AD/B727/196 - Fuel Tank Float Switches

The Directive rests on a small set of operational and technical concepts that determine what actions are mandatory and how they must be carried out.

• Applicability: The instrument applies to an identified list of Boeing 727-series aeroplane models (Model 727, 727C, 727-100, 727-100C, 727-200 and 727-200F). The Directive’s requirements are therefore aircraft-model specific rather than owner- or operator-specific in nomenclature. Applicability is stated at the start of the Directive.

• Detection and verification: The first two requirements establish a two-stage screening process. Requirement 1 mandates an inspection of the wing and auxiliary fuel tanks to determine whether any float switches are present, but explicitly permits a records review "instead of an inspection" where the presence of a float switch can be "conclusively determined" from the maintenance records. Requirement 2 requires identification of the float switch model if any float switch is present, and likewise permits a records review to determine the identity where it can be done conclusively. These provisions create a procedural pathway that accepts documentary evidence as an alternative to physical intrusion when the records provide conclusive proof.

• Remedial interventions linked to model identity: The required remedial action depends on the float switch model found. If the installed float switch is other than an Ametek Model F8300-146, the Directive requires installation of a liner system inside the float switch electrical cable conduit in accordance with Boeing ASB 727-28A0127 (Requirement 3). If an Ametek Model F8300-146 is installed, the Directive requires replacement of the float switch with "a new switch" and installation of the same liner system per the ASB (Requirement 4). Thus the policy differentiates between the Ametek Model F8300-146 and all other switch models in terms of required replacement.

• Prohibition on specific replacement spares: Requirement 5 prohibits the installation of Ametek Model F8300-146 float switches "in any fuel tank on any aeroplane as a replacement spare" as of the Directive’s effective date. The Directive therefore not only requires removal of certain installed parts, it prevents the future reintroduction of that specific part as a spare.

• Reference to manufacturer service instructions: The Directive makes adherence to Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-28A0127 mandatory for the technical execution of liner installation and switch replacement, by specifying that the work must be done "in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 727-28A0127, dated 26 August 2004." Note 1 explains the organization of that ASB into nine work packages covering six fuel tank configurations, and the Directive imports both the content and the organisational flexibility of the ASB into the compliance regime.

• Temporal structure and immediate operational constraint: The Directive uses two different timing devices. For a full fleet screening, Requirement 1 provides a 48-month window from the effective date (29 September 2005). For the subsequent steps where float switches are present, Requirements 2, 3 and 4 are all required "before further flight" after the inspection/determination. This combination permits a deferred general inspection while imposing immediate action when an inspection or records review reveals an installed float switch that requires remediation.

• Safety rationale: The Background records the causal concerns motivating the Directive: contamination of the float switch by moisture or fuel and chafing of float switch wiring against the fuel tank conduit, which could create an ignition source within the fuel tank and thereby risk fire or explosion. The Directive therefore targets three linked failure modes , contamination, mechanical chafing and resulting ignition risk , by insulating the wiring (liner system) and removing a specific float switch model from operational circulation.

The Directive directly names the set of Boeing 727-series aeroplane models to which it applies: Model 727, 727C, 727-100, 727-100C, 727-200 and 727-200F. The Directive’s stated requirements therefore impose actions on the parties who are responsible for those aeroplanes’ continuing airworthiness and maintenance. The text does not list particular airlines, lessors, owners or maintenance organisations by name; it sets obligations in terms of the physical asset (the applicable aeroplane models) and the maintenance status of the fuel tanks and their float switch installations. Practically, the following categories of actors are implicated by the Directive’s text and structure.

• Operators and owners of the affected model aeroplanes: The Directive requires inspection or records review (Requirement 1), identification of installed float switch models (Requirement 2), liner installation (Requirement 3), replacement of a specific model (Requirement 4) and a prohibition on installing a specific model as a replacement spare (Requirement 5). These are maintenance actions that must be undertaken by or arranged by the person responsible for the aeroplane’s airworthiness; therefore owners and operators of the listed aircraft models will be the parties who must ensure the inspections and work are done within the timeframes set.

• Maintenance providers and certificated maintenance organisations: The Directive requires physical work inside wing and auxiliary fuel tanks and installation of liner systems in cable conduits "in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions" of a Boeing ASB. That implies involvement of personnel competent to carry out fuel tank work and to follow Boeing ASB procedures. The ASB’s division into nine work packages and six fuel tank configurations (Note 1) also creates a coordination role for maintenance providers, who must identify applicable work packages per aeroplane and execute them.

