AD/A330/108 - Thales Pitot Probes

A pitot probe is a pressure-sensing device that measures total air pressure for airspeed indication. On the Airbus A330 series, three pitot probes are installed at positions 1 (Captain), 2 (First Officer), and 3 (Stand by). The directive differentiates between three part numbers: Thales Avionics C16195AA, Thales Avionics C16195BA, and Goodrich 0851HL. The Thales C16195AA is treated as the least robust; it is to be entirely removed and prohibited from any installation after the compliance date. The Thales C16195BA is an improved design but still considered inferior to the Goodrich probe in resistance to high-altitude ice crystals. The directive mandates a mixed configuration: Goodrich at positions 1 and 3, Thales C16195BA at position 2. This suggests a safety assessment that the first officer's position can tolerate the less robust probe, perhaps due to cross-referencing or redundancy. Alternatively, operators may install Goodrich probes at all three positions, eliminating the Thales probe entirely.

The directive uses service bulletins (SBs) issued by Airbus as the means of compliance. These SBs are detailed engineering instructions for removing and installing the probes. The directive specifies two SBs: A330-34-3206 (for certain models with C16195AA) and A330-34-3231 (for the BA removal). Operators may use later revisions of these SBs provided they are approved by EASA. This allows for updates and refinements without requiring a new AD.

The compliance timeline has two stages: the replacement actions (requirements 1 and 2) must be completed within four months after the effective date (i.e., by 7 January 2010). The prohibitions (requirements 3 and 4) take effect on 7 January 2010. This synchronisation means that after that date, any aircraft not compliant with the configuration requirements would be in breach of the prohibitions. The directive also references EASA AD 2009-0195, indicating alignment with European regulatory action. The delegated authority of CASA, as exercised by James Coyne, issues the directive under the Civil Aviation Act and regulations.

The concept of an airworthiness directive is a mandatory corrective action to address unsafe conditions. ADs are binding on aircraft owners and operators. They supersede any voluntary maintenance schedules. This AD is interim, meaning a permanent solution (potentially a new pitot probe design or revised flight procedures) may be forthcoming. The source does not indicate what triggered the AD beyond the reported occurrences and wind tunnel tests.

The directive directly affects operators and owners of the following Airbus A330 models with any serial number: A330-201, A330-202, A330-203, A330-223, A330-243, A330-301, A330-302, A330-303, A330-321, A330-322, A330-323, A330-341, A330-342, A330-343. The condition is whether Thales C16195AA probes are installed at any position, or Thales C16195BA probes at positions 1 and 3. The directive therefore applies to any airline, charter operator, or private owner of these aircraft types. This includes major airlines (e.g., Qantas, Jetstar, Virgin Australia at the time), leasing companies, and maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) organisations that hold air operator certificates or responsible for continuing airworthiness.

MRO organisations performing maintenance on these aircraft must be aware of the AD to ensure their work conforms. They must source the correct parts (Goodrich probes, or supply Thales C16195BA for position 2 if not doing all-Goodrich) and follow the approved service bulletins. Parts suppliers are affected indirectly: Thales faces reduced demand for its C16195AA probes and for C16195BA probes for positions 1 and 3; Goodrich (now part of United Technologies/Raytheon) may see increased demand for the 0851HL probe. The directive also impacts the supply chain for aftermarket parts and could create a temporary scarcity of Goodrich probes, driving up prices and lead times.

The compliance burden falls disproportionately on operators with large fleets of A330s, particularly those who previously used Thales probes. They must coordinate replacement schedules, possibly grounding aircraft if parts are unavailable. Operators located in regions with limited access to approved MRO facilities may face higher costs and logistical challenges. The directive also affects insurers, who may see increased premiums for non-compliant aircraft or require proof of compliance. Passengers are indirectly affected by potential flight disruptions during the compliance window, though the AD aims to reduce safety risks.

Regulators other than CASA, such as EASA and other national aviation authorities, may adopt similar directives. The directive acknowledges EASA AD 2009-0195. Operators under different jurisdictions must comply with their local versions.

