Zadravec v Commission of Police, NSW Police Force [2026] NSWCATAD 54;

1. On 20 June 2024, the applicant telephoned NSW Police to make a complaint about domestic violence allegedly perpetrated by her former partner.
2. A police officer came to her house that evening and took a statement from her. The police officer was wearing a body worn video camera. The applicant contends that NSW Police did not properly investigate her complaint. She lodged a complaint, firstly, with NSW Police and then with the LECC. The LECC decided to take no further action and, unsatisfied with this, the applicant lodged a GIPA application on 2 April 2024 seeking:

"Body-Worn camera footage from 20/06/2024 when the officer attended my residence to take my statement. Activation logs showing when the camera was turned on and off, including timestamps.

All entries or documents showing attempts or actions to contact the named witnesses particularly between 20/06/2024 and 07/11/24.

Records of follow-up actions or communications from the Constable Alo involving the DVLO and prosecutor between 16/08/2024 and 07/11/2024.

Internal records documenting actions taken, officer notes, supervisory reviews, decisions made, file access or updates, and any documentation relating to the disclosure of the case − including running sheets, event chronologies, sergeant or supervisor sign offs, case activity logs and internal justification for concluding the investigation covering the period from 20/06/2024 to 07/11/2024."

1. The reason the applicant gave for wanting this information is recorded as follows:

"I recently discovered that body-worn camera was turned off without my knowledge, the attending officer failed to contact my named witness, and the matter was closed without even providing me an event number, which I had to chase weeks later. I've been dismissed, ignored and treated with deep disrespect for simply reporting domestic violence. The officer implied I was lying and claimed to have contacted my witness, yet he only did so on the night I attended the station in person, after being continually ignored. This delay severely impacted the integrity of the investigation, giving the offender time to manipulate the situation and coach the witness. Weeks continued to drag on without any follow up, despite the officer's assurance that he would seek assistance from the DVLO. This request is to clarify what actions were taken and when, as there are clear discrepancies in how my case was handled."

1. The respondent has identified that the following documents as responsive to this request:

(1) Police incident record 651371-20062024;

(2) Police incident record 139750-23032025;

(3) The Computerised Operating Policing System (COPS) Event E81901379;

(4) Witness statement of Delanie Zadravec;

(5) Internal NSW Police email correspondence dated 9-10 April 2025;

(6) Internal NSW Police email correspondence dated 23-25 March 2025;

(7) Email correspondence between the applicant and NSW Police (including internal NSW Police email correspondence) dated 21 June 2024 to 23 August 2024;

(8) Internal NSW Police email correspondence regarding body-worn video camera activation dated 19 May 2025;

(9) Bodyworn video camera footage of 20 June 2024 labelled IMS ID- 19945924-0004 (the first recording); and

(10) Bodyworn video camera footage of 21 June 2024 labelled IMS ID- 19445926-0003 (the second recording).

1. On 5 May 2025, the information review officer who was managing the applicant's access application wrote to the LECC to inquire whether the LECC had received a complaint relating to COPS Event E81901379. By letter dated 9 May 2025, the LECC confirmed that this was the case and further stated that it objected to disclosure of all documents relating to COPS Event E81901379.
2. On 19 May 2025, a delegate of the respondent refused access to the information requested on the grounds that the information was excluded information for the purposes of the GIPA Act and the LECC had refused consent to the release of the information. The applicant requested an internal review. By decision dated 6 June 2025, the internal reviewer also found that the information withheld was excluded information of the LECC.
3. In the submissions lodged with the Tribunal prior to the hearing (at para 41), the respondent stated that he had revised his position to the following effect:

(1) access may be provided to the records referred to in (1), (2) (5) and (8) in full and access to (6) and (7) could be provided in part;

(2) access should still be refused to the records referred to in (3) and (4) and part of the records in (6) and (7) as this information is excluded information of the LECC and therefore exclusively presumed to be subject to an overriding public interest against disclosure;

(3) access should be refused to the second recording, namely (10), as it is subject to an overriding public interest against disclosure, applying the public interest test; and

(4) access to the first recording (ie (9)) should be by way of "view only" access is there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of a copy.

1. The applicant says she would accept "view only" access on the first recording (item (9)). This leaves items (3), (4), (10) and part of (6) and (7) in dispute. At the time of the hearing, the respondent had already released to the applicant items (1), (2), (5) and (8). In her submissions at the end of the hearing, the applicant said she would also accept view only access in relation to the second recording .

1. The GIPA Act was introduced in 2009 to facilitate public access to government information.
2. Section 3 provides that the object and intent of the GIPA Act is as follows:

"(1) In order to maintain and advance a system of responsible and representative democratic Government that is open, accountable, fair and effective, the object of this Act is to open government information to the public by--

(a) authorising and encouraging the proactive public release of government information by agencies, and

(b) giving members of the public an enforceable right to access government information, and

(c) providing that access to government information is restricted only when there is an overriding public interest against disclosure.

(a) that this Act be interpreted and applied so as to further the object of this Act, and

(b) that the discretions conferred by this Act be exercised, as far as possible, so as to facilitate and encourage, promptly and at the lowest reasonable cost, access to government information."

1. Relevantly, s 5 of the GIPA Act provides that there is a presumption in favour of the disclosure of government information unless there is an overriding public interest against disclosure.
2. Section 9 provides that a person who makes an access application for government information has a legally enforceable right to be provided with access to the information unless there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of the information.
3. Section 12(1) provides that there is a general public interest in favour of the disclosure of government information. Examples of public interest considerations in favour of disclosure are set out in the Note to s 12 as follows:

"Note.

The following are examples of public interest considerations in favour of disclosure of information--

(a) Disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to promote open discussion of public affairs, enhance Government accountability or contribute to positive and informed debate on issues of public importance.

(b) Disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to inform the public about the operations of agencies and, in particular, their policies and practices for dealing with members of the public.

(c) Disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to ensure effective oversight of the expenditure of public funds.

(d) The information is personal information of the person to whom it is to be disclosed.

(e) Disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to reveal or substantiate that an agency (or a member of an agency) has engaged in misconduct or negligent, improper or unlawful conduct."

1. Section 13 sets out how the public interest test must be assessed and states:

"There is an overriding public interest against disclosure of government information for the purposes of this Act if (and only if) there are public interest considerations against disclosure and, on balance, those considerations outweigh the public interest considerations in favour of disclosure."

1. Section 14 of the GIPA Act sets out the public interest considerations against disclosure and relevantly provides, at subs (1), that it is to be "conclusively presumed" there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of any of the government information described in Sch 1. Schedule 1 identifies 18 different categories of government information where it is conclusively presumed there is an overriding public interest against disclosure. One of those categories in cl 6 is "excluded information", which states:

"Excluded information

(1) It is to be conclusively presumed that there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of information that is excluded information of an agency, other than information that the agency has consented to the disclosure of.

(2) Before an agency decides an access application by refusing to provide access to information on the basis that it is excluded information of another agency, the agency is required to ask the other agency whether the other agency consents to disclosure of the information.

(3) A decision that an agency makes to consent or to refuse to consent to the disclosure of excluded information of the agency is not a reviewable decision under Part 5."

1. Schedule 2 contains the interpretation provisions for the GIPA Act and states:

"excluded information of an agency specified in Schedule 2 means information that relates to any function specified in that Schedule in relation to the agency."

1. Schedule 2 sets out the "excluded information" of particular agencies. The Note to Sch 2 states:

"Note.

