AD/B737/301 Amdt 2 - Spoiler Actuator Jamming

The Directive is built around a small set of core technical and procedural concepts drawn from the unsafe condition reported to the FAA and the mitigations chosen by Boeing and CASA.

• Unsafe condition and mechanism. The Background identifies seven reported flight spoiler actuator jams on 737-800 SFP aeroplanes. The cause is stated as interference within the actuator main control valve, which can produce an actuator "hardover" and jam the spoiler fully extended. The Directive emphasises the hazard that two or more hardover failures on the same wing, undetected prior to take-off, can create significant roll and consequent loss of control (Background).

• Detect-and-correct operational controls. Requirement 1 imposes a detect-and-correct regime: visual checks of spoiler position after every landing and after any rejected take-off until retrofit, with mandatory entries into aircraft records. The checks are narrowly defined: determine spoiler position relative to the speedbrake handle, and if all spoilers are properly stowed, no further action is required under that Requirement.

• Immediate corrective action. Requirement 2 mandates replacement of any flight spoiler actuator found improperly stowed before further flight, using a flight spoiler actuator P/N P665A0001-01 or higher dash number, and only by a method approved by the Manager, Seattle ACO. The AD lists two Boeing AMM tasks (Flight Spoiler Actuator Removal and Installation, Ch 27-61-51) as approved methods.

• Operational verification. Requirement 3 requires an operational test of the speedbrake control system after any maintenance action that operates that system (with AMM Chapter 27-62-00 specified as one approved test method). Requirement 4 ties findings from that test to the same immediate corrective action as Requirement 2.

• Termination option. Note 1 and Requirement 8 specify that installing P/N P665A0001-01 (or higher dash number) actuators in all eight spoiler positions ends the need for the repetitive visual and operational checks. The Directive prescribes Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-27A1283, dated 3 April 2007, as the accomplishment instruction for the terminating retrofit.

• Parts control. Requirements 6 and 9 bar the use of the older part, P/N P665A0001-00, as a replacement spare or for installation. The Directive also accepts previously installed P/N P665A0001-01 actuators installed under earlier amendment work as satisfying the requirement for that position (Requirement 8).

• Recordkeeping and reporting. Visual checks must be entered into the aircraft records. Requirement 7 compels electronic reporting to Boeing via BCS if any spoiler is improperly stowed during a visual check, with specified data fields to be reported (serial number, jam position, spoiler panel number/wing position, date of check, and flight hours).

• Regulatory cross-references. The Directive references FAA oversight and prior FAA ADs. Methods and approvals are to be obtained from the Manager, Seattle ACO (FAA). Note 2 cites FAA AD 2007-15-04 and states the AD supersedes FAA AD 2007-06-52.

Taken together, the Directive uses immediate operational mitigations (frequent checks and tests), mandatory corrective action before further flight, parts prohibition, and a retrofit path that terminates the operational mitigations. It situates technical methods inside Boeing AMM tasks and a Boeing Alert Service Bulletin, and channels approvals through the FAA Manager, Seattle ACO.

The Directive affects a narrow, identifiable set of actors and assets. The primary affected parties are:

• Aeroplane operators of the listed Model 737-800 series aeroplanes. Applicability is strictly limited to the serial numbers enumerated in the Applicability table. Only those operators of the identified serial-numbered aeroplanes are bound by the Directive’s operational inspection, reporting, testing and retrofit requirements. The Directive does not claim broader model-wide applicability in the text provided.

• Flight crews. Under Requirement 1, visual checks of spoilers to determine spoiler position may be carried out either by qualified personnel or by the flight crew. Flight crew are therefore directly tasked with executing visual inspections after every landing and after any rejected take-off until the retrofit is complete, and must ensure entries are placed in aircraft records showing compliance.

• Maintenance personnel and maintenance organisations. Requirement 2 and Requirement 3 call for removal and installation of flight spoiler actuators and operational tests in accordance with approved methods. The Directive accepts Boeing AMM tasks (Chapters 27-61-51 and 27-62-00) as approved methods, so maintenance technicians executing those AMM tasks or other FAA-approved methods must comply. Maintenance organisations are responsible for performing replacements and operational tests and for recording compliance.

