AD/B767/170 Amdt 1 - MLG Outer Cylinder at Aft Trunnion

The AD frames several technical and procedural concepts that determine compliance.

Applicability. The scope is plainly defined: "All Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series aircraft" (Applicability). That is the universe of aircraft to which the directive attaches.

Target structure. The hardware at issue is the main landing gear (MLG) outer cylinder "at Aft Trunnion" (title and Background). The Directive is limited to that structural location rather than the whole landing gear or the airframe generally.

Material of interest. The specific corrosion inhibiting compound (CIC) is Titanine JC5A, with an alternate identification provided, "also known as Desoto 823E508" (Background). The AD therefore treats material provenance and trade-name/part-number equivalence as central: different names for the same product are explicitly recorded so that record searches are unambiguous.

Decision datum. The first-step compliance action is a records inspection: the AD requires inspection of maintenance records to determine whether JC5A was ever used in the aft trunnion area "during general maintenance, overhaul, or incorporation of Alert Service Bulletin 767-32A0148 original issue, or Revision 1, as required by AD 96-21-06 (AD/B747/85 Amdt 3)" (Background). The AD therefore relies on documentary evidence rather than initial physical inspection of every aircraft.

Conditionality. The AD is binary in outcome at the records stage. If the specified CIC "was never used, no further action is required. If found to be used, repetitive inspections for stress corrosion cracking or corrosion are required" (Background). That sets an operator’s decision tree: verify material usage, then either stop or begin inspections.

External technical authority. The directive delegates technical detail to FAA AD 2005-03-03 Amdt 39-13959 (Requirement). It also references Boeing Service Bulletins 767-32A0192 original issue and Revision 1, or later FAA approved revision, and earlier Alert Service Bulletin 767-32A0148 tied to AD 96-21-06 (Requirement and Background). Practically this means the AD supplies the high-level mandate and refers to the FAA AD and Boeing SBs for inspection intervals, inspection methods, corrective actions and compliance times.

Amendment status and effective date. This instrument is Amendment 1 to AD/B767/170 and becomes effective on 12 May 2005 (Compliance; "This Amendment becomes effective on 12 May 2005"). The Background explains why Amendment 1 was issued: because the FAA identified that JC5A "was used on more aircraft during production than previously identified."

Authority and issuer. The AD is signed by David Villiers, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, dated 31 March 2005. The signature line identifies CASA as the issuer but the AD refers directly to FAA material for technical content.

Together these concepts show the AD is a records-driven, targeted safety measure that relies on cross-referenced foreign authority (the FAA AD) and manufacturer service bulletins for technical specification, and that it focuses specifically on the aft trunnion area of the main landing gear outer cylinder in specified 767 variants.

The text identifies the primary affected population and implicates secondary parties through the compliance chain.

Aircraft operators. The Applicability clause makes every operator of Model 767-200, -300 and -300F aircraft the immediate audience: "All Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series aircraft." Operators must determine whether the AD applies to any aircraft in their fleet and follow the AD’s records inspection and potential inspection programme. The Background’s instruction to inspect "maintenance records" places the initial compliance action with the entity that holds or controls technical records for the aircraft, typically the operator or contracted maintenance organisation.

Maintenance organisations and approved maintenance providers. The AD demands inspection of maintenance records and, conditional on those records, "repetitive inspections for stress corrosion cracking or corrosion." Those inspections are maintenance acts. Therefore organisations that perform general maintenance, overhauls, or that incorporated Alert Service Bulletin 767-32A0148 (as required by AD 96-21-06) will be implicated. The Background specifically mentions "general maintenance, overhaul, or incorporation of Alert Service Bulletin 767-32A0148 ... as required by AD 96-21-06," tying historical maintenance actions to present compliance needs.

Continuing airworthiness managers and records custodians. The instrument elevates the role of the records custodian because the initial compliance hinge is documentary: operators must search records to determine whether Titanine JC5A (Desoto 823E508) was used. Entities responsible for long-term maintenance records, aircraft histories and logbooks are directly affected. The AD effectively transforms historical material usage into a present-day compliance requirement.

