AD/B767/222 Amdt 1 - Station 1725.5 Area Cracking

The instrument is concise; its main concepts can be read directly from the table entries. They are:

• Applicability: The AD is limited to particular Boeing 767 models, namely Model 767-200, -300, -300F, and -400ER series aircraft (Applicability). This defines the population of aeroplanes captured by the directive.

• Subject area and hazard: The technical problem is "Station 1725.5 Area Cracking," specifically cracking in the skin panel common to stringer 7R and aft of STA 1725.5 butt splice, and cracking in the strap of the bulkhead outer chord at STA 1725.5. The background describes the safety consequence as potential progression of cracking into surrounding areas, reduction in structural integrity of the support structure for the vertical or horizontal stabiliser, and subsequent loss of control of the aircraft (Background). That hazard statement expresses the safety rationale for the original AD and for continuing inspections/repairs.

• Technical reference and compliance baseline: The AD references FAA AD 2006-09-09 as the prescriptive set of technical requirements to be followed (Requirement). It also refers to Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 767-53-0118 (original issue or later FAA-approved revision) as a relevant service document (Requirement Note).

• Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOC): The change in this amendment concerns AMOCs approved by the FAA process. Corrective actions approved on FAA form 8100-9 and approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, or the Manager's delegate, as an AMOC to FAA AD 2006-09-09, are expressly permitted to be carried out without needing to obtain an exclusion from CASA from this AD (Requirement). The FAA form 8100-9 is the documented approval instrument for those alternative methods as referenced by the AD.

• Procedural linkage across authorities: The amendment creates an operational bridge between FAA approvals (AMOC on form 8100-9, and approval by the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office or delegate) and CASA compliance obligations. The amendment effectively recognises FAA-AMOC approvals as sufficient, under the stated conditions, to permit operators to proceed without seeking CASA exclusion.

• Temporal and administrative metadata: This amendment is labelled 2/2009, was signed 24 December 2008 by David Punshon as a CASA delegate, and becomes effective 12 February 2009. The original AD had become effective on 6 July 2006 (Background and signature block).

These are the concepts the source itself supplies and relies upon. Any implementation or compliance task must be read against FAA AD 2006-09-09, the FAA AMOC approval process recorded on form 8100-9, the Seattle ACO Manager or delegate sign-off, and Boeing SB 767-53-0118 where applicable.

The source identifies concrete affected parties and stakeholders by naming the equipment, approving authorities, and procedural actors:

• Operators and owners of the specified Boeing 767 models: Model 767-200, -300, -300F, and -400ER series aircraft are expressly within Applicability. Those operators are obliged to follow the "Action in accordance with the technical requirements of FAA AD 2006-09-09" (Requirement). Practising maintenance organisations working on those specific aeroplanes will therefore be directly affected.

• Maintenance and engineering approvals holders: Organisations or personnel who propose corrective actions (repairs or repeat inspections) for the Station 1725.5 area will interact with the FAA AMOC process. The amendment contemplates corrective actions "that are approved on an FAA form 8100-9 and approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office or delegate as an Alternative Method of Compliance (AMOC) to the requirements of FAA AD 2006-09-09" (Requirement). Those persons preparing AMOC submissions and the FAA ACO delegates reviewing them are implicated.

• CASA and its delegates: The directive is issued under CASA authority, and the document is signed by a CASA delegate (David Punshon). CASA retains an AD for the fleet in Australia, but the amendment modifies CASA's procedural requirement that would otherwise require operators to obtain an exclusion from CASA before carrying out FAA-approved AMOC repairs. CASA staff responsible for AD compliance will need to administer the new policy of allowing FAA-approved AMOCs to substitute for CASA exclusions where the specified conditions are met.

• Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (Seattle ACO) Manager and delegates: The amendment explicitly requires that the corrective action be "approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office or delegate" as an AMOC on FAA form 8100-9. That FAA office therefore plays a decision-making role affecting what Australian operators can do without applying to CASA for an exclusion.

• Aircraft certification and continuing airworthiness auditors: Auditors and inspectors charged with verifying compliance with ADs will need to reconcile Australian records and FAA-approved AMOC documentation (form 8100-9) where corrective actions have been carried out under the permission in this amendment.