Information that relates to a function specified in this Schedule in relation to an agency specified in this Schedule is excluded information of the agency. Under Schedule 1 it is to be conclusively presumed that there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of excluded information of an agency (unless the agency consents to disclosure). Section 43 prevents an access application from being made to an agency for excluded information of the agency."

1. Clause 2 of Sch 2 thus provides that information of the LECC that relates to its functions on corruption prevention, handling of misconduct matters (within the meaning of the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission Act 2016) and its investigative and reporting functions is "excluded information".
2. Section 14(2) of the GIPA Act states:

"The public interest considerations listed in the Table to this section are the only other considerations that may be taken into account under this Act as public interest considerations against disclosure for the purpose of determining whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of government information."

1. The Table to s 14(2) enumerates seven different grounds for public interest considerations that may be taken into account as public interest considerations against disclosure for the purposes of determining whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of government information. The seven grounds are: responsible and effective government (cl 1); law enforcement and security (cl 2); individual rights, judicial process and natural justice (cl 3); business interests of agencies and other persons (cl 4); environment, culture, economy and general matters (cl 5); secrecy provisions (cl 6) and exempt documents under Interstate Freedom of Information legislation (cl 7).
2. Each of these considerations, with the exception of the exempt documents, require determination of whether disclosure of the information "could reasonably be expected" to have one or more of the effects (or in the case of the secrecy ground, contraventions) outlined within each of the grounds. To establish any one of the six considerations described in the Table it is therefore necessary to identify the listed effects (or contraventions) and make an assessment about whether disclosure of the requested information could reasonably be expected to have that effect or constitute a contravention.
3. According to the Appeal Panel in Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force v Camilleri (GD) [2012] NSWADTAP 19, this involves a two-step approach to the question of whether information has been properly refused. The Tribunal must first identify whether the public interest considerations in the Table to s 14(2) are established and, if so, the Tribunal must then weigh that case against the factors favouring disclosure. This is the balancing exercise required under s 13, where the Tribunal must also be "mindful of the injunctions" that appear in both sections 12 and 15 of the GIPA Act.
4. The respondent now relies on the public interest considerations referred to in clauses 1(d) and 1(f) and 3(a) of the Table to s 14(2), which are as follows:

"1(d) prejudice the effective exercise by an agency of the agency's functions,

...

1(f) prejudice the supply to an agency of confidential information that facilitates the effective exercise of that agency's functions,

...

3(a) reveal an individual's personal information,"

"6 Secrecy provisions

(1) There is a public interest consideration against disclosure of information if disclosure of the information by any person could (disregarding the operation of this Act) reasonably be expected to constitute a contravention of a provision of any other Act or statutory rule (of this or another State or of the Commonwealth) that prohibits the disclosure of information, whether or not the prohibition is subject to specified qualifications or exceptions.

(2) The public interest consideration under this clause extends to consideration of the policy that underlies the prohibition against disclosure."

1. Section 15 of the GIPA Act sets out the principles that apply to agencies and, relevantly, to the Tribunal, when making a determination as to whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of government information. Decision-makers must make public interest determinations in accordance with the following principles:

"(a) Agencies must exercise their functions so as to promote the object of this Act.

(b) Agencies must have regard to any relevant guidelines issued by the Information Commissioner.

(c) The fact that disclosure of information might cause embarrassment to, or a loss of confidence in, the Government is irrelevant and must not be taken into account.

(d) The fact that disclosure of information might be misinterpreted or misunderstood by any person is irrelevant and must not be taken into account.

(e) In the case of disclosure in response to an access application, it is relevant to consider that disclosure cannot be made subject to any conditions on the use or disclosure of information."

1. Section 53 of the GIPA Act sets out the obligations of an agency and the searches it must undertake once a request for information is received. The obligation to provide access to government information is limited to the information held by the agency when the application is made. Section 54 provides that an agency must take such steps, if any, as are reasonably practicable to consult with a person before providing access to the government information if the information is of a kind that requires consultation under the section, the person may reasonably be expected to have concerns about the disclosure of the information and those concerns may reasonably be expected to be relevant to the question of whether there is a public interest consideration against disclosure of the information.
2. Under s 55, an agency is entitled to take into account the personal factors of the applicant in determining whether there is an overriding public interest against or in favour of disclosure of government information: ss 55(1) and (2) of the GIPA Act. An applicant may provide any evidence or information concerning the personal factors of the application that the applicant considers to be relevant to the determination of whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of the information applied for: s 55(4) of the GIPA Act. The personal factors of the applicant that may be taken into account are:

"(a) the applicant's identity and relationship with any other person,

(b) the applicant's motives for making the access application,

(c) any other factors particular to the applicant."

1. Section 58(1) provides that applications for review are to be decided by the agency: deciding to provide access to the government information sought (subs (a)); deciding that the information is not held by the agency (subs (b)); deciding that the information is already available to the applicant (subs (c)); deciding to refuse the application because there is an overriding public interest against disclosure (subs (d)); deciding to refuse to deal with the application (subs (e)) and deciding to refuse to confirm or deny that information is held by the agency because there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of information confirming or denying that fact (subs (f)).
2. In this case, the decision made by the respondent was made under s 58(1)(d) of the GIPA Act.
3. Also relevant, given proposals made about access to the first and second body worn video recordings (items (9) and (10)) are sections 72, 73 and 74 of the GIPA Act.
4. Section 72 provides

"Forms of access

(1) Access to government information in response to an access application may be provided in any of the following ways--

(a) by providing a reasonable opportunity to inspect a record containing the information,

(b) by providing a copy of a record containing the information,

(c) by providing access to a record containing the information, together with such facilities as may be necessary to enable the information to be read, viewed or listened to (as appropriate to the kind of record concerned),

(d) by providing a written transcript of the information in the case of information recorded in an audio record or recorded in shorthand or other encoded format.

(2) The agency must provide access in the way requested by the applicant unless--

(a) to do so would interfere unreasonably with the operations of the agency or would result in the agency incurring unreasonable additional costs, or

(b) to do so would be detrimental to the proper preservation of the record, or

(c) to do so would involve an infringement of copyright, or

(d) there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of the information in the way requested by the applicant.

Note:

Decisions about how to provide access are reviewable under Part 5."

"Access to be unconditional

(1) An agency is not entitled to impose any conditions on the use or disclosure of information when the agency provides access to the information in response to an access application.

(2) A condition may be imposed as to how a right of access may be exercised (such as a condition that prevents an applicant making notes from or taking a copy of a record that is made available for inspection) but only to avoid there being an overriding public interest against disclosure of the information."

"Deletion of information from copy of record to be accessed

An agency can delete information from a copy of a record to which access is to be provided in response to an access application (so as to provide access only to the other information that the record contains) either because the deleted information is not relevant to the information applied for or because (if the deleted information was applied for) the agency has decided to refuse to provide access to that information."

