Both parties sought for the decision under review to be set aside and provided expert evidence to the Tribunal about the site value of the property. The key issue for the Tribunal's determination was whether a Development Deed which applied to the property should be considered in undertaking a valuation, which was the key difference between the approaches of the applicant and respondent.

The Tribunal considered the nature of hearing an application for review under s 25C of the Act, whether the Development Deed is an encumbrance such that it should be disregarded in undertaking a valuation, and an application for joinder as a third party under s 54 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013.

Held, setting aside and substituting the decision under review:

• The Tribunal is satisfied that the Development Deed is an encumbrance with a depreciatory effect on market value and ought to be disregarded in assessing the site value of the Property;
• The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and substitutes the decision that the site value of 16-30 Young Steet, Adelaide, as at 1 January 2021, was $12.3 million;
• The Tribunal dismisses the application made by KTS Properties Pty Ltd to be joined as a party to the proceedings.

Administrative Review - Valuation of Land Act 1971 - Review conducted as appeal de novo - Decision of a land valuer upon a review

City of Adelaide Development Control Act 1976 s 39d

South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 ss 34, 37, 54

Valuation of Land Act 1971 ss 5, 25B, 25C

Bargwanna Pty Ltd & Anor v Valuer-General [2011] SASC 67

CSR Ltd v Valuer-General (1977) 17 SASR 446

Martin v Valuer-General [2020] SACAT 104

McEwin & Ors v Valuer-General [1993] SASC 3833; (1993) 60 SASR 241

Shires v Valuer-General [2022] SACAT 52

Trust Company of Australia Ltd & Anor v Valuer-General; Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd & Anor v Valuer-General [2008] SASC 169

Wood v Valuer-General [2021] SACAT 7

Mr B Hayes KC and with him Mr B Jenner, counsel, appeared for the applicant, instructed by Adco Legal (Mr Jenner appearing on 4 April 2025 also as counsel for the non-party KTS Properties Pty Ltd ACN 096 913 610)

Mr C Pager and Ms L Williamson, Crown Solicitor's Office, appeared for the respondent

Made under the South Australian Civil & Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 s 37(1)(c)(i)

1. This is an application made under s 34 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SACAT Act) and s 25C(1)(b) of the Valuation of Land Act 1971 for review of a decision of a review valuer of the Office of the Valuer-General made on 21 March 2023.
2. The issue for the Tribunal to determine is whether the review valuer made the correct and preferable decision when he determined that the site value of the applicant's property located at 16-30 Young Street, Adelaide, as at 1 January 2021, was $8.625 million. Neither party contends that he did.
3. A review under s 25C of the Valuation of Land Act requires the Tribunal to consider the matter de novo.
4. A hearing de novo requires that the applicant must satisfy the Tribunal that a different valuation should have been made. But the applicant need not demonstrate error in the original decision by the Valuer-General, and the Tribunal must consider the matter afresh without any requirement to have regard to or to give weight to the original decision - see Martin v Valuer-General [2020] SACAT 104 at [13]. Another way of putting it is that "the applicant must satisfy the Tribunal that a different valuation should have been made but need not demonstrate an error in the original decision. This is a de novo 'merit review' and the Tribunal may be satisfied to reach the same or a different decision based on the material before the initial decision maker, or on that material and any additional material tendered on the review": Shires v Valuer-General for South Australia [2022] SACAT 52 at [16].
5. Both the applicant and the respondent put forward expert evidence about the site value of the relevant property as at 1 January 2021. The applicant relied on expert evidence of Nick Bell of Knight Frank and the respondent relied on expert evidence of Joanne Gaetjens of Land Services SA. Both experts gave oral evidence before the Tribunal on 6 February 2025.
6. Mr Bell provided two written reports. The first was dated May 2024 and expressed the opinion that the site value as at 1 January 2021 was $5.985 million. The second was dated August 2024 and expressed the opinion that the site value was $1.4 million.
7. Ms Gaetjens also provided two written reports. The first was dated 19 January 2024 and expressed the view that the site value as at 1 January 2021 was $8.8 million. The second was dated 26 August 2024 and expressed the view that the site value was $12.3 million.
8. In the Tribunal both parties contended that the decision under review should be set aside. Despite contending that the decision under review was not the correct or preferable decision, the respondent did not seek that the decision be remitted to the Valuer-General for reconsideration. Given that the matter was lodged in the Tribunal in April 2023, and taking into account the length of time it took for the matter to reach readiness for full hearing (after a number of adjournment applications, including of full hearings), in the interests of efficiency the Tribunal did not direct that the matter be remitted to the respondent.
9. The key difference in approach between the applicant and respondent in ascertaining the correct site value for the property as at 1 January 2021 is whether or not to have regard to a Development Deed dated 16 December 1993 concerning the relevant land.
10. Regrettably the parties did not take up an invitation from the Tribunal to have their respective expert witnesses confer and reach a joint position on the quantum of the site value, in the two situations of the Development Deed being (a) taken into account, or (b) disregarded. No reason was provided to the Tribunal why that invitation was not taken up by the parties.

