AD/BELL 222/24 Amdt 1 - Main Rotor Hydraulic Actuator Support

The directive is built around a small set of technical and temporal concepts. Each concept carries a defined operational or compliance consequence:

• Applicability by model and part number. The directive applies only where support part number 222-040-125-001 is installed on Models 222, 222B, 222U and 230. The applicability clause restricts the rule to a particular hardware configuration; helicopters without that part number are outside this AD’s scope (see "Applicability"). This is a common AD design that focuses compliance burden on affected hardware rather than all airframes of a model series.

• Visual inspection for dowel pins and sealant. Requirement 1.a mandates a visual check for the presence of all dowel pins and for sealant between the support and the transmission. The presence or absence of pins and sealant is a binary operational condition that determines whether further action is required: missing pin or absence of sealant triggers removal and further inspection, and repair or replacement before further flight (see "Requirement: 1.a").

• Torque verification thresholds expressed in inch‑pounds and in counts. Requirement 1.b sets two torque thresholds: an upper-nut minimum torque of 40 inch‑pounds and a lower-nut minimum torque of 90 inch‑pounds. The AD measures compliance both by individual threshold and by counts: if two or more upper nuts are below 40 in‑lb, or two or more lower nuts below 90 in‑lb, the AD requires removal and detailed inspection (see "Requirement: 1.b(i)"). If fewer than two nuts in the respective set are below the threshold, the operator is instead required to re‑torque the nuts to specified ranges (upper: 50-70 in‑lb plus tare; lower: 100-140 in‑lb plus tare) before further flight (see "Requirement: 1.b(ii)"). The "two or more" counting rule is functionally important because it differentiates between probable systemic problems that require disassembly and localised torque issues that can be corrected by re‑torquing.

• Re‑installation re‑verification. Requirement 2 requires verification of torque after any re‑installation of the support "for any reason," referencing the same torque-verification criteria as Requirement 1. The AD preserves prior compliance timing for Requirement 2 (see "Requirement: 2" and the note that its compliance time remains unchanged).

• Timing and recurring inspection intervals. The Compliance section sets an initial compliance window (within 25 hours TIS after 30 August 2007 unless already done) and then recurring intervals not to exceed 600 hours TIS or 12 months, whichever occurs first. For post‑reinstallation verification, the window is between 20 and 30 hours TIS. These temporal parameters define when operators must schedule work and set permissible maintenance intervals.

• Normative references to manufacturer service information and parallel foreign directives. The AD directs operators to follow BHTC Alert Service Bulletins (ASBs) for further inspection and repair procedures (Accomplishment Instructions paragraphs 5-7). It also references Transport Canada ADCF‑2000‑29 and FAA AD 2001‑01‑51, indicating that related foreign airworthiness actions exist and that the AD aligns with or takes into account those documents (see "Requirement" note and "Background").

Those concepts translate into operational requirements (inspections, torque checks, removal and repair) and scheduling constraints (initial windows and repeat intervals). The AD uses counts and thresholds rather than purely subjective criteria; it directs removed-component inspection and repair to the manufacturer's ASB paragraphs 5-7, thereby delegating procedural specifics to the manufacturer documentation referenced in the AD.

This AD affects a defined set of Australian-registered rotorcraft and, in practice, the operators, maintenance organisations and mechanics who maintain and service them:

• Operators of Bell Model 222, 222B, 222U and 230 helicopters where main rotor hydraulic actuator support part 222-040-125-001 is installed. The "Applicability" clause limits the AD to these models with that specific support part number. If a helicopter of the nominated model series does not have part number 222-040-125-001 fitted, the AD’s requirements do not apply to that machine as drafted.

• Maintenance personnel and approved maintenance organisations who must perform the specified visual inspections, torque checks, removals and repairs, or those who must carry out re‑torque operations in accordance with the torque ranges set out in Requirement 1.b(ii). The AD explicitly requires inspections "in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions paragraphs 5 through 7 of [the] applicable ASB" when removal and further inspection are mandated; this directs procedural work to the ASB and therefore affects the mechanics who must follow those instructions.

• Aircraft owners and operators who schedule maintenance, bear downtime and parts costs, and maintain airworthiness records. The Compliance section sets initial and recurring inspection windows: initial inspection within 25 hours time in service after 30 August 2007 unless already done, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 600 hours TIS or 12 months; and post‑reinstallation torque verification at 20-30 hours TIS. These timing constraints affect operators’ maintenance planning and resource allocation.

