YNM v NSW Trustee and Guardian

1. Fifty-seven-year-old YNM seeks leave to appeal from a decision made on 11 March 2025 by the Guardianship Division of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT). In that decision, NCAT made a financial management order in respect of YNM (the appellant), committing the management of her estate to the NSW Trustee and Guardian (the NSW Trustee). In addition, the Tribunal ordered that the order be reviewed within 12 months.
2. The appellant contends that the finding made by the Tribunal that she was not capable of managing her financial affairs was demonstrably wrong and against the weight of evidence. In addition, she contends that the decision to review the financial management order within 12 months was oppressive, and that a more appropriate decision would have been to review that order within three months. Finally, the appellant urges us to exercise the power under s 80(3) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act) to deal with the appeal by way of a new hearing on the grounds of "fresh evidence" which she claims establishes that she has capacity to manage her financial affairs.
3. There was no contradictor in the appeal. The appellant was the only party to participate.
4. We explain below our reasons for refusing to grant the appellant leave to appeal and for declining to deal with the appeal by way of a new hearing.

1. In February 2025, a hospital social worker, YNT (the applicant social worker), made an application to NCAT for a financial management order to be made in respect of the appellant. In that application, the applicant social worker claimed that the appellant was incapable of managing her financial affairs and that there was a real risk that the appellant might sell her home, give away her money, and be left homeless.
2. On 11 March 2025, when the hearing to determine that application was held, the appellant was an "involuntary patient" (Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW), Ch 3, Pt 2)at a mental health facility in a public hospital (the Facility). The appellant was admitted to the Facility on 28 January 2025 and was discharged on 13 March 2025.
3. In reasons for the decision under appeal (the Reasons), the Tribunal considered two central questions, first, whether the appellant was incapable of managing her financial affairs and, if so, whether there was a need for a financial management order.
4. At [13], the Tribunal noted that in a report dated 13 February 2025, Dr Prish Rajendra, a psychiatric registrar at the Facility, said that the appellant "demonstrates paranoid and persecutory delusions, grandiose delusions, audio hallucinations and serious disorder of thought forms, together with an inability to plan solutions to problems". At [14], the Tribunal recorded that Dr Rajendra said that the appellant's treating team held "grave concerns" about "her history of impulsive and excessive spending, her inability to formulate or/and articulate any plan for her accommodation if the house sale completes and ... apparent inability to appreciate either the consequences of the sale of her house or the need to identify and implement arrangements for alternative accommodation".
5. The applicant social worker, was unable to attend the hearing. At [15], the Tribunal recorded that the social worker who attended in her place (the substitute social worker) emphasised the appellant's "apparent lack of planning skills, her seeming inability to grasp the risk of homelessness if she sells her house and her apparent unwillingness or inability to understand the benefits of and need for prudent stewardship of her assets". The substitute social worker said she was concerned that the appellant was potentially vulnerable to exploitation, "noting her devotion to her church community and the risk of that devotion manifesting itself as a large donation to church activities".
6. At [16], the Tribunal recorded the appellant's response to the concerns expressed by Dr Rajendra and the substitute social worker. The appellant asserted she knew what selling her home involved and the consequences of doing so but was "unconcerned". She said she expected to realise at least $1 million from the sale and "once she had that in her hands, she could do whatever she likes". The appellant said that her home had been damaged in a recent storm and that damage had not been repaired. She said she would probably sell her home as a damaged property, and, in her view, there was no value in deferring the sale until the damage was repaired. She also referred to a valuable coin collection which had been (or at least was proposed to be) sold. She also referred to family issues and her concerns that her family was attempting to take control of her assets.
7. At [17], the Tribunal said that while the appellant had "explained at length and articulated her current financial situation and the proposed property sale", nonetheless it was concerned that her "appreciation of her financial position was essentially calculational and mechanical, and that she had little appreciation of the desirability of managing and preserving her wealth, of the risk of loss (except in the limited context of perceived family designs of her wealth) or of the difficulty of recouping wealth once lost". The Tribunal said that although the appellant was at a superficial level, "transactionally quite sophisticated concerning her affairs, she was fundamentally vulnerable to loss and at risk of dissipating her assets". The Tribunal was satisfied that the appellant was "at least in part unable to manage her affairs": at [18].
8. The Tribunal went on to consider whether there was a need for a financial management order. At [19], the Tribunal said that while the appellant remains an "involuntary patient", the practical risk of her undertaking a significant financial or property transaction is limited because "her activities as an inpatient can be expected to be closely supervised by hospital personnel". However, the Tribunal reasoned with her imminent discharge from the Facility on a "community treatment order" (Mental Health Act, Ch 3, Pt 3), "the degree of supervision exercised over her dealings will reduce, with the result that her practical financial vulnerability will be accentuated". The Tribunal said that if the treatment proposed under the community treatment order is successful this risk is likely to be reduced, however, it "cannot be assumed that following discharge the treatment will take full effect immediately or that there will not be some period of adjustment during which [the appellant's] mental health (and thus her financial vulnerability) is variable".
9. At [20], the Tribunal concluded that because of those concerns there was a need to appoint a person to manage the appellant's affairs and that it was in the best interests of the appellant that a financial management order be made.
10. The Tribunal appointed the NSW Trustee to manage the appellant's estate because no individual had been proposed for appointment and further the appellant held "concerns about her family's desire to take away her assets": at [23].
11. At [24], the Tribunal said it decided to exercise the discretion to order that the financial management order be reviewed within a specified period "because underlying [that] order was a concern to ensure that [the appellant's] financial situation is protected and preserved until the effectiveness of her post discharge medication in controlling her mental illness is demonstrated". At [25], the Tribunal said that because it is not readily predictable how long this process would take, it had decided to make the order reviewable within 12 months "to provide a reasonable measure of certainty and predictability to [the appellant] herself, to her treating team, and to the financial manager, concerning the period of management". At [26], the Tribunal noted that if the appellant's post discharge treatment proved successful and her mental health stabilises after discharge, it would be open to her to seek an earlier review with a view to the earlier revocation of the financial management order it made.

