The instrument defines a compact set of concepts that delimit who is in scope and what activities are regulated.

Designated system and Participants

• It applies to “the payment system operated within Australia known as the ATM system” designated on 10 December 2008 (Application, paragraph 2).
• Key participant categories are drawn from the ATM Access Standard: “Access Provider”, “Access Seeker”, “ATM Acquirer”, “ATM Issuer”, and “Direct Connector” (Application, definitions). The Regime ties legal effect to those definitions: several mandatory duties and pricing limits refer to these defined roles.

Services and fees

• Two services are central. The Direct Connection Service (definition referenced in the Application) is the service for which a Connection Charge may be levied; the Regime caps that Connection Charge at a Direct Connection Cap (Price of access, Connection Charge for providing the Direct Connection Service). The Direct Clearing/Settlement Service is separately carved out and, from 3 March 2009, cannot be charged between participants (Price of access, Connection Charge for providing the Direct Clearing/Settlement Service).
• “Interchange fee” is defined as a wholesale fee payable by an ATM Issuer to an ATM Acquirer when the issuer’s cardholder undertakes an acquired ATM transaction (Application, definitions). The instrument then tightly constrains when such wholesale fees may be paid (Interchange fees).

Exceptions and network structures

• The Regime recognises “one-way arrangements” and “ATM sub-networks” as legitimate exceptions to the general prohibition on interchange fees (Application, definitions; Interchange fees). An ATM sub-network is a component for which access is provided on a multilateral basis and for which there is a common multilateral interchange fee; the administrator or representative of such a sub-network must publish that fee and the rules for access (Transparency, paragraphs 2 and 3).

Supporting instruments and interpretative points

• The instrument expressly incorporates the ATM Access Standard developed and administered by AusPayNet with a commencement date of 1 October 2025 “as in force on that date” for defined-terms linkage (Application, definitions). It also invokes AusPayNet’s 2008 costs survey as the empirical basis for the initial Direct Connection Cap (Application, definitions; Price of access).
• The Regime contains an interpretative instruction: it must be interpreted in accordance with its objective to promote competition and efficiency in the payments system and “by looking beyond form to substance” (Application, paragraphs 3 and 4). It also contains a general duty provision that “Each participant in the ATM System must do all things necessary on its part to ensure compliance with this Access Regime” (Application, paragraph 1). A severability clause preserves remaining provisions if any part is invalid (Application, paragraph 2).

Transparency and administrative oversight

• Reporting deadlines for existing and new one-way arrangements are prescribed: existing arrangements must be reported to the RBA by 3 April 2009 and new arrangements within 30 days of entry (Transparency, paragraph 1). The RBA has explicit discretion to grant exemptions and must publish notice of grants (Exemptions, paragraphs 1 and 2).

Together, these concepts frame a regime that focuses on wholesale inter-participant pricing (connection, clearing/settlement, interchange), network structure (one-way versus multilateral sub-network), and public transparency and administrative oversight.

The Regime identifies and affects several distinct categories of market participants, each with different obligations and interests.

Access Providers and Access Seekers

• Access Providers and Access Seekers, terms given the same meaning as in the ATM Access Standard, are central. Access Providers offer Direct Connection Services and may levy a Connection Charge which is capped by the Regime. Access Seekers negotiate Connection Agreements and are therefore protected by the cap (Application, definitions; Price of access, Connection Charge for providing the Direct Connection Service).

ATM Issuers and ATM Acquirers

• ATM Issuers and ATM Acquirers, again defined in the ATM Access Standard, are the parties between which interchange fees operate. The Regime directly constrains who may pay or receive interchange fees, thereby affecting participants that have historically earned or paid wholesale interchange revenue (Application, definitions; Interchange fees).

Direct Connectors

• A Direct Connector is a participant that exchanges ATM transaction messages and clears and settles transactions using two or more direct connections. The Regime’s prohibition on charges for the Direct Clearing/Settlement Service will affect Direct Connectors’ cost recovery options (Application, definitions; Price of access, Direct Clearing/Settlement Service).

Operators, administrators and representatives of ATM sub-networks

• The instrument contemplates ATM sub-networks that operate on a multilateral basis with a common interchange fee. Administrators or representatives of such sub-networks must publish the common interchange fee and the access rules. That creates public disclosure obligations for network operators and any representative body (Transparency, paragraphs 2 and 3).

