(2) A complaint may be made direct to the Complaints Committee or through the Law Complaints Officer.

(3) A complaint should normally be in writing, but the Complaints Committee or the Law Complaints Officer may formulate in writing any oral complaint received.

(4) A complaint must -

(b) if possible, identify the Australian legal practitioner about whom the complaint is made; and

(c) describe the alleged conduct the subject of the complaint.

(b) by an Australian legal practitioner with the authority of the complainant; or

1. Division 4 of Part 13 also includes s 415 which provides for the summary dismissal of a complaint on various grounds. Section 415(1)(b) allows the LPCC to summarily dismiss a complaint upon grounds which include that it is 'vexatious, misconceived, frivolous or lacking in substance'.[6] Section 415(2)(c) mandates that the LPCC must summarily dismiss a complaint if it is not one that the LPCC has power to deal with.[7]
2. By Division 6 of Part 13, the LPCC is granted powers of investigation. Section 421 provides for investigation of the LPCC's own initiative and mandates that each complaint must be investigated unless it is referred to the Tribunal, dismissed or withdrawn or is subject to mediation.
3. Division 7 sets out a range of decisions which the LPCC may make following an investigation.
4. Section 424(1) provides that:

After an investigation under section 421 is completed, the Complaints Committee must -

(a) in the case of the investigation of a complaint, dismiss the complaint under section 425, or, in the case of an investigation on the initiative of the Complaints Committee, decide to take no further action; or

(b) take action under section 426; or

(c) refer the matter to the State Administrative Tribunal under section 428.

1. Section 425 provides for dismissal of complaints:

After an investigation of a complaint against an Australian legal practitioner is completed, the Complaints Committee may dismiss the complaint if satisfied that -

(a) there is no reasonable likelihood that the practitioner would be found guilty by the State Administrative Tribunal of either unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct; or

(b) it is in the public interest to do so.

1. Division 8 of Part 13 includes s 435, which provides as follows:

(1) Subject to subsection (2), a person aggrieved by -

(a) a decision of the Complaints Committee to dismiss a complaint; or

(b) a decision made by the Complaints Committee under section 426,

may apply to the State Administrative Tribunal for a review of the decision.

(2) If the Complaints Committee, in its reasons for its decision, specifically finds the complaint -

(a) to be trivial, unreasonable, vexatious or frivolous; or

(b) in the case of a complaint purporting to be made under section 410(1)(e), to be a matter in which the complainant does not have, or did not have, a direct personal interest,

the person aggrieved cannot apply to the State Administrative Tribunal for a review of the decision without the leave of the Tribunal.

1. By its decision on 26 July 2022, the first respondent determined to dismiss four complaints against the second respondent and five complaints against the third respondent pursuant to s 425(a) of the LP Act, all on the basis that they were unreasonable pursuant to s 435(2)(a) of the LP Act. It also declined to deal with another complaint against each of the second and third respondents pursuant to s 410 of the LP Act on the basis that the complainant did not have a direct personal interest in the matters alleged in those complaints.
2. As is apparent, the first respondent made its decision pursuant to powers set out in the LP Act, despite that decision being made after that Act's repeal on 1 July 2022.
3. It was not in dispute, and we find, that it had the power to do so pursuant to s 313 of the Application Act.
4. Section 313 of the Application Act provides for the continuation, after 1 July 2022, of the LPCC's powers of investigation and determination in relation to complaints made under Part 13 of the LP Act by the first respondent, notwithstanding the repeal of the LP Act on that date.
5. While there is no dispute that s 313 provides the first respondent with the power to make its decision, the applicant and the first respondent disagree as to whether that section also provides for a person in the position of the applicant to bring review proceedings in this Tribunal of such a decision.