1. As a party to the proceedings before the Tribunal, the appellant has a right to appeal the decision under appeal, an "internally appealable decision", on any question of law or, with the leave of the Appeal Panel, on any other ground: NCAT Act, s 80(2)(b).
2. The appellant does not contend that the appeal raises a question of law. Nor, adopting the "more generous or benevolent approach" endorsed by the Court of Appeal (Griffiths AJA, Meagher and Kirk JJA agreeing) in Kudrynski v Orange City Council [2024] NSWCA 33 at [50], [51], are we able to discern a question of law from the notice of appeal, the accompanying material and the submissions made by the appellant in support.
3. In addition, the appellant requests that we deal with the appeal by way of a new hearing as permitted by s 80(3) of the NCAT Act. The appellant seeks to rely on "fresh evidence" which she contends demonstrates that she is now capable of managing her financial affairs.

Statutory framework: financial management orders

1. Contained in Part 3A of the Guardianship Act 1987 (NSW), s 25E(1) gives the Tribunal power to order that the estate of a person be subject to management under the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 (NSW).The Tribunal may exclude a specified part of the estate from that order: _Guardianship A_ct, s 25E(2).
2. To make a financial management order, the Tribunal must consider the person's capability to manage their affairs and be satisfied of the three matters specified in s 25G of the Guardianship Act:

25G Grounds for making financial management order

The Tribunal may make a financial management order in respect of a person only if the Tribunal has considered the person's capability to manage his or her own affairs and is satisfied that:

(a) the person is not capable of managing those affairs, and

(b) there is a need for another person to manage those affairs on the person's behalf, and

(c) it is in the person's best interests that the order be made.

1. Where the Tribunal makes a financial management order, it may appoint a suitable person as manager of that estate: Guardianship Act, s 25M(1)(a). Alternatively, the Tribunal may commit the management of the estate to the NSW Trustee: Guardianship Act, s 25M(1)(b).
2. Section 4 of the Guardianship Act imposes a duty on anyone exercising functions under the Guardianship Act, including the Tribunal, to observe the principles in s 4 of that Act (the section 4 principles).

The finding that the appellant was not capable of managing her financial affairs was not against the weight of evidence and/or demonstrably wrong

1. The appellant contends that the finding made by the Tribunal that she was not capable of managing her financial affairs (the impugned finding) was both against the weight of evidence and demonstrably wrong.
2. The appellant claims that the trigger for her admission to the Facility was a report she made to NSW Police when "100% sober" about a neighbour who was screaming over two consecutive nights and asking for help. The appellant said she realised in retrospect that it was not a good idea to have made that report because, rather than helping the neighbour, the Police labelled her as a "psychotic with a mania", accused her of "being crazy"' and sent her to the Facility.
3. The appellant claimed that the Facility's medical practitioners misinterpreted several comments she made to them on admission. She said it would have been better had she not answered their questions. In addition, she contends that a mental health nurse in the hearing (which we understand to be a hearing before the NSW Mental Health Review Tribunal, not NCAT) had a distorted view of her character. She asserted that there was no basis for the allegation made by the substitute social worker, whom she had not met before the NCAT hearing, that she failed to appreciate the consequences of selling her home and the risk of homelessness. She said that she had always carefully managed her finances and was experienced in "flipping" houses.
4. The appellant claims that the decision to make the financial management order was harsh and has left her without sufficient funds to survive. Furthermore, as a result of that decision, she is now required to pay to the NSW Trustee a "huge penalty", 1.5% of her late husband's savings.

