 August 2005 effective date), it references a Transport Canada AD from 2001 and BHTC ASBs with a baseline date of 18 May 2001, and it permits later ASB revisions only when approved by the specified Transport Canada authority. The document contains no internal record of subsequent CASA amendments, revocations or replacements.

The AD text contains no litigation history. It does not reference any judicial decisions, administrative appeals, or contested enforcement actions within Australia or elsewhere. The document is a regulatory instrument: it records the safety background, technical requirements, applicability, and the effective date, but does not report any court proceedings, appeals against the AD, or other dispute resolution outcomes.

What the AD records that bears on potential litigation is limited to:

• The stated safety background: "There were reports of interference between the new pin P/N 230-010-402-101 and the rotating ring drive pin bore. The radius at the inboard surface of the rotating ring drive pin hole may be inadequate. BHTC has issued a series of alert service bulletins to provide instructions to inspect the drive pin to rotating ring joint." That is a factual statement of reported incidents or risks, but the AD does not document incident reports, accident investigations, or formal findings that might have become subject to litigation.
• Cross-reference to Transport Canada AD CF-2001-29. The AD notes the Transport Canada AD, but does not indicate whether any legal challenge or litigation arose in relation to that foreign AD.

Because the AD text provides no litigation record, any questions about challenges to the AD’s validity, enforcement disputes, or judicial interpretation would have to be answered by searching litigation databases or CASA records outside the text of this AD. The AD in isolation does not supply any case law, appeal outcomes, or precedent.

In sum, there is no litigation history contained in the AD document supplied. The document only sets the regulatory obligations and cross-references related technical materials and prior foreign regulator action.

This AD contains a number of specific technical and administrative traps that can create compliance risk if overlooked. The following items are drawn directly from the AD text.

Narrow part-number and serial-number scope that can be missed. Applicability is specific: rotating ring assemblies P/N 222-010-403-005, -113 and -117 equipped with drive pins P/N 230-010-402-101 or -103, and precise serial-number ranges for helicopter models: 222 S/N 47008-47089; 222B S/N 47131-47156; 222U S/N 47501-47574; 230 S/N 23001-23038. Operators who rely on shorthand model designators without confirming serial numbers or part-number fitment risk non-compliance. Similarly, spare parts custodians must check both rotating ring P/N and the fitted drive-pin P/N; a rotating ring assembly with a different pin P/N might fall outside the AD.

One specific exception that can be overlooked. The AD contains an explicit carve-out: "Rotating ring assemblies P/N 222-010-403-117 identified with serial number 'TI XXX' are not affected" (Note 1). Parts bearing that serial identifier are excluded. Failure to verify serial markings could lead to unnecessary scrapping or unnecessary inspections.

Dependence on external ASB and approval status. The AD requires inspection "in accordance with the following applicable alert service bulletin dated 18 May 2001 or later revision approved by the Director, Aircraft Certification, Transport Canada." The AD therefore requires (a) obtaining the correct ASB for the specific model (222-01-90, 222U-01-61, 230-01-23), and (b) ensuring that, if using a later ASB revision, it has the specified Transport Canada approval. Using an ASB revision not approved by Transport Canada would not meet the AD’s stated requirement.

Measurement units and tolerances. The acceptance criterion for the radius is given in inches: "0.060 to 0.090 inch." Operators who work in metric-only tooling environments must ensure they convert and measure precisely. The AD does not specify measurement method or tooling in its text; those procedural details are in the ASB. Nevertheless, the numerical tolerance is narrow and requires appropriate measurement capability.

Immediate timing. Compliance is "Before next flight after the effective date." The AD’s effective date is 4 August 2005. The phrasing gives no grace period beyond the next flight, which can operationally ground an aircraft pending inspection. Scheduling inspections and maintenance capability (and obtaining the relevant ASB/procedures) must be done promptly to avoid unintended grounding.

Scrapping requirement with no authorised repair. If the radius is out of tolerance the AD requires the rotating ring assembly and drive pins to be "removed and scrapped." The AD text does not authorise rework, machining, or replacement of pins, nor does it provide an approved repair pathway. This can create immediate supply-chain and cost consequences for operators needing replacement assemblies.

Spare parts in inventory are included. The AD expressly captures spare rotating ring assemblies when they are equipped with the specified pins. Parts managers may have spares intended for future installation; failure to inspect spares can leave future installations non-compliant or lead to installation of uninspected parts into aircraft.

Cross-jurisdictional approval nuance. The AD ties ASB revision acceptance to approval by the Director, Aircraft Certification, Transport Canada. That is an unusual cross-border twist: CASA’s AD conditions local compliance on a Transport Canada approval. Operators must confirm the ASB revision’s approval status with the referenced Transport Canada authority or rely on the published 18 May 2001 version.