The document does not name insurers, passengers, or third-party lessors; however, where the aircraft are subject to contractual obligations for maintenance or records, the practical consequences for those parties arise from their relationship to the operators and their need to evidence compliance. The source itself does not detail contractual or commercial rights, cost-bearing, record-keeping requirements, or third-party notification obligations; those must be inferred only from the stated regulatory instructions that operators follow FAA AD 2006-09-09 and may use FAA-approved AMOCs without seeking CASA exclusion.

The source specifies a compact set of duties and a single explicit right:

Duties:

• Follow the technical requirements of FAA AD 2006-09-09. The Requirement entry states "Action in accordance with the technical requirements of FAA AD 2006-09-09." That obligation is the baseline compliance duty imposed by the AD.

• Ensure that any corrective actions performed under the permission given in this amendment are specifically "approved on an FAA form 8100-9 and approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office or delegate as an Alternative Method of Compliance (AMOC) to the requirements of FAA AD 2006-09-09" (Requirement). The duty here is to have FAA AMOC approval recorded on the specified form and signed off by the specified FAA authority or their delegate prior to proceeding under this pathway.

• Comply with any additional steps or schedules contained in the referenced FAA AD and applicable Boeing Service Bulletin (Requirement Note: "Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 767-53-0118 original issue, or later FAA approved revision, refers."). The AD ties Australian compliance to those external technical documents.

Rights:

• Right to proceed with FAA-approved AMOC corrective actions without seeking a CASA exclusion from this airworthiness directive. The amendment explicitly allows that "may be carried out without the need to obtain an exclusion from CASA from this airworthiness directive" where the corrective action has the FAA AMOC approval as described (Requirement).

Operational consequences of these duties and rights, as set out in the source:

• Procedurally, an operator who holds an FAA form 8100-9 AMOC approved by the Seattle ACO Manager or delegate may carry out the corrective action in Australia under this AD without the extra procedural step of applying for a CASA exclusion. The AD therefore removes a CASA-specific administrative requirement for certain FAA-approved AMOCs.

• The duty to act "in accordance with the technical requirements of FAA AD 2006-09-09" imports the FAA AD's inspection intervals, repair instructions, and any repeat inspection obligations; those technical requirements are not reproduced in this Australian amendment, they are bootstrapped by reference.

What the source does not state, and therefore does not impose as a duty:

• The AD text does not set out CASA record-keeping, reporting, or certification tasks in respect of FAA form 8100-9 approvals. It also does not specify audit or retention periods, nor does it set out how CASA will verify that an FAA AMOC was in fact approved before the work was undertaken. Any such ancillary duties are therefore outside the explicit scope of this instrument as published.

In summary, the operator duty is to follow FAA AD 2006-09-09 and to ensure FAA AMOC approval exists on form 8100-9 when relying on the procedural exemption; the operator gains the right to proceed without a separate CASA exclusion in those circumstances.

The source document does not include an express penalties or enforcement section. The published table provides the AD text, the applicable models, the requirement (to act in accordance with FAA AD 2006-09-09), the permission regarding FAA AMOCs, the compliance reference ("As specified in the Requirement document"), the effective date ("This Amendment becomes effective on 12 February 2009"), and background information on the safety issue. There is no text in the supplied instrument that sets out:

• specific civil or criminal penalties for non-compliance;
• the process by which CASA will detect or investigate non-compliance with the AD; or
• administrative enforcement measures such as suspensions, directions, or fines.

Because the instrument is presented as an airworthiness directive, it is an instrument of continuing regulatory force in the way an AD is used to mandate inspections and corrective actions; however, the source itself does not specify enforcement mechanisms or sanctions. The AD does not include clauses describing monitoring, inspection of records, mandatory notifications to CASA after repairs, or processes for CASA to audit or to impose sanctions.

Readers seeking the enforcement regime that applies to AD non-compliance in the Australian regulatory environment will not find it in this text. The AD refers operators to the technical requirements of FAA AD 2006-09-09 and permits certain FAA AMOC-approved repairs to proceed without CASA exclusion, but it does not set out enforcement steps in the case of failure to perform inspections or repairs, or for incorrectly claiming an FAA AMOC approval. Those enforcement processes, if they exist, are not contained within the provided instrument.