Regulator and oversight bodies. The AD is issued by a CASA delegate and makes an explicit technical reference to FAA AD 2005-03-03. This implicates cross-jurisdictional technical standards and the practical need for CASA to ensure that operators acting under its regulatory oversight have complied with the AD and with the FAA-referenced requirements. Although the AD text does not set out enforcement mechanisms, the issuer is the Civil Aviation Safety Authority as shown by the signatory block.

Manufacturers and suppliers. Boeing service bulletins are referenced in the Requirement. The AD’s note to "Boeing Service Bulletins 767-32A0192 original issue and 767-32A0192 Revision 1, or later FAA approved revision, refer" makes Boeing’s service literature part of the technical pathway. Additionally, the AD identifies the CIC by trade name and alternate designation, so chemical suppliers or material datum records may be involved in traceability.

Insurers and financiers. While not named in the text, parties with contractual or financial interest in aircraft airworthiness will be affected indirectly because operators must determine and record compliance steps. Any financing or insurance covenants that require an aircraft to be maintained in compliance with applicable ADs will be engaged by this directive. The AD itself does not reference those commercial instruments.

In sum, the directive principally affects operators of the specified Boeing 767 variants, their maintenance providers and records custodians, and secondarily manufacturers and regulatory oversight bodies by creating an operational obligation tethered to historical material use.

The AD sets a narrow set of duties and the correlative conditional reliefs.

Duty to inspect records. The AD requires inspection of maintenance records to determine if Titanine JC5A, also known as Desoto 823E508, "was ever used in the aft trunnion area of the main landing gear outer cylinder during general maintenance, overhaul, or incorporation of Alert Service Bulletin 767-32A0148 ... as required by AD 96-21-06 (AD/B747/85 Amdt 3)" (Background). That requirement is the AD’s primary affirmative duty and establishes a records-review obligation.

Duty to carry out further inspections if material used. The AD creates a follow-on duty conditioned on the records outcome. If the specified CIC "was found to be used, repetitive inspections for stress corrosion cracking or corrosion are required" (Background). The AD does not itself specify the inspection technique, frequency, or corrective action, but instead refers to "the technical requirements of FAA AD 2005-03-03 Amdt 39-13959" (Requirement). Therefore the operator’s duty, upon a positive records finding, is to follow the technical requirements in the referenced FAA AD and Boeing service bulletins.

Right to cease action if material not used. The AD explicitly grants relief where records show the CIC "was never used" in the aft trunnion area: "no further action is required" (Background). That is an immediate conditional release from the inspection and repetitive-inspection obligations. The AD thereby provides a clear compliance shortcut: a conclusive negative records result terminates further AD activity for that aircraft.

Duty to act in accordance with referenced documents. The Requirement instructs affected parties to "Action in accordance with the technical requirements of FAA AD 2005-03-03 Amdt 39-13959" and to refer to Boeing Service Bulletins 767-32A0192 original issue and Revision 1, or later FAA approved revision (Requirement). The AD therefore imposes a duty to implement external technical documents. Practically that means the duties concerning inspection intervals, methods, acceptable findings, and corrective actions are contained in the FAA AD and the Boeing SBs rather than in the AD text itself.

Duty to observe the compliance effective date. The Compliance block notes that the actions are to be carried out "As specified in the Requirement document, with a revised effective date of 12 May 2005." The AD itself becomes effective on 12 May 2005. Affected parties must therefore ensure any mandated actions referenced in the FAA AD and Boeing SBs are met with respect to that effective date.

Recordkeeping and traceability. While the AD does not specify additional recordkeeping obligations beyond the records inspection, the structure of the AD makes historical record reliability central to compliance. To rely on the "no further action" relief an operator must have accessible records that demonstrate non-use; likewise to demonstrate that inspections have been performed an operator will need to retain evidence of inspection outcomes and corrective actions, as required by the FAA AD and Boeing SBs the AD references.

No explicit rights of appeal or exemption are set out in the AD text. The AD contains an explicit delegate signature, "David Villiers Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority," indicating the instrument has been issued by CASA, but the AD does not provide procedural text in this document about administrative review or exemptions.