• Parts suppliers and overhaul facilities that provide replacement supports, studs, dowel pins or transmission cases altered by the inspections or replacements. Requirement 1.a requires repair or replacement of "any unserviceable support, transmission case, stud, or dowel pin before further flight," thereby creating demand for parts or overhaul services as necessary.

• Regulators and inspectors within the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) and possibly foreign authorities referenced in the Note. The AD is issued by CASA (signed by the Delegate, David Villiers) and aligns with Transport Canada and FAA directives; CASA will be the issuing body and has delegated authority to issue the AD (see signature block and background references).

The AD does not, in its text, specify parties responsible for funding the required work, nor does it set enforcement penalties. The operational consequence is that the listed operators and maintenance organisations carry responsibility to perform the inspections and take remedial action in the windows specified by the AD. The AD’s requirement that further inspection and repair be conducted "in accordance with" specific ASB paragraphs places a procedural obligation on the maintenance provider to follow the manufacturer's detailed instructions.

The AD places enumerated duties on operators and maintenance providers and, by omission, establishes limited procedural rights through the allocation of remedial options. All duties below are grounded in the AD text.

Duties

• Applicability check. Duty to determine whether the helicopter is within applicability: Model 222, 222B, 222U or 230 with support part number 222-040-125-001. This is the starting compliance obligation; if the part number is not installed the AD does not apply (see "Applicability").

• Visual inspection duty. Requirement 1.a imposes a duty to visually inspect the main rotor hydraulic actuator support for all dowel pins and for sealant between the support and the transmission. If any pin is missing or no sealant is visible, the operator must remove the support and perform further inspection per the relevant ASB paragraphs 5-7. Any unserviceable support, transmission case, stud or dowel pin must be repaired or replaced before further flight.

• Torque verification duty. Requirement 1.b imposes a duty to verify torque of support attaching nuts, with explicit pass/fail criteria: upper nuts must not rotate at less than 40 inch‑pounds; lower nuts must not rotate at less than 90 inch‑pounds. The duty is both to measure and to take the prescribed remedial steps if these minimums are not met.

• Remedial duties tied to counts. Where two or more upper nuts or two or more lower nuts rotate below the specified minimum torque (40 in‑lb upper, 90 in‑lb lower), the duty is to remove the support and inspect support, transmission case, studs and dowel pins per the ASB (paras 5-7), and to repair or replace unserviceable items before further flight (Requirement 1.b(i)). Where fewer than two nuts fail the minimum, the duty is to re‑torque those nuts to the specified ranges (upper 50-70 in‑lb plus tare, lower 100-140 in‑lb plus tare) before further flight (Requirement 1.b(ii)).

• Post‑reinstallation duty. Requirement 2 requires verification of the nuts’ torque after any re‑installation of the support for any reason, in accordance with Requirement 1. The AD keeps the original compliance window for Requirement 2: verify at not less than 20 hours TIS nor more than 30 hours TIS (see "Compliance").

• Recurring inspection duty. After the initial inspection (within 25 hours TIS after 30 August 2007 unless already done), operators must repeat the inspection at intervals not to exceed 600 hours TIS or 12 months, whichever occurs first (see "Compliance").

Rights and procedural options

• Limited remedial option between removal and re‑torque. The AD gives a conditional choice when nuts are below the minimum torque: if two or more nuts in a set are low, removal and extended inspection is required; if fewer than two are low, re‑torque within prescribed ranges is permitted. That operational fork is the AD’s primary procedural choice allocated to the operator/maintenance provider.

• Manufacturer procedural reliance. The AD directs the operator or maintainers to the BHTC Alert Service Bulletins’ Accomplishment Instructions paragraphs 5-7 for the actions following removal and further inspection. This is not framed as discretionary: the AD mandates those ASB paragraphs as the method for the further inspection and repair. The "right" is therefore the ability to rely on the manufacturer's specified procedure rather than devising an alternative procedure; the AD does not offer an alternative compliance method within its text.

• No express exemption process described. The AD itself does not specify alternative compliance or exemption procedures, nor does it name an appeal or permit process in its text. Any such processes would be handled through CASA or existing regulatory mechanisms outside the AD text; the AD does not articulate them.