1. The parties were able to co-operate to provide a Statement of Agreed Facts. The facts agreed are:

(i) The relevant property the subject of the applicant's objection as to its site value for 2021-2022 is located at 16-30 Young Street Adelaide and is comprised in Certificate of Title Register Book Volume 5214 Folio 948 ("Property").

(ii) On 10 September 1991, the Corporation of Adelaide and Willmont Pty Ltd entered into a Deed ("the 1991 Deed") relating to the development of the total site which included the Property.

(iii) On 20 January 1992 the Corporation of Adelaide and Willmont Pty Ltd entered into a Deed ("the 1992 Deed") relating to the development of the total site which included the Property. The terms of the 1992 Deed provided for the rescission of the 1991 Deed.

(iv) On 16 December 1993, the Corporation of Adelaide and the then vendors of the Property entered into a deed ("Development Deed") that among other things rescinded the 1992 Deed and which in its terms only permitted the development of the Property in a manner that:

• accorded with the plans annexed to that deed;
• maintained access points and tunnels to adjoining land; and
• maintained carpark facilities.

(v) The Development Deed was expressed to bind future vendors and is registered on the title of the Property.

(vi) The annexed plans to the Development Deed provide for:

• the easement located on the north of Young Street that is a ramp that is used to access the basement Carparking in the Franklin Street property;
• the easement located on the south that is a six metre easement above the carpark roof being maintained;
• on the east of Young Street, a restriction limiting the floor space such that a restriction on development is that it remains 3.3 metres from the boundary;
• the building be limited to five storeys; and
• the easements identified as Land marked A, B, C and D, which is the land encompassing the ramp at the Northern Boundary, are recorded on the Certificate of Title.

(vii) On 30 May 1994, the then vendor of the Property granted an easement to the then adjoining owner granting a free and unrestricted right of way and rights of support as referred to in easement number 7731446 that is registered on the title.

(viii) The applicant and FYD Investments Pty Ltd (the purchaser of 71 Franklin Street Adelaide) are related parties.

(ix) On 30 March 2010, FYD Investments entered into a contract to purchase 74 Franklin Street Adelaide (that adjoins the Property) ("Franklin Street Property"), and Young Auto Park Pty Ltd entered into a contract to purchase the Property.

(x) On 30 April 2010, the applicant made an application for development on the Property to among other things, construct apartment and office space on the Franklin Street Property with access through the carpark on the Property that was to increase to a seven level structure including the basement level and ground level of the building on the Property.

(xi) The applicant is the registered proprietor of the Property having settled on the purchase of the Property on 15 June 2010, together with the contemporaneous settlement for the purchase of the Franklin Street Property that adjoins the Property.