• Parts suppliers and stock controllers: Requirement 5 states that "Ametek Model F8300-146 float switches may not be installed in any fuel tank on any aeroplane as a replacement spare" as of the Directive’s effective date. Parts managers, suppliers and logistics personnel responsible for spares provisioning will therefore be affected in terms of acceptance, inventory control and substitution of replacement parts. Existing inventories of the prohibited spare model will have to be treated in light of that mandate; the Directive itself does not state the required disposition for existing spares, only the prohibition on installation as a replacement.

• Regulatory actors referenced by the Directive: The Directive is issued by the Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (signed by James Coyne) and it references Boeing ASB 727-28A0127 and FAA AD 2005-16-07 Amdt 39-14212. The inclusion of the manufacturer’s ASB and the FAA AD situates the Directive in a network of manufacturer instructions and foreign regulatory actions that are relevant to the implementers.

• Scheduling and operational planners: The compliance timing produces different impacts on operations. Requirement 1 allows up to 48 months to determine the presence of float switches, which gives fleet managers time to schedule inspections. However, once a determination is made under Requirement 1 that a float switch is present, the subsequent steps (Requirements 2 to 4) must be completed "before further flight" after the inspection or determination. This imposes an operational constraint requiring immediate remedial work where an inspection reveals non-compliant installations, affecting dispatch decisions and maintenance scheduling.

The Directive does not explicitly allocate costs or penalties in the text provided. It therefore does not name who pays or how enforcement is to be carried out; the parties above are the ones who will in practice bear the operational, maintenance and parts costs of compliance and who must ensure the technical actions occur in line with the specified timelines and ASB instructions.

The Directive creates a set of affirmative duties and one categorical prohibition. It does not set out express rights or appeal mechanisms in the text supplied. The duties and constraints are as follows, phrased in the language and sequence used in the Directive.

• Duty to inspect or to review records (Requirement 1): Within 48 months of the Directive’s effective date (29 September 2005), the responsible party must "inspect the wing and auxiliary fuel tanks to determine if any float switches are present." The Directive permits a jurisdictionally equivalent documentary alternative: "Instead of an inspection of the fuel tanks, a review of aeroplane maintenance records is acceptable if the presence of any float switch can be conclusively determined from that review." The duty is therefore to reach a conclusive determination about presence or absence of float switches either via physical inspection or via documentation review.

• Duty to identify the float switch model (Requirement 2): If any float switch is present, the Directive requires an identification of the float switch model. Again, the Directive allows identification by maintenance records in lieu of physical inspection "if the identity of the float switch can be conclusively determined from that review." The temporal requirement for Requirement 2 is "before further flight, after the Requirement 1 inspection/determination." Thus identification is a prerequisite for any remedial action and must be completed immediately after any inspection or records determination that finds a float switch.

• Duty to install a liner system where installed switch is not Ametek F8300-146 (Requirement 3): If a float switch other than an Ametek Model F8300-146 is installed, the Directive requires installation of "a liner system inside the float switch electrical cable conduit in the fuel tanks in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 727-28A0127, dated 26 August 2004." The Directive requires completion of this task "before further flight, after the Requirement 2 inspection/determination."

• Duty to replace Ametek F8300-146 switches and install liner (Requirement 4): If any Ametek Model F8300-146 float switch is installed, the Directive requires replacement "with a new switch and install a liner system inside the float switch electrical cable conduit in the fuel tanks in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of ASB 727-28A0127." This replacement and liner installation must be done "before further flight, after the Requirement 2 inspection/determination." The Directive does not specify the replacement switch make or model beyond stating "a new switch."

• Prohibition on installing Ametek Model F8300-146 as a replacement spare (Requirement 5): The Directive explicitly states "Ametek Model F8300-146 float switches may not be installed in any fuel tank on any aeroplane as a replacement spare." Compliance with this prohibition is required "as of the effective date of this Directive." The Directive thereby creates a forward-looking ban on use of that specific spare model in fuel tanks.