Documentation evidence expectation. Although the AD does not specify record-keeping, the numeric pass/fail standard and scrapping requirement create an expectation that inspectors will record measurements and scrapping actions. Lack of documented evidence may complicate later enforcement or airworthiness enquiries.

No alternative flight permission stated. The AD does not reference special flight permits, ferry flight exceptions, or temporary relief. If an operator needs to reposition an aircraft or fly to a maintenance facility, the AD text contains no procedure for authorisation to fly prior to inspection.

In short, the gotchas are concentrated in precise part/serial matching, the ASB approval condition, immediate timing, the scrapping-only disposition for out-of-tolerance parts, and the inclusion of spares. Confirming serial numbers and part-number fitment, obtaining the correct ASB and Transport Canada approval status, and arranging prompt and properly documented inspections are essential to avoid unintended non-compliance.

The AD sets a short list of required actions. The following compliance checklist translates the AD’s textual requirements into operational steps, strictly referencing the AD language and the ASBs it mandates.

1. Identify affected helicopters and spares.

   • Cross-check fleet records to identify any Bell 222, 222B, 222U or 230 helicopters. Confirm serial numbers against the AD ranges: 222 S/N 47008-47089; 222B S/N 47131-47156; 222U S/N 47501-47574; 230 S/N 23001-23038 (Applicability: 1(a)-(d)).
   • Inventory rotating ring assemblies and spares. Identify rotating ring P/Ns 222-010-403-005, -113 and -117 and confirm whether they are equipped with drive pins P/N 230-010-402-101 or -103 (Applicability: 2). Note that assemblies P/N 222-010-403-117 with serial "TI XXX" are not affected (Note 1).

2. Obtain the correct Alert Service Bulletin and verify approval status.

   • For Model 222 and 222B, obtain ASB 222-01-90; for Model 222U, obtain ASB 222U-01-61; for Model 230, obtain ASB 230-01-23 (Requirement, table).
   • Use the ASB dated 18 May 2001 or, if using a later revision, confirm it is "approved by the Director, Aircraft Certification, Transport Canada" as required by the AD (Requirement). Only use an ASB revision that satisfies that Transport Canada approval condition.

3. Schedule and perform the inspection.

   • The AD requires the inspection "Before next flight after the effective date." With the effective date of 4 August 2005, ensure inspections are conducted prior to operating an affected aircraft after that date (Compliance).
   • Execute the inspection "in accordance with" the applicable ASB’s procedures (Requirement). The ASB contains the technical measurement method; follow it exactly.

4. Apply the numeric acceptance criterion.

   • Measure the radius at the inboard surface of the rotating ring drive pin hole and determine if it is within "0.060 to 0.090 inch" (Requirement). Record measurement values and measurement method in inspection documentation.

5. Follow mandatory disposition for non-conforming parts.

   • If the radius is not within the 0.060-0.090 inch band, remove and scrap "the rotating ring assembly, including the drive pins" as required by the AD (Requirement). Ensure scrapping is complete and recorded.

6. Record-keeping and evidence.

   • The AD does not set a record-retention period, but to demonstrate compliance keep: identification of the affected helicopter or spare (model, S/N or P/N and part serial number), the ASB used (including revision and Transport Canada approval evidence if using a later revision), measurement readings, inspector identity and qualifications, date/time of inspection, and evidence of scrapping where applicable. Such records will be necessary if CASA requires proof of compliance.

7. Manage operational consequences.

   • If inspection cannot be completed immediately due to access, tooling or personnel constraints, do not operate the affected aircraft after the AD effective date until inspection is completed. If scrapping occurs, plan procurement of replacement rotating ring assemblies or parts to restore airworthiness, recognising that the AD contains no authorised repair pathway beyond scrapping.

8. Coordination with maintenance and parts suppliers.

   • Notify maintenance providers and parts custodians about the AD’s inclusion of spare rotating ring assemblies fitted with the specified drive pins. Ensure suppliers of replacement parts are aware of the P/Ns and any serial-number exclusions (Note 1).

9. Verify ASB revisions and Transport Canada approvals.

   • If a later ASB revision is used, ensure the revision has the specified Transport Canada approval. Maintain documentary proof of approval as part of compliance records.

10. Consider contractual and warranty implications.

• The AD requires scrapping non-conforming assemblies. Operators should promptly notify parts suppliers and the manufacturer where scrapping raises warranty, replacement, or supplier-liability issues, though the AD itself does not set out warranty processes.

By following the above steps, an operator or maintenance organisation implements the AD's specific textual commands: identify affected items, use the correct ASB, measure to the 0.060-0.090 inch standard, scrap if out of tolerance, and perform inspections before flying after the effective date. The AD does not authorise alternative remedial measures, nor does it provide an administrative exemption path within the text; therefore documented compliance as described above is the operative means to meet the AD’s requirements.