AD/B767/224 - Driessen Galleys

The Directive is structured around a small set of interlocking concepts drawn from Boeing service information and an FAA airworthiness action. The first concept is scope or applicability: the AD applies only to Model 767-300 series aeroplanes equipped with certain Driessen or Showa galleys (Applicability). The second is identification: operators must determine whether installed galleys carry part numbers listed in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 767-25-0297 Revision 1 dated 11 November 2004. Identification may be achieved by physical inspection of the galley assemblies, or, alternatively, by a review of aeroplane maintenance records if the part numbers can be positively determined from those records (Requirement 1). The third concept is conditional remediation: replacement of spiral protective wrapping is required only when the galley carries a listed part number (Requirement 2). The fourth concept is technical compliance: the replacement spiral wrapping must have been shown to meet specified flammability testing requirements and must be installed in accordance with the applicable Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin (Requirement 2). The Directive also recognises legacy compliance actions as acceptable: replacement performed before the Directive’s effective date, if done in accordance with Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin dated 15 March 2001, satisfies the replacement requirement (Requirement 2). The Directive further accepts later revisions of the Boeing service bulletin where those revisions have been approved by the FAA as an Alternate Method of Compliance to FAA AD 2006-12-06 (Requirement 2; Note 2). Finally, there is a defined timeframe: operators must complete the identification and any required wrapping replacement within 72 months after the effective date (Compliance). The background clause explains the safety rationale offered by the FAA and the manufacturer: testing and manufacturer reports indicated “unacceptable flammability properties” of the existing wire wrapping in certain galleys and closets, and the action seeks to prevent fire propagation or smoke in the cabin area due to electrical arcing, sparking or ignition of the spiral wire wrapping (Background). The Directive thus ties part identification, technical specification for replacement materials, adherence to Boeing service documentation, and timing into a single compliance regimen.

The Directive explicitly affects operators who operate Model 767-300 series aeroplanes that are fitted with the specified Driessen Aircraft Interior Systems or Showa Aircraft Industries galleys (Applicability). That is the narrow universe of affected aircraft that must take any action under the Directive. Within those operators, the Directive differentiates between aeroplanes that carry galleys fitted with part numbers identified in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 767-25-0297 Revision 1 and those that do not. For aeroplanes where the installed galley part numbers are not on the Boeing list, the Directive imposes no further action (Requirement 1). For aeroplanes where the galley part numbers are on the list, operators are required to perform an intrusive maintenance action: replacement of the spiral protective wrapping on the galley electrical cables with wrapping proven to meet the relevant flammability testing standards (Requirement 2). The Directive explicitly includes buffets and closets in the definition of galley for the purposes of the required actions (Note 1). The document provides two methods of determining whether an aeroplane is affected: physical inspection of the installed galley assemblies, or a review of maintenance records if those records allow the operator to positively determine the applicable part numbers (Requirement 1). The time pressure is modest in absolute terms: operators have 72 months from the effective date to complete identification and any necessary replacement (Compliance). The instrument accepts prior work carried out in line with Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin dated 15 March 2001 as compliant if performed before the effective date, thereby removing retrospective exposure for operators who had previously carried out the same replacement in line with that earlier Boeing SB (Requirement 2). The Directive is issued by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and signed by a Delegate, which indicates the regulatory source; the text does not specify variance or exemption procedures beyond accepting FAA-approved AMOCs to the FAA AD as equivalent compliance (Requirement 2; Note 2). The Directive therefore imposes primary obligations on aeroplane operators in the narrow category of Model 767-300 series with the identified galleys, and gives them two routes to determine whether they are in that category.

The Directive sets a compact set of duties and a limited catalogue of rights or compliance options. Duties:

• Duty to determine galley applicability: Operators must inspect galleys or review maintenance records to determine whether galley part numbers listed in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 767-25-0297 Revision 1 are installed (Requirement 1). The Directive explicitly allows either physical inspection or records review, provided the records permit positive identification of the relevant part numbers (Requirement 1).
• Duty to replace non-compliant wrapping: Where a listed part number is fitted, operators must replace the existing spiral protective wrapping on the galley electrical cables with new spiral wrapping that has been shown to meet certain flammability testing requirements, and must carry out that replacement in accordance with the applicable Boeing service information (Requirement 2).
• Duty to comply within timeframe: Both the identification work and any required replacement must be completed within 72 months after the Directive’s effective date (Compliance).