1. Section 80 of the GIPA Act sets out the decisions of an agency which are "reviewable decisions" for the purposes of Part 5 of the GIPA Act. Relevantly, s 80(d), being a decision to provide access or refuse to provide access to information in response to an access application, is a reviewable decision.
2. Section 82 provides that a person aggrieved by a reviewable decision of an agency is entitled to a review of the decision, referred to as an "internal review'.
3. Under s 100 of the GIPA Act, a person who is aggrieved by a reviewable decision may apply to the Tribunal for an administrative review of the decision under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) (ADR Act). Section 105 provides that the onus is on the agency to justify decisions made in respect of access under the GIPA Act. Section 107 sets out the procedure for dealing with public interest considerations when the Tribunal undertakes administrative review and provides that the Tribunal is to ensure it does not, in the reasons for its decision or otherwise, disclose any information for which there is an overriding public interest against disclosure. The Tribunal must receive evidence and hear arguments in the absence of the public, the review applicant and the applicant's representative if, in the opinion of the Tribunal, it is necessary to do so to prevent the disclosure of information for which there is a public overriding public interest against disclosure.
4. Section 63(1) of the ADR Act provides that in determining an application for an administrative review, the Tribunal must make the "correct and preferable" decision based on the material before it at the time of the decision: YG & GG v Minister for Community Services [2002] NSWCA 247 at [25]. In determining the application for review, the Tribunal may decide to affirm or vary the decision or set aside the decision and make a decision in substitution or set aside the decision and remit the matter for reconsideration by the administrator, in this case the respondent, in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal: s 63(3) ADR Act.

1. While the provisions of the GIPA Act are at the centre of this dispute, there is other legislation which the respondent contends is relevant to the determination of the issues in dispute.
2. The LECC is constituted under the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission Act 2016 (NSW) (LECC Act) and s 25 provides that the LECC has the functions conferred on it by or under the LECC Act or any other act. Section 26 sets out the LECC's functions as follows:

"The functions of the Commission with respect to misconduct matters include the following -

(a) to receive misconduct matters directly or that are notified to it in accordance with misconduct matters management guidelines,

(b) in accordance with misconduct matters management guidelines -

(i) to detect, investigate (including by carrying out examinations in appropriate cases) and expose conduct that is (or could be) serious misconduct or serious maladministration, and

(ii) to refer to the Commissioner of Police for police investigation misconduct matters relating to conduct of members of the NSW Police Force that are (or could be) officer misconduct or officer maladministration and conduct of the NSW Police Force that is (or could be) agency maladministration (other than conduct referred to in subparagraph (i)), and

(iii) to refer to the Crime Commissioner for Crime Commission investigation misconduct matters relating to conduct of Crime Commission officers that are (or could be) officer misconduct or officer maladministration and conduct of the Crime Commission that is (or could be) agency maladministration (other than conduct referred to in subparagraph (i)), and

(iv) to refer misconduct matters for investigation or action by other appropriate authorities, and

(v) to oversee the investigation or handling of misconduct matters referred by it to the Commissioner of Police, Crime Commissioner or other appropriate authorities."

1. A "misconduct matter" is defined by s 4 of the LECC Act to mean a complaint or misconduct information, which is defined in s 13 to mean:

"...a mandatory or other report or other information contained in any other document that the Commission becomes aware of otherwise than through a complaint that indicates or suggests conduct is (or could be) officer misconduct or officer maladministration or agency maladministration."

1. Section 9 provides that "police misconduct" means any misconduct, by way of action or inaction, of a police officer and includes conduct, whether or not it occurs while the police officer is officially on duty.
2. Section 14 provides for misconduct matters management guidelines to be formulated from time to time by agreement between the LECC and the Commissioner of Police. A copy of the current misconduct matters management guidelines was provided to the Tribunal. The guidelines provide that documentation considered or used in the triage, investigation and resolution of a misconduct matter should be uploaded or otherwise clear referenced in the misconduct matters information system. The guidelines also note that the LECC is to be provided unrestricted access to the misconduct matters information system.
3. Any person may complain to the LECC about the conduct of a police officer and the LECC may request further information from the complainant or other persons: ss 35, 40 and 41. Section 44 provides that when the LECC receives or becomes aware of a misconduct matter, it may investigate or take over the investigation of the misconduct matter, refer the misconduct matter for police investigation or other action, refer the misconduct matter to the Commissioner of Police, refer the misconduct matter to another body or person for investigation, attempt to deal with the misconduct by alternative dispute management or take no further action with respect to the misconduct matter. Section 49 requires registration of misconduct matters in the misconduct matters information system.
4. Section 128 of the Police Act 1990 (NSW) (Police Act) also provides for a misconduct matters information system and relevantly states:

"(1) The regulations may make provision for or with respect to a system for recording information about misconduct matters concerning police officers, administrative employees and the NSW Police Force received by the Commissioner or of which the Commissioner becomes aware under this Act and received by the LECC or of which the LECC becomes aware under the Law Enforcement Conduct Commission Act 2016 and, in particular, for or with respect to -

(a) the establishment, control, operation and maintenance of the system, and

(b) the registration of misconduct matters in the system, and

(c) the nature of the information about misconduct matters that is to be registered in the system, and

(d) the form in which any such information is to be entered into the system, and

(e) access to information in the system, and

(f) retention, amendment and deletion of material in the system, and

(g) security arrangements for the system, and

(h) mechanisms for identifying, preventing and detecting abuse, misuse or corrupt use of the system or information in the system.

(2) Protocols and memoranda of understanding may be entered into by the LECC and by the Commissioner regarding any matter for or with respect to which regulations may be made under this section."

1. According to the evidence from Chief Inspector Holgate, the misconduct matters information system is known as the IA Pro system. This is relevant to the respondent's contention that items (3), (4) and part of (6) and (7) are "excluded information" for the purposes of the GIPA Act and, as such, it is to be conclusively presumed that there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of this information.
2. Other legislation that is relevant to the issues in dispute and the determination of the applicant's GIPA Act application is the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) (Surveillance Devices Act).
3. Body-worn video footage under s 50A(1) of the Surveillance Devices Act is "protected information" under s 39(d) of the Surveillance Devices Act.
4. Section 50A(1) specifically refers to the use of body worn video devices by police officers and states:

"50A Police use of body-worn video

(1) The use of body-worn video by a police officer is in accordance with this section if -

(a) the police officer is acting in the execution of his or her duty, and

(b) the use of body-worn video is overt, and

(c) if the police officer is recording a private conversation, the police officer is in uniform or has provided evidence that he or she is a police officer to each party to the private conversation.

(2) Without limiting the ways in which the use of body-worn video may be overt for the purposes of subsection (1)(b), the use of body-worn video is overt once the police officer informs the person who is to be recorded of the use of body-worn video by the police officer.

(3) The use of body-worn video by a police officer is also in accordance with this section if -

(a) it is inadvertent or unexpected, or

(b) it is incidental to the use of body-worn video by the police officer in the circumstances set out in subsection (1)."

1. Sections 40(1) and (2) of the Surveillance Devices Act provide for restrictions on the use, communication or publication of protected information - there are criminal sanctions for breach. The respondent contends that s 40(1) is a secrecy provision for the purposes of cl 6 of the Table to s 14(2) of the GIPA Act. Section 40(1) states:

(a) the person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly uses, communicates or publishes any protected information, and

(b) the person knows that, or is reckless as to whether, the information is protected information, and

(c) the person knows that, or is reckless as to whether, the use, communication or publication of the information is prohibited by this section.

1. Subsections 40(3)-(9) of the Surveillance Devices Act set out exemptions and specify the authorised uses for body worn video footage. Section 40(4A) states:

"(4A) Information obtained from the use, in accordance with section 50A, of body-worn video by a police officer may also be used, published or communicated -

(a) in connection with the exercise of a law enforcement function by a member of the NSW Police Force, or

(b) in connection with education and training of members of the NSW Police Force or students of policing within the meaning of the Police Act 1990, or

(c) for any purpose prescribed by the regulations."