Duties:
An operator's primary duty is to achieve compliance with requirements 1 through 4 within the specified timelines. For aeroplanes with Thales C16195AA probes installed at any position, the duty is to replace those probes as per the applicable service bulletin. For aeroplanes with Thales C16195BA probes at positions 1 and 3, the duty is to remove them and install Goodrich 0851HL probes at those positions. After replacement, the operator must ensure the resulting configuration matches the mandated mix (Thales BA at position 2, Goodrich at 1 and 3) or the alternative all-Goodrich configuration. Operators also have an ongoing duty not to install prohibited probes: after 7 January 2010, they must not install a Thales C16195AA probe at any position, nor a Thales C16195BA probe at positions 1 or 3. The duty extends to ensuring that any maintenance or parts procurement follows the approved service bulletins or later EASA-approved revisions.

The directive does not explicitly require reporting of compliance to CASA, but under normal Australian aviation regulation, the operator must record compliance in the aircraft's technical log and may be required to notify the regulator upon request.

Rights:
Operators have a right to choose between the mandated mixed configuration and the alternative method of replacing all three probes with Goodrich 0851HL. The alternative method is not mandatory but is explicitly approved as a compliant option. Operators also have the right to use later revisions of the service bulletins provided they are approved by EASA. This gives flexibility to incorporate any improved instructions that may simplify the work or address configuration differences. There is also an implied right to use other means of compliance if specifically approved by CASA, but the directive does not list any such process; it only mentions Airbus approved data for the all-Goodrich alternative. Operators may also seek an extension of the compliance period from CASA, though the directive does not specify that. The directive does not impose a duty to monitor further rulemaking, but operators should anticipate future ADs.

The directive does not grant any right to compensation for compliance costs. This is typical: regulatory safety mandates impose uncompensated costs on operators.

The source does not prescribe specific penalties for non-compliance with this directive. In general, under the Australian legislative framework governing airworthiness directives, failure to comply with a mandatory AD is a serious breach of the Civil Aviation Act 1988 and the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR). A contravention can attract civil penalties. For an individual, fines can reach thousands of penalty units; for a body corporate, higher multiples. Additionally, CASA may suspend or revoke an air operator certificate, aircraft registration, or maintenance approval. Non-compliance also exposes the operator to liability under the Civil Aviation (Carriers' Liability) Act if an accident occurs. Insurers may deny coverage for losses arising from non-compliant operations.

Enforcement is delegated to CASA, which can issue infringement notices, initiate civil proceedings, or in extreme cases, ground an aircraft. The directive itself is legally binding from its effective date (7 September 2009). The compliance date for replacements is 7 January 2010, and the prohibitions also take effect on that date. After that date, any aircraft found with a prohibited configuration is automatically in breach. Enforcement may be triggered by routine audits, spot checks, or incident investigations.

From an economic viewpoint, the penalty regime provides a strong incentive to comply promptly. The cost of non-compliance (potential grounding, fines, loss of licence) far outweighs the cost of replacement, making compliance a rational choice. However, small operators may be tempted to delay if parts are unavailable, but the regulatory risk remains high. The directive's interim label may also create a moral hazard: operators might defer full compliance if they believe a future AD will supersede this one or offer a different solution. Yet the prohibitions are clear and absolute; after 7 January 2010, any aircraft with a Thales C16195AA probe anywhere is illegal to operate.

The directive explicitly references EASA AD 2009-0195, noting that the EASA directive forms the basis for the CASA requirement. This alignment is common where an AD originates from the state of design (the A330 is designed in Europe). Under the Chicago Convention, Australia, as a member state, generally recognises ADs issued by the state of design (EASA). This directive effectively adopts the EASA AD with additional detail for Australian-registered aircraft. Operators with aircraft on the Australian register must comply with this domestic AD, even if they also operate under an EASA regulation.

The directive interacts with the Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR), particularly Part 39 (Airworthiness Directives) which governs the issuance, amendment, and compliance with ADs. The directive is issued under the delegation from CASA. The Civil Aviation Act 1988 provides the overarching legal authority. Failure to comply may also breach an operator's continuing airworthiness obligations under CASR Part 42 (for large aeroplanes) or Part 91 (general operating rules). For maintenance organisations, compliance with ADs is a necessary condition for maintaining Part 145 approval.

From a contractual perspective, the directive may affect lease agreements. Many aircraft leases require the lessee to maintain the aircraft in compliance with all mandatory ADs. Non-compliance could constitute an event of default. The lessor may require evidence of compliance and may pass on the cost of parts and labour through increased lease payments. The directive may also trigger warranty claims if the Thales probes were supplied as OEM equipment and later found defective; but the directive does not itself create a remedy.

The directive does not replace product liability law. If a Thales probe causes an accident, injured parties may sue Thales under common law for negligence or breach of Australian Consumer Law. The directive's findings (inferior performance) could be used as evidence in such litigation.