All participants in the ATM system

• The instrument imposes a catch-all compliance obligation: “Each participant in the ATM System must do all things necessary on its part to ensure compliance with this Access Regime” (Application, paragraph 1). That is a broad, affirmative duty that extends to any entity that qualifies as a participant under the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 or the ATM Access Standard.

Reserve Bank of Australia

• The RBA is an actor rather than an affected commercial participant. It has power to grant exemptions from the interchange and reporting requirements and to publish notices of exemptions. The RBA therefore has both oversight and discretionary regulatory functions under this regime (Exemptions, paragraphs 1 and 2).

Third parties and end users (indirectly)

• Cardholders and the public are not given direct rights under the instrument, but their interests are identified in the objective as matters the regime must have regard to: “the interests of current participants”, “future participants”, “the public interest”, and “financial stability of the ATM system” (Objective, 1-4). The instrument’s constraints on inter-participant pricing may indirectly affect cardholder access costs and ATM deployment decisions, although the Regime does not set prices charged to end users.

Who pays

• The instrument directly governs which participants may charge other participants. It caps Connection Charges levied by Access Providers and prohibits charges for Direct Clearing/Settlement Services, thereby shifting cost-recovery options away from inter-participant wholesale charges. Interchange fee restrictions change who can be a payer and a payee in interchange arrangements (Price of access; Interchange fees).

Who decides

• Commercial parties still negotiate Connection Agreements, but within the statutory cap for Connection Charges and subject to the Access Standard definitions. The RBA retains decision-making power to grant exemptions and publishes notices of those grants. Administrators of sub-networks decide and publish multilateral interchange fees and the access rules, but those fees must be common among members to fit within the exception (Transparency; Exemptions).

The text imposes affirmative duties, sets pricing rights and exceptions, and establishes reporting and publishing duties. The principal duties and rights follow from those provisions.

Affirmative compliance duty

• “Each participant in the ATM System must do all things necessary on its part to ensure compliance with this Access Regime” (Application, paragraph 1). That is a broad duty to take measures necessary to observe the instrument’s pricing, reporting and transparency requirements. The provision is general in scope and creates an operational obligation rather than a set of narrowly prescribed steps.

Connection Charge cap

• Access Providers retain the right to levy a Connection Charge for providing the Direct Connection Service, but they are constrained: the charge “must not exceed the Direct Connection Cap, calculated in accordance with paragraph 9 below, applying on the date the Connection Agreement is entered into” (Price of access, Connection Charge for providing the Direct Connection Service, paragraph 1). The Regime fixes the initial Direct Connection Cap at $76,700 excluding GST, derived as “the lowest estimated cost for providing a Direct Connection Service as measured in AusPayNet’s 2008 costs survey” (paragraph 2). This creates a statutory pricing ceiling applicable at the date of agreement.

No charge for Direct Clearing/Settlement Service

• From 3 March 2009, “no charge may be levied between participants in the ATM system for providing the Direct Clearing/Settlement Service” (Price of access, Connection Charge for providing the Direct Clearing/Settlement Service, paragraph 1). That removes the right of participants to levy inter-participant fees for that specific service.

Interchange fee prohibitions and exceptions

• Interchange fees are generally prohibited: “no interchange fee shall be paid between participants ... unless” one of two exceptions applies: (a) a one-way arrangement where a participant pays to access one and only one other participant’s ATMs, or (b) membership of an ATM sub-network where a common multilateral interchange fee is payable between members (Interchange fees, paragraphs 1 and 2). The Regime also restricts participants who pay under one-way arrangements from receiving interchange fees from other participants unless the receiving participant is in the same sub-network with a common fee (Interchange fees, paragraph 3).

Reporting obligations

• An ATM Acquirer receiving interchange fees under the permitted one-way arrangement must report that arrangement to the RBA by no later than 3 April 2009 for existing arrangements, or within 30 days of entry for new arrangements (Transparency, paragraph 1). This creates an administrative reporting duty tied to the timing of arrangements.

Publication obligations for sub-networks

• The administrator or representative of an ATM sub-network must publish the multilateral interchange fee and the rules governing access to the sub-network, either on its or a representative’s website or by making the information generally available by other means (Transparency, paragraphs 2 and 3). This imposes disclosure duties on network operators.

