AD/B767/244 - Auxiliary Fuel Tanks

Applicability: The directive applies to Boeing 767-200 series aeroplanes that carry auxiliary fuel tanks installed under FAA STC SA5544NM (Applicability table). The AD is therefore targeted at a defined subset of 767-200s rather than the entire 767 fleet. The AD identifies the STC number explicitly, which confines the technical scope to those installations.

Deactivation requirement and constraints: The AD mandates deactivation of the auxiliary tanks "in accordance with an approved deactivation procedure" and requires any remaining auxiliary tank components to be secured and to have no effect on operational safety or airworthiness. It also stipulates that deactivation "may not result in the need for additional instructions for continued airworthiness" (Requirement). Those phrases set both a mandatory outcome (deactivation, safety neutral) and a procedural boundary (approved procedure, no additional continued-airworthiness instructions).

Appendix A content and non-binding drafting language: Appendix A provides ten numbered criteria "that should be included in the deactivation procedure." The Appendix therefore operates as prescriptive guidance that the AD advocates but frames using "should", whereas the main Requirement and Compliance provisions are mandatory. Appendix A covers fuel removal and vapour clearing; electrical, pneumatic, and fuel plumbing disconnections and capping (with specific capping locations, e.g., "cap them at the aeroplane tank side"); circuit breaker handling; AFM and maintenance-manual amendments; weight and balance revisions requiring CASA approval; and post-deactivation leak/pressure and systems verification checks (Appendix A paras 1-9). The Appendix also allows operators to include additional relevant information they deem necessary (Appendix A para 10).

Reference to external FAA material: The AD cross-references FAA AD 2008-12-03 Amdt 39-15546 (Note 2) and refers to FAA Advisory Circular AC 25-8 as one approved method for capping and securing fuel plumbing interfaces (Appendix A para 4). These cross-references indicate that the deactivation procedure should conform to certain FAA-identified methods where relevant.

Documentation and placarding: The AD requires AFM amendments to indicate the auxiliary tank is deactivated, removal of the auxiliary-tank operating procedures and AFM Supplement for the STC, placement of a flight-deck placard indicating deactivation, and maintenance manual amendments to remove auxiliary tank maintenance procedures (Appendix A para 7-8). It explicitly permits accomplishing AFM revisions by inserting the Directive into the AFM.

Verification and return-to-service checks: After deactivation, operators must perform leak and pressure checks and verify that the airplane's fuel quantity indication system (FQIS) and fuel distribution systems have not been adversely affected before returning to service (Appendix A para 9).

Timeframe and administrative facts: The Directive becomes effective 28 August 2008, was issued 16 July 2008 by a CASA delegate (James Coyne), and required compliance on or before 16 December 2008 (Compliance; signature block).

Operators and registrants of Boeing 767-200 aeroplanes fitted with Rogerson auxiliary fuel tanks under FAA STC SA5544NM are the primary parties affected. The Applicability table limits the regulated population to Model 767 aeroplanes equipped with the specified auxiliary tank STC (Applicability). That points to a distinct subset of operators rather than all 767s.

Maintenance organisations, licensed aircraft maintenance engineers (AMEs), design approval holders, and continuing-airworthiness personnel who perform or approve deactivation work are affected because the Directive imposes technical and documentation actions,physical disconnection and capping of electrical, pneumatic and fuel interfaces, placarding, AFM and maintenance-manual revisions, leak and pressure checks and verification of FQIS and fuel distribution systems (Appendix A paras 1-9). Where the Directive requires "an approved deactivation procedure" and CASA approval for weight and balance revisions, it places decision and approval roles on CASA as regulator and on those persons authorised to produce approved procedures (Requirement; Appendix A para 6).

Passengers and commercial operators carrying cargo or passengers on affected aeroplanes are indirectly affected through potential out-of-service times and operational limitations resulting from the work. The Directive requires AFM amendments and removal of STC-operational procedures, which change the aircraft's certified standard operating procedures and may alter range or payload characteristics indirectly via weight and balance changes (Appendix A paras 6-7).

