Consideration
59 Before considering the particular issues in this matter, it is convenient to mention how the exercise of the power conferred by s 31A should be approached. In the present case, the question is whether any of the respondents have no reasonable prospect of defending the proceedings or any part of the proceedings. How this question should be answered was recently discussed by Foster J in Wang v Anying Group Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1500 at [43]:
The critical words of s 31A(1), when applied to the present case, require me to be satisfied that the respondents have "… no reasonable prospect of successfully defending the proceeding …". The following principles may be extracted from the authorities:
(a) The moving party does not have to demonstrate that the defence is hopeless or unarguable;
(b) The Court must consider the pleadings and the evidence with a "critical eye" in order to see whether the respondent party has evidence of sufficient quality and weight to be able to succeed at trial (Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd v Ford Motor Company of Australia Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 372 at [23] (p 382) (per Finkelstein J));
(c) The respondent party is not obliged to present its whole case in order to defeat the summary judgment applicant but must at least present a sufficient outline of the evidence in order to enable the Court to come to a preliminary view about the merits for the purpose of considering the statutory test in s 31A(1)(b) (Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd 167 FCR 372 at [22] (p 382) (per Finkelstein J)); and
(d) The test may require greater scrutiny of the pleadings and evidence in some cases than in others. In my judgment, the words of s 31A(1) compel a flexible approach. The real question in every case is not so much whether there is any issue that could arguably go to trial but rather whether there is any issue that should be permitted to go to trial. This seems to be the approach of Finkelstein J in Jefferson Ford Pty Ltd 167 FCR 372 and of Gordon J in the same case (as to which see [123]-[134] (pp 406-409)), although Rares J in that case at [73]-[74] (p 394) and in Boston Commercial Services Pty Ltd v GE Capital Finance Australasia Pty Ltd (2006) 236 ALR 720 esp at [45] (p 731) favoured a test which is much closer to the older test articulated in authorities decided under Rules of Court expressed in terms different from the language of s 31A(1)).
60 I am content to adopt broadly the same approach. Foster J went on to indicate that he agreed with the summary of the relevant principles given by Gilmour J in Dandaven v Harbeth Holdings Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 955. Generally, I also agree. However it was submitted in this matter that before a point was reached where the prospects of a respondent successfully defending the proceedings was considered, it was necessary to consider whether there was a case of substance advanced by the applicant to which a sustainable (in the sense of having reasonable prospects of success) defence would have to be raised. I think, in this particular case, there is much to commend such an approach though in most cases where the prospects of a respondent successfully defending the proceeding was raised, the assumed starting point would be that the applicant did have a case of substance though that, in turn, may depend on the extent to which the applicant's asserted case was admitted or denied in the defence.
61 The first claim for which the applicant seeks summary judgment against the first and second respondents is one based on s 52 of the Trade Practices Act. It is said that the first respondent in signing the licence agreement on behalf of "Duke Video Pty Ltd" engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct. Somehow this conduct is also attributable to the second respondent. It is said that the signing of the agreement involved misleading and deceptive conduct because the licensee was, in truth, another company, namely Video Sports Pty Ltd, a fact now accepted by the applicant. This aspect of the claim, as against the first respondent, is misconceived. Section 52 concerns the conduct of corporations and not individuals. The case relied upon by the applicant, Houghton v Arms (2006) 225 CLR 553, is of no assistance. That case concerned the liability of individuals under the Fair Trading Act 1999 (Vic) and not the Trade Practices Act. In addition, the document containing the company name "Duke Video Pty Ltd" which the first respondent signed was prepared by the applicant. It is difficult to see how the signing of the agreement involved misleading or deceptive conduct at all let alone involved such conduct on the part of the second respondent. There should be no summary judgment in favour of the applicant on this aspect of his case.
62 The second claim for which the applicant seeks summary judgment against the first and second respondents is, again, based on s 52 though, at some points in his written material, the applicant appears to suggest this is also a contractual claim. It concerns the terms of clause 4 of the licence agreements whereby the licensee agreed to produce a minimum of 3000 copies within one month of signing the agreement. It is common ground that, as a matter of fact, only approximately 2500 copies of each film were produced. It is convenient, at this point, to deal with another claim of a similar type concerning clause 5 of the agreements, namely the agreement to notify every three months the amounts of sales and royalties and a claim that the first respondent represented that the second respondent would market the DVDs competently. In so far as these are claims under the Trade Practices Act and are maintainable under that Act, they are of a character that would ordinarily attract s 51A, that is, they are representations about future matters (that a particular number of DVDs would be produced, notification would be made about sales and royalties and the DVDs would be marketed in a particular way). That section would raise, in turn, whether there were reasonable grounds for making the representation. That would involve a factual investigation and, accordingly, summary judgment on this aspect of the applicant's claim would be inappropriate.