• Duty to follow Boeing ASB instructions (throughout Requirements 3 and 4): The Directive makes the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing ASB 727-28A0127 the required technical standard for installation of the liner system and for the replacement process. Note 1 clarifies that the ASB segregates work into nine work packages for six fuel tank configurations and that these packages "do not have to be completed sequentially," permitting flexibility in execution, but also imposing the duty that "all work packages, as applicable for each fuel tank configuration, must be done to complete the requirements of this Directive." Practically, the duty is both substantive (install liner, replace switch where required) and procedural (do the work as set out in the ASB and complete all applicable work packages).

The Directive does not set out express procedural rights such as an explicit right to apply for exemption or deferral in the text supplied. It also does not specify who may carry out the inspections and modifications, beyond the ASB reference which directs how the work must be done. Rights to rely on maintenance records as an alternative to inspection are, however, explicitly recognised in Requirements 1 and 2.

The text of the Directive supplied does not contain explicit penalty provisions, monetary fines, administrative sanction mechanisms or criminal sanctions. It is an Airworthiness Directive that prescribes mandatory technical and procedural requirements; however the Directive itself does not state the enforcement tools that will be used should a person fail to comply. The document does identify the issuing authority role: it is signed by James Coyne, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, dated 18 August 2005, and it specifies an effective date of 29 September 2005. Beyond those facts, the Directive does not set out express mechanisms for detecting non-compliance, the administrative consequences of non-compliance, or appeal procedures.

The Directive’s structure nonetheless contains embedded compliance controls and immediate operational constraints that will create practical enforcement points. The use of "before further flight" for Requirements 2, 3 and 4 creates an operational cutoff: if a float switch is identified during the inspection or records review as requiring remedial action, that remedial action must be completed before the aircraft is permitted to fly again under the terms of the Directive. That wording therefore makes compliance a precondition to further flight in those circumstances, which in practical terms links compliance to dispatch and airworthiness determinations made by operators and maintenance organisations. Similarly, the 48-month deadline for Requirement 1 imposes a fleet-level scheduling constraint for initial screening.

The Directive also imports tiered technical standards by reference to Boeing ASB 727-28A0127, and to the FAA AD 2005-16-07 Amdt 39-14212 (the latter cited in Note 2). Where a regulatory instrument mandates compliance with specific manufacturer instructions or references a foreign authority’s AD, those references become the standards against which technical compliance will be measured. The Directive’s requirement that liner installations and replacements be accomplished "in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions" of the named ASB places the ASB’s procedural and technical steps at the centre of what constitutes compliant work.

Given the absence of penalty text in the document, any enforcement, sanctioning or oversight measures would be administered under the broader regulatory framework within which the Directive operates; however those broader mechanisms and penalties are not stated in the AD as supplied. The practical enforcement levers evident in the AD text are operational (flight permissibility linked to the "before further flight" obligation), technical (mandatory use of Boeing ASB instructions and work-package completion), and temporal (48‑month and effective-date deadlines). Any formal penalties, suspension mechanisms, or administrative procedures applied in practice would come from regulatory processes outside the AD text provided.

The Directive explicitly imports and references technical instruments and foreign regulatory action, thereby creating an interaction between Australian regulatory direction and manufacturer and foreign regulator materials. The AD requires work to be performed "in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 727-28A0127, dated 26 August 2004." In doing so the Directive converts the recommended or instructional content of a Boeing ASB into a mandatory compliance standard for the specified repairs and modifications. Note 1 describes how the Boeing ASB structures the work across nine work packages and six fuel tank configurations, and the Directive adopts that structure while retaining flexibility: work packages need not be sequential and may be done independently or simultaneously, but all applicable work packages must be completed to meet the Directive’s requirements.

The AD also explicitly references an FAA Airworthiness Directive: Note 2 states "FAA AD 2005-16-07 Amdt 39-14212 refers." That creates a cross-reference to the United States Federal Aviation Administration’s action on the same safety issue. The Directive therefore sits in a network of instruments where the Australian regulator has taken the safety concern addressed by Boeing and the FAA and has imposed mandatory obligations for the specified models on Australian-regulated aircraft. The AD does not elaborate the legal hierarchy between these instruments; it simply incorporates the ASB’s technical instructions and notes the FAA AD exists.