• Engineering and airworthiness managers. Decisions about approved methods (where the AD requires approval by the Manager, Seattle ACO) and the use of the Boeing Alert Service Bulletin for the terminating retrofit will involve engineering/airworthiness managers coordinating with the Seattle ACO for approval and with Boeing for accomplishment instructions.

• Supply chain and spares managers. Requirement 6 and Requirement 9 prohibit installation of P/N P665A0001-00 spare actuators and require use of P/N P665A0001-01 or higher. Logistics, procurement and inventory management functions therefore face parts-obsolescence or re-procurement tasks.

• Boeing. Requirement 7 requires operators to report incidents to Boeing via the Boeing Communications System (BCS), creating an ongoing reporting channel and data feed to the manufacturer.

• Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) and FAA. CASA is the issuing authority (signed by the CASA delegate), and the Directive specifically invokes approvals by the FAA Manager, Seattle ACO. FAA ADs are referenced (superseding earlier FAA AD 2007-06-52 and referencing FAA AD 2007-15-04).

Who pays and who decides. Operators pay for the inspections, tests, replacement parts (P/N P665A0001-01 or higher), labour and downtime implied by the requirements. Decisions on approved methods for replacement and operational testing are to be made or ratified by the Manager, Seattle ACO; maintenance organisations and flight operations decide who (flight crew or qualified personnel) performs the visual checks and how the records and reports are maintained and submitted to Boeing.

The Directive’s applicability and stepwise obligations mean the costs and operational impacts are concentrated on the relatively small set of operators of the listed serial numbers, while CASA, FAA and Boeing bear administrative and oversight roles.

The Directive prescribes discrete duties for operators, flight crews, maintenance personnel and engineers; it also states a limited set of permissions and acceptances.

Key duties

• Mandatory visual checks (Requirement 1). After every landing and after any rejected take-off, operators must visually check spoiler position to determine whether spoilers are properly stowed, until the terminating retrofit (installation of P/N P665A0001-01 or higher in all eight positions) is accomplished. The Directive explicitly allows the checks to be performed by "qualified personnel or flight crew" and requires that checks be entered into the aircraft records showing compliance. (See Compliance paragraph for timing.)

• Immediate replacement (Requirement 2). If any spoiler is found improperly stowed during the Requirement 1 check, the operator must replace the flight spoiler actuator with P/N P665A0001-01 or higher before further flight, using a method approved by the Manager, Seattle ACO. The Directive lists the AMM "Flight Spoiler Actuator Removal" and "Flight Spoiler Actuator Installation" tasks in Chapter 27-61-51 as approved methods.

• Operational testing (Requirement 3). After any maintenance action that operates the spoiler system, operators must carry out an operational speedbrake control system test until the retrofit is installed. The “Speedbrake Control System Operational Test” in Chapter 27-62-00 of the AMM is identified as an approved method.

• Follow-up replacement after failed operational test (Requirement 4). If the operational test shows a spoiler fully extended when the handle is down or fully retracted when the handle is up, replacement of the flight spoiler actuator in accordance with Requirement 2 is mandatory before further flight.

• Parts prohibition and retrofit (Requirements 6, 8 and 9). Operators must not install P/N P665A0001-00 flight spoiler actuators on any aeroplane as a replacement spare or otherwise. They must install P/N P665A0001-01 or higher in all eight spoiler positions within 120 days of the effective date to terminate the repetitive checks and tests, following Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-27A1283 (Requirement 8 and Compliance).

• Reporting (Requirement 7). If any spoiler is found improperly stowed during any visual check, operators must report specified data to Boeing via the Boeing Communications System (BCS), either within seven days after the AD’s effective date for checks done before the effective date, or within seven days after carrying out the inspection for checks done after the effective date.

• MMEL change (Requirement 5). Operators of Model 737-800 series aeroplanes equipped with an SFP package must accept that MMEL Item 27-7 "Auto Speed Brake System" is no longer applicable as of the AD’s effective date.

Rights and acceptances recorded in the Directive

• Choice of inspector. The AD explicitly allows either flight crew or qualified personnel to perform the visual checks under Requirement 1.

• Approved methods. The Directive permits use of methods approved by the Manager, Seattle ACO. It names specific AMM tasks (Chapters 27-61-51 and 27-62-00) and Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-27A1283 as approved or acceptable methods. This gives operators a degree of clarity and a limited menu of acceptable technical procedures.