In short, duties are: inspect records, and if JC5A was used, implement the FAA AD/Boeing SB mandated repetitive inspections and corrective actions from the effective date; rights are limited to conditional cessation of action where records show no use of the named CIC.

The AD text supplies limited direct material on penalties or enforcement mechanisms. The document is an amendment to AD/B767/170 and is signed by "David Villiers Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority" (signature block). It declares an effective date, "This Amendment becomes effective on 12 May 2005" (Compliance). Beyond these administrative facts, the AD text does not specify particular penalties, fines, or enforcement procedures within the document itself.

What the source does show. The AD is issued by a CASA delegate and incorporates by reference FAA AD 2005-03-03 Amdt 39-13959 and Boeing Service Bulletins 767-32A0192. The text therefore establishes a mandatory obligation in substance by instructing operators to "Action in accordance with the technical requirements of FAA AD 2005-03-03" (Requirement), and by setting an effective date. The presence of an AD signed by the CASA delegate implies regulatory force within the issuing agency’s administrative framework; however the AD text does not enumerate the sanctions or enforcement steps that CASA may take for non-compliance.

Enforcement levers not specified. The AD does not itself list enforcement instruments such as grounding orders, prohibition on operation, suspension of certificates, monetary penalties, or criminal sanctions. The document likewise does not specify procedures for CASA inspections, auditing, or follow-up compliance verification. Nor does it provide an appeals process or explain how an operator could obtain an alternative method of compliance. Those enforcement and procedural details, if available, would normally be found in the relevant civil aviation safety legislation, CASA regulatory instruments, or in CASA’s compliance policy documents rather than in the AD text.

Practical enforcement implication. Because the AD requires records inspection and, where JC5A usage is found, repetitive physical inspections, the practical enforcement path would involve CASA exercising its general oversight and continuing airworthiness functions to request evidence of records review, inspection dates and results, and corrective actions where necessary. The AD identifies the specific technical references operators must follow; the absence of those records or failure to implement the FAA AD/Boeing SBs would be the factual basis for any regulatory follow-up. The AD itself does not, however, detail the sequence of administrative measures that CASA would take on discovering non-compliance.

In summary, the document demonstrates that CASA issued an amendment AD with a mandatory-sounding compliance instruction and an effective date. The AD text does not set out statutory penalties or administrative enforcement steps within this document; those would be inferred from CASA’s wider regulatory functions and separate instruments, none of which are reproduced in the source text.

The AD explicitly cross-references prior airworthiness directives and manufacturer service literature rather than listing statutes. The interaction is therefore technical and procedural, tied to other ADs and service bulletins.

Cross-reference to FAA AD. The Requirement mandates action "in accordance with the technical requirements of FAA AD 2005-03-03 Amdt 39-13959" (Requirement). This creates a direct technical relationship between CASA’s AD/B767/170 Amdt 1 and the FAA AD. The referenced FAA AD will contain the substantive inspection procedures, intervals and corrective-action criteria. The CASA AD therefore imports technical requirements from a foreign regulator’s directive rather than restating them, making the FAA AD part of the compliance mix.

Interaction with Boeing Service Bulletins. The Requirement contains a Note: "Boeing Service Bulletins 767-32A0192 original issue and 767-32A0192 Revision 1, or later FAA approved revision, refer." By directing operators to these Boeing service bulletins, the AD ties CASA’s compliance expectations to manufacturer guidance. The note thus integrates manufacturer-recommended practices into the regulator’s requirement set.

Link to prior AD AD 96-21-06 (AD/B747/85 Amdt 3). The Background states the records inspection must consider whether JC5A was used "during general maintenance, overhaul, or incorporation of Alert Service Bulletin 767-32A0148 original issue, or Revision 1, as required by AD 96-21-06 (AD/B747/85 Amdt 3)." That reference creates an inter-AD relationship by making compliance for the present AD contingent on work that may have been carried out pursuant to an earlier AD and an alert SB. The AD thus incorporates historical compliance events mandated by earlier ADs into the present compliance assessment.