The Directive is silent on how it interacts with other domestic Australian aviation laws and regulations in the supplied text. It does not quote or amend any provisions of primary legislation or provide cross-references to Civil Aviation Regulations or other statutory instruments in the text provided. It does, however, effect operational constraints that will intersect in practice with other regulatory obligations held by operators and maintenance organisations, such as airworthiness certification and maintenance record-keeping, because the AD imposes requirements "before further flight" and permits records review as an alternative to physical inspection where conclusions are "conclusive." These features imply that an operator’s airworthiness determinations, maintenance release practices and record systems will be the practical junctions where this Directive intersects with broader domestic regulatory duties, even though the AD text itself does not spell out those cross-references.

Finally, the Directive’s stated Background risk , contamination and chafing creating a potential ignition source inside the fuel tank , links the technical requirements to a safety rationale that other regulators and manufacturers also address, as evidenced by the FAA reference. The Directive therefore forms part of an international safety response chain for a shared equipment type, imposing Australian-specific mandatory actions while relying on Boeing’s ASB for technical detail and acknowledging the FAA’s corresponding AD.

The text supplied presents a single instrument: Airworthiness Directive AD/B727/196, dated 10/2005, signed by James Coyne, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority on 18 August 2005, with an effective date of 29 September 2005. The document shows the AD number, title ("Fuel Tank Float Switches"), applicability, requirements, compliance timings, notes and background. It cites Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-28A0127 dated 26 August 2004 and references FAA AD 2005-16-07 Amdt 39-14212 in Note 2.

There is no amendment log, revision history, superseding AD number, or later amendment language contained in the supplied text. The Directive does not record any prior AD that it amends, nor does it include any "Amendment" clause such as rescission or replacement. The dates that do appear are the Boeing ASB date (26 August 2004), the signature date of the CASA Delegate (18 August 2005), and the AD effective date (29 September 2005). The document itself is styled AD/B727/196 (10/2005), which identifies it as the AD number and the month/year of issuance, but contains no entries indicating subsequent amendments or revocations.

Note 1 and Note 2 are internal annotations advising implementers about the ASB work-package structure and the FAA AD reference; they are not presented as amendments. The absence of an amendment history in the supplied text means that, for the purposes of this analysis and any compliance action taken by parties relying solely on this document, this AD should be treated as the operative instrument as issued on the dates shown, with no later in-text modifications recorded.

Practically, parties should verify that they hold the most current version of the AD and the referenced Boeing ASB, and should check for any subsequent ADs, revisions or regulatory guidance issued after the effective date, but such subsequent materials are not included in the text supplied and therefore are outside the scope of this document’s internal amendment history.

The text of the AD contains no information about litigation, legal challenges, judicial review, or administrative appeals related to AD/B727/196. It does not reference any court proceedings, disputes, or determinations that have arisen in relation to the Directive, nor does it cite any case law. The supplied document is a standalone issuance from the Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority and contains technical and compliance provisions without noting any disputes.

Because no litigation history is included in the instrument, the document does not record precedents, appellate decisions or enforcement cases that would clarify how the AD has been interpreted in contested settings. The lack of litigation details in the text means that any practitioner or affected party seeking to understand how this AD has been applied in contested circumstances would need to seek external records (for example regulator enforcement files, court or tribunal dockets, or legal databases) that are not part of the AD as supplied. None of those external materials are provided in the text; therefore this section records only that the AD itself does not include or summarise any litigation history.

If compliance disputes or enforcement actions exist in practice, they are not reflected here. Users of this analysis should treat the AD’s text as silent on litigation outcomes and should not infer the existence or absence of litigation solely from the AD document presented.

The Directive’s wording contains several provisions and structural features that can create operational pitfalls if overlooked. The following points identify specific practical traps and the precise textual source of each.

• Deferred fleet-wide inspection but immediate remedial timing: Requirement 1 permits up to 48 months from the effective date to determine whether float switches are present. However, Requirements 2, 3 and 4 are triggered by a positive finding and require action "before further flight, after the Requirement 1 inspection/determination." That structure allows an aircraft to remain in service until inspected, but once an inspection or conclusive records review identifies a float switch, remedial action must be completed before the aeroplane may fly again. The operational implication is that scheduling an inspection near the end of the 48-month window risks immediate grounding for any aircraft where a float switch is found, unless parts and qualified personnel are pre-arranged. The text of Requirements 1-4 creates this sequence.

