AD/AMD 50/35 - Flight Controls - Trailing Edge Flaps Rotating Rods

The AD applies to the fleet types listed under "Applicability": Mystere Falcon 50, Mystere Falcon 900 and Falcon 900EX aeroplanes. Any operator, owner, maintenance organisation, or authorised engineer responsible for the continuing airworthiness of these aeroplanes is directly affected because the AD imposes mandatory actions on those aeroplanes. The Requirement section prescribes technical actions to be taken in specific aircraft locations (LH/RH wing root compartment and LH and/or RH main landing gear compartment), which means the personnel performing periodic maintenance and inspections must follow the referenced Dassault Aviation Service Bulletins. The SB references in Table 1 tie the AD’s procedural expectations to manufacturer documentation: Dassault Aviation SB F50-468 (Mystere Falcon 50), SB F900-367 (Mystere Falcon 900) and SB F900EX-269 (Falcon 900EX), or later DGAC-approved revisions.

Although the AD does not explicitly name duties for certificated maintenance organisations versus individual licence holders, the technical nature of the requirements (verification of assembly, replacement in accordance with SBs, labelling per SBs) places practical responsibility on whoever conducts maintenance and airworthiness tasks for the affected aeroplanes. The effective date (3 August 2006) and the compliance timing create immediate scheduling obligations for operators who must either fit the verification and labelling into ongoing maintenance within 330 flight hours or 7 months, or be prepared to replace any damaged rod before further flight if detected. The AD also implicitly affects parts suppliers and logistics because replacement requires the appropriate rod parts and any associated brackets called for by the SBs; the AD does not supply parts or instructions concerning parts availability. The AD’s note that "EASA AD 2006-0115 dated 10 May 2006 refers" identifies a cross-jurisdictional reference point for operators with European compliance interfaces or multinational fleets, but the AD itself applies to the Australian-regulated scope defined in Applicability.

The AD sets out three mandatory duties for the operators of the affected models. First, verify correct assembly: the Requirement, point 1, directs verification of the correct assembly of the flap rotating rods and their retaining brackets in the LH/RH wing root compartment and in the LH and/or RH main landing gear compartment "as instructed in the respective Dassault Aviation Service Bulletins" (Table 1). Second, replace damaged rods: Requirement, point 2, mandates replacement "in accordance with the respective Dassault Aviation SB" where a rod is found damaged. Third, labelling: Requirement, point 3, mandates labelling of the rods and associated retaining brackets as the respective SB instructs.

The AD also sets different temporal duties. Under Compliance, point 1 and point 3 set the deadline for verification and labelling to "Within 330 flight hours or within 7 months from the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first." Compliance, point 2 requires replacement "Prior to further flight after the effective date of this AD." Thus an operator who discovers a damaged rod must not return the aircraft to service until the rod has been replaced following the relevant SB. The AD binds operators to the Dassault SBs identified in Table 1, but it also permits the use of later DGAC-approved revisions of those SBs.

The text does not articulate any rights such as appeal mechanisms, deferral options, or alternative compliance methods. It also does not contain an explicit safe harbour for compliance performed under other, equivalent procedures; instead the AD prescribes compliance "as instructed in the respective Dassault Aviation Service Bulletins" listed. The AD’s authority and signature identify CASA as the issuing entity (signed by James Coyne, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority), and the AD becomes effective on a stated date. The AD therefore imposes clear, time-bound duties on operators and maintenance personnel to carry out the inspection, replacement where necessary, and labelling in accordance with the specified manufacturer SBs.

The instrument itself does not set out explicit penalties or enforcement procedures within its text. The AD records the required actions, the compliance intervals and the effective date, and it is signed by "James Coyne, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority" with an effective date of 3 August 2006. The text does not include any provisions describing penalties for non-compliance, administrative enforcement steps, or the procedure for CASA inspections or enforcement activity. Similarly, the AD does not specify processes for seeking exemptions, alternative methods of compliance, or appeal routes.

Because the AD text does not record enforcement mechanisms or sanctions, practitioners reviewing this document for compliance implications must note that the AD communicates technical and timing obligations but does not itself include enforcement language. The absence of penalties or enforcement text in the body of the AD means that any regulatory or legal consequences for non-compliance are not contained in this instrument as published. The AD does, however, make the actions mandatory by its form and clarity of direction: verification and labelling within 330 flight hours or 7 months, and replacement of damaged rods prior to further flight. The AD’s signature block and effective-date statement indicate formal issuance by CASA, but the AD does not describe the downstream regulatory steps that CASA or others might take to enforce the obligation. The AD also records a reference to EASA AD 2006-0115, but it does not describe coordination mechanisms for enforcement between jurisdictions.

Practitioners should therefore treat the AD as a binding technical directive as to what must be done on the affected aeroplanes but should not expect to find in this instrument a catalogue of enforcement tools or sanctions. The AD’s text leaves those matters outside its scope; any questions concerning legal or regulatory sanctions, inspection visits, or corrective action notices would need to be sourced from other CASA regulatory instruments or statutory provisions not contained in the AD text.