Lessors and financiers who have security interests in affected aircraft are stakeholders because the Directive requires physical modification and documentation changes to the asset. The AD requires AFM and maintenance manual amendments and possibly structural or systems changes; such modifications can affect the economic value and lease terms of the aircraft. The Directive also requires CASA approval of weight-and-balance revisions, which can be material to an aircraft’s operational capabilities (Appendix A para 6).

Design organisations and certifiers for the STC are implicated because the AD addresses an STC-installed system and cross-references FAA guidance and FAA AD material. The Background states the Directive "results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer," indicating the manufacturer's work led to the issuance. The AD therefore engages parties responsible for the STC installation both technically and administratively (Background).

Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) is the issuing regulator and the decision-maker for approvals required by the Directive, specifically weight and balance revisions (Appendix A para 6). The Directive does not state enforcement mechanisms in the text provided, but it gives CASA the approval role explicitly in at least one procedural step.

Mandatory duties imposed by the Directive: Operators of affected aircraft must deactivate the auxiliary fuel tanks in accordance with an approved deactivation procedure (Requirement). Where auxiliary tank components remain, they must be secured and must "have no effect on the continued operational safety and airworthiness of the aeroplane" (Requirement). The work must be completed on or before the stated compliance date (on or before 16 December 2008) and the Directive is effective from 28 August 2008 (Compliance; effective date).

Documentation and procedural duties: Appendix A requires revision of the weight and balance document where necessary and explicit CASA approval of that revision (Appendix A para 6). It requires amendment of the AFM to indicate the auxiliary tanks are deactivated, removal of auxiliary tank operating procedures and STC AFM Supplement, and placement of a flight-deck placard stating the auxiliary tank is deactivated (Appendix A para 7). The maintenance manual must be amended to remove auxiliary tank maintenance procedures (Appendix A para 8). The Appendix also instructs that leak checks and pressure checks be accomplished before returning the aeroplane to service, including verification that the FQIS and fuel distribution systems have not been adversely affected (Appendix A para 9).

Technical duties: Appendix A prescribes specific physical actions: permanent draining and clearing of vapours (para 1); disconnection and stowage of electrical connections (para 2); disconnection, capping and securing of pneumatic connections (para 3); disconnection and capping of fuel feed and vent plumbing interfaces at the OEM tank side and securing them in an approved method, and leaving disconnected auxiliary vent lines open and secured to avoid structural deformation during decompression (para 4); pulling and collaring of circuit breakers used to operate the auxiliary tank (para 5).

Rights and procedural flexibility indicated by the Directive: Appendix A allows an operator to include "any relevant information or additional steps that are deemed necessary by the operator to comply with the deactivation and return the aeroplane to service" (Appendix A para 10). The AFM revisions may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this Directive into the AFM (Appendix A para 7), which provides a practical method for compliance without drafting entirely new AFM pages. The Appendix also notes that removal of a bladder "might help eliminate out-gassing" as a non-mandatory option (Appendix A para 1, note).

Constraints and limits on methods: The main Requirement says deactivation "may not result in the need for additional instructions for continued airworthiness." That language constrains acceptable deactivation approaches to those that do not create new continuing-airworthiness obligations; operators must therefore select a deactivation method consistent with the overall continuing-airworthiness framework.

Interaction with external standards: The Appendix directs that one approved method for securing disconnected plumbing interfaces is FAA AC 25-8 Fuel Tank Systems Installations (Appendix A para 4). Operators or certifiers using that method will need to follow its requirements where relevant.

Approval and regulatory gatekeeping: CASA must approve weight and balance revisions where required (Appendix A para 6), and the Directive is issued by CASA (signature block). The Requirement's "approved deactivation procedure" language implies a need for regulatory acceptance or approval of the method used, although the AD text does not detail the approval pathway.

The text of the Directive sets compliance obligations and timeframes but does not specify penalties, fines or particular enforcement mechanisms in the provided material. The AD declares the required actions, the compliance deadline ("On or before 16 December 2008") and the effective date ("This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 28 August 2008"), and it requires items such as CASA approval of a weight and balance revision (Appendix A para 6). The Directive does not, within the text given, set out sanctions, infringement notice provisions, or criminal penalties.