(xii) On 23 September 2010, the applicant received Development Plan consent to its proposed development of the Property to an additional five levels to the carpark on the Property in conjunction with approvals for development of the Franklin Street Property ("Earlier Approval").

(xiii) On 3 December 2010, a development application was made to vary the Earlier Approval.

(xiv) On 12 May 2011, the applicant received Development Plan consent to the amendments to the development approved in the Earlier Approval.

(xv) The applicant constructed the additional levels of carpark in accordance with the development approvals, in and around 2012, and completed the apartment and office space development on the adjoining Franklin Street property in accordance with the concurrent development approval for both the Property and the Franklin Street Property.

(xvi) As at 1 January 2021, the building on the Property comprised:

• a basement car park level;
• a retail ground level, being predominantly car parking with only the western (street front) portion being retail;
• five upper levels of carparking bays; and
• at basement level, an access ramp in the north of the building providing the only access to the adjoining Franklin Street apartments and commercial premises carpark.

(xvii) The site value assessment for 2018/2019 for the Property was $2.45 million and the capital value was assessed at $10.85 million.

(xviii) The site value assessment for 2019/2020 for the Property was $2.75 million and the capital value was assessed at $11.45 million.

(xix) The site value assessment for 2020/2021 for the Property was $2.755 million and the capital value was assessed at $11.45 million.

(xx) The site value assessment for 2021/2022 for the Property was $8.625 million and the capital value was assessed at $11.45 million.

(xxi) On 29 June 2022, Tom Rowe of McGee's Property for and on behalf of the applicant made an application to the respondent for the review of the site valuation of the property for the year commencing 1 January 2021.

(xxii) On 29 August 2022, Tom Rowe for and on behalf of the applicant, made submissions to the review valuer by way of a report prepared by Mr Rowe as to the site value of the Property.

(xxiii) In and around July 2022/August 2022, Rachel Elliott of Land Services SA provided a report on the site value of the Property as at 1 January 2021.

(xxiv) On 17 March 2023, Chris Carter (the review valuer), confirmed the respondent's assessment of the site value at $8.625 million.

(xxv) Up until the Addendum Report prepared by Ms Joanne Gaetjens dated 26 August 2024, every previous expert report prepared prior to and since the commencement of this matter proceeded on the basis that the Development Deed was taken into consideration in assessing the site value of the Property.

1. I make findings of facts in terms of the facts agreed by the parties as set out in subparagraphs (i-xxv) above.

Whether the Development Deed is an encumbrance

1. 'Site value' is a defined term under s 5(1) of the Valuation of Land Act. It is relevantly defined as follows:

site value of land means the capital amount that an unencumbered estate in fee simple in the land might reasonably be expected to realise upon sale assuming that any improvements on the land, the benefit of which is unexhausted at the time of valuation, had not been made; for the purposes of this definition -

(a) improvements means -

(i) buildings and structures (but not including structures in the nature of site works); ...

1. In Wood v Valuer-General [2021] SACAT 7, the President of the Tribunal considered the definition of site value and the nature of an encumbrance. She ruled "there is no reason to assume that the words in the context of the [Valuation of Land] Act have acquired a technical meaning" (at [72]), and that "the ordinary meaning should be given to the words of the definition of 'site value'" (at [74]).
2. The President further ruled in Wood that "site value is determined by reference to the capital amount that an 'unencumbered estate in fee simple' might reasonably be expected to realise on sale" (at [79]). In Wood, the President was dealing with leases which depending on their terms could either be seen as an encumbrance on land or as a benefit. In Wood both parties submitted that the leases did not encumber the relevant land. The President formulated the question before her as being "whether the leases encumber the land" (at [79]).
3. The President ruled in Wood that "a lease will be taken into account in determining the capital amount that an estate in fee simple in the land might reasonably be expected to realise upon its sale, and therefore the site value of the land, unless the lease has a depreciatory effect on the market value of the land" (at [103]).
4. In Wood the President referred to (among other decisions) the decision of the Full Supreme Court in Trust Company of Australia Ltd & Anor v Valuer-General; Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd & Anor v Valuer-General [2008] SASC 169. D Bleby J delivered the leading judgment, with Duggan and Anderson JJ agreeing. That judgment considered the meaning of 'capital value' in respect of 2 separate parcels of land. 'Capital value' is defined in s 5(1) of the Valuation of Land Act as follows:

capital value of land means the capital amount that an unencumbered estate of fee simple in the land might reasonably be expected to realise upon sale, but if the value of the land has been enhanced by trees planted on the land (other than commercial plantations), or trees preserved on the land for the purpose of shelter or ornament, the capital value must be determined as if the value of the land had not been so enhanced.

5. The concept of an 'an unencumbered estate in fee simple in the land' is common to the statutory definitions of both site value and capital value, as is the requirement to identify 'the capital amount that an unencumbered estate of fee simple in the land might reasonably be expected to realise upon sale'.
6. The Full Court in Trust Co of Australia at [58] considered case law on the meaning of 'unencumbered' and held that 'for the purposes of assessing the capital value on the market of an estate [in fee simple] for rating or similar purposes, one ignores other interests in or restrictions on use of the land which are depreciatory of its value other than restrictions imposed by virtue of generally applicable legislation such as planning legislation'. I am satisfied that the same analysis applies to assessing site value. Restrictions imposed by generally applicable legislation are not to be ignored in assessing site value, but one ignores other interests in or restrictions on use of the land which are depreciatory of its value.
7. Following Wood and Trust Co of Australia, the question of whether the Development Deed is an encumbrance depends on whether the Development Deed has a depreciatory effect on the market value of the land. If so, the Development Deed should be disregarded, but not if the Development Deed is a restriction on the Property imposed in a generally applicable way such as by legislation, in which case it should not be disregarded.
8. Neither party in this matter submitted that the Development Deed is a benefit to the Property or that it had the effect of increasing the market value of the Property. In this way, the Development Deed differs from the leases that applied to the land considered in both Wood and Trust Co of Australia.
9. I note, but am satisfied that nothing turns on, the fact that the current carpark on the Property appears to be higher than the Development Deed appears to allow, being seven storeys not five.
10. The applicant contended that the Development Deed has a depreciatory effect on the market value of the land. The respondent did not contend to the contrary. I accept that the Development Deed has a depreciatory effect on the market value of the Property. That leaves the question whether the Development Deed should be disregarded when assessing the site value of the Property.
11. The applicant relied on a passage from the decision of Mullighan J in McEwin & Ors v Valuer-General [1993] SASC 3833; (1993) 60 SASR 241 at [247] where he ruled "the valuer cannot ignore any relevant restrictions upon the use or development of land when assessing the site value" and "restrictions caused by the heritage listing must be considered when determining the site value". In my view the result in McEwin is distinguishable from this matter. McEwin concerned a heritage-listed building which was accepted as being "historically and architecturally one of the most significant buildings in the State" and "a major landmark building on North Terrace" (at [244]). That is quite different from the Property in this matter, which is a car park on an unremarkable cross-street in Adelaide's CBD and neither historically significant nor heritage-listed. Unlike McEwin, what is unique in this matter is not the nature of the Property but the existence of the Development Deed. Further, in my view heritage listing of a building is akin to a restriction imposed by generally applicable legislation, which following Trust Co of Australia is not to be disregarded when assessing capital value (and equally, when assessing site value). The Development Deed in this matter is in my view not a restriction imposed by generally applicable legislation, notwithstanding that it makes specific reference to s 39d of the City of Adelaide Development Control Act 1976 (no longer in force). Section 39d imposed no general restrictions on land, but instead empowered Adelaide City Council to enter into agreements with owners of land. 'Agreements' is the key word. It is irrelevant that the original parties who agreed the Development Deed with Adelaide City Council are no longer the owners of the Property and the adjoining land also affected by the Development Deed.[1] The change in land ownership does not transmute the nature of the Development Deed from being an agreement into being a restriction of general applicability.
12. The applicant contended that in years prior to the decision under review, the respondent had always taken the Development Deed into account and ought not be permitted to resile from that approach. The applicant relied on oral evidence from Ms Gaetjens in cross-examination to the effect that taking the Development Deed into account in her first report was "consistent with what had been done in the past". Ms Gaetjens further said in cross examination that "in hindsight" she now sees the Development Deed as an encumbrance on the Property which ought not to be taken into account in assessing site value.
13. The applicant contended that the approach to valuation taken by the respondent ought to be consistent from year to year. This would mean that the respondent ought not be free to take the Development Deed into account one year then disregard it as an encumbrance in another year.
14. The respondent contended that the question of whether the Development Deed is an encumbrance or not is a question of law. It would follow from that contention that, if the Development Deed is an encumbrance and the respondent nevertheless took it into account in assessing site value prior to the site valuation as at 1 January 2021, the respondent made an error of law in those prior assessments. I see no reason why the respondent ought to have to take a 'consistent' approach as the applicant contends, if to do so is to perpetuate an error of law in assessing site value.
15. I am satisfied that the Development Deed is an encumbrance with a depreciatory effect on market value and ought to be disregarded in assessing the site value of the Property.
16. Having found that the Development Deed is an encumbrance, the Tribunal must consider the correct site value of the land. Each party submitted two expert reports.