1. Regulation 5 of the Surveillance Devices Regulation 2022 (NSW) provides:

"5 Police officers' use of body-worn video - additional purposes for using information obtained - the Act, s 40

(1) For the Act, section 40(4A)(c), the information obtained from the use of body-worn video by a police officer may also be used for the following purposes -

(a) coronial proceedings under the Coroners Act 2009,

(b) administrative decisions made under an Act administered by the Minister for Police and Emergency Services,

(c) proceedings of a court or Tribunal in which the NSW Police Force or the State is a party or in which a member of the NSW Police Force is called as a witness,

(d) investigations of a complaint against, or the conduct of, a member of the NSW Police Force,

(e) investigations of an alleged workplace injury to a member of the NSW Police Force,

(f) a media production including, for example, a television, radio or internet broadcast, but only if -

(i) the body-worn video from which the information is obtained is provided particularly for the purposes of the media production, and

(ii) the NSW Police Force has approved all content to be used in the media production, and

(iii) the use of the information is otherwise lawful and does not breach guidelines issued by the Commissioner of Police for the purposes of this subsection.

(2) In this section -

use of information includes publication and communication of the information."

1. The respondent contends that these latter provisions under the Surveillance Devices Act and Regulation are relevant to its contentions in relation to the public interest tests against disclosure under cl 6 to the Table to s 14(2) of the GIPA Act.

Material Before the Tribunal and Outline of Evidence

(1) Submissions of the applicant received 29 October 2025.

(2) Bundle of documents provided by the applicant paginated, numbered 1-107, received on 29 October 2025, which included a copy of a complaint from the applicant to the LECC dated 7 February 2025, a letter dated 26 March 2025 from the LECC to the applicant and her response of the same day.

(3) An open bundle of material, with redactions, lodged pursuant to s 58 of the ADR Act, which included a schedule of the documents (being each of the 10 items) with details of whether the documents were released or refused and the relevant public interest consideration against disclosure.

(4) A confidential bundle of material lodged with the Tribunal, including USBs of body worn video camera recordings (items (9) and (10).

(5) A schedule of documents table which sets out particulars for each of the 10 items in dispute, including a description of the information, whether the information was released or withheld and the grounds for the refusal.

(6) Affidavit of Marc Holgate sworn 18 September 2025.

(7) Affidavit of Marc Holgate sworn 25 September 2025.

(8) Guidelines, signed by the respondent on 11 November 2022 and the Chief Commissioner of the LECC on 14 November 2022 and issued pursuant to the s 14 Agreement between the LECC and the Commissioner of Police (being a reference to the LECC Act).