The Initial Basis for the Application for Review

1. The application to the Tribunal for review of the first respondent's decision was made on 13 September 2022, pursuant to s 319 of the Application Act.
2. That section applies to applications for review of decisions of the first respondent that were made prior to 1 July 2022 - s 319(1)(a)(i) concerns applications for review commenced prior to that date, which necessarily requires a decision of the first respondent prior to that date, while s 319(1)(a)(ii) concerns applications made under s 318, which in turn allows for applications to be made after 1 July 2022 in relation to decisions made by the first respondent prior to that date.
3. The first respondent, in its written Outline, submitted that this case falls into neither of those two categories.[8]
4. In written submissions filed in response to the respondent's Outline, the applicant accepted that was the case and also conceded that the general savings provisions provided by s 37 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) do not assist.[9]
5. We agree with the first respondent's submission that the only possible sub-paragraph of s 37 which might be relevant is s 37(1)(c). That sub-paragraph provides that the repeal of the relevant statute (which in this case is the LP Act):

does not, unless the contrary intention appears -

(c) affect any right, interest, title, power or privilege created, acquired, accrued, established or exercisable or any status or capacity existing prior to the repeal;[10]

1. Prior to the repeal of the LP Act, the applicant had no right, interest, title, power or privilege in respect of an application for review to the Tribunal. Section 435 of the LP Act creates such a right upon the dismissal of a complaint by the first respondent; prior to such a decision no right exists. As no decision had been made prior to 1 July 2022, no such right existed.[11]
2. As noted above, the applicant acknowledged as much and sought leave to amend the application such that it was deemed to have been made under s 435 of the LP Act.[12]
3. The applicant submitted that s 435 of the LP Act continues to have operation by s 313 of the Application Act.[13]
4. Given its centrality to the dispute before us, it is convenient to set out in full the provisions of that section:

(1) This section applies to any of the following matters under the old Act that were not completed before commencement day[14] -

(a) a complaint or inquiry being dealt with by the Complaints Committee under the old Act because of section 621 of that Act;

(b) a complaint being dealt with by the Complaints Committee under Part 13 of the old Act;

(c) an investigation by the Complaints Committee under section 421 of the old Act.

(2) Unless the local regulations provide that another person is to deal with the matter, the Legal Services and Complaints Committee may deal with the matter under the provisions of the old Act dealing with the matter, including provisions necessary to give effect to those provisions, as if -

(b) a reference to the Complaints Committee in those provisions were a reference to the Legal Services and Complaints Committee.

(3) If the local regulations provide that another person is to deal with the matter -

(a) the person must have regard to the steps taken by the Complaints Committee before the person deals with the matter; and

(b) the person must deal with the matter in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the local regulations.

The Decision to Decline to Deal with two Complaints per s 410 was a Decision to Dismiss those Complaints

1. As set out above, s 410(1)(e) of the LP Act provides that a person may make a complaint if they have, or 'had a direct personal interest in the matters alleged in the complaint'.
2. It was on this basis that the first respondent declined to deal with the fourth complaint against the second respondent and the fifth complaint against the third respondent.[15]
3. In each case, the 'relevant complaint' made by the applicant was that the relevant practitioner was in a position of conflict of interest.
4. The alleged conflict was said to arise on three grounds, each of which concerned the relevant practitioner's duties to his clients, where the applicant was not a client of either practitioner.
5. Although there is no express power in s 410(1)(e) to make such a decision, it necessarily follows from the terms of s 435(2)(b), quoted above, that a decision to decline to deal with a complaint on the basis that the complainant lacks a direct personal interest in the subject matter of the complaint amounts to the dismissal of a complaint.
6. That sub-section requires that leave be obtained for an application for review of a decision where the LPCC has 'specifically found' that the complainant in a complaint purportedly brought under s 410(1)(e), lacks a direct personal interest. The section would have no work to do, and indeed would make no sense, if the decision to decline to deal with the complaint was not to be taken as a decision to dismiss the complaint.
7. We also agree with the joint submission of the parties that such an inference is consistent with s 415(2)(c), which mandates that the LPCC must dismiss a complaint if it is 'not one that [it] has power to deal with.'[16]
8. That is, a decision to decline to deal with a complaint on the ground that the complainant lacks the necessary personal interest is, in our view, a dismissal of the complaint pursuant to s 415(2)(c).