Amendment to an earlier CASA AD. The instrument is labelled an amendment "Amdt 1" to AD/B767/170 which indicates it changes an existing CASA AD. The Compliance section explicitly revises the effective date to 12 May 2005. The Background explains the reason for the amendment: the FAA discovered JC5A "was used on more aircraft during production than previously identified." That factual development required updating the CASA AD to align with the FAA’s expanded identification of affected aircraft or material usage.

Implicit regulatory chain. The AD therefore sits within a chain of continuing airworthiness instruments: manufacturer service bulletins, alert service bulletins, earlier ADs, and the FAA AD it references. The CASA AD uses these external materials as the locus for technical instructions while itself operating as the national administrative instrument that notifies Australian operators of the required actions.

No statute-level citations in the source. The AD text does not cite specific provisions of Australian primary legislation or subordinate instruments that grant CASA the power to issue ADs, nor does it cite administrative appeals procedures or enforcement statutes. The authorising power for such directives would typically be found in aviation safety legislation and CASA regulations, but those are not included in the text provided.

In summary, AD/B767/170 Amdt 1 integrates with a network of technical instruments: it imports substantive requirements from FAA AD 2005-03-03, refers to Boeing service bulletins for inspection method and detail, and ties back to prior AD 96-21-06 and Alert SB 767-32A0148 as historical triggers. The AD therefore acts as a national notice that maps international and manufacturer technical instructions into the compliance expectations for Australian-registered aircraft in the specified fleet.

The document is an amendment to an existing AD and the source provides a concise amendment record.

Identity of the amendment. The instrument is titled AD/B767/170 Amdt 1. The repetition of the title in the source shows the document is the first amendment to AD/B767/170. The signature block is dated "31 March 2005" with the printed effective date and an explicit Compliance line that revises the effective date to "12 May 2005."

Reason for amendment. The Background explains why Amendment 1 was required: "Amendment 1 is issued in response to a new FAA AD, which was prompted by a report that JC5A was used on more aircraft during production than previously identified." That factual update to the FAA’s understanding of which aircraft may have received JC5A during production is the trigger for CASA to issue this amendment.

Effective date change. The Compliance block states: "As specified in the Requirement document, with a revised effective date of 12 May 2005." It then adds: "This Amendment becomes effective on 12 May 2005." That sets the operative commencement date for the amended obligations.

References to prior ADs and SBs. The amendment links to previous materials that form part of the continuing amendment history: it references FAA AD 2005-03-03 Amdt 39-13959, Boeing Service Bulletins 767-32A0192 original and Revision 1, and earlier AD 96-21-06 (AD/B747/85 Amdt 3) tied to Alert Service Bulletin 767-32A0148. These references indicate the amendment did not create an entirely new regulatory regime but instead updated the CASA AD to align with developments in FAA notices and manufacturer service literature.

Signatory authority. The amendment is signed by David Villiers, "Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority," dated 31 March 2005. That signature constitutes the formal administrative act recorded in the AD.

No further amendment history in the source. The document affords no additional amendment entries, no prior amendments, and no subsequent amendments beyond Amdt 1 are present in the supplied text. There is no schedule of future revisions, nor is there an administrative history beyond the single amendment action described.

In sum, the amendment history provided is confined to the creation of AD/B767/170 Amdt 1 dated 31 March 2005, effective 12 May 2005, issued as a response to the FAA AD prompted by newly identified material usage during production.

The source text contains no litigation history. There are no judicial proceedings, appeals, or case citations referenced in the AD document. The AD includes factual background, technical cross-references and an administrative signature, but it does not recount any legal challenges or litigation outcomes relating to the directive or to the underlying FAA AD or Boeing service bulletins.

What is present in the source. The Background narrative explains a regulatory development process: the FAA issued a new AD because it had a report that JC5A was used more widely during production. CASA issued this amendment in response. That administrative chain is recorded, but the source does not indicate any disputes, reviews, or judicial consideration arising from the FAA AD, Boeing service bulletins, or this CASA amendment.