All these duties carry immediate operational consequences: inspections and torque checks must be scheduled and carried out within the stated time windows, and removal/repair actions must occur before further flight where specified. The AD ties certain remedial actions to counts (two or more nuts), which creates a clear operational decision rule for maintenance staff.

The text of the AD does not set out penalties or a detailed enforcement regime. What the instrument does provide that bears on enforcement is:

• Issuing authority. The document is an airworthiness directive published under the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), signed by David Villiers as Delegate of CASA (see signature and effective date). The presence of a CASA delegate’s signature indicates that CASA is the issuing authority for the AD.

• Effective date and mandatory language. The AD uses mandatory language ("Required", "Before further flight", "verify", "repair or replace"), and it specifies an effective date (this Amendment becomes effective on 30 August 2007). The mandatory terms and effective date indicate the AD is intended to impose immediate mandatory requirements on affected operators from that date forward (see "Compliance" and "This Amendment becomes effective on 30 August 2007"). The AD itself, however, does not articulate the legal mechanism for enforcing compliance or the penalties for noncompliance.

• No penalties text in AD. There is no provision in the AD text that specifies fines, certificate actions, or criminal penalties. The instrument does not describe how CASA will monitor compliance, what evidence operators must produce to demonstrate compliance, or what administrative or legal consequences flow from failure to comply. Those enforcement mechanisms sit outside the AD text and fall within CASA’s broader regulatory and enforcement framework not described in this document.

• Reference links to foreign directives. The AD notes Transport Canada ADCF‑2000‑29 and FAA AD 2001‑01‑51. Those references indicate companion foreign directives but do not, within this AD text, alter Australian enforcement procedures nor spell out cross‑jurisdictional enforcement matters.

Consequences for operators who do not comply are not stated in the AD itself. In practice, enforcement actions would normally be taken under the broader legislative powers and enforcement processes available to CASA (for example, regulatory enforcement, certificates of operation, or administrative penalties), but the AD document does not assert or describe any particular enforcement steps or penalty amounts. The AD therefore imposes technical and temporal obligations without specifying enforcement instruments or penalties in its text; operators and maintainers must consult CASA’s broader regulatory framework for detailed enforcement practices and potential sanctions.

The AD expressly references related foreign directives and the manufacturer’s service information, thereby situating itself among parallel airworthiness instruments and technical instructions. The AD text provides the following interactions:

• Cross‑reference to manufacturer service bulletins. The AD requires further inspection and any repair or replacement to be performed "in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions paragraphs 5 through 7 of BHTC Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 222-00-86, 222U-00-57 or 230-00-18, as applicable" when the removal and further inspection condition is triggered (see "Requirement: 1.a" and 1.b(i)). This means the AD does not stand alone procedurally; it delegates procedural specifics to the BHTC ASBs. Operators must therefore have access to and follow the ASB procedures, linking the AD to the manufacturer’s technical requirements.

• Reference to foreign airworthiness directives. The AD explicitly notes Transport Canada ADCF‑2000‑29 and FAA AD 2001‑01‑51 in a Note and in the Background it records that the FAA had received a report and that Action followed. This demonstrates the AD is part of a network of airworthiness directives addressing the same hardware concern across jurisdictions. The references show that CASA’s AD is consistent with or influenced by actions taken by Transport Canada and the FAA, but the AD itself applies Australian regulatory force independent of those foreign instruments.

• Procedural fit within maintenance regimes. The AD’s timing rules (initial compliance within 25 hours TIS after 30 August 2007 and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 600 hours TIS or 12 months) will interact with operators’ existing maintenance schedules and logbook entries. Operators must incorporate these inspection windows into maintenance programmes and record-keeping practices. The AD does not itself modify the Civil Aviation Regulations or Maintenance Regulations, but compliance will need to be reflected in maintenance releases and logbook entries as required by those broader regulations, which are not reproduced in this AD.

• No express conflict resolution text. The AD does not specify how conflicts should be resolved where another service bulletin or maintenance requirement imposes different intervals or procedures. It delegates procedural tasks to specific ASB paragraphs and sets mandatory inspection intervals in the AD; where another instrument prescribes different action, operators would need to consult CASA guidance or regulatory frameworks to determine precedence. The AD itself does not provide a conflict resolution clause or specify whether following the ASB alone suffices in lieu of the AD or whether compliance with the AD plus ASB is required.

