What it does
This document is an amendment to Airworthiness Directive AD/BEECH 36/54, issued by a delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) and effective from 27 February 2012. It modifies a previously issued directive concerning the forward elevator control cable on Beechcraft 36 (Bonanza) series aeroplanes.
Mechanically, the amendment makes three principal changes. First, it clarifies the applicability section by adding Figure 1, a diagram adapted from the Beechcraft Illustrated Parts Catalogue, to assist registered operators in determining whether their specific aircraft is subject to the AD. This reduces ambiguity about which forward elevator cable configuration is covered. Second, it removes the requirement for repeat inspections of the forward elevator cable as well as the mandatory removal of cables that have been in service for more than 15 years. These requirements were present in the original issue of the AD. The removal is contingent on the manufacturer having published Instructions for Continuing Airworthiness (ICA) that CASA considers satisfactory to prevent elevator cable failure, provided the ICA is adhered to during the inspection process. Third, it updates the compliance timeframe for Requirement 1: aircraft that have not had the forward elevator cable replaced or inspected within the last maintenance release period must comply before further flight after the original effective date (16 January 2012). However, a transitional provision allows one positioning flight (pilot only) to a location where the inspection can be carried out if the inspection cannot be performed at the current location.
The original AD (effective 16 January 2012) required immediate inspection of the forward elevator control cable assembly for wear, broken wires, and corrosion, or alternatively replacement of the cable assembly. It also required removal from service of any defective cable and prohibited reinstallation of such cables. The trigger for the original AD was a reported forward elevator cable failure immediately before take-off, followed by discovery of extensive fraying in a second aircraft and reports of five more unserviceable cables after the original issue.