What it does
This instrument, Airworthiness Directive AD/BELL 212/4 Amendment 22, is a mandatory regulatory directive issued by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) under subregulation 39.1(1) of the Civil Aviation Regulations 1998 (CAR 1998) (see opening paragraph). It revokes the prior Amendment 21 and imposes two primary, concrete obligations on operators and maintainers of Bell Helicopter Textron Model 212 helicopters.
First, Requirement 1 mandates the retirement of specified components at the times set out in the Mandatory Airworthiness Limitations Schedule, Section 4, of the Bell 212 Maintenance Manual (Revision 5 or later) with a small number of explicit exceptions and additions listed in the AD itself (see Requirement 1 and the accompanying table). That table prescribes specific retirement lives for identified part numbers (for example, certain skid landing gear aft cross tubes and drive link bolts), and it declares a set of float landing gear crosstube assembly part numbers as "Not eligible for service on Australian helicopters" (see table under Requirement 1).
Second, Requirement 2 requires operators of Model 212 helicopters that have particular main rotor mast or main rotor trunnion part numbers installed to determine the accumulated Retirement Index Number (RIN) for those components and to perform inspections and any required follow-up actions in accordance with the technical requirements of FAA Emergency Airworthiness Directive 2000-15-52 (see Requirement 2 and the Note). The AD provides an availability note pointing operators to the FAA internet site or the Australian Authority for a copy of FAA AD 2000-15-52.
Timing is specified in the Compliance paragraph. For the RIN-related inspections that comprise part of Requirement 2, the AD requires certain actions "before further flight after 9 August 2000" for paragraph (a) of the Requirement document, unless already accomplished. The AD became effective on 9 August 2000 and was notified in the Commonwealth Gazette on that date. The Background section records the safety rationale: the AD addresses metal fatigue risks identified after a cracked main rotor mast was discovered, with metallurgical inspection attributing the crack to snap ring groove radii that were below the 0.020 inch minimum allowable dimension, and it notes that the FAA concluded corrections to RIN counting procedures were necessary.