1AD/B767/179 Amdt 1 - Inboard Main Flap Support Bolts

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998), PART 39 - 105 CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY

SCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

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AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE

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For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below revokes Airworthiness Directive (AD) AD/B767/179 and issues the following AD under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CASR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.

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Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes

AD/B767/179

Amdt 1

Inboard Main Flap Support Bolts 9/2003

Applicability: Model 767 series aircraft, including Model 767-400ER aircraft; line numbers 1 through 879.

Requirement: Action in accordance with the technical requirements of FAA AD 2003-11-16 Amdt 39-13175.

Note: Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-27A0176 Revision 1 refers.

Compliance: As specified in the Requirement document, with a revised effective date of 4 September 2003.

This Amendment becomes effective on 4 September 2003.

Background: The FAA received a report indicating that an operator found one missing bolt and two loose bolts out of four bolts at the aft attachment locations on the outboard support of the inboard main flap on a B767 series aircraft. There was evidence that the bolts were not installed tightly, though when the improper installation occurred has not been determined. The outboard support for the inboard main flap cannot carry limit load with one bolt missing in the aft attachment locations. Missing, loose, or cracked bolts at this location, if not detected, could lead to loss of the inboard main flap.

Amendment 1 is issued in response to a new FAA AD, which requires a new one- time inspection and check, corrective actions if necessary, and eventual replacement of existing titanium bolts with steel bolts.

The original issue of this Airworthiness Directive became effective on 26 December 2002.

Signature of David Villiers, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.

David Villiers