Practically, this means the instrument communicates operational obligations and permissions, but anyone needing to advise on penalties, suspension powers, or enforcement timelines will need to consult other CASA instruments, administrative law provisions, or statutory enforcement frameworks, none of which are included in the supplied text.

The text explicitly creates procedural interplay between this Australian airworthiness directive and a specific FAA airworthiness directive and FAA AMOC approval process, and it references a Boeing service bulletin. The interactions stated in the source are:

• Import of FAA technical requirements: The Requirement entry states "Action in accordance with the technical requirements of FAA AD 2006-09-09." That is a direct cross-reference; the Australian AD does not restate those technical requirements, instead it makes them the operative technical standard for compliance under this AD.

• Recognition of FAA AMOCs: The amendment permits corrective actions that have been approved on FAA form 8100-9 and approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office or delegate as AMOCs to FAA AD 2006-09-09 to be carried out "without the need to obtain an exclusion from CASA from this airworthiness directive." This establishes a specific recognition by CASA of FAA AMOC approvals in place of a separate CASA exclusion, thereby altering procedural requirements arising from CASA law or practice that previously required that exclusion.

• Reference to Boeing service bulletin: The Requirement Note cites "Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 767-53-0118 original issue, or later FAA approved revision." That service bulletin is referenced as a technical document that operators should consult; therefore the AD interacts operationally with Boeing technical literature as part of the compliance chain.

What the source does not do:

• The AD does not purport to alter the substantive content of FAA AD 2006-09-09 or to displace it; it relies on it as the technical engine for action. It also does not purport to modify FAA law or FAA enforcement processes; it recognises FAA approvals for Australian procedural purposes.

• The AD does not cite or modify any Australian statutory provision, nor does it reproduce CASA's enabling legislation or enforcement authorities. There is no express statement of primacy, preemption, or mutual recognition beyond the limited permission to use an FAA-approved AMOC without a CASA exclusion.

Consequences for compliance architecture:

• Operators must read FAA AD 2006-09-09 and related AMOC approvals and Boeing SB 767-53-0118 together with this Australian AD. The amendment effectively requires operators to coordinate across regulatory regimes: to obtain the FAA AMOC approval on form 8100-9 and the Seattle ACO Manager or delegate approval, then rely on the permission in this Australian AD not to seek a CASA exclusion.

• The AD therefore creates a dependency between Australian regulatory compliance for the specified Boeing models and the FAA's AMOC process and Seattle ACO decisions. The document itself does not elaborate on how conflicts between FAA-approved AMOCs and any Australian regulatory requirements would be resolved; the text simply allows the FAA AMOC pathway to substitute for a CASA exclusion in the circumstances stated.

In sum, the source specifies targeted cross-jurisdictional recognition between CASA and FAA processes for this particular structural issue on specific Boeing 767 models, and it links to Boeing technical material as a reference.

The source provides a brief amendment history limited to the original directive and the amendment recorded here:

• Original AD: The background entry records that "The original issue of this directive became effective on 6 July 2006." That identifies the initial AD date and indicates that the present instrument modifies or supplements that original AD.

• This amendment: The front matter identifies this document as "AD/B767/222 Amdt 1" and marks it 2/2009. The Compliance block states "This Amendment becomes effective on 12 February 2009." The signature block shows the document was signed by David Punshon, "Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority," on 24 December 2008. The label "AD/B767/222 Amdt 1 | Station 1725.5 Area Cracking | 2/2009" appears in the tabular header.

What the source does not provide:

• The instrument does not include a sequence of revisions beyond Amdt 1. There is no text in the supplied document describing prior amendments, consultation drafts, or the administrative history that produced Amendment 1 beyond the two effective dates (6 July 2006 for the original AD, and 12 February 2009 for this amendment). No intermediate or subsequent amendments are recorded in this text.

• The source does not include an explanatory memorandum, regulatory impact statement, or other materials that would typically accompany a legislative change to document stakeholder submissions or cost estimates. The only rationale in the instrument is the background safety statement explaining the technical hazard and the reason for allowing FAA AMOC-approved corrective actions to proceed without CASA exclusion.