1. Ms Gaetjens used the comparable transactions method, and assessed the site value on the basis of rate per square metre of site area. She relied on the site area of the Property being 3,521 square metres. She considered four sale transactions, all of properties of lower site area. She expressly took into account "the effects of [the Development Deed], restricting development or redevelopment of the property in use and height to a '5 storey car park building including a retail component at ground level and commercial component on the first, second, third and fourth storey'". She noted that all of the four comparable properties sold in the range of $1,957 to $4,782 per square metre, and concluded that "a rate towards the lower to mid portion of the analysed rates determined from the sales evidence is considered reasonable to adopt, being $2,500 per square metre of site area". Accordingly, she reached a rounded site value of $8.8 million. It is evident, particularly on page 13 of her report, that Ms Gaetjens did not disregard the Development Deed as an encumbrance but took it into account in reaching her opinion about the reasonable rate per square metre being $2,500.

1. In preparing this report, Ms Gaetjens had been instructed by the Crown Solicitor's Office to disregard the Development Deed. This changed her view of the highest and best use of the Property from the existing carpark to "a commercial/mixed use development". She reviewed the 4 comparable properties she had previously taken into account, with 1 additional property also located in Adelaide's CBD. All the properties were smaller than the Property. The lowest sale price achieved was $2,168,880 for the smallest property, and the highest sale price achieved was $9.2 million for the second-largest property. In other words, the comparable transactions did not reveal any direct correlation between property size and the rate obtained on sale per square metre. In fact, the largest comparable property had obtained the lowest rate per square metre.
2. Ms Gaetjens changed her opinion of the reasonable rate per square metre from $2,500 to $3,500, and thus arrived at a rounded site value of $12.3 million.

1. Mr Bell utilised three valuation methods, namely the capitalisation of imputed net market income method, the residual method and the comparable transactions method. He arrived at a rate per square metre of $1,700. Accordingly, he arrived at a site value of $5,985,000. He conceded that in assessing site value, it is usual for the comparable transactions method to be adopted. He said that the existence of the Development Deed made the comparable transactions method unsuitable in this case. In other words, he took the Development Deed into account in arriving at his opinion. He said that using the residual method would assist in quantifying the extent of the impact of the Development Deed on site value.
2. Using the residual method resulted in a nonsensical outcome where the site value would be estimated in a negative amount because the cost of constructing a new building (estimated at $42 million) would be more than the estimated market value of the new building (estimated at $30 million).
3. In considering comparable transactions, Mr Bell took into account four other car park sales of which two were in Perth and two were in the Adelaide CBD. He also took into account what he called 'CBD development sites', of which there were six.
4. Using the capitalisation of imputed net market income method, Mr Bell said he had "adopted an improved market value of land and buildings rounded to $30 million". He did not appear to specify a site value arrived at using this method.
5. Mr Bell's analysis using the comparable transactions method was redolent with references to the Development Deed and the restrictions it placed on the property. In using this method to arrive at a site value of $5,985,000, it is obvious (and not disputed) that he took the Development Deed into account instead of ignoring it as an encumbrance.

