AD/B767/197 Amdt 3 - Air Data System

Several core concepts drive the structure of this Airworthiness Directive. The first is the “air data switching system”, which is the electrical and wiring infrastructure that conveys pitot‑static and other air data information to cockpit instruments and the autopilot. The AD requires either a full modification of this system or a two‑step process involving re‑termination of wires and later modification. The system is critical because erroneous overspeed or stall warnings can overwhelm flight‑crew decision‑making; the background states that silencing such warnings was the objective of the original directive.

The second concept is the distinction between two compliance pathways for Requirement 1. Option 1.a is a direct, single‑stage modification within 24 months. Option 1.b breaks the work into a faster wiring change (18 months) and a later system modification (72 months). This creates a trade‑off: operators can defer the full modification for three extra years if they first perform the wire termination change. The extension from 24 to 72 months is a substantial deferral that likely reduces immediate downtime and cost, but imposes an extra intermediate task. The AD also grandfathers earlier work: modifications done per earlier service bulletin versions or per Requirement 2 of the original AD are treated as equivalent to 1.a compliance, reducing the need for rework.

The third concept is the “EICAS computer” replacement. Not all aeroplanes require this; only those that appear on both the ASB list and one of the five listed SBs. The AD requires that improved EICAS computers be fitted, and that a readout comparison confirms the correct software is used. This is a pure upgrade mandate: existing EICAS computers that are still serviceable must be replaced with improved units that can be upgraded with certain software. The wiring changes that accompany this replacement are also mandatory. The compliance timing is “prior to, or concurrently with, SB 767-34A0332, Revision 1 or Revision 2”, meaning the EICAS upgrade cannot be deferred beyond the air data system modification whichever compliance path is chosen.

The fourth concept is the “replacement parts prohibition”. Parts identified as “Existing Part Number” in the service bulletins are permanently banned from installation as replacements. This goes beyond a one‑time removal requirement: it is an ongoing prohibition that affects inventory, procurement, and future maintenance. Operators holding spares of those part numbers cannot use them on any affected aeroplane, and must either dispose of them or use them only on non‑affected types (if technically possible). This imposes a compliance cost on inventory management and supply chain.

The AD also relies on the concept of “alternate methods of compliance”. Each amendment has introduced new acceptable means. The original AD relied on earlier revisions of the ASB; Amendment 1 clarified options; Amendment 2 added ASB Revision 2 and corrected a typo in Note 1; Amendment 3 adds SB 767-31-0149 Revision 2 as an alternative for the wire termination step. These incremental changes increase flexibility but also create a complex compliance matrix where operators must track exactly which revisions are acceptable for their chosen path.

Finally, the interlocking effective dates are important. The original issue was 5 August 2004; Amendment 1 effective 30 September 2004; Amendment 2 effective 17 February 2005; Amendment 3 effective 15 July 2005. Compliance times for Requirements 1.a and 1.b are measured from the Amendment 1 effective date (30 September 2004), not from this amendment. That means for operators who have not yet complied, the time remaining is much shorter. Requirement 2 must be done before or with the air data modification, and Requirement 3 applies from the original issue date (5 August 2004). Any operator who installed a prohibited part after that date is already in breach, even if they did not know of the AD. This retrospective effect is a notable legal feature.

The primary duty holders are the operators of the identified Boeing 767 series aeroplanes registered in Australia or operated under an Australian Air Operator’s Certificate. The applicability list is defined by the aeroplane models (767-200, 767-300, 767-300F) and by inclusion in Boeing ASB 767-34A0332, Revision 2. Thus, any operator with a 767 on the Australian register that appears in that service bulletin must comply. The AD also indirectly affects foreign operators who operate into Australia; while the CASA AD applies to Australian‑registered aeroplanes, operators of foreign‑registered 767s must comply with the equivalent FAA AD (2004‑10‑05) under their own regulatory authority. For Australian operators, the CASA AD is mandatory and is enforceable under Australian law.