The AD incorporates external technical material by reference and explicitly refers to related authority in a limited way. It directs the performance of specified tasks "as instructed in the respective Dassault Aviation Service Bulletins" listed in Table 1, and it expressly allows the use of "or later DGAC approved revision[s]" of those SBs. By doing this the AD makes manufacturer-issued SBs, conditioned on DGAC approval, the operative technical standard for compliance. The AD also includes a note stating that "EASA AD 2006-0115 dated 10 May 2006 refers," thereby identifying an international regulatory instrument that addresses the same or related unsafe condition. The AD therefore interacts procedurally with manufacturer SBs and with the EASA AD by reference, making those external documents relevant to the means of compliance.

Beyond those explicit references, the AD text itself does not cite or quote statutory provisions, enforcement powers, or other domestic regulatory instruments. It does not set out mechanisms for mutual recognition, nor does it explain how compliance with the Dassault SBs or with the referenced EASA AD would be recorded against Australian regulatory obligations. There is no text in the AD that specifies how deviations, exemptions, or equivalent compliance paths are to be handled; the AD instead imposes obligations by stating required actions and binding the operator to specific SB procedures or later DGAC-approved revisions.

In consequence, the AD functions as a regulatory node that channels operators to the manufacturer’s technical guidance (subject to DGAC approval) and signals harmonisation with an EASA instrument, but it leaves unexplained within the AD text the domestic legal mechanics of enforcement, approval of alternative procedures, or interplay with other CASA instruments. Any legal or regulatory interactions beyond the AD’s text , for example, how CASA would treat records, approvals, or alternative means of compliance , are not addressed in the AD itself and would need to be sought in other official CASA material or statutory texts outside the AD.

The AD text as provided contains no recorded amendment history. It appears as a standalone instrument with an assigned identifier AD/AMD 50/35 and an effective date of 3 August 2006. The body of the AD lists the applicable Dassault Aviation Service Bulletins in Table 1 and expressly permits "later DGAC approved revision[s]" of those SBs to be used for compliance, but the AD itself does not note any prior versions, supersessions, suspensions or later amendments to the AD text. There is a signature block showing "James Coyne, Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority" and a date of 21 June 2006, which indicates issue timing and the delegated authority but does not record subsequent modifications.

Because the instrument does not include an internal amendment trail, the AD as presented should be read as the active original text that became effective on 3 August 2006. The AD’s allowance for later DGAC-approved SB revisions shows a deliberate reliance on external, evolving technical material rather than on static procedures captured within the AD; that design choice reduces the need to amend the AD each time a manufacturer updates an SB, but it does not constitute an amendment history of the AD itself. If later AD amendments, superseding ADs, or revocations existed, they are not reflected in the AD document provided.

Practitioners requiring a full compliance history or an authoritative current status of AD/AMD 50/35 should note that the AD text here does not disclose whether the AD has later been amended, revoked or incorporated into subsequent regulatory instruments. The AD, as published in this document, does not provide a record of any amendments or a chronology of changes to its own terms.

The AD document contains no litigation history. There is no reference in the provided text to any judicial or administrative proceedings, disputes, challenges, or case law arising from this AD. The instrument records the safety issue that motivated the directive , a rotating rod installed on the wrong side during maintenance that subsequently broke in flight , and the corrective actions required, but it does not record any appeals, enforcement proceedings, or contested decisions related to the AD.

Because the AD itself is silent on litigation, the document does not provide any courthouse or tribunal citations, nor does it indicate that any party has sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, or damages arising from the AD’s issuance or implementation. The absence of litigation references in the text means the AD does not memorialise any precedent or judicial interpretation that might be useful for assessing legal risk or interpreting ambiguous provisions within the AD itself.

For readers concerned about judicial treatment of similar instruments, or the legal consequences of compliance or non-compliance, the AD as published offers no internal guidance. Any litigation history or adjudicative rulings that bear on AD/AMD 50/35 would need to be located outside the AD document in court records, administrative decisions, or regulatory enforcement files; such materials are not part of the AD’s text and are not referenced in the provided instrument.

Several practical and legal nuances within the AD deserve attention because they affect implementation risk and scheduling.

1. Differing compliance timings across actions: The AD separates the timeliness of tasks. Verification (Requirement 1) and labelling (Requirement 3) share the same compliance window: "Within 330 flight hours or within 7 months from the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first" (Compliance, points 1 and 3). By contrast, replacement of a damaged rod is required "Prior to further flight after the effective date of this AD" (Compliance, point 2). Operationally, this means if an inspection reveals damage, the aircraft may not continue in service until replacement is completed in accordance with the SB; conversely, an aircraft with no damage still must be verified and labelled within the longer-but-still-limited interval.

2. Scope of inspection locations and sides: The Requirement specifies inspections in both the LH/RH wing root compartments and in the LH and/or RH main landing gear compartment. The AD’s phrasing "LH and / or RH main landing gear compartment" implies that the main landing gear compartment inspection may be required selectively depending on installation, but practitioners must read the SB instructions closely. The AD does not provide technical diagrams or definitions for the precise inspection points; it defers that detail to the Dassault SBs.