1. The applicant made submissions about why she made her complaint to NSW Police and why she had made the request for access to information about how her complaint was managed. She alleges she had been the subject of domestic violence from her ex-partner over the years, and this was causing problems in her relationship with her daughter. She alleges there was a recent incident which led to her making a complaint with NSW Police on 20 June 2024. The applicant also relies on a statement about the circumstances leading to her complaint and about her dealings with NSW Police in relation to her complaint. She provides copies of emails with officers from NSW Police.
2. The respondent relies on the affidavits of Chief Inspector Holgate. He also gave evidence at the hearing.
3. In his second affidavit, Chief Inspector Holgate set out his professional experience and roles up to the time that he was appointed as Professional Standards Manager in August 2019. In summary, Chief Inspector Holgate has been a member of the NSW Police Force since 1992, serving in various roles until 2008 when he was promoted to Sergeant. He was assigned to the internal witness support unit within the Professional Standards Command where he was responsible for supporting police officers who had made misconduct reports about their colleagues. He was Assistant Professional Standards Manager from 2010 to 2012 and in October 2012, he was promoted to Inspector. He continued to work in the professional standards portfolios and from October 2016 to August 2019, he was the Professional Standards Manager of the northwest metropolitan command. Chief Inspector Holgate has been involved in professional standards and complaints handling within the NSW Police Force for over 17 years and is an experienced police officer.
4. In his first affidavit, Chief Inspector Holgate states that as the Professional Standards Manager, his duties and responsibilities included ensuring that all legislative, policy and administrative obligations related to complaint management are met for misconduct matters about members the NSW Police Force. His role includes liaising with the LECC in relation to serious complaints. As part of his role, he has access to the IA Pro system. This is the misconduct matters information system used by the NSW Police Force and the LECC. According to Chief Inspector Holgate, documents held by NSW Police Force in its database are shared with the LECC through the IA Pro system. The LECC has access to all documents that are placed on the IA Pro system. Chief Inspector Holgate states that on 18 September 2025, he was provided with a bundle of documents in the confidential bundle. He reviewed those documents and was satisfied the documents at pages 7 to 26 and 33 to 38 of the confidential bundle were available on the IA Pro system and had been shared with the LECC. These documents are the documents identified by the respondent as items (3), (4) and part of (6) and (7) in the schedule of documents.
5. At the hearing, Chief Inspector Holgate explained that when there are complaints from the public or complaints of misconduct, documents relating to the complaint are uploaded to the IA Pro system. He does not know exactly when the documents, which were the subject of the applicants complaint, were uploaded but the practice would be to upload those documents as soon as the complaint had been made. In this case, the applicant made a complaint to the NSW Police Force and when she made a complaint to the LECC on 7 February 2025, the documents relevant to the complaint would have been uploaded onto the IA Pro system. He had access to this system and confirmed that the documents referred to in his first affidavit had been uploaded and remained on the IA Pro system, even though the LECC had advised the applicant it was taking no further action in relation to her complaint.
6. In his second affidavit, Chief Inspector Holgate explained that body worn video footage supports operational policing activities by contemporaneously recording visual and audio images of police interactions, incidents and crimes. It can be used for the purposes of investigating or prosecuting individuals and for oversight and disciplinary purposes or for internal education and training. The body worn video cameras are worn conspicuously on the front of a police officer's uniform and must be used overtly. He states that the cameras are a valuable tool for the gathering of evidence by officers in the course of their duties and they serve as an important protective purpose for both officers and members of the public by providing a contemporaneous record of interactions. The overt use of such cameras to record police interactions with members of the public can also serve as a deterrent to threatening behaviour or inappropriate conduct.
7. Chief Inspector Holgate further states that access to and release of body worn video footage is carefully controlled by NSW Police consistent with the strict regime followed by NSW Police under the Surveillance Devices Act for how such information is to be managed. He states that these measures are directed towards maintaining the integrity of the footage, ensuring that personal information that has been recorded is not illegally or improperly released and ensuring that the prevention, detection investigation of crime is not undermined by the public dissemination of information relating to sensitive law enforcement technology, techniques or methodology.
8. Where body worn video footage is used for the purposes of prosecution, there are strict measures in place to limit the extent to which footage is used, distributed or otherwise disclosed. For instance, where such footage is to be used in support of a charge or a legal process, NSW Police offer the accused or the legal representative an opportunity to view the footage under police supervision and neither the accused nor the legal representative would be provided with a copy of the footage. If body worn video footage is produced in response to a subpoena included in a brief of evidence, it is provided with a caveat screen prior to the video which states that the footage is protected information under the Surveillance Devices Act. At the conclusion of a criminal proceeding, the officer in charge will seek an order for the return of the footage and once the relevant appeal period has lapsed, there is provision for copies of the body worn video footage to be destroyed in the presence of a witness.
9. According to Chief Inspector Holgate, body worn video is a technology that is routinely used by police to investigate and prosecute crimes in the community. In his view, it is crucial for the NSW Police to maintain the integrity and quality of the footage recorded by body worn video. In his opinion, there is a broader community interest in ensuring the integrity and quality of this footage given its value as an investigative and evidentiary tool. The release of body worn video footage in response to an application under the GIPA Act would be, in his opinion, contrary to and inconsistent with the strict regime regulating the use of such footage under the Surveillance Devices Act and the practices and procedures observed by NSW Police to ensure compliance. He states that body worn video footage often depicts interactions and images of individuals and to provide access has the effect of disclosing personal information about those individuals. The footage may also capture the personal information of third parties such as visual images of witnesses or other bystanders, and visual images are persons home or information about third parties. This would be a serious invasion of privacy of those individuals depicted.
10. Chief Inspector Holgate is also concerned that providing access to body worn video footage would reveal sensitive evidentiary material which has the potential to prejudice ongoing investigations or undermine the integrity of that evidence. Providing access to copies of footage would also give rise to concern that the footage accompanying the metadata may be altered. He is further concerned that the release of body worn video footage may reveal confidential police methodologies and investigative techniques if a copy of body worn video footage is provided and, theoretically, that footage could then be published or widely broadcast on a public platform.
11. Chief Inspector Holgate states that he has reviewed the body worn video footage in the first and second recordings, being items (9) and (10). The first recording depicts police interaction with the applicant in her home, and the second recording depicts an interaction with the applicant's ex-husband out the front of his home.
12. Chief Inspector Holgate states that the footage in the first recording records visual and audio images of the police interaction with the applicant on 20 June 2024. The interaction occurred at the applicant's home during which the applicant makes allegations of domestic violence against her former husband. The footage also discusses the children of the applicant and her former husband. The applicant has been offered the opportunity to view this footage at a police station, but NSW Police have refused to provide the applicant with a copy. Chief Inspector Holgate states that he would have significant concerns with the applicant having unconditional access to a copy of this footage and it would be contrary to the strict regime that is established under the Surveillance Devices Act for dealing with protected information. He is also concerned that providing a copy gives rise to the risks previously outlined in his affidavit. These matters are of particular concern given the possibility that an investigation into the incident may be enlivened again at some point in the future.
13. In relation to the second recording, Chief Inspector Holgate notes that this footage records visual and audio images of police interactions with the applicant's former husband on 21 June 2024. The interaction occurred at the home of the applicant's former husband and contains his response to the applicant's allegations. Chief Inspector Holgate has significant concerns with the provision of unrestricted and unconditional access to a copy of this footage. He also has concerns that the footage contains personal information of other persons. The footage shows the exterior and, briefly, the interior of the home and contains personal information relating to his family.
14. Chief Inspector Holgate states that each of the recordings contain information that has been supplied to NSW Police by members of the public in the course of an investigation. NSW Police rely on members of the public to report incidents or allegations and conduct of concern to carry out to assist NSW Police to carry out its core legal enforcement and investigative functions. NSW Police receive this information and there is an expectation and understanding that the information provided will be kept confidential and only be disclose to the extent necessary to pursue an investigation or in the context of legal proceedings. This expectation of confidentiality is consistent with the policy framework in which NSW Police officers operate, for example, cl 76 of the Police Regulation 2015 (NSW) requires that members of the NSW Police Force treat all information that comes within their knowledge and their official capacity as strictly confidential. In Chief Inspector Holgate's opinion, maintaining the confidentiality of information provided is crucial to ensuring that members of the public are willing to engage with members of the NSW Police Force and if information supplied to NSW Police is disclosed under the GIPA Act, this would be perceived as a breach of trust and may lead to allow a loss of confidence in the NSW Police Force. In his view, this would undermine community confidence.
15. Chief Inspector Holgate gave evidence at the hearing about the logs of radio transmissions in response to the applicant's questions. These records had been released to the applicant. Chief Inspector Holgate explained the entries recorded on the log transmission records for 21 June 2024 and 23 March 2025 and why there were periods without an entry. The applicant asked these questions because one of her concerns on reviewing the records release is "inconsistencies" she has identified in the log transmissions records. This evidence does not go to the substance of the issues in dispute on the review before the Tribunal but rather to the issues of concern raised by the applicant in relation to how NSW Police dealt with her complaint. There is no suggestion that the records identified by NSW are incomplete, however, the applicant contends that because certain information has not been released, it is difficult for her to verify the actual investigations undertaken by NSW Police.
16. Chief Inspector Holgate said that he remained concerned about providing access to the second recording because it provided personal information about the applicant's former husband and his family and he was concerned that if the investigation was enlivened, the applicant could use this information to compromise any further investigation. Even though the investigation had been closed by NSW Police, Chief Inspector Holgate was also concerned about information being released in relation to the nature of the questioning by police and methods of investigation being released. In his view, this needed to be kept confidential.
17. I have reviewed both the first and second recordings. The recordings are consistent with the description given by Chief Inspector Holgate in his affidavit and his evidence to the Tribunal. The second recording is footage of an interview by a police officer with the applicant's former partner outside his home. The recording films into an area near the entrance of his home. The filming also records the former partner providing his telephone number. The police officer asks the former partner some questions and he responds. In this interview, the former partner provides personal information about another individual.