• No statutory amendments cited. The AD does not amend other legislation; it is a standalone directive issued by CASA under its airworthiness authority. The AD therefore interacts operationally with existing aviation safety and maintenance laws through its mandatory inspection and repair requirements, but it does not purport to amend those statutes within its text.

In short, this AD integrates manufacturer technical instructions and references foreign ADs, creating a technical‑legal web in which operators must reconcile AD timing and procedural requirements with their existing maintenance and regulatory obligations. The AD itself provides the mandatory inspection and remedial steps and points to the ASB paragraphs for how to carry them out, but it leaves broader enforcement, record-keeping and statutory interpretation to the general regulatory framework and CASA.

The document presented is Amendment 1 to AD/BELL 222/24. The Amendment history recorded in the AD text is compact but explicit:

• Original AD base. The AD is identified as AD/BELL 222/24, and the entry is titled "AD/BELL 222/24 Amdt 1." The AD text does not reproduce the original AD text in full; rather it presents the amendment as issued.

• Change introduced by Amendment 1. The Background section states that "Amendment 1 is issued to include the Model 230 helicopter in applicability." That is the explicit substance of Amendment 1: expanding applicability to add Model 230 helicopters (see "Background"). The remainder of the AD’s requirements are framed without further textual change noted in the document as presented.

• Effective date of Amendment 1. The AD notes that the Amendment becomes effective on 30 August 2007. The signature block is dated 11 July 2007, indicating the delegate’s signing date precedes the effective date (see the signature and "This Amendment becomes effective on 30 August 2007").

• Historical trigger. The Background states that the FAA received a report of the failure of a main rotor hydraulic actuator support that resulted in an accident of a Model 222U helicopter. That event is cited as the safety trigger underlying the AD issuance. The AD also references existing foreign actions: Transport Canada ADCF‑2000‑29 and FAA AD 2001‑01‑51 are noted; the AD’s Note indicates these documents are relevant to the issue (see "Requirement" note).

• No further amendment chronology included. The AD text does not contain any additional amendments, revocations, supersessions or effective‑end dates beyond Amendment 1 and its effective date. It does not indicate whether Amendment 1 modifies any other clauses of the underlying AD beyond expanding applicability to Model 230. There is no statement in this text of any planned future amendments or historical earlier amendments before Amendment 1.

• Signatory. The delegate of CASA, David Villiers, is listed on 11 July 2007. That places the amendment's administrative preparation and signing within July 2007 and its effective date in late August 2007.

If users need a complete amendment trail or to verify whether later amendments, supersessions or cancellations exist, they must consult CASA’s official AD database or legislative repository and cross‑check this Amendment 1 with earlier or subsequent AD entries. The AD as presented documents a single amendment whose substance is explicitly limited to including Model 230 in applicability and setting the compliance and remedial requirements as described.

The AD text does not contain or reference any litigation history. There are no cases, appeals, disputes or court decisions cited in this instrument, and no mention of litigation arising from the AD or from the underlying incident. The document’s Background notes a report of a failure that resulted in an accident to a Model 222U helicopter and it references related foreign directives (Transport Canada ADCF‑2000‑29 and FAA AD 2001‑01‑51), but it does not cite any legal proceedings.

Because the AD text contains no litigation references, the following points are strictly limited to what the AD shows:

• No judicial decisions are cited in the AD. The instrument does not provide case law or administrative decisions as part of its authority or explanation.

• No administrative appeals or waivers are described. The AD does not set out an appeal process, an exemption route, or records of any prior appeals about the AD in the text provided.

• No enforcement or penalty proceedings are described. The AD does not recount any enforcement actions taken for noncompliance, nor does it identify any disputes concerning the AD’s requirements.

For readers seeking litigation information connected to this AD, the AD as provided offers no leads beyond its references to Transport Canada and FAA directives. Any litigation history would need to be searched for in administrative tribunals, civil court records, CASA enforcement records, or aviation safety incident databases since none is included in this AD document.

This AD contains procedural and technical details that can generate compliance pitfalls if overlooked. The following are concrete practical issues and traps that arise from the AD’s text; each follows directly from the instruction language and timing requirements.