Because the AD is an instrument issued by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, the directive functions as a regulatory requirement. The AD text makes obligations explicit (for example, "Deactivate the auxiliary fuel tanks" and "Any auxiliary tank component that remains on the aeroplane must be secured") but leaves enforcement detail unarticulated in the excerpt provided. The document’s signature block shows it was issued by a CASA delegate, indicating the regulatory source and authority, but the AD itself does not enumerate enforcement steps, inspection rights, or administrative penalty amounts.

Operationally, the requirement to obtain CASA approval of weight and balance revisions (Appendix A para 6) establishes one point where regulatory oversight and gatekeeping occur. Compliance will be recorded and demonstrable through amended AFM and maintenance records, placarding, and approvals that regulators typically inspect during surveillance, but the AD text does not describe audit or inspection processes.

For practitioners advising affected parties, this absence in the text signals the need to consult CASA’s broader enforcement and compliance frameworks, administrative law, and the Civil Aviation Regulations for explicit enforcement mechanisms and sanctions applicable to non-compliance. The AD itself documents the obligation, timeframe and technical content required, and those records are likely the basis for any enforcement action, but the AD does not itself describe penalty mechanics in the supplied material.

The Directive explicitly cross-references and integrates guidance and actions associated with foreign regulatory material and the aircraft’s existing certification documents. The AD refers to FAA AD 2008-12-03 Amdt 39-15546 (Note 2) and specifies FAA Advisory Circular AC 25-8 Fuel Tank Systems Installations as "one approved method" for capping and securing disconnected fuel plumbing interfaces (Appendix A para 4). Those references indicate that the required deactivation actions are to be performed with regard to established FAA-adopted methods where applicable. In practice, that means operators may need to align deactivation activities with FAA-prescribed technical standards to satisfy the AD’s expectations.

The AD interacts directly with aircraft operational and continuing-airworthiness documentation by requiring AFM amendments (including removal of STC AFM Supplement statements and auxiliary tank operating procedures) and maintenance manual amendments (Appendix A paras 7-8). Those document changes intersect with certification and operational rules about the AFM and maintenance documentation: the Directive requires specific documentary outcomes that will be relied upon for continued airworthiness and operational compliance.

Weight and balance revisions require "CASA approval" (Appendix A para 6). That connects the AD to the domestic regulatory framework for mass and balance certification and implies a regulatory approval process administered by CASA. The AD therefore triggers engagement with CASA under existing weight-and-balance and type-certification regulatory authorities.

The AD's statement that "Deactivation may not result in the need for additional instructions for continued airworthiness" (Requirement) creates an interaction with the continuing-airworthiness regime. If a chosen deactivation method would create continuing-airworthiness instructions, that method would be inconsistent with the AD constraint, thus forcing either an alternative method or additional regulatory approvals.

The Directive does not, within the supplied material, reference criminal or civil aviation safety statutes or state-specific regulatory instruments beyond CASA and FAA references. It does not identify the specific provisions of Australian aviation law that empower the AD, nor does it list penalties or enforcement references. Accordingly, to understand interactions with enforcement powers, one must consult the broader legislative framework that authorises CASA to issue ADs and the enforcement provisions of aviation legislation. That said, the AD does create concrete compliance obligations that intersect with administrative approvals, operational manuals and maintenance records, which are typically within the scope of broader aviation regulatory regimes.

The supplied Directive text does not record any subsequent amendments to AD/B767/244. The document itself includes issuance and effective dates that document its initial adoption: the directive was signed by James Coyne, Delegate of CASA, on 16 July 2008, states that it "becomes effective on 28 August 2008" and sets a compliance date "On or before 16 December 2008" (Compliance; signature block). The header repeats AD/B767/244 and "9/2008" as the issuing identifier and month/year reference.

No later amendments, revocations or supersessions are mentioned in the provided material. The Appendix A is presented as the deactivation criteria accompanying the Directive, and no amendment or revision history for Appendix A is supplied. Where the AD references FAA materials (FAA AD 2008-12-03 and FAA AC 25-8), those references are identified but not themselves amended within this document.

Practitioners seeking later changes should note the absence of amendment information in the AD and must therefore consult CASA records, subsequent AD publications, or an official AD index for any post-2008 revisions, removals or clarifications. The Directive as provided records the original issuance and the set of actions required at that time but does not itself document any post-issuance legal changes.