1. Mr Bell stated in his report that he had been instructed to provide his opinion as to the site value of the Property as at 1 January 2021 on the basis of "an open-air bitumen grade level car park disregarding all existing improvements". He used the capitalisation of imputed net market income method. He arrived at a site value of the Property of $1.4 million. A virtue of this analysis is that it is easy to identify that what is being valued is the unimproved site value, whereas with the comparable transactions method, all of which involve improved land, it is more difficult to identify that the statutory definition of site value was correctly applied. I note Ms Gaetjens' oral evidence that in their August 2024 reports both she and Mr Bell assessed site value on the basis that the Property was unimproved. I have no reason to doubt that evidence.
2. In her oral evidence Ms Gaetjens criticised Mr Bell's use of the capitalisation of imputed net market income method as being 'overly subjective'. It is certainly a more complex method of valuation than the comparable transactions method.

Report of joint valuers' conference of June 2024

1. The Tribunal was provided with a joint valuers' report which pre-dated both of Ms Gaetjens' and Mr Bell's reports of August 2024. The joint valuers' report confirmed that the experts disagreed on which valuation method was most appropriate to use, with Ms Gaetjens preferring the comparable transactions method and Mr Bell at that time preferring the residual method. Both experts appeared to have taken the Development Deed into account, as set out in the section headed 'The areas upon which you both agree'. I did not derive much assistance from the joint valuers' report. It appeared to me to have been overtaken by the August 2024 reports.

1. Both Ms Gaetjens and Mr Bell gave their oral evidence in a straightforward and professional manner, and I am satisfied that they were both doing their best to assist the Tribunal.
2. In my view, neither Ms Gaetjens' report of January 2024 nor Mr Bell's report of May 2024 ought to be accepted by the Tribunal. Both reports took into account the Development Deed, and I am satisfied that they should not have done so. The relevant contest is between the respective reports of Ms Gaetjens and Mr Bell of August 2024. These reports used different valuation methods.
3. As Mr Bell conceded in oral evidence, the comparable transactions method is the usual method of valuation. This was the method used by Ms Gaetjens in both her reports. In his August 2024 report, Mr Bell used the capitalisation of imputed net market income method.
4. I have had regard to the Full Court decision in Trust Co of Australia. I note that that decision concerned a capital valuation rather than a site valuation but in my view that does not render irrelevant the principles laid down. In considering methods of valuation, the Full Court said at [22-23]:

One of the recognised methods of valuation is based on the assessment of comparable sales. The valuer will identify what are said to be comparable sales of land, at or near the date of valuation. The valuer will compare the relevant features of the land the subject of such sales, and will analyse the circumstances of each sale. By making appropriate adjustments and comparing the features of the land in question, the valuer will determine the value of the subject land and improvements. Such a method is particularly appropriate to certain types of land such as single unit residences and broadacre agricultural land. > > However, not all land is amenable to that valuation process. This is particularly so in cases such as the present where there is a substantial property, well developed, and let to a number of commercial tenants for the purpose of generating rental income. In most cases there will be no reasonably comparable sales, given the nature and diversity of such developments and their different locations ...