Exemption power and publication

• The RBA may grant exemptions from the interchange and reporting requirements where it is satisfied an exemption is appropriate having regard to the public interest, current and future participants’ interests and any other matters the RBA considers relevant (Exemptions, paragraph 1). When granting an exemption, the RBA must publish notice of the grant, the nature of the exemption and the identity of the participant(s) involved (Exemptions, paragraph 2).

Interpretation and severability rights

• The Regime directs readers to interpret it “in accordance with its objective” and “by looking beyond form to substance” (Application, paragraph 3). It also preserves remainder provisions where part of the Regime is invalid (Application, paragraph 2).

Rights left intact

• The instrument does not purport to regulate retail charges to cardholders, ATM placement decisions, or non-specified fees. Participants retain commercial bargaining on matters not covered by the caps, prohibitions and reporting rules, subject to their duty to ensure compliance with the Regime.

The instrument sets out obligations, reporting requirements and an RBA exemption power, but it does not itself specify enforcement sanctions, monetary penalties or adjudicative procedures. The available enforcement mechanisms and their contours must be inferred from the text and its relationship to the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998.

Express obligations without specified sanctions

• The Regime contains affirmative duties: participants “must do all things necessary on its part to ensure compliance with this Access Regime” (Application, paragraph 1). It also prescribes caps, prohibitions and reporting and publication obligations. The instrument does not, however, specify penalties, administrative fines or other sanctions for non-compliance within the text provided.

RBA oversight and publication

• The RBA is given an express administrative role: it receives mandatory reports of interchange arrangements, exercises discretion to grant exemptions from the interchange and reporting requirements, and must publish notice of any exemption granted (Transparency, paragraph 1; Exemptions, paragraphs 1 and 2). The RBA’s involvement creates an administrative oversight pathway for compliance monitoring and disclosure, but the Regime does not describe downstream enforcement steps the RBA will take if obligations are breached.

Interaction with the enabling Act

• The Regime is imposed under Section 12 of the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 (Application, paragraph 1). Enforcement mechanisms not specified in the Access Regime itself may be located in the enabling legislation. That means any penalties, investigative powers or sanctioning procedures the RBA may use are likely to derive from the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 rather than the Access Regime text. The Regime’s silence on sanctions points users to the enabling Act for enforcement detail.

Practical enforcement levers implied by the text

• Mandatory reporting by acquirers and mandatory publication by sub-network administrators create transparency that allows the RBA and market participants to detect non-compliance. The RBA’s exemption publication requirement also creates a public record against which market behaviour can be assessed. The combination of reporting, publication and RBA visibility is the instrument’s primary compliance architecture, rather than explicit in-regime penalties.

Operational uncertainty and dispute risk

• The broad duty to “do all things necessary” to ensure compliance, when combined with the interpretive instruction to “look beyond form to substance,” creates potential for dispute about what measures suffice to meet obligations. The instrument does not set out dispute-resolution processes for disagreement over cap calculation, the application of exceptions, or whether a particular arrangement meets the definition of a one-way arrangement or an ATM sub-network.

Enforcement implications for participants

• Because the regime alters revenue and cost recovery options (for example, by banning charges for direct clearing/settlement and significantly restricting interchange fees), non-compliance might take the form of surreptitious or non-transparent charges, informal side-payments, or contractual structures that attempt to replicate prohibited fees. The reporting and publication requirements are the mechanism designed to make such arrangements visible, but the instrument does not specify investigative or penal responses to circumvention.

In short, enforcement under this Access Regime is built primarily around reporting, publication and administrative oversight by the RBA, with substantive sanctioning power and procedural detail likely residing in the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 rather than in the instrument itself. The text as provided contains obligations and disclosure duties, but no express in-regime civil or criminal penalties.

The instrument situates itself as a statutory access regime made under the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 and explicitly cross-references the ATM Access Standard and AusPayNet materials. Its legal operation therefore sits within a layered regulatory and contractual landscape.

Enabling legislation

• The Regime is “imposed under Section 12 of the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998” (Application, paragraph 1). That means the primary legal authority for the instrument and any enforcement measures taken under its authority are grounded in that Act. The Regime itself does not reproduce the enabling Act’s powers, penalties, or procedural rules, and so any enforcement or appeal routes beyond reporting and publication obligations must be sought in the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998.