The Right to Seek Review of a Decision to Dismiss a Complaint under s 435 of the LP Act is not Preserved by s 313 of the Application Act

1. As noted above, the balance of the applicant's complaints were dismissed by the first respondent pursuant to s 425 of the LP Act on 26 July 2022.
2. Section 435 of the LP Act provides that a 'person aggrieved' by a decision to dismiss a complaint, which in our view includes a summary dismissal under s 415 and dismissal after an investigation under s 425, has the right to seek review of the decision by the Tribunal.
3. We accept the parties agreed position that s 313 of the Application Act extends the power of dismissal under s 415 and s 425 of the LP Act to allow the first respondent to make a decision after 1 July 2022 to dismiss a complaint lodged with the LPCC prior to that date.
4. It is the applicant's case that s 313 of the Application Act also extends the power to seek review pursuant to s 435 of the LP Act beyond 1 July 2022.
5. The applicant submitted that:

In summary, s 313 preserves the entirety of Part 13 of the LP Act in the applicant's scenario, and that preservation includes the applicant's right of review and the Tribunal's jurisdiction to conduct that review under s 435 of the LP Act.[17]

1. The applicant acknowledged that it is clearly a purpose of s 313 to identify the entity that will, after 1 July 2022, deal with a complaint that was made prior to that date. But it was submitted that it 'cannot' be the purpose of that section to restrict the ongoing operation of Part 13 of the LP Act to only those things that the first respondent can do and, by such a restriction, 'effectively oust[] a complainant's right of review, and indeed the Tribunal's jurisdiction in respect of such a review.'[18]
2. So much was said to follow from the context, which includes that:

(a) s 313(2) empowers someone other than the first respondent to have carriage of the investigation of a complaint if 'local regulations' so provide; and

(b) s 313(2)(b) provides that a reference to the LPCC in 'those provisions' is now to the first respondent.

1. On that basis the applicant submits that, logically, the second purpose of s 313:

... is to provide for how matters within s 313(1) are to be dealt with. On a plain reading of the section, the applicant's complaint being dealt with under Part 13, continues to be dealt with 'as if' Part 13 has not been repealed ... which includes the applicant's right of review found in s 435, which is within Part 13 of the LP Act.[19]