Rights, options and accepted practices:

• Right to use records instead of inspection: The Directive permits operators to rely on maintenance records rather than performing a physical inspection if the records allow positive determination of the part numbers (Requirement 1). This provides a compliance pathway that may reduce downtime if accurate records exist.
• Right to rely on prior compliant work: The Directive recognises earlier replacement work completed before the effective date, in accordance with Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin dated 15 March 2001, as satisfying Requirement 2 (Requirement 2). This removes duplication where the remedial work has already been done to the earlier specification.
• Right to use FAA-approved AMOCs: The Directive accepts later revisions of the cited Boeing service bulletin where those revisions have been approved by the FAA as an Alternate Method of Compliance to FAA AD 2006-12-06, treating such revisions as acceptable for compliance with the equivalent Requirements of this Directive (Requirement 2). That creates an external pathway for alternative technical solutions, subject to FAA approval.

The Directive specifies the technical standard for the replacement wrapping only in functional terms , the new spiral protective wrapping “has been shown to meet certain flammability testing requirements” and must be installed as set out in the applicable Boeing service information (Requirement 2). The Directive places on the operator the responsibility to follow the Boeing service bulletin instructions, to identify affected parts by P/N, and to complete the tasks within the stated 72-month period. The Directive does not, in its text, specify procedures for applying for a local alternative approval from CASA, nor does it include penalty provisions or enforcement mechanisms within the body of the text. The document does, however, point to FAA AD 2006-12-06 and to FAA-approved AMOCs as recognised alternatives where the FAA has approved a revision of the Boeing service bulletin for that purpose (Requirement 2; Note 2).

The text of the Directive does not set out specific penalty provisions, monetary fines, or explicit enforcement procedures within the body of the document supplied. What the Directive does show is that it is issued by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and signed by a Delegate, James Coyne, which indicates it is an official CASA regulatory instrument (signature block, date 20 June 2006; effective date 3 August 2006). The Directive sets clear compliance obligations and a firm compliance timeframe of 72 months after the effective date for the inspection and any required replacement (Compliance). Where a regulatory instrument sets mandatory maintenance or modification requirements, the operational consequence in practice is that aeroplane operators will need to demonstrate compliance to the relevant regulator. The Directive itself accepts compliance evidence in the form of maintenance records and in-service completion of Boeing service bulletin instructions, and it recognises earlier replacement done in accordance with a prior Boeing SB as compliant (Requirement 1; Requirement 2). The Directive also accepts later revisions of the Boeing service bulletin where those revisions are approved by the FAA as an Alternate Method of Compliance to FAA AD 2006-12-06 (Requirement 2; Note 2). The instrument does not specify whether CASA will issue continuing airworthiness orders, grounding notices, or administrative penalties for non-compliance in the text supplied. The background material reports the safety concern that motivated the Directive , the FAA had test results and manufacturer reports showing “unacceptable flammability properties” of the existing wire wrapping which could permit fire propagation or smoke in the cabin due to electrical arcing and ignition of the spiral wire wrapping (Background). That safety rationale is the stated basis for the Directive. Because the Directive is an airworthiness direction, operators should expect that non-compliance would affect the legal basis for continued airworthiness of affected aeroplanes, but the text before you does not set out enforcement instruments or sanctions in express terms. The Directive does, however, embed compliance-relief mechanisms in the form of acceptance of prior compliant work and FAA-approved AMOCs.

The Directive anchors itself to two external technical and regulatory instruments: Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 767-25-0297 (Revision 1 dated 11 November 2004, and the earlier 15 March 2001 version) and the United States FAA’s AD process, specifically FAA AD 2006-12-06 (Amdt 39-14631) (Requirement 1; Requirement 2; Note 2). The Directive treats adherence to the applicable Boeing service bulletin as the mechanism for achieving the technical standard for replacement work (Requirement 2). It explicitly allows a maintenance-records review in lieu of a physical inspection where the records permit positive identification of the relevant part numbers, thereby linking domestic compliance proof to standard maintenance documentation practices (Requirement 1). The Directive also recognises prior compliance where replacement was done before the effective date in accordance with Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin dated 15 March 2001 (Requirement 2). For alternative methods, the Directive accepts later revisions of the Boeing service bulletin if those later revisions have been approved by the FAA as an Alternate Method of Compliance to FAA AD 2006-12-06, making FAA AMOCs a directly accepted equivalence mechanism for CASA purposes in this instrument (Requirement 2; Note 2). The background text identifies that the FAA had received test results and manufacturer reports indicating flammability problems and that the FAA AD is relevant (Background; Note 2). The Directive therefore operates as a domestic implementation of a safety action arising from FAA findings and Boeing service information. The Directive does not itself purport to amend the Boeing service bulletin, nor does it specify how Australian regulatory approvals unrelated to the FAA (for example, domestic alternative approvals or exemptions) will be treated; it simply sets out that FAA-approved AMOCs to the FAA AD are acceptable alternatives. The text does not list or reference other Australian instruments such as Civil Aviation Regulations or Civil Aviation Orders within its body. In practical terms, the Directive places CASA’s requirement on operators that dovetails with FAA ADs and Boeing service bulletins, and it allows certain documentary and prior-work evidence recognised by those external instruments to stand as compliance demonstrations.