63 Indeed there is a more fundamental legal issue that would have to be resolved at any trial concerning the interaction between the Trade Practices Act and the contractual promises relied upon by the applicant. The issue was adverted to recently in a judgment of Gordon J in Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd v FKP Limited [2008] FCA 1915 at [67] - [69]:
[67] The interaction between the TPA and the law of contract is interesting and has been the subject of previous consideration: see by way of example Concrete Constructions Group v Litevale Pty Ltd (2002) 170 FLR 290; Futuretronics International Pty Ltd v Gadzhis [1992] 2 VR 217; Mander Forklift Pty Ltd v Dairy Farmers Co-operative (1990) ATPR (Digest) 46-061.
[68] In Futuretronics at 239, Ormiston J "expressed [his] doubts whether a contractual promise of itself carries with it any representation as to fact or conduct" actionable by reason of s 51A. His Honour explained the issue (at 238-39) in the following terms:
It is hard to believe that normally any promisee with ordinary contractual rights would … describe himself as having been deceived or misled [based on the mere acceptance of a promise]. It is only when it becomes apparent that the promise cannot be enforced, because, for example, it is either unenforceable or the promisee's rights are valueless or diminished, that one may return to the original promise to inquire whether that promise was of so little substance that it can be concluded that the promisee was indeed misled or deceived in the first place, at the time of his acceptance of the promise. Thus it may then be seen that the promisor originally had no intention to perform his promise or that he originally had no capacity or ability to perform it.
…
It would seem on the authorities that, at the least, a contractual promise would amount to an implied representation that the promisor then had an intention to carry out that promise. If it can be shown that he had no such intention, he would be guilty of misleading or deceptive conduct. Likewise it would seem that such a representation connotes a present ability to fulfil that promise which, if shown to be untrue at the time of making, would likewise characterise the implied representation as misleading or deceptive.
[69] As this passage reveals, an express contractual promise or representation will constitute an actionable implied representation under s 52 of the TPA only if the party making the promise or representation had no intention or capability of carrying it out at the time it was made (ie the promisor had no reasonable grounds for making the promise).
64 In so far as these claims are contractual, it would be inappropriate to give summary judgment. Ultimately, if there has been a breach of the licence agreements in one or a number of ways, the appropriate remedy will be damages if the applicant suffered loss. Making a declaration of breach, even if breach was now established, would be a barren exercise.
65 The next claim for which the applicant seeks summary judgment concerns the alleged contravention of s 103(1) of the Copyright Act by all respondents. The first way in which the applicant alleges contravention involves a construction of the sub-section which is, as I presently view things, untenable. At the very least, it is not a construction so obvious as to warrant summary judgment against respondents based on it. The applicant argues that if the circumstances identified in (a) or (b) of subs (1) of that section arise then there is infringement. That is, if (for present purposes) there is a sale or offering for sale of an article without the licence of the owner then that is an infringement by operation of s 103. However this construction of the subsection ignores the five lines of text following (a) and (b) which plainly enough, in my present view, completes the description of the circumstances which give rise to infringement. The circumstances are that an article is made which constitutes an infringement of the copyright, that article is then sold or offered for sale and the person selling or offering for sale the article either knew or ought reasonably to have known that the making of the article constituted an infringement. The construction advanced by the applicant misconceives, it presently appears to me, the effect of the "or" between (a) and (b). The applicant treats that word as separating from (a) not only, as an alternative, the circumstances identified in (b) but also the text which follows (b). The word "or" does not have that effect, as I presently read the subsection. It simply indicates that the circumstances in (a) and (b) are alternatives and that in either circumstance, if the remainder of the subsection is satisfied, there is an infringement.
66 The applicant also suggests, as I understood his oral submissions, that even accepting that his construction of the section was wrong, there was nonetheless infringement by all respondents. That was because the making of the DVDs which were sold or offered for sale by the respondents constituted an infringement. It is extremely difficult to see why this is so. The making of copies on behalf of the second respondent was authorised by the licence agreements. On the evidence adduced at this point, their making did not constitute an infringement. However, it is conceivable that one of the elements necessary to engage the section is satisfied if a licensee makes copies under a licence agreement but did so for a purpose not authorised by the agreement and, indeed, for a purpose contrary to the terms of the agreement. On this approach, the making of the copies for an unauthorised purpose might constitute an infringement and any person who knew or ought reasonably to have known this and sold or offered for sale the article infringed copyright because of s 103.