For anyone drafting compliance timelines or advising on record-keeping, the key historical markers available in the source are: original AD effective 6 July 2006; amendment signed 24 December 2008; amendment effective 12 February 2009; document is AD/B767/222 Amdt 1, 2/2009.

The supplied instrument contains no litigation history. It does not reference any judicial or administrative decisions, appeals, or contested enforcement actions concerning AD/B767/222 or its amendment. The document names no cases, and contains no discussion of disputes, challenges, or precedent.

Because the source is silent on litigation, the following are factual points grounded in that silence as presented by the instrument:

• There are no reported court decisions, tribunal outcomes, or formal administrative reviews included in this text. The AD simply presents the technical directive, the procedural change for AMOCs, and background safety reasoning.

• The instrument does not record any appeals or objections to the AD or to the amendment, nor does it note any stays, injunctions, or litigation-related conditions on the AD's effect.

Advisers or counsel seeking to determine whether this AD has been the subject of litigation or administrative challenge will need to consult external sources, judicial records, or CASA enforcement archives, because that information is not included in the AD itself.

The source is short but contains a few detail-sensitive points that can produce compliance surprises if read too cursorily. The following are practical cautions, each grounded in the instrument's text:

• Narrow applicability: The AD applies only to Model 767-200, -300, -300F, and -400ER series aircraft (Applicability). Operators of other 767 variants or non-767 types should not assume coverage or relief under this instrument. The text does not provide a mechanism to extend applicability beyond the listed models.

• Dependency on FAA AD wording and schedules: The Requirement instructs to act "in accordance with the technical requirements of FAA AD 2006-09-09." The Australian AD does not reproduce those technical requirements. Therefore compliance requires obtaining, reading and following FAA AD 2006-09-09 in full; an operator that overlooks a specific inspection interval or repair criterion in the FAA AD will not find that detail in the Australian amendment.

• AMOC documentation and sign-off must be specific: The permission to proceed without a CASA exclusion applies only to corrective actions that are "approved on an FAA form 8100-9 and approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office or delegate as an Alternative Method of Compliance (AMOC) to the requirements of FAA AD 2006-09-09" (Requirement). The AD therefore requires a particular form (FAA form 8100-9) and a particular approving authority (Manager, Seattle ACO or delegate). Corrections based on other FAA forms, other regional ACO approvals, or informal engineering approvals will not meet the explicit condition in this instrument.

• CASA exclusion no longer required for qualifying AMOCs, but CASA remains the issuing authority: The amended AD removes the need for a CASA exclusion when the FAA AMOC (on form 8100-9 and approved by the named FAA authority) is in place, but the AD remains an Australian regulatory instrument with its own scope and effective date. Operators must still ensure that the AMOC approval predates the work being done and that work otherwise meets the FAA AD technical requirements.

• Boeing service bulletin reference: The Requirement Note refers to "Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 767-53-0118 original issue, or later FAA approved revision." Operators should not assume that any revision of the Boeing SB is automatically acceptable; the AD ties acceptability to FAA approval of subsequent revisions. The AD text is precise: "original issue, or later FAA approved revision" , approval by FAA is the gating condition.

• Effective dates and timeline: The amendment becomes effective on 12 February 2009. The signature date is 24 December 2008. The original AD became effective 6 July 2006. Any compliance action or record created before the effective date of the amendment may have been subject to the earlier procedural expectations (for example, needing a CASA exclusion). Operators should verify which version of the AD applied at the time they performed any particular inspection or repair.

• The instrument is silent on record-keeping and post-repair notifications: The AD permits FAA-AMOC-approved repairs to proceed without a CASA exclusion, but it does not state whether or how CASA should be notified that the FAA-form 8100-9 approval exists or that the repair was carried out under it. Operators cannot rely on this AD alone to determine CASA's evidentiary expectations; the AD does not prescribe documentation retention or reporting steps.

• Safety hazard remains unchanged: Although the amendment is procedural in nature, the background reiterates the operational hazard: undetected cracking in the listed area "could progress into surrounding areas and result in reduced structural integrity of the support structure for the vertical or horizontal stabiliser and subsequent loss of control of the aircraft" (Background). The procedural relief from needing a CASA exclusion does not change the underlying technical necessity for inspections and repairs.