5. I am not persuaded that the Property in this matter is of a nature that makes the comparable transactions method unsuitable and dictates that the capitalisation of imputed net market income method is preferable. I am satisfied that the comparable transactions method was an appropriate method to use in this matter. Comparable properties need not be identical properties. Further, I am satisfied that the properties compared by Ms Gaetjens were in fact comparable, whereas properties taken into account by Mr Bell included properties in a different city (namely Perth) and, in his August 2024 report, properties sold after the valuation date of 1 January 2021.
6. The applicant attacked Ms Gaetjens' opinion on the basis of a perceived lack of independence and that her August 2024 report "was doing nothing more than repeating the respondent's new case". I do not accept these criticisms. A party is entitled to ask an expert to provide an opinion based on certain facts or assumptions. If the facts or assumptions are not made out, the opinion will have no persuasive value. But providing an expert report based on a particular assumption the expert is asked to make, in this matter the assumption that the Development Deed is an encumbrance, does not mean that the expert lacks independence.
7. It is no doubt very frustrating for the applicant to have challenged the respondent's site valuation of the Property, only for it to come to light during the Tribunal process that there was indeed an error in the method of calculating site value (namely, taking into account the Development Deed, which ought to have been disregarded as an encumbrance unique to the Property and adjoining land) which has turned out to be an error not in the applicant's favour. I am not persuaded that that means that the capitalisation of imputed net market income method, resulting in a site value of $1.4 million, is the preferable valuation method in the matter. It does not appear to me that a site value of $1.4 million comes within what was referred to in Bargwanna Pty Ltd & Anor v Valuer-General [2011] SASC 67 as "the proper range of values for the land": at [6].
8. After consideration, I have reached the view that the correct and preferable site value of the Property is that propounded by Ms Gaetjens in her report of 26 August 2024, namely $12.3 million. I am satisfied that that amount comes within the proper range of values for the Property, taking into account the size of the Property, its location within Adelaide's CBD and that the applicable zoning[2] prescribes no height restriction. I have also taken into account the rates per square metre for the comparable properties analysed by Ms Gaetjens and I am satisfied that the rate she applied of $3,500 falls comfortably within the comparable range of rates per square metre. I can find no compelling reason not to accept Ms Gaetjens' opinion on the site value of the Property. In my view it would not be appropriate in this matter for the Tribunal to impose its own decision as to site value without reference to any of the expert opinions before it.