The maintenance organisations that perform the work are also directly affected. They must have access to the specified Boeing service bulletins and must follow the Accomplishment Instructions precisely. The work requires specialised knowledge of the air data system and EICAS software/hardware. Organisations must hold the appropriate CASA approvals (e.g., Part 145 maintenance organisation approval) to perform modifications and functional tests on type‑certified aeroplanes. If an organisation incorrectly applies a different revision or fails to perform the mandatory EICAS readout comparison, the compliance will be insufficient and the operator could be found in breach.

Parts suppliers and holders are affected by Requirement 3. The existing part numbers listed in the five service bulletins (767-31-0091 Rev 3, 767-31-0098 Rev 2, 767-31-0099 Rev 3, 767-31-0100 Rev 2, and 767-31-0101 original) cannot be installed as replacement parts on any of the affected aeroplanes. This includes any third‑party parts distributors, airlines’ internal stores, and maintenance organisations that hold inventory. The prohibition is permanent; it does not expire. This has a direct commercial impact: if an operator already holds a stock of those parts, they may become stranded assets unless they can be sold to operators of other aircraft types that are not covered by this AD. It also limits competition in the replacement parts market, because only the “improved” EICAS computers (presumably with a different part number) are permissible. The source does not list the new part numbers, so operators must refer to the service bulletins directly.

The wider aviation ecosystem is also affected. Aircraft lessors and financiers may require evidence of AD compliance before accepting a return or releasing funds. Insurers may adjust premiums based on AD compliance status. Pilot training organisations may need to update training materials to cover the new warning‑silencing capabilities, though the AD itself does not mandate training changes.

Critically, the AD does not apply to all 767s in the world; it applies only to those identified in the ASB. The ASB itself may have a specific serial number range, meaning some 767s of the same model may be excluded. Operators must cross‑reference their fleet against the ASB list. The earlier amendments adjusted applicability by deleting four aeroplanes and adding two, so the scope has changed over time. An operator who acquired an aeroplane after 5 August 2004 should check not just the current applicable list but also whether any prior owner had performed modifications that are grandfathered.

The central duty is to modify the air data switching system and, where required, replace EICAS computers, in accordance with the specified service bulletin revisions, within the defined compliance times. The duty falls on the operator. However, the operator may contract the physical work to a maintenance organisation; the legal responsibility remains with the operator. The operator must also ensure that no prohibited existing part numbers are installed on any affected aeroplane from the original effective date onward. This duty is ongoing and does not have a sunset.

The operator has a right to choose between two compliance methods for Requirement 1. Option 1.a is a single modification within 24 months (from 30 September 2004). Option 1.b gives an extra 48 months for the full modification (72 months from the same date), but requires a faster wire‑termination change at 18 months. This choice involves a trade‑off between immediate cost and long‑term deferral. An operator that already performed the wire termination under earlier revisions can use that work to satisfy 1.b.(i) if it was done per SB 767-31-0149 Revision 1 or 2. If wire terminations were done per an earlier revision not listed, the work may not be accepted unless it is grandfathered. The AD specifically grandfathered modifications done before the original effective date per an earlier ASB (10 January 2002 version) as acceptable for 1.a, and also accepted modifications done under Requirement 2 of the original AD for 1.a. There is no explicit grandfathering for the wire termination step except through the amendment’s acceptance of SB 767-31-0149 Revision 2.

The operator also has the right to rely on previously accomplished modifications that are deemed acceptable. The AD states: “Modifications accomplished before the effective date of the original issue of this Directive in accordance with Boeing ASB 767-34A0332 dated 10 January 2002 are considered acceptable for compliance with Requirement 1.a.” Also, modifications done under Requirement 2 of the original issue are acceptable for 1.a. This means an operator that already did the full air data system modification under the earlier ASB or under the original AD’s Requirement 2 does not need to redo it. However, if the operator has not done the EICAS computer replacement and the aeroplane is subject to Requirement 2, that work must still be done, because Requirement 2 only says the modifications done under original Requirement 2 are accepted for 1.a - not that Requirement 2 is fully satisfied. Any prior work that does not exactly match the listed service bulletin revisions may require evaluation by CASA or a design organisation approval.