• Credit for prior work. The AD states that any flight spoiler actuator P/N P665A0001-01 (or higher dash number) previously installed in any position in accordance with the requirements of the AD at Amendment 1 is acceptable for meeting the AD requirements for that position. This provides credit where prior compliance work already meets the new standard.

Duties are expressed in mandatory terms: "replace", "carry out", "do not install", "report", with prescribed compliance timeframes and "before further flight" triggers. The Directive does not, within its text, define enforcement penalties; compliance is mandated by the AD wording and associated compliance instructions.

The Directive itself is the instrument through which CASA mandates the actions; however, the text supplied sets out operational commands and compliance timeframes and does not specify civil or criminal penalties, fines or penalty schedules within the AD text. The enforcement mechanism implicit in the AD arises from the AD’s mandatory compliance conditions and the aviation regulatory framework under which CASA issues ADs. The Directive specifies concrete triggers and timing for mandatory actions that are enforceable as airworthiness requirements:

• Before further flight triggers. The Directive repeatedly uses the phrase "Before further flight" for Requirement 2 (replacement after an improper stowage finding) and Requirement 4 (replacement after an operational test failure). Those triggers create immediate grounding-type conditions for the affected aeroplane until the specified corrective action is completed.

• Prescribed compliance windows. The AD sets time-limited compliance obligations for other tasks: the terminating retrofit (Requirement 8) must be done within 120 days after the effective date; reporting timelines for Requirement 7 are seven days after the effective date for prior visual checks, or seven days after carrying out the inspection for checks done after the effective date. Operational checks are required "after any maintenance action that operates the spoiler system, until the installation ... is accomplished" (Compliance for Requirement 3).

• Recordkeeping. Requirement 1 requires visual checks to be entered into aircraft records showing compliance, creating an auditable trail to support enforcement and oversight.

• Interaction with MMEL. Requirement 5 removes the applicability of MMEL Item 27-7 for SFP-equipped 737-800s, which changes dispatchability and the set of permissible in-service deviations. The change in MMEL status intrinsically affects the operator’s ability to dispatch aircraft with certain speedbrake faults; enforcement mechanisms in operations oversight will reflect that MMEL change.

The AD references FAA approvals (Manager, Seattle ACO) for methods, which embeds an international oversight interface in approvals and technical acceptability. The Directive itself is signed by the CASA delegate (Charles Lenarcic) and lists effective dates; it therefore has regulatory force.

What the AD does not state. The text does not set out specific sanctions or penalty amounts, nor does it describe a process of notice, cure, appeal or administrative penalties within the AD wording. Any civil or administrative penalties, enforcement prosecutions or sanction processes would be found in the broader aviation regulatory framework and enforcement instruments outside the AD text. The AD nevertheless creates clear "non-compliance" conditions (e.g., operating without required visual checks or with prohibited spare parts installed), which aviation regulators and inspectors would likely treat as breaches under applicable airworthiness and operational regulations.

The Directive situates itself within the international and domestic regulatory framework by referencing and superseding FAA actions, changing MMEL applicability, and requiring approvals from a foreign authority’s office. The AD text explicitly connects to other regulatory materials and documents as follows:

• FAA Airworthiness Directives. Note 2 states that FAA AD 2007-15-04 Amdt 39-15133 dated 11 July 2007 is referred to. The Directive also states it supersedes FAA AD 2007-06-52. Those cross-references indicate the CASA AD is coordinated with, informed by, and in part responsive to FAA findings and corrective actions.

• Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office approvals. Requirements 2 and 3 require replacement and operational test methods to be "approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)". This makes the FAA Manager an approving authority for methods under this CASA AD. The AD also lists Boeing AMM tasks and a Boeing Alert Service Bulletin as approved or acceptable methods; nevertheless, where the AD requires Manager, Seattle ACO approval, the operator or maintenance organisation must secure that approval.

• Boeing technical documentation and Boeing Communications System. Requirement 8 directs installation in accordance with the "Accomplishment Instructions" of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-27A1283, dated 3 April 2007. Requirement 7 requires reporting to Boeing using the Boeing Communications System (BCS). Those references operationally tie compliance to manufacturer's instructions and manufacturer communication systems rather than only to CASA or FAA documents.

• Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL). Requirement 5 declares that MMEL Item 27-7, "Auto Speed Brake System," is no longer applicable to Model 737-800 aeroplanes equipped with an SFP package. The MMEL is a core operational control document affecting dispatch decisions. Changing MMEL applicability interacts with flight operations regulations and operator procedures, and may require operators to update their Minimum Equipment List (MEL) procedures and dispatch practices accordingly.

• Boeing Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) chapters. The AD identifies specific AMM chapters (27-61-51 and 27-62-00) as approved methods for replacement and operational testing. AMM tasks are manufacturer's maintenance procedures; referencing them aligns technical compliance with Boeing’s maintenance procedures.

Practical interaction effects

• International coordination. The AD demonstrates an outward interaction where CASA adopts or modifies measures that the FAA has taken or modified. Requiring FAA Manager approvals keeps a technical approval pathway with the FAA.

• Delegation of technical approvals. By directing approval authority to Manager, Seattle ACO, the AD places some method-approval decisions outside CASA’s direct technical authority and within the FAA’s purview. This could require operators or maintenance organisations to coordinate across jurisdictions for method approvals.

• Operational regulation. The change in MMEL applicability directly affects how operators apply domestic operations law (dispatch and MEL processes). Operators must align their MELs, operations manuals and flight dispatcher/crew procedures with the revised MMEL applicability.

• Recordkeeping and reporting obligations. The Directive imposes specific record entries and mandatory incident reporting to Boeing via BCS, creating interoperability with manufacturer reporting systems and with CASA’s oversight via maintenance and operations records.

In short, the AD overlays manufacturer's maintenance instructions, FAA approvals and the MMEL framework onto CASA’s regulatory command, requiring operators to navigate an intersecting set of documents and approvals to achieve full compliance.

The Directive’s text includes an explicit amendment chronology and cross-references to FAA ADs. The chronology is set out in the Background and other portions of the document as follows:

• Original AD issuance. The original issue of this AD became effective on 19 March 2007. The Background notes that the original issue was "issued to detect and correct any spoiler panel that is found in the up position with the speedbrake handle in the down position" and established initial inspection and corrective measures (Background).

• Amendment 1. Amendment 1 of this Directive became effective on 19 March 2007. The Background explains Amendment 1 was issued after advice from the FAA that incorrect spoiler actuator part numbers were inadvertently used in AD 2007-06-51 and were corrected in AD 2007-06-52. Amendment 1 incorporated those part number corrections.

• Amendment 2 (this document). This Amendment becomes effective on 25 October 2007. The cover and compliance sections state that "This Amendment becomes effective on 25 October 2007." The Directive is titled AD/B737/301 Amdt 2 and dated 11/2007 in the header and is signed by the CASA delegate on 10 September 2007, showing the administrative path to the effective date.

• FAA AD references. Note 2 in the AD states that FAA AD 2007-15-04 Amendment 39-15133 dated 11 July 2007 is referred to, and that the CASA AD supersedes FAA AD 2007-06-52. The Background also describes the origin of the unsafe condition and the FAA’s reported seven actuator jams which led to the original AD.

• Technical corrections. The Background says Amendment 1 corrected inadvertent use of incorrect part numbers in earlier FAA ADs and that Amendment 2 introduced the requirement to replace all flight spoiler actuators with higher dash-number parts to provide the terminating action.

• Effective dates and prior work. The Directive provides that any flight spoiler actuator P/N P665A0001-01 (or higher dash number) that was previously installed in any flight spoiler position in accordance with the requirements of the AD at Amendment 1 is acceptable to meet the requirements of the AD for that flight spoiler position. This preserves credit for earlier compliant work done under Amendment 1.

The amendment history shows a stepwise tightening of the corrective measures: initial detection and correction obligations, a part-number correction, and then a retrofit requirement intended to eliminate the unsafe condition. The AD documents its alignment with FAA ADs and records the effective dates for each stage.

The Directive text contains no reference to litigation, judicial review, challenges, or court decisions. There are no cases named in the AD, no mention of appeals to tribunals, and no record within the provided text of enforcement proceedings or contested compliance disputes. The document is a regulatory instrument issued by CASA and signed by the designated delegate, and the text records only administrative amendment history, FAA AD cross-references, technical requirements, compliance times and reporting obligations.