Finally, the directive complements international standards, such as ICAO Annex 8 (Airworthiness of Aircraft) and Annex 6 (Operation of Aircraft). Regulators in other countries where these aircraft are registered may issue equivalent ADs. Operators with international routes must ensure compliance with each local version.

This source is a discrete AD (AD/A330/108) with an effective date of 7 September 2009. The source does not include any amendment history or supersedure information. It does not reference any prior ADs that may have addressed the same issue. The background states that the actions are an interim measure and further rulemaking cannot be excluded, suggesting that the directive may be amended or replaced by a future AD. The source also notes that later revisions of the referenced service bulletins (A330-34-3206 Rev 01 and A330-34-3231) are acceptable for compliance if approved by EASA. This implies that the SBs themselves may be updated, but the AD as issued is the current requirement.

The directive was issued by the delegate of CASA on 2 September 2009. It is part of a numbered series (108) for the A330. Typical CASA ADs are numbered sequentially by aircraft type. There is no evidence in the source of any earlier related AD for the A330 with the same part numbers. It is possible that earlier ADs existed (e.g., for the A320 or A340 family, as the background mentions A340), but this source does not reference them. The note that EASA AD 2009-0195 refers also indicates that the European AD may have its own amendment history, but that is not detailed here.

Operators should be aware that the interim nature suggests that CASA or EASA may issue a superseding AD (e.g., requiring the all-Goodrich configuration permanently, or introducing a new probe design). They should monitor for further regulatory action. Compliance with this directive does not obviate the need to comply with any future AD.

The source contains no reference to any litigation or legal proceedings related to this directive or the underlying airspeed discrepancy issue. This is typical: airworthiness directives are regulatory safety mandates that are rarely challenged in court, as they are based on safety concerns and compliance is generally required for continued operation. However, the background references incidents that led to the AD: "occurrences have been reported on A330/340 family aeroplanes of airspeed indication discrepancies while flying at high altitudes in inclement weather conditions." These incidents may have been the subject of accident investigations (by ATSB or BEA) but the source does not name them. Notable A330 incidents involving pitot probes include the Air France Flight 447 accident in June 2009 (which involved an A330-200 with Thales probes), but the source does not mention that flight. The preliminary wind tunnel testing conducted in August 2009 is cited, but no litigation is referenced.

The absence of litigation does not mean none exists. It is possible that operators or suppliers challenged the economic burden of this AD, but the source does not record any such challenge. Given the precatory language ("precautionary measure"), a challenge may have been unlikely because the AD allows an alternative method. In practice, courts usually defer to aviation safety regulators on technical matters.

If a dispute arose (e.g., regarding the effectiveness of the all-Goodrich alternative or the validity of the test data), it would likely be heard in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) or Federal Court of Australia. However, no such case is cited in the source.

Several nuances in the directive could trip up operators and maintenance staff. First, the compliance timeline is not uniform. The replacement actions (requirements 1 and 2) must be completed within four months of the effective date (by 7 January 2010). But the prohibitions (requirements 3 and 4) also take effect on 7 January 2010. This means that an operator who completes a replacement on, say, 6 January 2010, still cannot have a prohibited probe installed after that date. In practice, the two timelines align, but an operator who replaces early (e.g., in September 2009) with a mixed configuration must ensure that they do not later install a prohibited probe inadvertently.

Second, the prohibited probes are different. After 7 January 2010, you cannot have a Thales C16195AA probe at any position. You also cannot have a Thales C16195BA probe at positions 1 or 3. But you can have a Thales C16195BA at position 2. This asymmetry might confuse: if an operator receives a loaned or replacement probe and does not check the part number, they could install a BA at position 1 by mistake. Also, if an operator chooses to do only the mixed configuration (Thales BA at pos 2, Goodrich at 1 and 3), they must ensure that no BA exists at 1 or 3. The directive does not explicitly require marking of probes, but careful documentation is essential.

Third, the alternative method (all Goodrich) is optional but seems simpler: no mixed configuration, no future sourcing of Thales BA probes. However, the directive says "in accordance with the instructions of Airbus approved data." This means using a service bulletin or other approval that allows all-Goodrich. If an operator wants to do all-Goodrich but cannot find the specific approved data (which may be a later revision or a different SB), they risk non-compliance. The directive does not reference a specific SB for all-Goodrich; it just says "Airbus approved data." Operators should verify with Airbus or CASA exactly which document constitutes approved data.