A further duty is the prohibition on installing the listed existing part numbers. This applies to any person, including maintenance organisations and parts suppliers, who install a part on the affected aeroplanes. It is a compliance obligation enforceable against the person who makes the installation, not just the operator. However, the operator would typically be liable for the airworthiness of the aeroplane, so they must ensure their suppliers and contractors comply.

The AD does not confer a right to deviate from the prescribed service bulletins without separate approval. If an operator wishes to use a different method or a later revision not listed, they would need to apply to CASA for an alternative means of compliance under the Civil Aviation Regulations. The AD does not explicitly grant that right; it is implied under the broader regulatory framework.

The compliance times are expressed relative to the effective date of Amendment 1 (30 September 2004). Because Amendment 3 becomes effective on 15 July 2005, the 24‑month deadline for 1.a has already passed by that date (it would have been 30 September 2006, but Amendment 3 is from 2005, so it’s still relevant - in real time, this AD is historical, but as a legislative analysis we treat it as current). For an operator who did not comply within 24 months of 30 September 2004, they would already be in breach by July 2005. However, the AD does not provide any extension; the compliance times remain unchanged from Amendment 1. The only extension available is the one in Note 1 for option 1.b, which gives 72 months. So if an operator missed the 24‑month deadline for 1.a, their only remaining legal option is to comply via 1.b, including the wire termination requirement at 18 months (which would already be overdue) and the full modification at 72 months. This creates a situation where an operator may have to perform both steps simultaneously or seek enforcement leniency.

The Airworthiness Directive is a legislative instrument made under the Civil Aviation Regulations. Failure to comply with an AD is a breach of the Civil Aviation Act and Regulations, enforceable by CASA. While the AD text does not specify the dollar amounts of fines or sanctions, the general penalty provisions apply. Under the Civil Aviation Act 1988, an individual can be fined up to 500 penalty units (currently about AU$156,500, but indexed) and a body corporate up to 5,000 penalty units (about AU$1.565 million) for each contravention. Additionally, CASA can vary, suspend, or cancel an Air Operator’s Certificate, a maintenance organisation approval, or an aircraft’s Certificate of Airworthiness if the AD is not complied with. An aeroplane that does not meet the AD is not airworthy and cannot be lawfully flown in Australian airspace.

The AD also incorporates by reference certain Boeing service bulletins. The failure to follow the Accomplishment Instructions exactly, including using the correct revision, is a non‑compliance. For example, if an operator uses ASB 767-34A0332 Revision 1 but the AD requires Revision 2, the work is not accepted unless the operator selected option 1.a which allows Revision 1 or 2. Similarly, if the wire termination is done per SB 767-31-0149 original (not Revision 1 or 2), it is not a recognised alternate method; those revisions were accepted only from Amendment 1 and Amendment 3 respectively.

Enforcement actions can be retrospective. If a prohibited part was installed after 5 August 2004 (the original effective date), that installation is non‑compliant regardless of when the AD was served on the operator. The AD was published and gazetted; constructive knowledge is likely presumed. However, a court would consider the reasonableness of an operator’s diligence in monitoring ADs.

The AD references FAA AD 2004‑10‑05, which suggests that the FAA has parallel enforcement mechanisms in the United States. Australian operators who also operate under FAA rules (e.g., if the aircraft is dual‑registered) must comply with both directives, and the stricter requirement would apply. In practice, CASA may coordinate with the FAA if cross‑border violations are detected.

No specific criminal penalties are stated in the source, but the Civil Aviation Act provides for criminal prosecution in cases of reckless or intentional non‑compliance that endangers safety. Maximum imprisonment terms (e.g., up to two years for certain offences) could apply, though for typical AD compliance matters administrative enforcement is more common. The background describes the safety risk as potential loss of control, so non‑compliance could be considered serious.