• Records review must be "conclusive": Both Requirement 1 and Requirement 2 allow a review of aeroplane maintenance records "instead of an inspection" provided the presence or identity of any float switch "can be conclusively determined from that review." The word "conclusively" imposes a higher documentary standard than a mere probabilistic inference. Maintenance records that are ambiguous or incomplete will not be sufficient under the AD text, and a physical inspection will be required in that case. Parties that attempt to shortcut inspections with inconclusive record checks risk non-compliance under the AD’s precise wording.

• Work packages are not sequential but all applicable must be completed: Note 1 explains that Boeing ASB 727-28A0127 divides the work into nine work packages for six fuel tank configurations, and that "the work packages do not have to be completed sequentially" and "each work package can be done independently or simultaneously." However the Note also requires that "all work packages, as applicable for each fuel tank configuration, must be done to complete the requirements of this Directive." Implementers could incorrectly assume that partial completion of work packages or selective performance is sufficient; the AD requires completion of all work packages applicable to the configuration.

• Replacement switch description is minimal: Requirement 4 directs that any installed Ametek Model F8300-146 float switch be "replaced with a new switch" and have a liner installed in accordance with the ASB. The Directive does not specify the exact make and model to be used as the replacement ("new switch" is undefined in the AD text). Implementers must therefore rely on Boeing ASB instructions or other authoritative maintenance guidance to select the correct replacement part, and cannot infer the replacement specification solely from the AD text.

• Immediate prohibition on installing Ametek Model F8300-146 as a replacement spare: Requirement 5 states that Ametek Model F8300-146 float switches "may not be installed in any fuel tank on any aeroplane as a replacement spare" as of the AD effective date. The Directive does not state what must be done with existing spares inventories of that model, or whether disposal, return to supplier, or reclassification is required. Parts managers may assume that existing installed units must be removed (which the AD requires when installed), but the AD does not instruct how to treat uninstalled stock beyond prohibiting installation; implementers must therefore create internal procedures to manage spares in compliance with the prohibition.

• Scope limited to specified models: The AD’s applicability list is precise. Operators of non-listed Boeing types or other makes might assume similar action is required; the AD as written applies only to the listed 727-series models. Conversely, operators of the listed models who operate in multiple jurisdictions should note that the AD references FAA AD 2005-16-07, which may have slightly different scopes or technical prescriptions. The AD text itself binds only the listed models.

• Tension between operational needs and "before further flight": The phrase "before further flight" imposes a binary decision point for aircraft that are found to have non-compliant equipment. Organisers of maintenance must therefore anticipate the need for immediate access to the ASB work packages, qualified personnel and parts to avoid extended grounding. The Directive does not provide a graded compliance tolerance once a non-conforming float switch is discovered.

• Technical reliance on Boeing ASB: The AD mandates that liner installation and replacement be done in accordance with Boeing ASB 727-28A0127. If implementers do not secure the exact ASB revision cited (26 August 2004) or misunderstand which work packages apply to their fuel tank configuration, they risk doing non-compliant work even if they effect some modification. Note 1 clarifies the structure but not the content; therefore careful cross-checking of the ASB and its nine work packages is essential.

Each of these "gotchas" derives from explicit wording in the Directive, the Notes and the Requirements. They are practical points that can create compliance risk if the precise textual conditions,timings, the "conclusive" threshold for records, the work-package completeness requirement, and the immediate prohibition on spare installation,are not followed to the letter.

The Directive itself sets out a clear sequence for compliance; implementers should execute the steps in the order the AD contemplates and document each determination. The following is a practical, source-grounded step-by-step compliance checklist and operational guidance based strictly on the Directive text and its Notes.

1. Confirm applicability: Verify that the aeroplane is one of the listed models: Model 727, 727C, 727-100, 727-100C, 727-200 or 727-200F. The AD applies only to these model types.

2. Plan and schedule the Requirement 1 inspection or records review: Requirement 1 must be completed "within 48 months after the effective date of this Directive." The effective date is 29 September 2005. The Requirement permits an alternative to physical inspection: "a review of aeroplane maintenance records is acceptable if the presence of any float switch can be conclusively determined from that review." You must therefore either schedule a physical inspection of the wing and auxiliary fuel tanks or undertake a records audit that is sufficiently thorough to reach a conclusive determination of presence or absence of float switches. Ensure record audit procedures are capable of reaching "conclusive" outcomes, and document the rationale if relying on records so that the determination is traceable.