Incorporation of external standards and surveys

• The instrument pulls definitions and contractual concepts from the ATM Access Standard “developed and administered by AusPayNet with a commencement date of 1 October 2025, as in force on that date” (Application, definitions). It therefore creates legal dependability on the content of an external standard as of a particular commencement date. Terms such as Connection Agreement, Direct Connection Service, Direct Clearing/Settlement Service, ATM Acquirer, ATM Issuer and others are defined with reference to that Access Standard. Changes to the Access Standard after the referenced commencement date may affect the meaning of those terms if the Regime allows definitions to be read against later versions, but the text ties the notion to the standard “as in force on that date”.

• The Regime also uses AusPayNet’s 2008 costs survey as the factual basis for the initial Direct Connection Cap (Application, definitions; Price of access). By doing so, the instrument anchors a statutory price ceiling to a specific industry survey.

Limits and overlaps with contract law

• The Regime governs what participants may charge one another for specific inter-participant services. Contracting parties (for example, Access Providers and Access Seekers entering Connection Agreements) must comply with statutory limits in their commercial agreements. The Connection Charge cap applies “on the date the Connection Agreement is entered into” (Price of access, Connection Charge for providing the Direct Connection Service, paragraph 1), which creates a statutory constraint on private contract terms. Contractual clauses that purport to circumvent the cap or the prohibition on clearing/settlement charges would be inconsistent with the Regime.

Interface with competition and consumer law

• The instrument asserts an objective to “promote competition and efficiency in the Australian payments system” and lists the public interest and financial stability among matters to have regard to (Objective). While the Regime itself imposes specific pricing and transparency rules, it does not mention interaction with the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, the Australian Securities and Investments regime, or other statutory regimes. That means potential overlaps are possible,competition law may address anti-competitive conduct that is not directly covered by this Regime, and vice versa,but the Regime itself does not displace or mention other statutory duties. Users should therefore consider concurrent obligations under competition law and other sectoral regulations where relevant.

Delegated standards and operational rules

• The Regime’s reliance on the ATM Access Standard and on AusPayNet’s materials means that participants must interface with industry-administered standards when implementing obligations. For example, definitions of Direct Connection Service and Direct Clearing/Settlement Service are imported from the Access Standard; practical compliance will require review of that standard as it existed and as it is administered.

Reporting and public record

• The mandatory reports to the RBA about interchange arrangements and the RBA’s publication of exemptions create an administrative public record that may be relevant in regulatory actions taken under other laws. Because the Regime requires publication of sub-network fees and rules, that information will be available for scrutiny under other regulatory regimes or in commercial disputes.

Severability and interpretive principle

• The Regime contains a severability clause and an instruction to interpret “in accordance with its objective” and “by looking beyond form to substance” (Application, paragraphs 2 and 3). These features will affect how courts or regulators reconcile the Regime with other legal instruments and how they construe contractual or industry standard-based arguments.

In sum, the Regime is a statutory instrument that operates in concert with the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998, industry standards administered by AusPayNet, and general principles of contract and administrative law. The Regime sets constraints that commercial agreements must respect and creates reporting and publication obligations that can be used by the RBA and other actors to monitor compliance; detailed enforcement mechanisms are to be found in the enabling Act rather than in the text provided.

The instrument itself records a limited chronology and leaves the remainder of amendment history unspecified in the text provided.

Commencement and current force

• The Regime “originally came into force on 3 March 2009 and remains in force, as varied from time to time, until it is revoked by the Reserve Bank of Australia or it otherwise ceases to be in force in accordance with subsection 15(1) of the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998” (Application, paragraph 1 under that section). That records the initial commencement date and indicates that the Regime has been capable of variation since that date.

References to later instruments

• The instrument as presented cross-references the ATM Access Standard “with a commencement date of 1 October 2025, as in force on that date” (Application, definitions). That phrasing indicates that at least one later instrument or standard is relevant to the Regime’s definitions. The Regime thus incorporates a later-dated standard for definitional purposes; whether that incorporation reflects an amendment to the Regime itself or simply an updating of cross-references is not explained in the text.

Variations and revocation

• The text states the Regime “remains in force, as varied from time to time”, but it does not record specific variations, amendments or the dates of such changes. It also specifies revocation can occur by the Reserve Bank of Australia, and that the regime can cease to be in force under subsection 15(1) of the enabling Act. The instrument does not list prior amendments nor their content.