It is also worth noting that the AD was signed by a delegate of CASA on 8 July 2005. Any challenge to the validity of the AD could be brought by way of judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 or under the common law. However, the source provides no litigation history, and the AD appears to be a standard safety directive with a clear technical basis. A successful challenge would require showing that the AD was ultra vires, procedurally flawed, or irrational in the legal sense. Given the delegation and the grounding in FAA research, that would be unlikely.

This Airworthiness Directive is subordinate legislation under the Civil Aviation Regulations 1988, specifically Regulation 39 (or equivalent provisions in CAR 1988). It sits within a hierarchy: the Civil Aviation Act provides CASA’s powers; the Regulations set out general airworthiness requirements; and ADs impose specific mandatory actions on particular types. Where an operator has also been issued an exemption or alternative means of compliance by CASA, that prevails over the AD to the extent of any inconsistency, but only if it is granted in writing.

The AD explicitly references FAA AD 2004‑10‑05 (Amdt 39‑13635) in Note 3. This indicates that the Australian directive is substantively harmonised with the US directive. For operators with both FAA and CASA approvals, compliance with the FAA AD may satisfy the CASA AD if the required actions are identical and no additional Australian‑specific requirements exist. However, the compliance dates in the two directives may differ because the effective dates of amendments are not identical. The FAA AD might have different deadlines. An operator would need to comply with the earlier of the two deadlines to be compliant in both jurisdictions. The Australian AD does not say that FAA compliance equals compliance; it merely notes the FAA AD exists. In practice, courts and CASA would likely accept FAA equivalent work, but the operator bears the burden of proving equivalence.

The AD interacts with maintenance regulations regarding alterations and repairs. Any modification performed under the AD is an alteration to a type‑certified product. The service bulletins used must be approved data under the applicable regulations (e.g., CAR 1988 Regulation 42 for major modifications). If a service bulletin is not CASA‑approved, the maintenance organisation may need additional CASA acceptance. However, since the AD itself mandates the use of those bulletins, it effectively grants approval for the modifications described, provided the exact instructions are followed. The AD does not create a blanket approval for all modifications; it only approves the specific modifications described in the referenced bulletins.

The installation prohibition of existing part numbers under Requirement 3 interacts with regulations governing the supply of aircraft parts. Under Part 42 of CASR (or equivalent), only parts that are eligible for installation may be fitted. The AD makes the listed parts ineligible for installation, effectively supplementing the eligibility lists. Any person supplying or installing those parts would be in breach of the supply regulations as well. This could have cascade effects: if an operator unknowingly purchases prohibited parts from a supplier, the operator is still liable for the installation, though they may have a claim against the supplier.

The AD also interacts with the operator’s continuing airworthiness management system. The AD must be included in the operator’s maintenance program and tracked for compliance. If the operator is an approved maintenance organisation under Part 145, the AD becomes part of the approved data that the organisation is required to follow. Failure to incorporate the AD into the maintenance system could lead to loss of approval.

For lessors and financiers, the AD becomes part of the aircraft’s technical records. A future sale or lease of an affected aeroplane requires proof that Requirements 1, 2 (if applicable) and 3 have been satisfied. The AD does not create a legal interest in the aircraft, but it affects its marketability. The compliance history will be scrutinised during pre‑purchase inspections.

Finally, the AD is subject to the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 (now part of the Legislation Act 2003). It must be registered, published, and subject to sunsetting. The AD was made in 2005 and has likely been superseded by later amendments or withdrawn if the 767 fleet has been retired. However, for analytical purposes, the interaction with the sunsetting regime means the AD would have ceased to have effect after ten years unless re‑made. Many older ADs are still legally relevant for historical compliance, but if the AD has sunset, no new enforcement action can be taken for breaches after the sunset date.

AD/B767/197 has undergone three formal amendments, plus the original issue. The original issue became effective on 5 August 2004. It required a modification of the air data system (ADC system) involving installation of new circuit breakers, relays, and related components and wiring changes. For certain aeroplanes, it also required other actions prior to or concurrently with the modification. The original AD included an option that extended the compliance time, but the source does not give details of that original option.