Implication for practitioners. Because the AD does not contain litigation history, practitioners requiring insight into any contested interpretive issues, enforcement proceedings, or precedent would need to seek materials outside this AD, such as CASA enforcement records, tribunal or court decisions, or industry bulletins. None of those materials are included in the source provided.

Therefore the source-supported statement is: no litigation history appears in the AD text.

The AD’s brevity and its reliance on external documents create practical pitfalls. The following are concrete, source-grounded points to watch for when interpreting and implementing the AD.

Name variants for the CIC. The AD identifies the corrosion inhibiting compound as "Titanine JC5A (also known as Desoto 823E508)" (Background). Operators must be careful when searching maintenance records that different trade names or product codes are present. The AD explicitly anticipates this potential confusion by listing the alternate name, but operators must still ensure searches capture both identifiers and any other synonyms used in older records.

Records as the compliance trigger. The AD requires inspection of maintenance records to determine whether JC5A "was ever used" in the aft trunnion area (Background). Therefore the presence or absence of records is dispositive for the next compliance step. A lack of records may not be equivalent to a recorded "never used" finding; operators and maintainers need to establish whether the AD contemplates an absence-of-evidence outcome as clearance. The AD text states "If above specified CIC was never used, no further action is required," which presumes a conclusive records finding that it was never used. Practically this matters because incomplete, lost or ambiguous records will force operators to decide how to demonstrate non-use or to proceed as if JC5A was used.

Scope of historical work to search. The AD specifies three contexts for potential JC5A use: "general maintenance, overhaul, or incorporation of Alert Service Bulletin 767-32A0148 original issue, or Revision 1, as required by AD 96-21-06 (AD/B747/85 Amdt 3)" (Background). That means historical overhaul records and documentation of work done to comply with AD 96-21-06 or with Alert SB 767-32A0148 must be examined. Operators should ensure their search covers contractual maintenance providers, third-party overhaul shops and any historical incorporation records associated with earlier AD compliance.

Conditional repetitive inspections. The AD imposes repetitive inspections "for stress corrosion cracking or corrosion" only if JC5A "was found to be used" (Background). The AD itself does not specify the inspection interval or method; those details are contained in the referenced FAA AD and Boeing SBs. A common implementation trap is to assume inspection methods or intervals. Operators must consult the FAA AD 2005-03-03 and Boeing SB 767-32A0192 to determine inspection frequency, non-destructive test type, and corrective action thresholds.

Dependency on external documents. The AD explicitly says to act "in accordance with the technical requirements of FAA AD 2005-03-03" and to refer to Boeing SBs (Requirement). That external dependency means that reading this AD alone is insufficient. Practical compliance requires accessing the FAA AD and Boeing SBs. A failure to reference or to follow an updated FAA AD or an FAA-approved Boeing SB revision could be a compliance shortfall. The Note that refers to "or later FAA approved revision" for the Boeing SBs means later FAA-approved revisions may alter inspection techniques or intervals.

Effective date and timing. The Compliance block revises the effective date to 12 May 2005. Where an operator receives this AD after that date, the operator must compare the AD effective date to any inspection dates or records searches already performed to determine whether those earlier actions satisfy the AD. The AD does not state retroactivity rules or grace periods.

Ambiguity about enforcement detail. As noted above, the AD does not set out enforcement penalties or the process for CASA follow-up. Operators should not assume that absence of penalties in the text means there will be no enforcement. The practical gap is a gotcha for entities that rely on the AD’s silence about sanctions.

Limited subject matter. The AD is focused by design on the aft trunnion area and on a specific CIC. Operators who are tempted to generalise from the AD across other areas or compounds should take care: this AD does not itself extend to other components or chemical products, unless such extension is explicitly set out in the referenced FAA AD or Boeing SBs.

In summary, the primary operational pitfalls are: ensuring records searches are sufficiently comprehensive and account for name variants; accessing and following the FAA AD/Boeing SBs for inspection detail; understanding the implications of incomplete historical records; and not assuming the AD contains enforcement or procedural detail beyond what is stated.