3. Reliance on external SBs and DGAC approval: Compliance is expressly tied to Dassault SBs listed in Table 1, with the option to use later DGAC-approved revisions. A practical catch is that the AD requires operators to obtain and follow those SBs and to verify their DGAC approval status for later revisions. The AD does not supply the text of the SBs or the process for confirming DGAC approvals.

4. Parts and labelling instructions are by reference: The AD mandates replacement "in accordance with the respective Dassault Aviation SB" and labelling "as instructed in the respective Dassault Aviation SB". The AD does not include replacement part numbers, labelling templates, or explicit wording; if the SBs require particular parts that are scarce or lead times are long, the AD does not provide alternative compliance paths or temporary measures.

5. Cross-reference to EASA AD: The Note states "EASA AD 2006-0115 dated 10 May 2006 refers." The AD does not explain whether compliance with EASA AD 2006-0115 satisfies the CASA AD; operators cannot infer equivalence from the note alone and must consult the referenced documents.

6. No enforcement or appeal text in the AD: The AD contains no explicit enforcement provisions or appeal routes. For operators needing clarity on enforcement risk associated with non-compliance or on processes for approval of alternative measures, the AD itself provides no answers.

7. Single-sourced technical guidance: Because the AD channels compliance to manufacturer SBs, operators are dependent on the SBs' technical clarity and any DGAC approvals. The AD does not provide fallback instructions if the SBs are ambiguous, inconsistent across revisions, or silent on a particular local configuration.

Careful reading of the AD’s Requirement and Compliance paragraphs together with the exact SBs cited is necessary to avoid mis-timing inspections, failing to replace a damaged rod prior to further flight, or misinterpreting which compartments and sides require inspection.

Follow these actions in direct reliance on the AD text and the Dassault Aviation Service Bulletins listed in Table 1.

1. Identify affected aeroplanes. Confirm that the aeroplane is one of the models listed under Applicability: Mystere Falcon 50, Mystere Falcon 900 or Falcon 900EX.

2. Obtain the applicable Dassault Aviation Service Bulletin. Use the model-specific SB in Table 1: Mystere Falcon 50 , SB F50-468 (or later DGAC approved revision); Mystere Falcon 900 , SB F900-367 (or later DGAC approved revision); Falcon 900EX , SB F900EX-269 (or later DGAC approved revision). The AD requires that verification, replacement and labelling be done "as instructed in the respective Dassault Aviation Service Bulletins" (Requirement, points 1-3).

3. Schedule the verification and labelling tasks within the stated compliance window. The AD requires verification of correct assembly and labelling of the rods and associated retaining brackets "Within 330 flight hours or within 7 months from the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first" (Compliance, points 1 and 3). Plan maintenance slots so both verification and labelling can be completed within that interval.

4. Perform inspections in the specified compartments and sides. Follow the SB procedures to "Verify the correct assembly of the flap rotating rods and associated retaining brackets installed in the LH/RH wing root compartment and in the LH and / or RH main landing gear compartment" (Requirement, point 1). Inspect for incorrect orientation, contact points, signs of wear, and damage as defined in the SB.

5. If any rod is found damaged, replace it before returning the aeroplane to service. The AD is explicit: "If a rod is found damaged, replace this rod in accordance with the respective Dassault Aviation SB" and the compliance mandate for replacement is "Prior to further flight after the effective date of this AD" (Requirement, point 2; Compliance, point 2). Do not return the aircraft to flight without completing the SB-specified replacement.

6. Label rods and retaining brackets per SB instructions. The AD requires labelling as part of the corrective package: "Label the rods and associated retaining brackets as instructed in the respective Dassault Aviation SB" (Requirement, point 3). Ensure the labelling location, wording and method match the SB.

7. Check for DGAC-approved revisions. Where an SB revision is used, confirm that it is a "DGAC approved revision" as permitted by the AD’s Table 1 language ("or later DGAC approved revision"). The AD does not specify how to document DGAC approval; follow DGAC procedures and the SB meta-data to confirm approval status.

8. Note the effective date. The AD states "This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 3 August 2006." Use that effective date when calculating the compliance windows (Compliance points 1 and 3 reference "from the effective date of this AD").

9. Refer to EASA AD 2006-0115 where relevant. The AD contains a note stating that "EASA AD 2006-0115 dated 10 May 2006 refers." The AD does not state whether following EASA AD 2006-0115 is sufficient for CASA compliance; however, operators for whom EASA material is relevant should consult the EASA AD text and the listed Dassault SBs together for procedural detail.

10. Do not assume alternative methods are authorised by the AD text. The AD does not set out alternative means of compliance or exemptions; it requires actions "as instructed in the respective Dassault Aviation Service Bulletins" listed. Any proposal for an alternative method of compliance, deferment or equivalent procedure is not addressed in the AD and therefore would require separate authorisation outside the AD.

The AD prescribes the concrete technical measures, the SBs to follow, and the timing for completion. Compliance must therefore be implemented by following the model-specific SB procedures in the cited revisions (or later DGAC-approved revisions) and by meeting the stated deadlines for inspection, replacement where necessary, and labelling.