Evidence base for initial price setting

• The Regime fixes the Direct Connection Cap as, from 3 March 2009, “the lowest estimated cost for providing a Direct Connection Service as measured in AusPayNet’s 2008 costs survey. This cost is $76 700 (excluding GST)” (Price of access, Connection Charge for providing the Direct Connection Service, paragraph 2). The use of AusPayNet’s 2008 survey anchors the initial price cap to a named data source at a point in time.

What is not present

• The instrument does not include a list of previous variations, nor does it provide a procedure for indexed adjustments to the Direct Connection Cap. There is no schedule in the provided text showing historical amendments, and no dates or descriptions of any variations between 2009 and the present are recorded in the text given.

Practical consequence for users

• Because the instrument references variation “from time to time” and an external Access Standard with a later commencement date, users must consult the consolidated instrument as published by the RBA and any contemporaneous versions of the ATM Access Standard and AusPayNet materials to determine the current operative text, the current calculation of the Direct Connection Cap (if varied) and the status of any exemptions that may have been granted.

In short, the instrument records its original commencement (3 March 2009), the initial factual basis for the Direct Connection Cap (AusPayNet’s 2008 survey), and that it may be varied or revoked, but it does not itself provide a detailed amendment history in the text supplied.

The text of the Access Regime as supplied contains no information about litigation, adjudication, administrative determinations, or court cases that have applied or interpreted the Regime. The instrument does not list any judicial or tribunal decisions, nor does it reference enforcement actions or disputes arising under its provisions.

Implications of the absence of recorded litigation

• Because the Regime’s text does not include litigation history, no case law is contained in this instrument that interprets the cap calculation, the meaning of one-way arrangements, the scope of an ATM sub-network, or the reach of the reporting and publication obligations. That means, based on the text alone, there is no statutoryly recorded body of precedent to rely upon within this instrument.

Areas likely to generate disputes

• Certain provisions are phrased in way that could generate legal disputes, though no cases are recorded here. Those areas include (a) the calculation and application of the Direct Connection Cap at the date a Connection Agreement is entered into, (b) the scope of what constitutes a “one-way arrangement” and whether particular commercial arrangements meet that definition, (c) the definition and membership criteria for an “ATM sub-network” and whether particular rules satisfy the requirement of a common multilateral interchange fee, (d) whether parties have satisfied the duty to “do all things necessary” to ensure compliance, and (e) any alleged circumvention of the prohibition on charges for the Direct Clearing/Settlement Service. The instrument itself does not report whether such disputes have been litigated.

Reporting, disclosure and administrative records

• The instrument requires reporting to the RBA and publication of certain information by sub-network administrators and obliges the RBA to publish notices of exemptions. Those public records, if present, could be the basis for subsequent disputes or enforcement actions; the instrument does not include any entries showing that such records have been created or used in litigation.

Where to find litigation history

• Because the instrument lacks litigation detail, users seeking case law or administrative decisions that interpret or apply the Regime must consult external records: court and tribunal databases, RBA publications, and contemporaneous administrative notices. The instrument points to the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 as the enabling legislation; any enforcement action taken under that Act may be recorded separately.

In sum, the supplied text contains no litigation history and therefore offers no precedent to guide interpretation. Parties needing certainty should seek external sources for decisions, administrative determinations or case law that may have arisen under or in relation to the Regime.

The instrument is short and specific, but several features carry practical traps for practitioners and in-house counsel. The points below are grounded in the text and identify places where operational missteps, timing errors or definitional mismatches can produce compliance risk.

Direct Connection Cap mechanics and provenance

• The Connection Charge cap is tied to a calculation “in accordance with paragraph 9 below” but the instrument then fixes the cap at $76,700 (excluding GST) as “the lowest estimated cost for providing a Direct Connection Service as measured in AusPayNet’s 2008 costs survey” (Price of access, paragraphs 1-2). Two practical issues arise. First, the cap applies “on the date the Connection Agreement is entered into”; the operative price ceiling is therefore date-dependent and not necessarily static. Second, the instrument does not provide an indexing mechanism or a re-calculation method beyond the 2008 survey; unless the Regime has been varied elsewhere, the cap remains anchored to a 2008 survey figure, which may not reflect current cost levels. Parties that assume the cap changes with costs or inflation may be mistaken.