The AD defines a clear, records-centred compliance pathway, but it delegates technical detail to other documents. The following stepwise approach conforms to the AD text and shows the actions an operator or maintenance organisation should take.

1. Confirm applicability. Verify whether the aircraft in question is within the AD’s scope: "All Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series aircraft" (Applicability). This determination is the initial gatekeeper for the remaining actions.

2. Obtain the referenced technical documents. The Requirement directs action "in accordance with the technical requirements of FAA AD 2005-03-03 Amdt 39-13959" and refers to Boeing Service Bulletins 767-32A0192 original issue and Revision 1, or later FAA approved revision. Before implementing inspection programmes or corrective actions, obtain and read the FAA AD and the cited Boeing SBs to learn specific inspection methods, intervals and corrective-action criteria.

3. Inspect maintenance records for JC5A use. The Background requires an inspection of maintenance records to determine if "Titanine JC5A (also known as Desoto 823E508) corrosion inhibiting compound (CIC) was ever used in the aft trunnion area of the main landing gear outer cylinder during general maintenance, overhaul, or incorporation of Alert Service Bulletin 767-32A0148 original issue, or Revision 1, as required by AD 96-21-06 (AD/B747/85 Amdt 3)." Ensure the records review covers:

   • All entries that could indicate use of Titanine JC5A or Desoto 823E508.
   • Overhaul logs and records from third-party MROs.
   • Records documenting incorporation of Alert Service Bulletin 767-32A0148 and AD 96-21-06 compliance actions.
   • Any material traceability or parts certificates that record protective compounds used during production or overhaul.

4. Document the records finding. The AD grants relief where the specified CIC "was never used, no further action is required." Therefore, if the records conclusively show non-use, create a retained compliance record stating the search scope, persons responsible, date of the search, and the specific findings. Retain the documentation in the continuing airworthiness file to evidence the basis for taking no further AD action.

5. If JC5A was used, implement the FAA AD/Boeing SB inspection programme. The AD directs that "If found to be used, repetitive inspections for stress corrosion cracking or corrosion are required" (Background). The AD itself does not give the techniques or intervals, therefore:

   • Follow FAA AD 2005-03-03 for inspection methods, intervals, and corrective actions.
   • Refer to Boeing SBs 767-32A0192 original and Revision 1, or later FAA approved revision, for manufacturer-recommended procedures and any additional detail.
   • Establish an inspection schedule, assign qualified personnel or an approved maintenance organisation, and ensure non-destructive test capability as specified by the FAA AD/Boeing SB.

6. Record all inspection and corrective actions. Where repetitive inspections are required, retain detailed records of inspection dates, findings, any stress corrosion cracking or corrosion identified, and remedial action taken. These records will form the continuing airworthiness evidence trail and support compliance verification.

7. Monitor for revisions. The Requirement note mentions "or later FAA approved revision" for Boeing SBs and the CAUSE of the amendment was a new FAA AD. Practically, maintain a process to monitor for further FAA AD revisions or FAA-approved Boeing SB revisions that could change inspection intervals, methods or affected populations, and be prepared to update the operator’s compliance programme accordingly.

8. Respect the effective date. This Amendment is effective 12 May 2005. Ensure that any compliance timeline or retrospective actions are aligned with that date, and that records show how and when the records inspection and any subsequent inspections were performed relative to the effective date.

9. Coordinate with CASA where uncertain. Although the AD does not spell out appeal or alternative method of compliance procedures, the AD is issued by a CASA delegate. If the operator faces records ambiguity, or proposes an alternative inspection method not described in the FAA AD or Boeing SBs, engage CASA or an authorised CASA contact to clarify acceptable approaches.

10. Treat the AD as part of the ongoing continuing airworthiness obligations. While this AD is narrow in scope, integrating its requirements into the continuing airworthiness management system will ensure inspections are not overlooked, particularly because they may be repetitive and ongoing where JC5A was used.

These compliance steps flow directly from the AD’s text: applicability clause, the Requirement to act under FAA AD 2005-03-03 and Boeing SBs, the Background’s records inspection instruction and conditional repetitive inspection mandate, and the Compliance statement fixing the effective date.