The Directive text embeds revision references to the Boeing service bulletins that structure the compliance obligations. It cites Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 767-25-0297 Revision 1 dated 11 November 2004 as the controlling service information for identifying affected part numbers and for the replacement instructions (Requirement 1; Requirement 2). It recognises Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 767-25-0297 dated 15 March 2001 as an earlier version; replacement work completed in accordance with that 15 March 2001 bulletin prior to the Directive’s effective date is accepted as compliant with the Directive’s replacement requirement (Requirement 2). The Directive also notes that later revisions of the Boeing service bulletin, if approved by the FAA as an Alternate Method of Compliance to FAA AD 2006-12-06, are considered acceptable for compliance with the equivalent Requirements of this Directive (Requirement 2; Note 2). The Directive itself is flagged with its identifier AD/B767/224 and dated as 8/2006 in the header (AD/B767/224 Driessen Galleys 8/2006). The signature block shows the delegate’s name, James Coyne, and date 20 June 2006, while the Directive becomes effective on 3 August 2006 (signature and effective date). The Amendment history contained within the Directive therefore is limited to the hierarchy of Boeing SB versions it references and the acceptance of FAA-approved later revisions as AMOCs. The Directive does not set out further national amendments, repeal schedules, or a revision trajectory for CASA’s AD itself within the supplied text. Any subsequent CASA amendments, revocations, or updates to AD/B767/224 would need to be checked against CASA’s official instrument register; the text provided here contains the initial issuance, the related Boeing SB versions recognised, and the acceptance posture with respect to FAA AMOCs.

The Directive’s text does not reference any litigation, court decisions, or administrative appeals related to this instrument. It cites the FAA AD 2006-12-06 (Amdt 39-14631) and Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletins as the technical and regulatory sources that supplied the safety findings and remedial steps (Requirement 2; Note 2; Background), but it does not name any judicial or tribunal cases challenging the AD or its underlying materials. The supplied document records the date of issue, the effective date, and the signature by a CASA Delegate, but contains no mention of injunctions, stays, appeals, or successful or unsuccessful legal challenges to the directive within the text provided. In short, there is no litigation history contained in the instrument’s text as supplied.

Several operational and compliance traps flow directly from the Directive’s wording and should be noted precisely.

• Narrow applicability but inclusive terminology: The AD applies only to Model 767-300 series aircraft equipped with certain Driessen or Showa galleys (Applicability). However the Directive explicitly states that the term galley, for this Directive, includes “buffet” and “closet” (Note 1). Operators who rely on a narrow plain-language definition of “galley” risk missing items within the buffets and closets that the Directive intends to capture.

• Part-number driven obligation: The replacement duty is conditional on whether the installed galley carries a part number listed in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 767-25-0297 Revision 1 (Requirement 1). If records are incomplete or ambiguous, an operator must either inspect physically or face uncertainty about whether replacement is required. The Directive permits records review in lieu of physical inspection only if the part numbers can be positively determined from those records (Requirement 1). Ambiguous records therefore create an evidence problem.

• Technical standard stated functionally: The Directive requires replacement with spiral protective wrapping “that has been shown to meet certain flammability testing requirements” but does not enumerate those tests or provide pass/fail criteria within the AD text itself (Requirement 2). The detailed technical criteria are therefore embedded in the referenced Boeing service information. Operators must consult the applicable Boeing SB to identify the technical acceptance criteria for replacement materials.

• Reliance on service bulletin and FAA approvals: The Directive requires operators to follow “the applicable service information” for the replacement and accepts later Boeing SB revisions only if those revisions are approved by the FAA as AMOCs to FAA AD 2006-12-06 (Requirement 2; Note 2). Operators seeking to use alternative materials or methods not covered by the Boeing SB must secure an FAA-approved AMOC (or equivalent) for those later SB revisions to be acceptable under this Directive. The Directive does not describe a CASA-specific AMOC pathway in its text.

• Acceptance of prior work is temporal: Replacement actions completed prior to the effective date are accepted only if done in accordance with Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin dated 15 March 2001 (Requirement 2). Replacement done before the effective date but not to that SB specification is not expressly accepted in the text.