Connection Agreement timing

• Because the cap applies on the date a Connection Agreement is entered into, parties must confirm the applicable cap for that date. Negotiating and executing a Connection Agreement without confirming the statutory cap applicable on the execution date risks entering a contract that breaches the statutory maximum.

No charge for Direct Clearing/Settlement Service

• The Regime disallows any charge between participants for the Direct Clearing/Settlement Service from 3 March 2009. Parties accustomed to charging for clearing/settlement must not attempt to re-label such charges or include them in bundled fees without careful legal analysis, as the prohibition is explicit.

One-way arrangements constrained to one counterparty

• The text permits interchange in a one-way arrangement “to access one, and only one, other participant’s ATMs” (Interchange fees). A participant operating multiple one-way arrangements or arrangements that provide reciprocal access could fall outside the permitted exception. The restriction to “one and only one” counterparty is narrow and easily breached by expansion of arrangements.

Reporting deadlines are short and historical

• The instrument required existing acquirer arrangements to be reported to the RBA by 3 April 2009 and new arrangements to be reported within 30 days of entry (Transparency, paragraph 1). Although these deadlines were contemporaneous to the regime’s commencement, failure to report on time at that point would have breached the text. For practitioners reviewing historical compliance, it is a gotcha that the instrument applies retrospective reporting obligations for existing arrangements.

Definitions tied to an external Access Standard with a later commencement date

• Definitions are cross-referenced to the ATM Access Standard with a commencement date of 1 October 2025 “as in force on that date” (Application, definitions). This framing can create uncertainty about which version of the Access Standard controls definitions for present-day arrangements. If a party interprets a term using a different version of the Access Standard, it may reach a different legal conclusion. Verify which version of the Access Standard is being applied by the Regime.

Transparency publication obligations

• Administrators of ATM sub-networks must publish the multilateral interchange fee and the sub-network’s access rules (Transparency, paragraphs 2-3). Failure to publish or making the published information unclear may trigger enforcement or RBA scrutiny. Additionally, publication creates a public record that competitors, journalists or regulators can use.

RBA exemption discretion

• The RBA may grant exemptions where it is satisfied an exemption is appropriate “having regard to” an open-ended list including “any other matters the Reserve Bank considers relevant” (Exemptions, paragraph 1). The open-ended nature of the RBA’s discretion can make it difficult to predict the likelihood of obtaining an exemption. When relying on an anticipated exemption, parties face risk if the RBA declines to grant it.

Duty to “do all things necessary”

• The broad duty that “Each participant ... must do all things necessary on its part to ensure compliance” is operationally vague. Participants cannot rely on narrow compliance checklists alone; the duty implies a standard of conduct that may be tested in light of the Regime’s objective and the instruction to “look beyond form to substance” (Application, paragraphs 1 and 3).

No in-regime sanctions set out

• Because the Regime does not itself specify penalties, parties may misjudge the consequences of non-compliance. Enforcement mechanisms likely derive from the enabling Act or from administrative practices; rely on the Payment Systems (Regulation) Act 1998 and any RBA guidance for enforcement detail.

Potential for contractual circumvention

• The Regime regulates specific inter-participant fees. Parties seeking to preserve revenue streams may attempt to restructure commercial arrangements or label payments differently. Given the interpretive instruction to look beyond form to substance, such re-labelling will be scrutinised.

In short, the most likely compliance pitfalls are timing errors on cap applicability and reporting, reliance on outdated cost anchors, definitional ambiguity from external standards, narrow exceptions for interchange, and attempts to recharacterise prohibited charges. These are not speculative; they arise directly from the text and its structural features.

The Regime prescribes a small number of concrete compliance steps. Below is a practical checklist mapped to the instrument’s requirements and wording.

1. Confirm participant status and roles

• Establish whether the entity is an Access Provider, Access Seeker, ATM Acquirer, ATM Issuer, Direct Connector or administrator/representative of an ATM sub-network. The Regime ties duties and constraints to those defined roles, which are defined with reference to the ATM Access Standard (Application, definitions). Document the legal basis for classification using the Access Standard as applicable.