3. If a float switch is present, perform Requirement 2 identification immediately: Requirement 2 must be done "before further flight, after the Requirement 1 inspection/determination." Identify the float switch model; the AD permits identification by maintenance records "if the identity of the float switch can be conclusively determined from that review." Keep identification evidence on file. Because Requirement 2 is temporally immediate after a positive finding, ensure personnel and processes enable rapid identification to avoid prolonged grounding.

4. Apply the remedial path according to the identified model:

   • If the installed float switch is not an Ametek Model F8300-146, then Requirement 3 mandates installation of a liner system inside the float switch electrical cable conduit in the fuel tanks "in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 727-28A0127, dated 26 August 2004." This must be completed "before further flight" after the identification.
   • If the installed float switch is an Ametek Model F8300-146, Requirement 4 mandates replacement of the float switch "with a new switch" and installation of a liner system as per the Boeing ASB. The replacement and liner installation must be completed "before further flight" after the identification.

5. Secure and follow the Boeing ASB: The AD makes the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing ASB 727-28A0127 mandatory for the technical execution of the liner installation and switch replacement. Obtain the exact ASB (26 August 2004) and follow the Accomplishment Instructions. Note 1 describes that the ASB is divided into nine work packages for six fuel tank configurations, and that work packages "do not have to be completed sequentially" but that "all work packages, as applicable for each fuel tank configuration, must be done." Therefore: identify which of the six fuel tank configurations applies to your aeroplane; determine which of the nine work packages are applicable; and complete all those applicable work packages in accordance with the ASB.

6. Address spare parts management: Requirement 5 establishes that "Ametek Model F8300-146 float switches may not be installed in any fuel tank on any aeroplane as a replacement spare" as of the AD’s effective date. Update spares provisioning and acceptance procedures to prevent installation of that model. Document any decisions about existing inventory (disposition, quarantine, return-to-supplier) in internal procedures, recognising that the AD itself does not provide disposition instructions. Ensure maintenance personnel are briefed not to install the Ametek Model F8300-146 as a replacement spare.

7. Record-keeping and evidence: The Directive explicitly accepts maintenance records as a substitute for inspection where the records are conclusive. Therefore maintain clear records of: (a) the inspection or records review conducted under Requirement 1, with the factual basis for the "conclusive" determination where relevant; (b) the identification of float switch model under Requirement 2; (c) the technical work performed under Requirements 3 and 4, with reference to the specific ASB work packages completed; and (d) spares control actions taken under Requirement 5. The AD’s reliance on records as evidence means the records themselves are a central compliance artifact.

8. Operational coordination: Because Requirements 2-4 must be completed "before further flight" after a positive finding, pre-plan availability of trained personnel, tools and parts to perform liner installation or switch replacement to minimise aircraft downtime. Use the ASB’s work-package structure described in Note 1 to sequence tasks for fleet efficiency; multiple work packages can be done simultaneously so long as all applicable packages are completed for a given fuel tank configuration.

9. Verify compliance scope and timing for each aeroplane: Confirm each aircraft’s fuel tank configuration, match to the ASB work packages, and confirm the completed work packages correspond to the correct configuration. Track the 48-month window for Requirement 1 for the fleet as a whole and ensure no single aircraft falls outside the screening timeframe.

10. Retain proof of compliance and be prepared to show it to the issuing authority: Although the AD text does not set out enforcement procedures, the Directive is a mandatory instrument issued by the Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority. Keep the inspection findings, identification evidence, ASB-compliant work records and spares control logs available for regulatory review.

By following these steps exactly as the Directive describes,using the ASB for technical execution, respecting the "conclusively determined" standard for records, completing all applicable ASB work packages, and meeting the "before further flight" constraints where applicable,an operator or maintenance organisation will align their actions with the AD text. The AD does not specify how to obtain approval for alternate methods of compliance or how to treat existing uninstalled spare stock; where such questions arise, implementers should document decisions and seek specific regulatory guidance outside the AD text, because the AD itself provides no procedure for variances in the material provided.

James Coyne, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, signed the Directive on 18 August 2005, and the Directive’s effective date is 29 September 2005. The Boeing ASB and the FAA AD cited in the Directive are the technical and contextual materials the Directive relies upon and implements.