1. In her written submissions, the applicant contends that the NSW Police Force's handling of her information request was improper and failed to meet the standards of transparency and accountability expected of a public authority. She submits that the correspondence and internal communications by NSW police officers created a perpetual and incorrect narrative about her which influenced how her requests and complaints were handled. The false narrative undermined her credibility and affected her standing as a victim. The event logs disclosed by the respondent were particularly concerning because they are inconsistent and incomplete. She is concerned that she cannot verify the information provided and her submissions can only be based on she knows to be true and what she has been told by NSW Police, which she believes is inconsistent.
2. The applicant makes detailed submissions about why she is unsatisfied with the way her complaint was managed by NSW Police and how she was treated. The applicant explains her disappointment that the LECC did not conduct its own investigations in relation to her complaint. The applicant also notes in her submission that prior to lodging her complaint with NSW Police, she emailed the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia on 12 June 2024 because of concerns that there was "a broader and continuing pattern of abuse, including breaches of consent orders used as another form of control" by her former husband. She notes that the records recording her complaint as "historical domestic violence" mischaracterised the situation and she believes that her statement to the police outlined ongoing coercive and controlling behaviour. Relevantly, the applicant's submissions query whether her former husband was actually questioned. She also queries the fact that NSW Police did not contact named witness who she said that she had confided in.
3. Much of the detail in the applicant's submission relate to her contention that NSW Police did not adequately investigate her claims. This detail has not been included because it is not the role of the Tribunal to make findings of fact or to adjudicate on these issues. However, the nature and extent of these concerns is relevant to public interest considerations in favour of disclosure in s 12 of the GIPA Act, examples of which include how NSW Police deal with members of the public, the applicant's personal information and claims about the mishandling of the applicant's complaint. These submissions are also relevant to the applicant's personal factors under s 55 of the GIPA Act.
4. The applicant further contends that NSW Police did not comply with the Charter of Victim's Rights. She submits NSW Police should release the documents requested by her in full.
5. In her oral submissions, the applicant submits that getting access to the requested information would assist her to understand the nature and extent of the investigations and inquiries made by the NSW Police Force in relation to her complaint. She said that she was prepared to accept "view only" access of the first recording, which had already been offered by NSW Police, and that she was also prepared to accept "view only" access of the second recording which could be appropriately redacted to remove any references to personal information about her former partner, including when he communicated his telephone number to the police officer.
6. The respondent submits that the information that is the subject of items (3), (4) and part of (6) and (7) in the schedule of documents is excluded information of the LECC. This is because the LECC had access to and considered this information and the information relates to a specified function of the LECC, namely, the handling of misconduct matters. It is further submitted that the fact the disputed information originated within the NSW Police Force rather than within the LECC does not preclude its classification as excluded information of the LECC. In this regard, the respondent relies on the decision of the Tribunal in FZS v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2024] NSWCATAD 88 at [155] and the cases cited therein. It is submitted that it should be conclusively presumed there is an overriding public interest against disclosure because the disputed information is excluded information of the LECC. The LECC has not consented to the release of this information, and it cannot be released.
7. The respondent submits that the question of whether information is excluded information turns on whether the information at issue has a connection with a specified function: Jeray v Information and Privacy Commission [2024] NSWCATAP 239 at [143]. One of the ways in which the LECC Act provides for the management of misconduct matters by the LECC is requiring the establishment of a misconduct management information system to be maintained by NSW Police. The misconduct management guidelines currently in place require that all documentation considered or used in the triage investigation and resolution of conduct of a misconduct matter is to be uploaded to that system it is thus submitted than any information that has been uploaded by NSW Police may be taken to be excluded information as it is information that relates to the LECC's handling of those registered misconduct matters. As observed by the Appeal Panel in Beregi v Department of Planning Industry and Environment [2020] NSWCATAP 185 at [77] the term "relates to" as it is used in the definition of "excluded information" has a broad meaning.
8. The respondent further submits, in respect of items (9) and (10), that there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of copies of the first and second recordings of the body worn video footage, having regard to the provisions of cll 1(d), 1(f), 3(a) and 6 of the Table to s 14(2). It is nonetheless submitted that "view only" access may be provided to the first recording as an alternative form to that requested by the applicant by providing view only access.
9. In reply to the applicant's submissions, the respondent contends that the submissions and the evidence provided to the Tribunal about how her complaint was managed is tangential to this review because the Tribunal's jurisdiction in these proceedings is confined to the review of the respondent's decision under the GIPA Act. The Tribunal is not empowered to conduct any further review of the respondent's conduct more broadly. The respondent has provided complete copies of all documents responsive to the applicant's access application, including the redacted information contained in the confidential bundle. These redactions were based on the decision to withhold certain information because there was an overriding public interest against disclosure.
10. The respondent further submits that the fact that the LECC complaint has been resolved does not mean that the information provided by NSW Police ceases to be excluded information. In this regard, the respondent relies on the decision in Robertson v Deputy Secretary, Local Government, Planning and Policy [2023] NSWCATAP 88 (Robertson) where the Appeal Panel held at [68] that the fact an investigation had concluded "does not prevent a final report from relating to that process". The respondent contends that where the function that rendered the information excluded has been discharged, this does not change the characterisation of the information as being excluded information for the purposes of the GIPA Act. Accordingly, it is submitted that the resolution of the LECC complaint does not mean information relating to the complaint handling function ceases to be excluded information.

1. Having regard to the submissions of the parties and the material before the Tribunal, the issues for determination are:

(1) Are items (3), (4) and part of (6) and (7) "excluded information" of the LECC for the purposes of the GIPA Act and therefore subject to the conclusive presumption in s 14(1)?

(2) Do items (9) and (10) fall within the public interest considerations against disclosure in the Table to s 14(2)?

(3) If so, can disclosure be provided in an alternative form, for instance, with view only access and with some sections of the video footage in respect of the body worn video recordings?

Is the disputed information "excluded information"?

1. According to Chief Inspector Holgate, items (3), (4) and part of (6) and (7) are information that was uploaded onto the IA Pro system and once the applicant made her complaint about police misconduct. I accept this evidence.
2. The question is whether this information is related to a function specified in Sch 2 to the GIPA Act.
3. There is no dispute that the LECC is an agency specified in Sch 2, cl 2. One of the specified functions is "handling of misconduct matters". The information uploaded into the IA Pro system was uploaded pursuant to the misconduct matters management guidelines based on the protocols agreed between the respondent and the LECC. These guidelines have been established to comply with obligations under the LECC Act and the Police Act. I am satisfied that items (3), (4) and part of (6) and (7) contain information that is related to a function specified in Sch 2 to the GIPA Act, namely the handling of misconduct matters. The documents in question were uploaded to enable the LECC to consider the applicant's misconduct complaint. The LECC had access to these documents, in addition to any documents or submissions provided by the applicant, when deciding what further action, if any, should be taken pursuant to s 44 of the LECC Act. It does not matter that the LECC decided not to take any further action. I am therefore satisfied, subject to two further issues that arise, that items (3), (4) and part of (6) and (7) fall within the definition of excluded information because the information in the IA Pro system has an undisputed connection with the handling of misconduct matters - this is why the information had been uploaded to the IA Pro system.
4. The first question that arises is whether the fact that this information in the shared database, which was created by NSW Police, is still information of the LECC.
5. The respondent contends that it is.
6. In Betzis v Commissioner of Police [2020] NSWCATAD 71 (Betzis) where the Tribunal found at [36] that the fact the document in dispute was prepared by the NSW Police Force arising out of its investigations into the death of a person "does not detract from its character as information prepared for and relied upon by the Coroner in the exercise of her judicial functions under the Coroners Act". The Tribunal also found at [40] that the fact the information was also held by the NSW Police Force in its investigation management system did not alter its character as excluded information of the coroner.
7. In Murdoch v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2025] NSWCATAD 196 (Murdoch), Hennessy ADCJ, Deputy President also found at [30] that the fact that the information in the brief of evidence was generated by the NSW Police Force and not the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), does not change the character of the information. It is irrelevant whether there was any involvement of the office of the DPP. Her Honour also found at [31]:

"I also reject Mr Murdoch**'**s submission that the information must be excluded information in the hands of the Commissioner. Despite what was said by the Tribunal in EGR v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2020] NSWCATAD 94 at [32]- [33], there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of information held by an agency even if that information is not the excluded information of that agency. Excluded information includes information held by one agency (in this case the Commissioner) that is the excluded information of another agency (in this case the office of the DPP). The Tribunal agreed with that proposition in FZS v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2024] NSWCATAD 88 at [153]- [155]."

1. I accept the submission of the respondent, which is consistent with the Tribunal decisions referred to above. I am satisfied that the information in items (3), (4) and part of (6) and (7) is excluded information of the LECC because it was uploaded into the IA Pro system specifically for the purpose of facilitating the LECC's assessment of the applicant's complaint and was information available to the LECC in a shared database. It does not matter that it was originally created by NSW Police.
2. The second issue that arises is whether the fact that the LECC decided not to take any further action on the applicant's complaint has an impact on the information in the IA Pro system such that it is no longer excluded information of the LECC.
3. I accept the respondent's submission that the resolution of the LECC complaint does not mean that information stored in the IA Pro system relating to the complaint handling function ceases to be excluded information. In Robertson, Murdoch and Betzis, the functions which enlivened the provisions of Sch 2 had concluded but the Appeal Panel and Tribunal found, in respect of each case, that the information remained at the heart of the Sch 2 function and therefore continued to be excluded information for the purposes of the GIPA Act. the position is slightly different in this case because there was no concluded report or document by the LECC which incorporates the excluded information shared through the IA Pro system. Despite this, there is evidence that the information remains within the IA Pro system, was relied on by the LECC to make its decision in relation to the complaint and therefore information which remains the information of the LECC, which retains the right to consent or withhold consent to its release.
4. Even though the LECC wrote to the applicant on 26 March 2025 advising her taking no further action on her complaint, when the LECC was consulted about access application on 9 May 2025, it refused to consent to the release of the information. Unless the LECC changes it position, I am satisfied that the disputed information in items (3), (4) and part of (6) and (7) is "excluded information" under the GIPA Act.
5. I therefore affirm that part of the decision under review.