• Applicability is part‑number specific. The AD applies only where main rotor hydraulic actuator support part number 222-040-125-001 is installed. Operators must confirm the exact part number before assuming the AD applies or not. Failing to check the part number could lead to unnecessary work or missed obligations (see "Applicability").

• Torque thresholds are in inch‑pounds and require measurement technique. Requirement 1.b specifies minimum rotate‑at torque values (upper nuts must not rotate at less than 40 in‑lb; lower nuts must not rotate at less than 90 in‑lb) and re‑torque ranges (upper 50-70 in‑lb plus tare; lower 100-140 in‑lb plus tare). Technicians must be equipped with calibrated torque measurement tools capable of reading in inch‑pounds and must understand "rotate at" testing versus static torque application. The AD does not define the method of measurement beyond the ASB reference, so using improper tooling or technique risks erroneous readouts and non‑compliance.

• The counting rule: "two or more" threshold triggers removal. The AD’s operational decision depends on counts. If two or more upper or lower nuts rotate below their respective minimums, removal and inspection per the ASB are mandatory. If fewer than two nuts fail, re‑torque is permitted. Miscounting or misclassification of which nuts belong to "upper" or "lower" sets could produce the wrong remedial action.

• "Plus tare" in re‑torque ranges. The re‑torque requirements require applying torque "plus tare". This implies that the residual friction or initial nut/preload must be accounted for. Technicians must therefore understand how to perform a "plus tare" re‑torque; the AD does not define the tare procedure in the text, so reliance on the referenced ASB or established torqueing practice is required. Misunderstanding "plus tare" may result in incorrect clamp loads.

• Requirement 2 timing window after re‑installation is narrow. The AD requires verification at not less than 20 hours TIS nor more than 30 hours TIS after re‑installation. Operators must schedule the re‑verification within that narrow 10‑hour window. Failure to do so could result in non‑compliance despite having re‑installed the support.

• Initial inspection timing relative to effective date. The initial inspection is required "within 25 hours time in service after 30 August 2007" unless already accomplished. Operators who postpone beyond that window incur non‑compliance. The AD does not provide a grace or catch‑up procedure; the stated window must be respected.

• Recurring interval choice is the sooner of two measures. Recurring inspections must occur at intervals not to exceed 600 hours TIS or 12 months, whichever occurs first. That means time‑based intervals can force earlier inspections even if hours are low, which matters for aircraft with low utilisation. Maintenance planning must account for both metrics.

• Reliance on manufacturer ASB paragraphs 5-7 for detailed inspections and repairs. Where removal and further inspection are required, the AD directs operators to specific ASB paragraphs. Operators must obtain and follow the correct ASB appropriate to their model (222, 222U, or 230). Using the wrong ASB version or failing to follow paragraphs 5-7 exactly could result in incomplete corrective work relative to the AD’s expectations.

• The AD references foreign directives but does not reproduce their content. The Note references Transport Canada ADCF‑2000‑29 and FAA AD 2001‑01‑51. Operators familiar with those documents should verify whether there are differences in required actions or timeframes. The AD itself does not harmonise or reconcile any differences in text; practitioners must treat the CASA AD as the operative Australian requirement.

• No enforcement or penalty text provided. The absence of specified penalties in the AD means operators need to consult CASA’s broader regulatory enforcement framework to understand consequences for non‑compliance. Assuming the AD itself outlines enforcement would be an error.

• Record‑keeping and maintenance release implications are not stated. The AD mandates actions "before further flight" in multiple places but does not specify documentation requirements in the AD text. Practitioners should not assume documentation obligations are covered by the AD; compliance with general maintenance record regulations is implied but not detailed here.

These "gotchas" are procedural and technical, and they arise directly from the AD’s emphasis on precise torque thresholds, part‑number applicability, narrow post‑reinstallation windows, and reliance on manufacturer ASBs for disassembly and repair instructions.

This section sets out a practical, step‑by‑step compliance checklist constructed from the AD’s requirements. Each step cites the operative provision in the AD text you must follow.

1. Confirm applicability (Applicability). Inspect records and the component to confirm that the helicopter is Model 222, 222B, 222U or 230 and that the main rotor hydraulic actuator support part number is 222-040-125-001. If that part number is not fitted, the AD’s requirements do not apply.