Fourth, the directive only addresses Thales probes. It does not require replacement of Goodrich probes. So if an operator already has Goodrich probes at all positions, they are already compliant with requirements 3 and 4, but they must still ensure they are not installing Thales probes. However, the directive does not mandate any action for Goodrich-only aircraft; they simply must not install Thales AA or BA incorrectly.

Fifth, the directive permits use of later revisions of the service bulletins "approved by EASA." This is a potential pitfall if an operator uses a later revision that is not yet approved by EASA, or if they use a revision approved by another agency (e.g., FAA). The directive explicitly requires EASA approval. So operators should check the approval status of any revision they use.

Sixth, the directive includes a background statement that Thales BA probes "have not yet demonstrated the same level of robustness to withstand high-altitude ice crystals as the Goodrich P/N 0851HL probe." that suggests that the BA probe at position 2 could become the subject of a future AD. The operator might consider preemptively replacing the BA at position 2 with Goodrich to avoid a second modification, but the current directive does not require that. This could be a gotcha of regulatory uncertainty: complying with the letter now may not preclude a follow-up requirement later.

Finally, the effective date is 7 September 2009, but the compliance clocks start from that date. Operators who read the directive after that date may have less than 4 months to comply. The source does not provide the date of issue (2 September 2009) as effective; it becomes effective on 7 September 2009. So the four month period is exactly until 7 January 2010.

To comply with AD/A330/108, an operator should follow this process.

Step 1: Determine applicability. Check whether the aeroplane is one of the listed models (A330-201 through -343). Record the serial number. If the aeroplane is not on the list, the directive does not apply. If it is, proceed.

Step 2: Conduct a configuration audit. Inspect the pitot probes installed at positions 1 (Captain), 2 (First Officer), and 3 (Stand by). Identify the part numbers. Record whether any Thales C16195AA probes are present. Record whether Thales C16195BA probes are present at positions 1 or 3.

Step 3: Choose a compliance path. Two options:

• Option A (default): Achieve a configuration of Thales C16195BA at position 2, Goodrich 0851HL at positions 1 and 3.
• Option B (alternative): Replace all three positions with Goodrich 0851HL probes.

Consider parts availability, cost, and future regulatory risk. Option B eliminates Thales probes entirely, potentially simplifying future compliance.

Step 4: Source parts. Order Goodrich P/N 0851HL probes. If using Option A, also ensure a Thales C16195BA probe is available for position 2 if not already installed. The directive does not require the Thales BA probe to be new; it can remain if already installed. But if any Thales BA is at position 1 or 3, it must be moved or replaced.

Step 5: Perform the work. Use the instructions in Airbus Service Bulletin A330-34-3206 Revision 01 (for aeroplanes with C16195AA probes, to replace them) or A330-34-3231 (for removal of BA probes). If the aeroplane has no AA probes but has BA at positions 1 and 3, only SB 3231 applies. Alternatively, use a later revision of these SBs if approved by EASA. For the all-Goodrich alternative, use Airbus approved data (e.g., a specific SB or engineering order). Ensure each replacement is documented in the aircraft maintenance log.

Step 6: Verify the final configuration. After work, confirm:

• No Thales C16195AA probe at any position.
• No Thales C16195BA probe at positions 1 or 3.
• If under Option A: position 2 has Thales C16195BA; positions 1 and 3 have Goodrich 0851HL.
• If under Option B: all three positions have Goodrich 0851HL.

Step 7: Record compliance. Enter the AD number, date of compliance, part numbers installed, and reference to the service bulletin used. Keep copies of the SBs and any alternative approval documents.

Step 8: Maintain ongoing compliance. After 7 January 2010, do not install any prohibited probes. When performing future maintenance or buying replacement probes, ensure the part numbers meet the requirements.

Step 9: Monitor for changes. The directive is interim. Monitor EASA and CASA for any superseding or amending ADs that may require additional actions. Consider subscribing to CASA's AD alerts.

The cost of compliance includes parts, labour, and potential aircraft downtime. For a fleet, coordination may be needed. The directive does not specify a form for reporting to CASA; normally compliance is evidenced by the aircraft's continued airworthiness records. CASA may check during routine audits.

The most efficient approach for operators with many affected aircraft may be to convert all to Goodrich probes, eliminating the need to manage two probe types and reducing the risk of future non-compliance. However, the upfront cost is higher. Operators should weigh that against the likelihood of a future AD requiring full conversion anyway.