1. At the hearing Ms Spencer, who appeared for the applicant, submitted that the phrase 'under the provisions of the old Act dealing with the matter' in s 313(2) are not limited in any way. On that basis, she submitted, the sub-section preserves the whole of Part 13 of the LP Act.
2. We do not agree.
3. Section 313 is limited in its terms to the work of the LPCC in 'dealing with' a complaint.
4. As was submitted by the first respondent, the scope and purpose of s 313 goes no further than to empower the first respondent to 'deal with' a complaint which was made under the LP Act prior to 1 July 2022 and which, at that date, remains incomplete.
5. In so dealing with a complaint, the first respondent may do so 'under the provisions' of the LP Act as if they have not been repealed.
6. We agree with the submission of the first respondent that the text of s 313 does not, either in its terms or by implication, continue the operation of s 435 of the LP Act or otherwise confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal to review a decision of the first respondent made after 1 July 2022.[20] That is, in our view, clear on the terms of the section.
7. Section 313(1) sets out the circumstances in which the section applies. That subsection is limited on its terms to those circumstances where the LPCC was, at 1 July 2022, either dealing with a complaint or investigating a complaint under Part 13 of the LP Act or investigating a complaint under s 421.
8. Section 313(2) then sets out, in very clear terms, that in such circumstances, the first respondent may 'deal with' the matter under the provisions of the LP Act as if those provisions had not been repealed and as if references in the LP Act to the LPCC were references to it, the first respondent.
9. The combined effect of ss 313(1) and (2) is that where the LPCC was 'dealing with' a complaint under Part 13 or investigating a complaint under s 421 as at 1 July 2022, the LPCC has the power to continue to do so under the same provisions.
10. The only additional breadth provided by s 313(2) is provided by the words 'including provisions necessary to give effect to those provisions' where 'those provisions' is clearly, from the context, a reference to the provisions contained in the LP Act that allowed the LPCC to deal with the matter.
11. It is not abundantly clear what additional provisions the words refer to, but in our view it is clear that it is not a reference to s 435; there is nothing in a power granting a person aggrieved by the LPCC's decision the right to seek review of that decision which can be said to be 'necessary to give effect to' the first respondent's decision.
12. Equally, we are of the view that the provisions of s 313(3) do not allow an alternative view or otherwise assist the applicant.
13. In our view, the scope of s 313(3) is clear: 'local regulations' (promulgated under s 252) may provide that somebody other than the first respondent may play the role that s 313(2) otherwise gives to it to continue the LPCC's work in 'dealing with' a complaint or investigating a complaint under s 421. It does no more than that.
14. Accordingly, while Ms Spencer is correct that there is no express limitation in the terms of s 313 as to which provisions of the LP Act continue to apply, the scope of that section is confined to that which the first respondent may do because that is the full extent and scope of its terms.
15. As Mr Beetham submitted in the hearing, the purpose of s 313 is to enable the first respondent to complete the task given to the LPCC under the LP Act, nothing more.[21]
16. He put the same point another way - s 435 of the LP Act is not continued by s 313(2) of the Application Act because s 435 is not a provision necessary for the first respondent to deal with a complaint that the LPCC was dealing with prior to 1 July 2022.[22]
17. The result is that there is no right of review for a decision that is made by the first respondent after 1 July 2022 in respect of a complaint made prior to that date.
18. We agree with the first respondent that that result is consistent with the balance of the Application Act in that both s 317(2) and s 319(2) of the Application Act provide for the continued operation of s 435 of the LP Act but only in respect of decisions made by the LPCC prior to 1 July 2022.[23]
19. The absence of a similar provision in relation to decisions made after 1 July 2022 'tells strongly against' the applicant's preferred construction.[24]
20. We also agree with the first respondent that the absence of a right of review to the Tribunal from a decision of the first respondent dismissing a complaint is consistent with the policy adopted in the Legal Profession Uniform Law (Uniform Law), which by s 6 of the Application Act is applied to Western Australia.
21. Section 312 of the Uniform Law provides that '[t]he determination of a complaint or matter by the designated local regulatory authority under this Chapter is final, except as provided by this Part.'
22. Only two other provisions are contained in the relevant Part of the Uniform Law, one of which provides for the designated local regulatory authority (ie the first respondent) to conduct an internal review of a decision (at its absolute discretion)[25] and the other provides a right of a review to the relevant practitioner.[26]
23. That is, the Uniform Law provides no right of review from a decision of the first respondent for the person who brought the complaint and who is 'aggrieved' by the first respondent's decision.

1. We are, accordingly, satisfied that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to determine the application for review of the first respondent's decisions made 26 July 2022.
2. The application for review must therefore be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.

[1] Affidavit of Russell John Daily, affirmed 4 November 2022, RJD-1, pages 4 - 13.

[2] The second and third respondent advised that they did not wish to be, and were not, heard in relation to this preliminary point.

[3] Affidavit of Russell John Daily, affirmed 4 November 2022, RJD-1, pages 4 - 13.

[4] Notwithstanding its repeal, the following description is expressed in the present tense for simplicity's sake.

[8] First Respondent's Outline of Submissions, dated 4 November 2022 (Outline), paras 17 - 20.

[9] Applicant's Submissions in Respect of the Preliminary Question, dated 5 December 2022 (Applicant's Written Submissions), paras 2 - 3 and paras 5 - 6.

[12] Applicant's Written Submissions, para 4.

[13] Applicant's Written Submissions, paras 7 - 8 and paras 12 - 16.

[14] 'Commencement day' is 1 July 2022, the day on which the Application Act commenced.

[15] Affidavit of Russell John Daily, affirmed 4 November 2022, RJD-2, paras 49 - 51 and RJD-3,

[16] Joint Submissions on Section 410 Legal Profession Act 2008, dated 22 June 2023, paras 12 - 13.

[17] Applicant's Written Submissions, para 8.

[18] Applicant's Written Submissions, paras 13 and 15.

[19] Applicant's Written Submissions, para 16.

[20] First Respondent's Reply Submissions, dated 9 December 2022 (Reply Submissions), para 4.