2. Schedule initial inspection (Compliance). If the initial inspection has not already been accomplished, arrange for it to occur within 25 hours time in service after 30 August 2007. For helicopters with the part fitted, do not defer beyond that window.

3. Perform the visual inspection (Requirement 1.a). Visually inspect the main rotor hydraulic actuator support for:

   • Presence of all dowel pins; and
   • Presence of sealant between the support and the transmission.

   If any pin is missing or no sealant is visible, remove the support and follow the Accomplishment Instructions paragraphs 5-7 of the applicable BHTC ASB (222-00-86, 222U-00-57 or 230-00-18) to further inspect the support, transmission case, studs and dowel pins. Repair or replace any unserviceable support, transmission case, stud, or dowel pin before further flight.

4. Perform torque verification (Requirement 1.b). Using calibrated tooling capable of reading in inch‑pounds, verify the torque of the support attaching nuts:

   • Upper nuts: must not rotate at a torque less than 40 inch‑pounds.
   • Lower nuts: must not rotate at a torque less than 90 inch‑pounds.

   Perform the "rotate at" test as required by the ASB or by accepted torque‑measurement technique, and record the results.

5. Apply the corrective decision rule based on counts (Requirement 1.b(i) and (ii)):

   • If two or more upper nuts rotate at a torque less than 40 in‑lb, or two or more lower nuts rotate at a torque less than 90 in‑lb, remove the support and carry out the further inspection required by the ASB paragraphs 5-7. Repair or replace any unserviceable parts before further flight.
   • If fewer than two upper nuts rotate at less than 40 in‑lb, or fewer than two lower nuts rotate at less than 90 in‑lb, re‑torque the nuts before further flight to the specified ranges:
     • Upper nuts: 50 to 70 in‑lb plus tare.
     • Lower nuts: 100 to 140 in‑lb plus tare. Ensure the "plus tare" procedure is performed correctly, as the AD requires torque "plus tare". Use the ASB paragraphs or approved torqueing procedures to calculate and apply the required torque increment.

6. If any support is removed and re‑installed, verify torque after re‑installation (Requirement 2). Requirement 2 requires that after re‑installing a support for any reason, you verify the torque of the nuts in accordance with Requirement 1. Note the specific compliance window for Requirement 2: the verification must be done at not less than 20 hours TIS nor more than 30 hours TIS. Schedule the aircraft to return for this verification within that 20-30 hour window.

7. Set up recurring inspections (Compliance). After the initial inspection, set recurring inspections at intervals not to exceed 600 hours time in service or 12 months, whichever occurs first. Establish maintenance scheduling and record entries so these recurring windows are tracked and not missed.

8. Use the correct ASB for further inspections and repairs. If removal and further inspection are required, perform those steps "in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions paragraphs 5 through 7" of the applicable BHTC ASB (222-00-86, 222U-00-57 or 230-00-18). Ensure the ASB version corresponds to the helicopter model.

9. Maintain records and evidence of compliance. The AD mandates actions "before further flight" for certain conditions but does not specify record-keeping in the text. Preserve inspection and torque measurement records, any parts replaced, and the ASB references used, so that maintenance logs and CASA auditors can verify compliance. Ensure the maintenance release procedure aligns with regulatory requirements for returning an aircraft to service.

10. Where repairs or replacements are necessary, ensure parts meet serviceability standards. The AD requires repair or replacement of any unserviceable support, transmission case, stud, or dowel pin before further flight. Verify that replacement parts conform to the manufacturer’s specifications and that any repair is carried out in accordance with the ASB or approved procedures.

11. Coordinate with CASA and consult the referenced foreign ADs and ASBs if required. The AD notes Transport Canada ADCF‑2000‑29 and FAA AD 2001‑01‑51; while these do not modify the CASA AD, they may be informative for operators who operate internationally or who wish to cross‑check the foreign advisories.

12. Train staff on counting rules, torque thresholds and "plus tare" concepts. Practical compliance hinges on correct measurement technique, correct identification of "upper" versus "lower" nuts, correct counting of nuts below threshold, and proper execution of the "plus tare" re‑torque. Ensure technicians understand these terms and the measurement devices used.

Following this checklist will implement the AD’s requirements as written. If an operator requires an alternative method of compliance, or has questions about enforcement or exemptions, those are not addressed in the AD and must be dealt with through CASA processes outside the text of this instrument.