• Long but finite compliance window: The compliance period is 72 months from the effective date (Compliance). That is a relatively long window, but it is fixed; operators cannot postpone indefinitely. The Directive’s effective date is 3 August 2006, which anchors the deadline schedule.

• No explicit penalty language in text: The Directive does not itself contain explicit penalty provisions or enforcement steps in the supplied text. That does not mean enforcement will not follow through standard regulatory mechanisms, however the AD text does not list them.

• Multiple moving references: The action you must take depends not only on what is installed on the aeroplane but on the particular Boeing service bulletin revision and on whether later revisions have FAA AMOC approval. That creates a compliance matrix that requires operators to consult several documents and approvals to confirm compliance status.

Follow the Directive’s two-step, document-driven pathway and preserve documentary evidence of each step.

1. Identify applicability (Requirement 1)

   • Consult the fleet manifest for Model 767-300 series aeroplanes that may be fitted with Driessen or Showa galleys (Applicability).
   • For each aeroplane, obtain the galley part number information. You may either:
     • Physically inspect the galley, buffet and closet assemblies to determine the installed part numbers; or
     • Conduct a review of the aircraft maintenance records if those records allow you to positively determine the relevant part numbers without inspection (Requirement 1; Note 1).
   • Compare the part numbers against the list in Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 767-25-0297 Revision 1 dated 11 November 2004. If the installed part number is not identified in that Boeing SB, no further action under this Directive is required for that galley (Requirement 1).

2. If a listed part number is present, perform replacement (Requirement 2)

   • Arrange for replacement of the spiral protective wrapping of the electrical cables of the affected galley, buffet or closet with new spiral protective wrapping that has been shown to meet the flammability testing requirements specified in the applicable Boeing service information (Requirement 2).
   • Perform the replacement exactly in accordance with the applicable Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin instructions cited in the Directive. Document the work thoroughly in the aircraft maintenance records to demonstrate that the wrapping installed meets the required flammability performance and that the Boeing SB instructions were followed (Requirement 2).
   • If the replacement was already completed prior to the Directive’s effective date, confirm that the work was done in accordance with Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 767-25-0297 dated 15 March 2001, and retain the supporting records; such prior work is accepted as compliance with Requirement 2 (Requirement 2).
   • If you intend to rely on a later Boeing SB revision, ensure that that later revision has been approved by the FAA as an Alternate Method of Compliance to FAA AD 2006-12-06; only then will the later revision be acceptable for compliance with this Directive (Requirement 2; Note 2).

3. Timeframe and record keeping (Compliance; Requirement 1; Requirement 2)

   • Complete the identification and any required replacements within 72 months after the effective date of the Directive (Compliance). The effective date in the Directive is 3 August 2006 (signature and effective date). Keep contemporaneous maintenance entries and parts traceability to demonstrate compliance.
   • Because the Directive permits maintenance records to substitute for a physical inspection only where they positively identify the relevant part numbers, ensure records clearly show the P/Ns or include manufacturer supplementation that ties part numbers to installed items.

4. Evidence and audit readiness

   • Keep copies of the Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletins referenced and any FAA AMOC approvals relied upon. Retain the maintenance records evidencing part-number identification and the records evidencing the replacement work, including parts certificates showing that the replacement wrapping meets the required flammability testing.
   • If relying on prior work done under the March 2001 Boeing SB, retain the service records and workpack confirming work conformed to that SB.

5. Technical queries and alternatives

   • The Directive accepts later Boeing SB revisions only where those revisions are approved by the FAA as an AMOC to FAA AD 2006-12-06 (Requirement 2; Note 2). If a party wishes to pursue an alternative material or method not covered by the referenced Boeing SBs, the Directive points to the FAA AD/AMOC mechanism rather than describing a CASA local alternative pathway in the text; operators should engage with the relevant regulatory authority to clarify acceptable alternatives and the documentary evidence required.

6. Safety rationale alignment

   • The background material explains that the action addresses “unacceptable flammability properties” of the existing spiral wire wrapping and intends to prevent fire propagation or smoke in the cabin arising from electrical arcing or ignition of the wrapping (Background). Ensure that the selected replacement wrapping and installation techniques explicitly address the flammability concerns cited and that testing or certification evidence is retained.

By following the identification path, the conditional replacement requirement and the record-keeping requirements set out in the Directive, operators can demonstrate compliance within the 72-month window. The controlling documents for the technical details are the cited Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletins and any FAA AMOC approvals relied upon (Requirement 1; Requirement 2; Note 2).