The first and second video footage: are there public interest considerations against disclosure?

1. In the schedule of documents to the tender bundle, the respondent relies on the public interest considerations against disclosure based on secrecy (cl 6) in respect of the first and second recordings and additionally relies on the public interest considerations against disclosure in the Table to s 14(2) relating responsible and effective government (cl 1) and individual rights (cl 3) in respect of the second recording, but not the first recording. This appears to be an oversight as the respondent makes submissions about all three public interest considerations against disclosure in relation to both recordings in his submissions lodged with the Tribunal on 30 September 2025. I also note that Chief Inspector Holgate includes in his second affidavit reference to the first recording as "revealing sensitive evidentiary material". I have therefore considered these public interest considerations in relation to both recordings.
2. I turn to each of the public interest considerations against disclosure.

1. As already noted, cl 6 of the Table to s 14(2) of the GIPA Act provides that there is public interest consideration against disclosure of information if disclosure of that information could reasonably be expected to constitute a contravention of a provision of any other act that prohibits the disclosure of information. The respondent submits that disclosure of body worn video footage would constitute a contravention of s 40 of the Surveillance Devices Act. It is submitted that s 40 creates a very strict and limited regime where information obtained through the use of surveillance devices, including body worn video, may be disclosed. The strictness of the regime is reflected in the seriousness of the penalties for breach of ss 40(1) and 40(2) of the Surveillance Devices Act which is a penalty of imprisonment of up to two years.
2. Examination of the exceptions to the prohibition on use, communication and publication demonstrate that they are not only limited in number but also limited in scope. The respondent contends that the limited nature of the exceptions demonstrates an intention to strictly control information obtained through a surveillance device. The respondent further submits that the limited number of exceptions to the prohibition on s 40(1) reflects important privacy considerations. The respondent relies on Voitenko t/as Access Party Hire v Zurich Australian Insurance Limited [2016] NSWSC 324 where Hall J said at [96]:

"...Two reasons for the prohibitions against disclosure of protected information under ss 40(1) and (2) may be discerned. First, in order to ensure that the intrusion into the private conversations of citizens recorded by the lawful use of surveillance devices under the SD Act are not to be used, communicated etc beyond the legitimate interests of law enforcement for which a warrant was issued under the Act. Second, in order to secure the integrity of investigations by law enforcement agencies by proscribing any other use, communication etc of protected information which might otherwise impair the efficacy of such investigations."

1. These observations made by Hall J in relation to private conversations are said to apply equally to body worn video recording interactions between police and citizens. It is further submitted that the policy considerations underpinning the prohibition on the use and disclosure of protected information through body worn video are not relevantly different from those underpinning the prohibition on the use and disclosure of protected information gathered through other forms of surveillance device.
2. The respondent contends that the strictness of the regime established by the Surveillance Devices Act and the importance of the policy considerations underpinning that regime was recognised in respect of body worn video footage in the decision of Cheung v Commissioner of Police [2019] NSWCATAD 249 (Cheung). Firstly, the Tribunal recognised that s 40 of Surveillance Devices Act is a secrecy provision that enlivened public interest consideration cl 6. Secondly, the Tribunal accepted that the restrictions on the use, communication or publication of information obtained through surveillance devices, including body worn video, should be given considerable weight. Notably, the Tribunal said at [55]:

"The use of surveillance devices, including body-worn video, is an essential and integral part of the detection and investigation of criminal offences in New South Wales. The legislation governing the use of such devices is also designed to ensure that the privacy of individuals is not unnecessarily impinged upon by providing strict requirements around the installation, use and maintenance of surveillance devices. As a result, the Surveillance Devices Act and Regulation establish a strict regime for the collection, use and disclosure of information gathered through the use of the surveillance device, including body-video footage. In my view, for these reasons considerable weight should be given to this public interest consideration against disclosure."

1. More recently in Higgins v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2024] NSWCATAD 175 at [82] the Tribunal, in considering whether body worn video should be released, cited Cheung, finding that in the circumstances of that case "the weight accorded to the secrecy considerations, outweigh the considerations in favour of disclosure".
2. The respondent also relies on the evidence of Chief Inspector Holgate who says that the release of body worn video footage in response to an application under the GIPA Act is, in his view, contrary to or inconsistent with the restrict regime regulating the use of such footage under the Surveillance Devices Act and the practices and procedures observed by NSW Police. The disclosure of information captured by the footage, which is often highly sensitive to the individuals involved, would be a serious invasion of privacy of the individuals depicted and would be contrary to community expectations regarding the confidentiality of interactions with police. Chief Inspector Holgate also expresses concerns that if copies of body worn video footage is released, there would be scope for the footage or metadata to be altered or manipulated.
3. I am satisfied that the body worn video footage that is the subject of the first and second recordings falls within cl 6 as it is "protected information", the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to contravene the secrecy provisions in the Surveillance Devices Act. I accept the submissions of the respondent about the importance of such footage as a surveillance and investigative tool, the strict regime around its use and disclosure and the policy considerations around restricting use, communication and publication to the authorised uses identified in s 40 of the Surveillance Devices Act. Video footage of interactions with police already impinges on a person's privacy. The unconditional release of a copy of such information under the GIPA Act has the potential to unnecessarily compromise a person's privacy and possibly lead to misuse of this footage by others if it is then widely distributed. I am also satisfied this is a public interest consideration against disclosure which should be given considerable weight.

Responsible and effective government: clauses 1(d) and (f)

1. The respondent submits that each of the first and second recordings contain information that has been supplied by members of the public to NSW Police in connection with a response to, and investigation of, an incident. It is submitted that the disclosure of such information could reasonably be expected to prejudice the supply of confidential information necessary for the effective exercise of functions of the NSW Police Force under cl 1(d) and/or disclosure could reasonably be expected to prejudice the effective exercise of NSW Police's investigative and law enforcement functions under cl 1(f).
2. The respondent contends that the information provided to the police officer which is the subject of both recordings is information that was provided confidentially. I accept this contention.
3. The respondent further contends that if members of the public were aware that information they supplied might later be released under the GIPA Act, members of the public would be reluctant to report matters to NSW Police or to assist in investigations. This contention is supported by the evidence of Chief Inspector Holgate and is consistent with the decision of the Supreme Court in Simring v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police [2009] NSWSC 270 where the Court found at [69]:

"When a person speaks with the police in respect of a criminal offence and reveals sensitive matters that person expects that statements made will only be used for the purpose of the Court proceedings and not otherwise. There are limits on what can be published. There is a strong public interest in criminal offences being reported to the police and the sources of information not drying up. If victims of crime thought that statements made in the course of a criminal investigation revealing their personal affairs, or some of them, could be released to an applicant under the FOI Act, those sources of information may well dry up or at least there could be a reduction in the flow of information available to the police..."