Amendment 1 became effective on 30 September 2004. It continued the original requirements but “clarified the optional methods of complying with Requirement 1”. The source does not specify exactly what was clarified, but it suggests that the structure of having two alternative methods (1.a and 1.b) was formally introduced or refined in Amendment 1. It also set the compliance times that remain unchanged through subsequent amendments: 24 months for 1.a, 18 months for 1.b.(i), and 72 months for 1.b.(ii). These times are measured from the effective date of Amendment 1 (30 September 2004). Thus, Amendment 1 was the amendment that established the key timelines.

Amendment 2 became effective on 17 February 2005. It introduced ASB 767-34A0332 Revision 2 as an alternate method of compliance. It also corrected a typographical error in Note 1 (likely the note about the compliance extension). Crucially, it changed the applicability by deleting four aeroplanes and including two additional aeroplanes. This means the list of affected aeroplanes in the ASB was revised. Operators who had relied on earlier applicability lists may have found their aeroplanes no longer covered, or newly covered. The amendment also updated the required service bulletins to include Revision 2.

Amendment 3, the subject of this analysis, became effective on 15 July 2005. It introduces SB 767-31-0149, Revision 2 as an alternate method of compliance for Requirement 1.b.(i) (the wire termination change). This expands the acceptable revisions for that step from Revision 1 only to Revision 1 or Revision 2. No other substantive changes to requirements or applicability are mentioned. The effective date is 15 July 2005, though the delegate’s signature is dated 8 July 2005. The AD is accompanied by a reference “9/2005 DM” which likely is an internal CASA document identifier.

The AD does not list any changes to penalties, monitoring, or enforcement. It is purely a technical amendment to recognise additional service bulletin revisions. The background also notes that Amendment 1 clarified the optional methods and that Amendment 2 introduced a new ASB revision. The cumulative effect is a gradually expanding set of acceptable compliance means, giving operators more flexibility over time, but also making the record‑keeping more complex because different revisions may be used for different steps.

The source text contains no reference to any litigation related to AD/B767/197 or its amendments. There is no mention of court cases, tribunal appeals, or enforcement proceedings. It is not possible to infer from the text whether any legal challenges were made. Given that this is a technical airworthiness directive similar to many others, it is plausible that no litigation occurred, or if it did, it is not recorded in the instrument itself.

That said, the absence of litigation does not mean the AD is immune from challenge. Under Australian administrative law, a person affected by an AD could apply to the Federal Court or the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for review of CASA’s decision to issue the AD. Grounds could include that the AD was beyond CASA’s power, that the procedure was not followed, or that the decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision‑maker could have made it. Technical ADs rarely attract successful judicial review because the safety rationale is generally accepted and the delegated legislation is carefully drafted.

If an operator were prosecuted for non‑compliance, the defence could argue that the AD was invalid (e.g., if not properly published or if the wrong service bulletin was referenced). However, the source does not provide any such cases. As an analyst, we must not fabricate litigation. We can note that the AD’s reliance on proprietary service bulletins may have raised concerns about access to the required documents, but that is more a practical compliance issue than litigation.

The reference to FAA AD 2004‑10‑05 might also imply that any US litigation concerning that AD would be relevant, but the source does not mention any. The Australian AD is a separate instrument.

For a complete picture, an operator would need to search CASA’s enforcement database and court records for any matters involving AD/B767/197. The absence in the source is neutral. We can simply state that the source contains no litigation history and advise readers to conduct their own research.

Several aspects of this AD are easy to overlook or misinterpret. The first is the measurement of compliance times from the effective date of Amendment 1 (30 September 2004), not from Amendment 3 effective date (15 July 2005). An operator reading Amendment 3 in isolation might mistakenly calculate deadlines from mid‑2005. For example, the 24‑month deadline for option 1.a would fall on 30 September 2006, not 15 July 2007. By the time Amendment 3 took effect (July 2005), those deadlines might be less than 15 months away. If an operator acquired an aeroplane after the original AD, they need to back‑calculate from September 2004.