• No enforcement language in the AD: The operator must not assume that absence of explicit penalties in the AD means non-compliance carries no consequences. The AD does not specify enforcement mechanisms; external enforcement provisions, if any, are not included in the supplied text.

These "gotchas" follow directly from the instrument's text and the gaps within it. Attention to the precise form, approving authority, external FAA AD and FAA-approved Boeing SB revisions will determine whether an operator can lawfully rely on the procedural relief in this amendment.

The source lays out a compact compliance pathway. The steps below are strictly grounded in the instrument's language:

1. Confirm applicability: Verify that the aircraft is one of the listed models: Model 767-200, -300, -300F, or -400ER (Applicability). If the aircraft is not listed, this AD does not apply as written.

2. Consult the FAA AD: Obtain and read FAA AD 2006-09-09, because the Australian AD requires action "in accordance with the technical requirements of FAA AD 2006-09-09" (Requirement). Compliance requires following the technical inspections, repair criteria, and any repeat inspection schedules contained in that FAA AD.

3. Prepare corrective action proposals, if required: If a repair or alternative inspection method is proposed instead of the prescriptive FAA AD actions, prepare an AMOC submission for FAA review and approval. The AD permits corrective actions that are "approved on an FAA form 8100-9 and approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office or delegate as an Alternative Method of Compliance (AMOC) to the requirements of FAA AD 2006-09-09" (Requirement).

4. Secure FAA AMOC approval on form 8100-9: Ensure that the corrective action has been formally approved by the FAA as an AMOC to FAA AD 2006-09-09, and that the approval is recorded on FAA form 8100-9, with the approval signed by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, or that Manager's delegate. The AD conditions the procedural relief on that specific form and approving authority.

5. Check Boeing service bulletin references: Review Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 767-53-0118 (original issue, or later FAA-approved revision) as referenced by the AD (Requirement Note). Ensure that any repair methods used correspond to the Boeing SB where it is applicable and FAA-approved.

6. Proceed without seeking a CASA exclusion, if FAA AMOC is in place: If the corrective action is an FAA AMOC properly recorded on form 8100-9 and signed off by the Seattle ACO Manager or delegate, the operator may carry out the corrective action "without the need to obtain an exclusion from CASA from this airworthiness directive" (Requirement). That is the explicit procedural permission granted by this amendment.

7. Ensure timing: Note the amendment becomes effective on 12 February 2009. Work carried out under the permission should rely on an FAA AMOC that was approved on form 8100-9 by the Seattle ACO Manager/delegate at the time the corrective action was carried out, consistent with the AD's effective date. The AD does not specify retroactive acceptance of earlier or later approvals.

8. Maintain records (recommended practice based on the AD's content): While the AD does not specify record-keeping requirements, good regulatory and airworthiness practice given the AD's reliance on FAA form 8100-9 is to retain a copy of the FAA form 8100-9 AMOC approval, the relevant FAA AD text (FAA AD 2006-09-09), Boeing service bulletin references, and maintenance records showing that the corrective actions were carried out in accordance with the FAA AMOC. The AD itself does not mandate these records, but they will be necessary to demonstrate compliance with the AD's requirement to act in accordance with FAA AD 2006-09-09 and to substantiate the claim that the work was performed under an FAA form 8100-9 AMOC approved by the Seattle ACO Manager or delegate.

9. Monitor for later FAA-approved revisions: If subsequent revisions of Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 767-53-0118 or new FAA AD amendments are published, ensure that any reliance on them is consistent with FAA approval status. The AD language permits "later FAA approved revision" of the Boeing SB only if FAA approval is present.

10. Seek clarity from CASA if uncertain: Because the AD permits proceeding without a CASA exclusion only in the tightly defined circumstances above, operators with ambiguous situations,for example, where the FAA authority granting an approval is not clearly the Seattle ACO Manager or delegate, or where form 8100-9 is not used,should obtain clarity from CASA or legal/regulatory counsel. The AD itself does not set out procedures for exceptions or for CASA verification.

These steps are derived directly from the instrument's Requirement, Applicability, Compliance, and Requirement Note entries, and from the effective date and background statements included in the provided text. The AD does not expand on record-keeping, notification to CASA, or enforcement procedures; practitioners should therefore treat those items as matters to be checked against other CASA instruments or general regulatory practice outside the text of this AD.