1. It is submitted that the supply of information from members of the public is necessary for the effective exercise of the functions of NSW Police. Any prejudice to the supply such information would undermine the performance of those functions. This is also supported by the evidence of Chief Inspector Holgate who says that NSW Police rely heavily on members of the public reporting incidents and conducts of concern and providing information in connection with investigations. I accept the submissions of the respondent and the evidence of Chief Inspector Holgate, who is an experienced and senior police officer.
2. I find that the disclosure of information provided confidentially in the course of making a complaint (the first recording) or assisting police in responding to a complaint (the second recording) could reasonably be expected to have the effect contended for in respect of clauses 1(d) and 1(f) of the Table to s 14(2). I also find, given the importance of the role of NSW Police in the exercise of its investigation and law enforcement functions, that these public interest considerations should be given considerable weight.

1. The respondent submits that cl 3(a) of the Table to s 14(2) applies to both recordings. Clause 3(a) relevantly provides that there is a public interest against disclosure of information if disclosure could be reasonably expected to reveal the personal information of individuals. "Personal information" is defined in Sch 4, cl 4 of the GIPA Act as information about an individual whose identity is apparent or can reasonably be ascertained from the information.
2. The first recording includes discussions by the applicant revealing personal information about individuals, including her former husband, given the allegations she makes. These are allegations that have not been tested. The second recording contains personal information about the applicant's former husband, including about his home and his response to the applicant's allegations. Notably, it also includes personal information relating to his family.
3. The applicant submits that she has already seen her former husband's home. The respondent submits that this is irrelevant because the issue of privacy relates more broadly to her former husband's personal information, not only as it relates to the applicant and her knowledge about his personal information.
4. Having reviewed both recordings, I am satisfied that the recordings reveal personal information of individuals other than the applicant and that the disclosure of this information could be reasonably expected to reveal the personal information of other individuals and in fact does so, insofar as the interactions recorded in those videos clearly include discussions, information provided and opinions express in respect of other individuals.
5. Accordingly, I accept the submission of the respondent that this consideration against disclosure carries significant weight.

1. Section 13 of the GIPA Act requires that the decision-maker, and therefore the Tribunal on review, undertake a balancing exercise to form a view about whether there is an overriding public interest against disclosure having regard to the public interest considerations identified as being relevant, both in favour and against disclosure.
2. The respondent accepts that there is the general public interest favouring disclosure of the information sought by the applicant under s 12(1) because disclosure could reasonably be expected to inform the public about the operations of NSW Police and their policies and practices for dealing with members of the public and some of the information requested is personal information of the applicant. The respondent also says that consideration of personal factors of the applicant under s 55 of the GIPA Act are relevant because the information requested relates to incidents involving the applicant. It is accepted that the applicant has a legitimate interest in accessing this information in relation to NSW Police response to her complaint.
3. I agree with these concessions, which are properly made.
4. There are public interest considerations in favour of disclosure in this case. I accept that disclosure may have the impact of disclosing to the public the operations of NSW Police and their policies and practices for dealing with members of the public and, relevantly, complaints made in respect of allegations of domestic violence. How NSW Police deal with domestic violence has been the subject of public scrutiny over the years. In addition, much of the information requested in the first recording and some in the second recording is personal information of the applicant. These are matters that favour disclosure.
5. I also accept that the applicant has reasons why she wants this information, relevant to s 55 factors − she wants to understand whether NSW Police have taken her complaint seriously and properly investigated her claims. The fact that NSW Police have not initiated criminal action in relation to her complaint does not mean that the applicant's complaint was not properly assessed or investigated. However, the difficulty for the applicant is she does not know the detail of those investigations. If the applicant had more information about this, she may be less dissatisfied with the outcome and less critical of the process.
6. On the other hand, I have found that there are strong countervailing public interest considerations against disclosure. As already noted, I am satisfied that the public interest considerations against disclosure under clauses 1(d), 1 (f), 3(a) and 6, cumulatively but also individually, weigh strongly against disclosure.
7. In weighing up these considerations, I am satisfied that there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of the first and second recordings.
8. The issue that arises is whether these public interest considerations against disclosure can be ameliorated through alternative view only access under s 72 of the GIPA Act.

Should view only access be provided to the first and second recordings?

1. Section 72(1)(c) provides for alternative access by allowing an applicant to view the material without taking or keeping a copy.
2. The applicant has agreed she would accept view only access of the first recording and view only access of the second recording, with certain parts containing personal information deleted.
3. The respondent accepts that, while there is an overriding public interest against disclosure of a copy of the first recording, providing access in the alternative form of "view only" serves to address certain concerns and thereby alter the balance of the public interest. The respondent accepts that the public interest favouring disclosure in respect of the first recording is weighty because the information relates to the applicant's own personal information. It is also accepted that considerations against disclosure, namely clauses 1(d) and 1(f) and 3(a), may be considered to carry somewhat less weight because the information is primarily that of the applicant. Even though concerns remain about disclosure of personal information of other individuals, the respondent says that concerns about the first recording being distributed, published or broadcast more widely will be mitigated if access is provided on a "view only basis". In other words, concerns about the public policy considerations underlying the regime under the Surveillance Devices Act would be mitigated by providing access in a controlled in the control alternative form proposed.
4. I accept these submissions and agree that this is a sensible and measured approach which provides access to the applicant, directed to addressing some of her concerns, but nonetheless mitigates the potential impact of the public interest considerations against disclosure.
5. This being the case, I find that the part of the decision in relation to the first recording, being item (9), should be varied to provide view only access to the applicant pursuant to s 72(1)(c) of the GIPA Act.
6. The position in relation to the second recording is different. In the recorded interview, the former husband refers to third parties in the answers he gives, provides his telephone number on request and has no choice, once he has opened the door to the police officer and co-operates with police by answering the questions put to him, to be videoed. Relevantly, he has not been consulted about the release of his personal information.
7. These considerations should be given significant weight against disclosure and cannot be mitigated by view only access under s 72. The disclosure of the second recording, albeit through view only access but without consultation and consent, does not address the privacy or secrecy considerations raised by the respondent. Nor does it address concerns about compromising investigation practices and procedures and, importantly, community expectations about confidentiality in interactions with NSW Police, particularly when those interactions are voluntary. Deleting those parts of the second recording that contain personal information about the applicant's former husband, his home and his family, does not resolve the concerns. First, this would require the majority of the recording to be edited and deleted and, secondly, this does not address concerns about prejudice to the supply to NSW Police of confidential information to facilitate the effective exercise of its functions and the prejudice more generally of the effective exercise of NSW police functions.
8. Accordingly, I reject the submission made by the applicant for "view only access", deleting personal information, in respect of the second recording.

1. For the reasons outlined above, the Tribunal varies the decision under review as follows:

(1) access should be allowed in full in relation to items (1), (2), (5) and (8) of the schedule of documents;

(2) access should be allowed in part in respect of those parts of items (6) and (7) of the schedule of documents that have not been redacted;

(3) that part of the decision under review refusing access to the information in relation to items (3) and (4) of the schedule of documents and in respect of those parts of items (6) and (7) of the schedule of documents that have been redacted is affirmed;

(4) access should be allowed to the first recording, being item (9) of the schedule of documents, by way of view only access at a police station nominated by the respondent; and

(5) that part of the decision under review refusing access to the information in relation the second recording, being item (10) of the schedule of documents is affirmed.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.