Therefore, based solely on the content of the Directive as provided, there is no litigation history to report. Any litigation or administrative proceedings arising from this AD would need to be sourced from external records, which are not contained in the AD text supplied.

The Directive contains multiple points where operators, maintenance organisations and flight crews commonly trip up if attention to detail lapses. The following are concrete implementation pitfalls and practical risks grounded in the AD text.

• Narrow applicability. The AD applies only to a specific list of 737-800 serial numbers. Failure to check and confirm whether a given aeroplane’s serial number appears in the Applicability list can lead to unnecessary work or non-compliance. Do not assume model-wide applicability; verify serial numbers.

• Repetitive inspection burden until retrofit. Requirement 1 mandates visual checks after every landing and after any rejected take-off "until installation of P/N P665A0001-01 or higher dash number in all eight flight spoiler positions is accomplished." This creates significant operational friction and crew/maintenance workload until the terminating retrofit is completed. Operators who delay the retrofit face a continuing inspection burden.

• Who may perform checks. The AD permits either qualified personnel or flight crew to perform the visual checks, but whichever party performs them must ensure the checks are recorded in the aircraft records. Avoid gaps in record entries; the AD requires entries "showing compliance with this AD."

• Immediate "before further flight" triggers. If any spoiler is improperly stowed during a visual check, Requirement 2 requires replacement before further flight. Likewise, a failed operational test per Requirement 4 requires replacement before further flight. These are grounding conditions: failure to replace means the aircraft should not fly.

• Parts control traps. The AD prohibits installation of P/N P665A0001-00 as a replacement spare (Requirements 6 and 9). Operators must review spares inventories and procurement orders to ensure the old part is removed from available spares. Continuing to carry banned spares or installing them risks non-compliance.

• Approved methods and FAA approvals. Requirement 2 and Requirement 3 require methods "approved by the Manager, Seattle ACO." While the AD lists AMM tasks as approved methods, any deviation or alternative method requires FAA Manager approval. Coordination with the Seattle ACO may add delay or administrative overhead; do not assume internal approval suffices.

• Reporting timing and method. Requirement 7 requires electronic reporting to Boeing via the Boeing Communications System (BCS) if any spoiler is found improperly stowed during any visual check. The Compliance section sets deadlines: for visual checks accomplished before the effective date, reporting is required within seven days after the effective date; for checks after the effective date, within seven days after carrying out the inspection. Operators must maintain BCS access and processes to meet these timelines.

• MMEL changes and dispatch ramifications. Requirement 5 removes MMEL Item 27-7 applicability for SFP-equipped 737-800s. Operators must update MELs, operational control documents and dispatcher/flight crew briefing material to reflect the MMEL change. Failure to update MMEL/MEL practices could create unlawful dispatch decisions.

• Credit for prior work limited. The AD accepts previously installed P/N P665A0001-01 actuators installed "in accordance with the requirements of this AD at amendment 1." If earlier installations were not performed under those AD requirements, credit may not be available. Maintain clear documentation of when and how prior parts were installed.

• Terminating action timeline. Requirement 8 requires installation of the terminating retrofit within 120 days after the effective date. Operators who postpone retrofit risk accumulating inspection and reporting obligations until that date, and risk grounding if problems are found.

• Reliance on Boeing documents and BCS. The AD relies on specific Boeing AMM chapters and Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-27A1283. Operators must ensure they have the correct issue dates and versions of those Boeing documents and the ability to carry out the service bulletin instructions exactly as written.

• Record accuracy and auditability. Because the Directive requires aircraft records entries for visual checks and reporting to Boeing, incomplete or inaccurate records will be conspicuous during oversight audits or incident investigations. Ensure that all visual checks, operational tests, replacements and reports are captured, dated and auditable.

These are concrete, document-grounded implementation "gotchas" operators should manage to avoid operational disruption and non-compliance.

This section gives a practical, stepwise compliance checklist grounded in the Directive’s requirements and compliance deadlines. Operators should verify serial number applicability first.

1. Verify applicability. Confirm the aeroplane serial number appears in the AD Applicability list. The AD applies only to the enumerated Model 737-800 serial numbers; if a serial number is not listed, the AD does not apply to that aeroplane under the text supplied.