67 In so far as the first and second respondents are concerned, there is no evidence of substance to suggest that copies of the two films were made other than to enable the second respondent as licensee to sell copies in accordance with the licence. At the very best for the applicant there is an unresolved factual question (apart from the legal question about the scope of s 103) about whether circumstances existed in which the copies made were infringing copies for the purposes of s 103. For this reason alone it would be entirely inappropriate to give summary judgment in favour of the applicant against those two respondents. This reasoning applies equally to the other respondents. In addition, on the evidence as it presently stands in relation to respondents other than the first and second respondent, it is highly improbable that the applicant could establish the relevant knowledge or imputed knowledge to establish contravention of s 103. This provides an additional reason why summary judgment should not be given in favour of the applicant against those respondents.
68 I should, at this point, mention one other argument advanced by the applicant. It was to the effect that in selling the DVDs online, the respondents were communicating the film to the public in derogation of the rights of the owner of the copyright: see s 86(c). A DVD version of a film lawfully created (that is, the chattel comprising the disk on which the film has been lawfully reproduced, any plastic covering and any printed artwork etc) can, fundamentally, be treated the same as any other chattel. What a purchaser of an article to which copyright relates, including a DVD of a film, cannot do is use it in a way that contravenes the rights of the owner of copyright. As noted earlier in relation to a cinematograph film, those rights are those embodied in s 86. Speaking generally (and subject to qualifications which need not be explored now), the purchaser of such a DVD cannot make a copy of the film, cause it to be seen in public or communicate it to the public. In the present case, respondents other than the second respondent have not, it appears on the evidence, done any of these things. My present view is that it is almost certainly not the case that the expression in s 86 "to communicate the film to the public" encompasses, as the applicant contends, selling or offering for sale a DVD version (that is, the chattel comprising the disk, any plastic covering and any printed artwork etc) of the film on the internet.
69 As Bryson J said in Kervan Trading Pty Ltd v Aktas (1987) 8 IPR 583 (a matter related to an alleged breach of copyright of a number of films produced in Turkey) at 589:
The Copyright Act does not protect the right of sale alone; once copyright articles have gone into the flow of trade they may be resold, whether new or secondhand, in the course of trade within Australia…
The right under s 86(c) is to "communicate the film to the public". The term "communicate" is defined in s 10 of the Copyright Act (see para [27] of this judgment) and refers to when the film is made available "online or electronically" transmitted. This latter expression encompasses the film itself being viewed online, not simply an image of the DVD or chattel. The terms "communicate" and "to the public" have been judicially considered in relation to s 85 of the Copyright Act: cf. Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper (2005) 65 IPR 409 and Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (2005) 220 ALR 1. Justice Tamberlin in Cooper held in relation to the communication of sound recordings to the public that the respondent did not "make available" or "electronically transmit" the sound recordings within the meaning of the expression because no sound recordings were actually stored on the website and the sound recordings were made available for downloading by the remote websites linked to via the website. The presence of the hyperlinks alone was insufficient. In this matter, the evidence indicates the films reproduced on DVDs have not been electronically transmitted.
70 The next and final claim of the applicant for which summary judgment is sought is based on s 53 of the Trade Practices Act and, in particular, paragraphs (bb), (d), (f) and (g). As to all respondents, the applicant contends that they engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct by falsely representing they had the approval of the applicant (as owner of the copyright) to offer the DVDs for sale: s 53(d). Similarly, it is alleged, they falsely represented they had a right to sell them: s 53(g). Both arguments depend, as I understood the submission, on the applicant's seemingly erroneous construction of s 103 discussed earlier at [65]-[67]. As I presently view things, unless s 103 operates in the way the applicant contends (and as I have earlier indicated, I do not presently consider that it does) then the various respondents were entitled to sell the DVDs they purchased to any person anywhere. The only qualification to this general observation concerns the first and second respondents who were bound by the licence agreement and apparently bound to offer for sale and sell only in Australia and New Zealand. But whether, simply as a matter of fact, either representation was made (as to purchases by consumers in other countries) would need to be investigated at a trial having regard to the first respondent's evidence about what the second respondent's sites did or did not say and what the site did or did not permit from time to time (by way of purchase from locations in Australia and New Zealand). There should be no summary judgment in favour of the applicant in relation to these matters
71 The applicant alleges, additionally, contravention of paragraphs (bb), (d) and (f) of s 53 by the first and second respondent based on statements made by the first respondent in email correspondence before the licence agreements were signed. Those statements concerned entry into a mass market, use of a distributor, numbers of DVDs to be created and marketing and sales for or on Father's Day 2005. Again these allegations almost certainly concern future matters and the observations I made earlier (at [62]) apply to these allegation is as well. There should be no summary judgment in favour of the applicant in relation to these matters.
72 I have not, in these reasons, sought to deal with the applicant's allegations broadly made against both corporations and individuals associated with them. At a trial, these undifferentiated allegations would need to be examined carefully to determine whether, in relation to any given individual, any case made out against a corporation could be treated as made out against the individual as well.