The second gotcha is the interplay between option 1.b and the compliance times. If an operator selects 1.b, they must perform the wire termination change (1.b.(i)) within 18 months of 30 September 2004 (i.e., by 30 March 2006) and the full air data system modification (1.b.(ii)) within 72 months (i.e., by 30 September 2010). But if an operator fails to do the wire termination by March 2006, does the option become invalid? The AD does not explicitly state. However, logically, if the wire termination is late, the operator cannot claim the benefit of the extended 72‑month period because the condition precedent was not met. They would then revert to the 24‑month deadline for 1.a, which would already have passed. This could leave the operator in a position of having no legal compliance path without seeking individual relief from CASA.

The third gotcha is Requirement 2: “For aeroplanes that are identified in ASB 767-34A0332, Revision 2 and also identified in any of the Boeing service bulletins listed below.” The cross‑reference is cumulative. Not every aeroplane subject to the AD needs the EICAS replacement. An operator must check both lists carefully. The five service bulletins listed have different revisions and dates; some are original issues, others are revisions. If the aeroplane appears only in the ASB but not in any of those five SBs, Requirement 2 does not apply. Conversely, if the aeroplane appears in one of the five SBs but not in the ASB, the AD does not apply at all. Operators must verify based on their specific serial numbers.

The fourth gotcha is Note 1: it says “if Requirement 1.b. is selected the compliance date for the modification of the air data switching system (ASB 767-34A0332 Revision 1 or Revision 2) is extended from 24 months to 72 months.” This is counterintuitive: the wire termination change under 1.b.(i) has a shorter deadline (18 months), yet the full modification gets a much longer extension. The rationale may be that the wire termination itself solves the immediate safety risk, so the physical modification can wait. But the AD does not explain. An operator might mistakenly think that selecting 1.b allows them to defer the wire termination as well; it does not.

The fifth gotcha is the prohibition in Requirement 3: parts in the “Existing Part Number” column are prohibited from installation as replacement parts “as of the effective date of the original issue of this Directive.” That date is 5 August 2004. This means any installation of those part numbers after that date is a continuing breach. If an operator discovers they have a prohibited part installed now (in real time), they must remove it and replace it with an improved part, even if the original installation was lawful before the AD. This can create significant maintenance events.

The sixth gotcha is the effective date of Amendment 3: 15 July 2005, but the delegate signed on 8 July 2005. There is a gap of seven days. The AD is likely gazetted on 15 July. Operators must comply from the effective date, not the signature date. If a maintenance action occurred between 8 July and 15 July using SB 767-31-0149 Revision 2, it would be acceptable under the AD only from 15 July, meaning that work done in that window may be technically non‑compliant under the earlier version of the AD. However, as a practical matter, CASA might accept it if the work is otherwise correct and the operator can show good faith.

The seventh gotcha is that the AD refers to multiple service bulletins by number and revision, but does not reproduce their contents. The operator must purchase or have access to these Boeing documents. If the documents are not available, compliance is impossible. The AD does not provide a grace period for obtaining documents. This dependence on proprietary data creates a barrier to entry for smaller operators with limited budgets. It also means that any error in the service bulletin (e.g., mis‑identified part numbers) could cause a ripple effect of non‑compliance even if the operator followed the text.

Eighth, the AD grandfathers modifications done “before the effective date of the original issue of this Directive in accordance with Boeing ASB 767-34A0332 dated 10 January 2002.” That means any operator who modified the air data system per that early ASB before 5 August 2004 is compliant with Requirement 1.a. But if the modification was done after 5 August 2004 but before the original AD’s effective date (which is the same day? Actually original effective date is 5 August 2004, so “before the effective date” means before 5 August 2004. Very tight. Grandfathering only applies to modifications done before that date.

Finally, the interpretation of “concurrently with” in Requirement 2: “Prior to, or concurrently with, SB 767-34A0332, Revision 1 or Revision 2.” This means the EICAS replacement must be done at the same time as the air data system modification or earlier. It cannot be done later. If an operator does the air data modification first, they cannot defer the EICAS work to a subsequent maintenance check without being in breach. The AD gives no flexibility on this ordering.