2. Record the AD’s effective date and compliance windows. The Amendment becomes effective on 25 October 2007, and Requirement 8 (terminating retrofit) must be completed within 120 days after that effective date. Visual checks accomplished before the effective date require reporting within seven days after the effective date; checks after the effective date require reporting within seven days of the inspection.

3. Implement mandatory visual checks (Requirement 1). Until the terminating retrofit is done, perform visual checks of the spoilers to determine spoiler position after every landing and after any rejected take-off. The visual check must specifically determine whether any spoiler is in the up position while the speedbrake handle is down. Checks may be performed by qualified personnel or by flight crew. Enter each check into the aircraft records showing compliance with the AD.

4. Prepare for immediate corrective action (Requirement 2). If any spoiler is found improperly stowed (up with speedbrake handle down) during any visual check, plan to replace the flight spoiler actuator with P/N P665A0001-01 or higher dash number before further flight. Use one of the approved methods: the AMM “Flight Spoiler Actuator Removal” and “Flight Spoiler Actuator Installation” tasks in Chapter 27-61-51 are listed as approved methods. If proposing an alternative method, secure approval from the Manager, Seattle ACO.

5. Conduct operational tests after maintenance (Requirement 3). After any maintenance action that operates the spoiler system, conduct an operational test of the speedbrake control system until the retrofit is completed. The AMM Chapter 27-62-00 “Speedbrake Control System Operational Test” is specified as an approved method. Record the test results in the maintenance records.

6. Replace after failed operational test (Requirement 4). If an operational test finds any spoiler fully extended when the speedbrake handle is down, or fully retracted when the handle is up, replace the flight spoiler actuator per Requirement 2 before further flight.

7. Update MMEL/MEL and operational procedures (Requirement 5). For SFP-equipped 737-800 aeroplanes, remove/MODIFY reliance on MMEL Item 27-7 "Auto Speed Brake System" since the AD declares it no longer applicable. Update operator MEL(s), dispatch and crew briefing procedures to reflect this change.

8. Control spares inventory (Requirements 6 and 9). Remove P/N P665A0001-00 from available replacement spares and prohibit its installation on any aeroplane. Ensure procurement orders specify P/N P665A0001-01 or higher dash number only.

9. Report jam incidents to Boeing (Requirement 7). If any spoiler is found improperly stowed during a visual check, report aeroplane serial number, jam position, spoiler panel number or wing position, date of visual check, and flight hours accumulated on the aeroplane to Boeing electronically via the Boeing Communications System (BCS) in the timeframe prescribed by the Compliance section: within seven days after the effective date for visual checks performed before the effective date, or within seven days after the inspection for checks performed after the effective date.

10. Plan and perform terminating retrofit (Requirement 8). Within 120 days after the AD’s effective date, install P/N P665A0001-01 or higher dash number flight spoiler actuators in all eight flight spoiler positions using the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-27A1283, dated 3 April 2007. Once installation in all eight positions is done, the Requirement 1 repetitive visual checks and Requirement 3 operational checks are no longer necessary.

11. Accept credit for prior compliant work. If a P/N P665A0001-01 (or higher) actuator was previously installed in accordance with the requirements of the AD at Amendment 1, that installation is acceptable to meet the AD requirements for that position. Ensure documentation of such prior work is retained.

12. Maintain auditable records. Log all visual checks, operational tests, replacements, compliance with the Boeing service bulletin, approvals from the Manager, Seattle ACO (where applicable), and reports to Boeing in the aircraft maintenance and compliance records. Ensure entries show dates, personnel, serial numbers and any parts installed to provide an auditable trail.

13. Coordinate FAA approvals as required. For replacement or testing methods that need specific approval, initiate and maintain communications with the Manager, Seattle ACO to secure necessary approvals before carrying out non-AMM or non-service-bulletin methods.

14. Train crews and maintenance staff. Ensure flight crews and maintenance personnel understand the visual-check procedure, the meaning of "before further flight" actions, the reporting requirements, and the parts prohibition. Confirm familiarity with the AMM tasks and Service Bulletin instructions referenced in the AD.

Following these steps aligns operator actions with each Requirement and with the AD’s compliance timelines. The Directive’s terminating retrofit is the single most effective way to remove the ongoing inspection and test burden; operators should plan parts procurement and maintenance scheduling accordingly.