The Directive text supplied contains no litigation history, court decisions, or references to judicial review in relation to AD/B767/244. There are no case names, proceedings, or legal challenges recorded in the document. The AD records the technical background (manufacturer fuel-system reviews identifying potential unsafe conditions) and provides the regulatory remedy (deactivation), but it does not report judicial scrutiny or litigation arising from the AD.

If practitioners require litigation history, the absence of such material in the directive indicates the need to search judicial and administrative review records, tribunal decisions, or legal databases external to the Directive to determine whether the AD was the subject of legal challenge. The AD itself does not supply any litigation or administrative challenge narrative.

1. Scope limited to a specific STC: The AD applies only to Model 767-200 aircraft equipped with auxiliary tanks installed under STC SA5544NM (Applicability). Operators with other auxiliary tank installations or other STCs are not within this AD’s specified scope but should verify applicability carefully to avoid misclassification.

2. Approved procedure requirement: The AD requires deactivation "in accordance with an approved deactivation procedure" (Requirement). The AD does not set out the approval pathway or criteria beyond the Appendix "should" list, so parties must ascertain what constitutes an "approved" procedure with CASA. Failure to secure or document regulatory approval for the chosen deactivation procedure could leave operators exposed to compliance questions, even if the physical work is completed.

3. No explicit penalties in the text: The Directive does not include specified penalties or enforcement steps in the provided material. That absence is not an absence of enforcement risk; rather, parties should recognise that other legislative instruments and regulatory enforcement frameworks (not reproduced here) are likely implicated. Operators should therefore not assume a lack of enforcement because penalties are not stated in the AD.

4. "May not result in the need for additional instructions for continued airworthiness": This constraint (Requirement) limits the choice of deactivation method. A deactivation approach that creates new continuing-airworthiness tasks may be inconsistent with the AD, requiring consultation with CASA to reconcile the approach.

5. Vent line handling nuance: Appendix A para 4 requires that, "In order to eliminate the possibility of structural deformation during cabin decompression, leave open and secure the disconnected auxiliary fuel tank vent lines." Leaving vent lines open but secured is a specific technical requirement that, if omitted, could have safety or structural implications during decompression tests or events.

6. Capping location specificity: Appendix A para 4 requires that disconnected fuel feed and vent plumbing be capped "at the aeroplane tank side", not at the auxiliary tank side. Performing the capping at the wrong end could leave the OEM tanks vulnerable or provide a conduit for vapour or leak paths.

7. FQIS and fuel distribution verification required: Appendix A para 9 requires verification that the aircraft FQIS and fuel distribution systems "have not been adversely affected." Deactivation work that disturbs sensors, wiring or pumps can inadvertently impair fuel quantity indication or distribution, with operational consequences. Verification is required before return to service.

8. Weight and balance approval: Appendix A para 6 mandates revising the weight and balance document if required and obtaining CASA approval. This approval requirement can introduce scheduling delays if not factored into planning and affects the aircraft's loading limits and performance data.

9. AFM and maintenance manual changes and placarding: Appendix A para 7-8 require AFM revisions, removal of STC operating procedures and maintenance manual deletions, and a flight-deck placard. Failing to update or to make the changes in an approved fashion can create compliance gaps.

10. "Should" versus "must": Appendix A uses "should" to describe criteria to include in procedures, while the Requirement uses "must" style language. Practitioners must distinguish between mandatory Directive clauses and Appendix guidance that, while influential, is framed as recommended content for approved procedures.

11. Practical record-keeping: The Directive states AFM revisions "may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this Directive into the AFM" (Appendix A para 7). While this is a practical route, auditors or regulators may require more formal AFM pages; reliance on insertion should be coordinated with CASA acceptance to avoid disputes about sufficiency.

12. Multiple stakeholders: Lessors, insurers, and repair stations need to be coordinated; the AD’s requirements affect the physical state and documentation of the aircraft which can have contractual and insurance implications that are not detailed in the AD but are operationally material.

Follow the AD’s mandatory requirement and use Appendix A as the procedural checklist for an approved deactivation procedure. The AD requires deactivation "in accordance with an approved deactivation procedure" and completion by the compliance date (Requirement; Compliance). The Appendix lists ten discrete action areas; a compliance approach that maps each Appendix item to accountable tasks, responsible persons and documentary outputs will meet the AD’s structure.