2. For Access Providers: ensure Connection Charges comply with the cap

• If you are an Access Provider levying a Connection Charge for the Direct Connection Service, calculate the applicable cap on the date the Connection Agreement is entered into. The Connection Charge “must not exceed the Direct Connection Cap” (Price of access, Connection Charge for providing the Direct Connection Service, paragraph 1). As of 3 March 2009 the Regime sets that cap at $76,700 excluding GST based on AusPayNet’s 2008 costs survey (paragraph 2). If relying on a different calculation method or later variation, obtain written confirmation of the operative cap from the RBA or consult the consolidated Regime text and any variations.

3. For all participants: do not levy charges for Direct Clearing/Settlement Service

• Do not impose inter-participant charges for the Direct Clearing/Settlement Service. The instrument prohibits any such charge from 3 March 2009 (Price of access, Connection Charge for providing the Direct Clearing/Settlement Service, paragraph 1). Review contracts and fee schedules to ensure no lawful or disguised clearing or settlement fees are being charged between participants.

4. For Issuers and Acquirers: review interchange practices

• Review any current interchange fee arrangements. Interchange fees are only permitted in (a) one-way arrangements with access to “one, and only one, other participant’s ATMs” or (b) among members of an ATM sub-network where a common multilateral interchange fee applies (Interchange fees, paragraphs 1-2). Ensure that any one-way arrangement strictly meets the “one and only one” restriction and that no additional interchange receipts are being collected in breach of paragraph 3.

5. Reporting: meet RBA reporting deadlines

• If you receive an interchange fee under a permitted one-way arrangement, report the arrangement to the RBA within the timelines specified: existing arrangements by 3 April 2009 and new arrangements within 30 days of entry (Transparency, paragraph 1). For current compliance assessment, verify that historical reporting obligations were met; for prospective arrangements, implement processes to report within 30 days.

6. For administrators/representatives of ATM sub-networks: publish fee and rules

• If you administer or represent an ATM sub-network, publish the multilateral interchange fee and the rules that govern access to the sub-network on your website or otherwise make them generally available (Transparency, paragraphs 2 and 3). Maintain a clear public record and ensure the published rules reflect actual access and fee practices.

7. Where required, seek an RBA exemption with supporting justification

• If commercial or operational necessities appear to require departure from the interchange or reporting rules, prepare an exemption application to the RBA. The RBA will consider whether the exemption is in the public interest and takes account of current and potential participants and other relevant matters (Exemptions, paragraph 1). Include a clear statement of public interest rationale, effects on access and competition, and how financial stability considerations are addressed. Be aware that the RBA must publish any granted exemption (Exemptions, paragraph 2).

8. Establish internal controls and documentation

• Given the general duty to “do all things necessary on its part to ensure compliance” (Application, paragraph 1) and the instruction to “look beyond form to substance” (Application, paragraph 3), maintain records of decision-making, cost calculations, contractual terms, and compliance steps. Implement a documented compliance policy that addresses fee-setting, contract review, reporting timelines, publication obligations and the process for seeking legal advice or RBA guidance.

9. Review contracts and remove prohibited terms

• Audit Connection Agreements and other inter-participant contracts to ensure they do not include prohibited or disguised fees (for example, fees labelled differently that function as clearing charges or interchange). Where necessary, renegotiate or amend contracts to remove or re-price such clauses in line with the Regime.

10. Consider secondary effects and monitor market responses

• The Regime constrains inter-participant revenue sources. Participants should monitor whether counterparties respond by changing other commercial terms, such as the level or placement of retail charges, changes in ATM deployment, or alternative contractual arrangements. Document any such changes and assess whether they amount to circumvention of the Regime’s prohibitions.

11. Keep versions of the ATM Access Standard and AusPayNet materials

• Because several definitions are tied to the ATM Access Standard and the Direct Connection Cap is initially based on AusPayNet’s 2008 costs survey, maintain the precise versions of those documents that the Regime references. Where the Regime cross-references a particular commencement date (for example, 1 October 2025 for the Access Standard), confirm which version is applicable for interpretation.

12. If in doubt, obtain RBA clarification and legal advice

• For questions about the scope of “one-way arrangements”, what constitutes an ATM sub-network, the permissible scope of published rules, or calculation of the Direct Connection Cap, obtain written guidance from the RBA and legal advice. The RBA’s exemption power and publication practice mean that the RBA is a central interlocutor for compliance interpretation.

Following these steps aligns contractual practice and internal governance with the text’s pricing ceilings, prohibitions, reporting and publication obligations, and with the broad duty imposed on participants to ensure compliance.