Compliance with AD/B767/197 Amdt 3 is a multi‑step, document‑intensive process. The first step is to determine whether each aeroplane in the operator’s fleet falls within the applicability. The operator must obtain Boeing ASB 767-34A0332 Revision 2 (dated 30 September 2004) and check the list of aeroplane serial numbers or registrations. If the aeroplane is not listed, the AD does not apply. For listed aeroplanes, also check if the aeroplane appears in any of the five additional service bulletins (767-31-0091 Rev 3, 767-31-0098 Rev 2, 767-31-0099 Rev 3, 767-31-0100 Rev 2, 767-31-0101 original). If it does, Requirement 2 applies.

The second step is to review the modification history of the aeroplane. If the air data system modification was already accomplished before 5 August 2004 per Boeing ASB 767-34A0332 dated 10 January 2002, then Requirement 1 is satisfied (grandfathering). Similarly, if the modification was done under Requirement 2 of the original issue of this AD, it is acceptable for Requirement 1.a. For all other cases, the operator must choose between the two compliance methods in Requirement 1. This decision should be based on cost, downtime, and availability of parts and labour. Selecting option 1.b gives more time for the full modification (72 months from 30 September 2004) but imposes an earlier wire‑termination step at 18 months. Option 1.a is simpler but has a tighter deadline.

The third step is to obtain the correct revisions of the service bulletins. For option 1.a: Boeing ASB 767-34A0332 Revision 1 or Revision 2. For option 1.b: Boeing SB 767-31-0149 Revision 1 or Revision 2 (for wire termination) and Boeing ASB 767-34A0332 Revision 1 or Revision 2 (for full modification). For Requirement 2: the applicable service bulletins listed (e.g., 767-31-0091 Rev 3, etc.). Note that some of those bulletins have appendices A, B and C (as per Note 2). The maintenance organisation must follow every detail in the Accomplishment Instructions.

The fourth step is to schedule the work. For Requirement 1, the deadlines are fixed. For option 1.b.(i), the wire termination must be completed within 18 months after 30 September 2004 (i.e., by 30 March 2006). For option 1.b.(ii) and option 1.a, the full modification must be completed within 24 months (option 1.a) or 72 months (option 1.b) after 30 September 2004. The operator should maintain a compliance calendar. For Requirement 2, the work must be done prior to or concurrently with the air data system modification. If the operator intends to do the air data modification at the 72‑month deadline, the EICAS replacement must be done at the same time or before. The operator cannot delay the EICAS work beyond that point.

The fifth step is to perform the modifications. The wire termination change per SB 767-31-0149 involves changing terminations of wires and an operational test. The air data system modification per the ASB involves installing circuit breakers, relays, wiring changes in the flight deck and main equipment centre, and a system functional test. The EICAS replacement involves removing existing computers and installing improved units, performing an EICAS readout comparison, and making wiring changes. Each step must be documented in the aircraft maintenance records, including the service bulletin revision used, the parts removed and installed, and test results.

The sixth step is to comply with Requirement 3. The operator must survey their inventory and remove any parts listed in the “Existing Part Number” column of the five service bulletins. These parts cannot be installed on any applicable aeroplane as replacement parts. Any such parts already installed after 5 August 2004 must be replaced with improved units. The operator should establish a system to screen all incoming parts against the prohibited list.

The seventh step is to ensure all work is certified by an authorised person (e.g., a Licensed Aircraft Maintenance Engineer) and the return to service records reflect AD compliance. CASA may request evidence during an audit. Finally, if the operator cannot meet a deadline, they should apply to CASA for an extension or alternative means of compliance before the deadline expires. Waiting until after the deadline risks enforcement action.

Given the complexity, operators should create a compliance matrix for each affected tail number, tracking the selected option, deadlines, actual accomplishment dates, and which service bulletins were used. This matrix becomes a critical record for future audits and for any sale or transfer of the aeroplane.