1. The applicant argued that the Property was akin to the land considered in CSR Ltd v Valuer-General (1977) 17 SASR 446 (namely, a sugar refinery) and that the Tribunal should find in this case, as it contended was found in CSR, that the number of potential purchasers is low and 'most purchasers' should be excluded because the Property has no 'general use' apart from as a carpark and is subject to the restrictions of the Development Deed. I do not accept this argument. A carpark in Adelaide's CBD is a qualitatively different type of property from a sugar refinery. I do not accept that the Development Deed means that 'most' potential purchasers would be deterred from purchasing the Property and that the site value ought necessarily to be lower as a consequence.
2. The applicant contended that the Development Deed should be regarded as being in the nature of a zoning restriction, of general applicability and therefore not to be ignored in assessing site value. I have already stated above that the Development Deed in this matter is in my view not a restriction imposed by generally applicable legislation but is in essence an agreement between Adelaide City Council and the owners of the Property and the adjoining land. I reject the contention that the Development Deed should be regarded as being in the nature of a zoning restriction.
3. To the extent that the applicant's arguments at some points appeared to rely on site value being the same as market value, I reject that. Site value has a statutory definition in which market value plays a part. That does not mean that site value is the same as market value.
4. The respondent argued that the Development Deed "has no legal or practical effect and is unenforceable": Supplementary Outline of Argument of the Respondent at [2]. This argument appears to rest on the fact that the registration of the Development Deed on the certificate of title occurred after the repeal of the City of Adelaide Development Control Act, which permitted such registration pursuant to s 39d. As I have already said above, what is enshrined in the Development Deed is an agreement. I do not accept that the agreement no longer has "legal or practical effect and is unenforceable" simply because it was (apparently) registered on the certificate of title after the repeal of the City of Adelaide Development Control Act. Flowing from the respondent's contention that the Development Deed "has no legal or practical effect and is unenforceable", the respondent made a consequent argument that I ought to direct the correction of the certificate of title. Because I do not accept the initial premise, it follows that I must reject that consequent argument. I make no finding as to whether the Tribunal has power to direct the correction of the certificate of title as the respondent contends.
5. The respondent argued that the review valuer ought not to have conducted a review valuation at all because s 25B(3)(c) of the Valuation of Land Act provides that no application for review of a valuation may be made under s 25B if the objection to the valuation involves a question of law. The relevant question of law was identified as being whether the Development Deed is an encumbrance. Neither party submits that the decision of the review valuer was correct and preferable. Whatever the jurisdiction of the review valuer, the task of the Tribunal now is to consider the matter de novo. In a de novo hearing, there is no requirement for the Tribunal to identify error on the part of the original decision-maker. In my view, in a de novo hearing, that extends equally to jurisdictional error as to any other type of error. Further, even if the review valuer ought not to have made his decision, the matter could have come before the Tribunal pursuant to s 25C(1)(a) of the Valuation of Land Act rather than pursuant to s 25C(1)(b). In other words the Tribunal itself is not deprived of jurisdiction, regardless of the jurisdiction of the review valuer, upon which I make no finding and which I regard as not relevant for present purposes. In a matter which is a rehearing rather than a de novo hearing, it may be that the jurisdiction of the original decision maker is a crucial point, but this is not such a matter.
6. The respondent argued that the Tribunal ought not "tinker with the valuation": Respondent's Closing Submissions at [3]. This submission appeared to emanate from a footnote in the Supreme Court decision of Bargwanna where the Court said that "section 25B [of the Valuation of Land Act] prohibits review valuers "tinkering" with valuations of the Valuer-General by making variations of ten per cent or less": footnote 4. I do not accept that that footnote has any application to the task of the Tribunal. The Tribunal's powers are as set out in s 37 of the SACAT Act and s 25C of the Valuation of Land Act and are not subject to any restriction of the kind that applies to review valuers as set out in footnote 4 of Bargwanna.

1. I have had regard to the material that was before the review valuer and to the additional written and oral evidence put before the Tribunal on review, in particular the oral evidence of Ms Gaetjens and Mr Bell and their respective reports of August 2024. I find that the decision made on 21 March 2023 should be set aside and that the Tribunal should substitute an order that the site value of the Property as at 1 January 2021 was $12.3 million.

Application by KTS Properties Pty Ltd ACN 096 913 610

1. On 4 April 2025, when this matter was part-heard following hearings on 6 February 2025 and 13 March 2025 and all that remained for the Tribunal to hear was final reply submissions by the applicant, KTS Properties Pty Ltd lodged an application to be joined as a party to the proceedings pursuant to s 54(1)(b) of the SACAT Act. I am not satisfied that the interests of KTS Properties are affected in any relevant way by this matter. The mere fact that the Development Deed applies to land owned by KTS Properties adjoining the applicant's Property is insufficient to give KTS Properties any relevant interest in the outcome of this administrative review of a valuation decision concerning the applicant's Property. I decline the application by KTS Properties to be joined as a party.

1. The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review.
2. The Tribunal substitutes the decision that the site value of 16-30 Young Street, Adelaide, as at 1 January 2021, was $12.3 million.
3. The Tribunal dismisses the application made by KTS Properties Pty Ltd ACN 096 913 610 on 4 April 2025 to be joined as a party to the proceedings.

[1] See the Agreed Facts, and the Affidavit of Amanda Louise Brady filed in the Tribunal on 4 April 2025 at [4-9].

[2] Adelaide (City) Development Plan consolidated 30 April 2020, Capital City Zone, Policy Area 13.