Stepwise practical approach:

1. Confirm applicability: Identify aircraft fitted with Rogerson auxiliary tanks under STC SA5544NM. Do not proceed unless the installation matches the STC in the Applicability table.

2. Prepare an approved deactivation procedure: Draft a deactivation procedure that addresses Appendix A paras 1-10. Because the AD requires an "approved" procedure, engage with CASA early to determine approval route and documentation expectations. Include the Appendix items or show equivalence where operationally justified. The Appendix provides suggested content; incorporate those items explicitly.

3. Drain tanks and clear vapours: Permanently drain auxiliary tanks and clear fuel vapours to eliminate out-gassing risk (Appendix A para 1). Where applicable, assess removal of the bladder as an option to assist vapour elimination (Appendix A para 1 note).

4. Electrical disconnection and stowage: Disconnect all electrical connections associated with auxiliary tanks (FQIS, pumps, float switches) and stow them at the auxiliary tank interface in a secure manner (Appendix A para 2). Ensure wiring is labelled and stowed to avoid interference with OEM systems.

5. Pneumatic disconnection and capping: Disconnect pneumatic connections, cap them at the pneumatic source and secure them (Appendix A para 3). Use approved caps and materials and document the capping.

6. Fuel plumbing disconnection and capping at aircraft tank side: Disconnect fuel feed and vent plumbing interfaces with OEM tanks and cap them at the aeroplane tank side; secure per an approved method. Appendix A para 4 identifies FAA AC 25-8 as an acceptable method; if using that or another method, document conformance. Leave disconnected auxiliary vent lines open and secured to avoid structural deformation during decompression (Appendix A para 4).

7. Circuit breaker handling: Pull and collar circuit breakers associated with the auxiliary tank system so they are inoperative and visibly isolated (Appendix A para 5). Record the condition in relevant logbooks.

8. Weight and balance revision and CASA approval: Determine whether weight and balance changes are necessary after deactivation. If so, revise the weight and balance document and obtain CASA approval prior to returning the aeroplane to service (Appendix A para 6). Plan for the approval timeline in project scheduling.

9. AFM and maintenance manual amendments; placarding: Amend the AFM to indicate the auxiliary tank is deactivated and remove auxiliary tank AFM procedures and STC AFM Supplement references. Place a flight-deck placard indicating deactivation. Amend maintenance manual sections to remove auxiliary tank maintenance procedures. The AD allows AFM revisions to be accomplished by inserting a copy of the Directive into the AFM; confirm with CASA whether this is acceptable for your operator (Appendix A para 7-8).

10. Post-deactivation checks and verification: Before returning to service, perform leak checks and pressure checks as necessary, including verification that the FQIS and fuel distribution systems have not been adversely affected (Appendix A para 9). Record the checks and test results in maintenance records.

11. Operator-specific documentation: Include any additional steps or information the operator deems necessary in the deactivation procedure and submit those to CASA if needed for approval (Appendix A para 10).

12. Record-keeping and demonstrable compliance: Document all physical work, approvals (including CASA weight-and-balance approval), AFM/maintenance manual changes, placarding, circuit breaker actions, and test results. Maintain traceable records demonstrating that remaining components are secured and have no effect on safety, as required by the AD’s main Requirement.

13. Coordinate stakeholders: Notify lessors, insurers and line maintenance providers as required by contractual obligations. Ensure that the deactivation work is performed by appropriately certified personnel and that sign-off complies with existing maintenance and release-to-service requirements.

14. Use cross-referenced guidance where applicable: Where the Appendix cites FAA AC 25-8 as an approved method for fuel-plumbing capping and installation practice, adopt and document conformity with that AC or an equivalent approved method accepted by CASA (Appendix A para 4).

Timing: Complete the above processes in time to meet the Directive’s compliance date (on or before 16 December 2008). Even though the date is historical, the compliance structure and procedural expectations remain relevant where the work has not yet been recorded as done.

Final note: The AD requires that deactivation does not create new continuing-airworthiness instruction needs (Requirement). Where a proposed deactivation method would create new continuing tasks, consult CASA to either obtain approval for those instructions or identify an alternative deactivation approach that satisfies the Directive’s constraint.