1. On 6 June 2025, a differently constituted Appeal Panel listed the appeal for hearing and directed the appellant to give to the Appeal Panel and the other parties to the appeal, the evidence which was before the Tribunal and/or a transcript of the relevant parts of the hearing if, in the appeal, she intended to rely on that evidence, or anything that happened or was said in the hearing: Orders 3(a), 3(d). The appellant failed to give us the evidence which was before the Tribunal or a transcript of the hearing.
2. Therefore, the task of determining whether the impugned finding is against the weight of evidence is difficult. We proceed on the basis that the only evidence before the Tribunal was that referred to by the Tribunal in the Reasons.
3. The Reasons record that the following material was before the Tribunal:

(1) A report prepared by, and oral evidence given by, Dr Rajendra. In his opinion, the appellant "demonstrates paranoid and persecutory delusions, grandiose delusions, audio hallucinations and serious disorder of thought forms, together with an inability to plan solutions to problems".

(2) The opinion of the appellant's treating team who held "grave concerns" about the appellant's "history of impulsive and excessive spending, her inability to formulate or/and articulate any plan for her accommodation if the house sale completes".

(3) The opinion expressed by the applicant social worker in the initiating application, that the appellant was seemingly unable to "grasp the risk of homelessness if she sells her house" and was potentially vulnerable to exploitation, including the risk of her devotion to her church "manifesting itself as a large donation".

(4) The oral evidence given by the appellant about her plans in relation to the sale of the house. The Tribunal found that evidence indicated that the appellant's appreciation of her financial position was "essentially calculational and mechanical, and that she had little appreciation of the desirability of managing and preserving her wealth, or the risk of loss".

1. The appellant's claim that she was able to manage her finances and appreciated the consequences of selling her house was unsupported. There was no expert or independent evidence which raised into question, less still contradicted, the opinion expressed by Dr Rajendra, the appellant's treating team and the substitute social worker.
2. The impugned finding was one reasonably open to the Tribunal on the available evidence.
3. There is no evidence which might suggest that in making the impugned finding the Tribunal took into account irrelevant considerations, or failed to have regard to evidence given, or submissions made, by the appellant. The Tribunal gave cogent reason for its findings. We reject the contention that that finding was "demonstrably wrong".

The decision to review the financial management order within 12 months was not demonstrably wrong

1. The appellant contends that the presiding member said during the hearing that the Tribunal was considering making the financial management order reviewable within three months. However, when she questioned that decision, "the judge very quickly changed the order to 12 months". She contends that this is "simply too long for a widow on Centrelink, when I needed the funds". In addition, the appellant contends that the decision to impose a 12-month review period was oppressive and demonstrably wrong.
2. Without the benefit of the transcript, it is not possible to determine whether, as the appellant appears to contend, that she was not given an opportunity to comment on the decision made by the Tribunal to require the financial management order to be reviewed within 12 months.
3. The Reasons reveal that the Tribunal acknowledged that the appellant's mental health might improve. At [24], the Tribunal reasoned that "until the effectiveness of her post-discharge medication in controlling her mental illness is demonstrated", it was necessary to "ensure that her financial situation is protected and preserved". At [25], the Tribunal went on to say that "it is not readily predictable as to how long this process will take" and for that reason had decided to make the order reviewable within 12 months. This, reasoned the Tribunal, would provide "a reasonable measure of certainty and predictability to [the appellant], to her treating team and to the financial manager concerning the period of management". At [26], the Tribunal pointed out that if, as it "sincerely hopes the post-discharge treatment proves successful and [the appellant's] mental health stabilises quickly after her discharge, it is open to her to seek an earlier review hearing with a view to the earlier revocation of the order".
4. It was open to the Tribunal to make a financial management order for an indefinite period, that is, an order not be reviewed within a specified period. However, the Tribunal decided to exercise the discretion to make the financial management order reviewable within 12 months and gave a reasoned and persuasive explanation for that decision. It is implicit that in exercising the discretion to make the financial management order reviewable within a specified period, the Tribunal had regard not only to its obligation to give paramount consideration to the appellant's welfare and interest, but also to its obligation to take into account her views, and, to restrict her freedom of decision-making and action as little as possible: Guardianship Act, ss 4(a), 4(b), 4(d).
5. The decision to make the decision reviewable within 12 months required the Tribunal to make an evaluative judgment based on the available material and having regard to the section 4 principles. We accept that the appellant holds the genuine belief a 12-month review period represents an unwarranted restriction on her autonomy. However, we are not persuaded that, the decision to make the financial management order reviewable within 12 months was demonstrably wrong.

1. The principles governing applications for leave to appeal from an internally appealable decision are well established. To be granted leave to appeal, the appellant must demonstrate something more than that the primary decision maker was arguably wrong in the conclusion arrived at or that there was a bona fide challenge to an issue of fact: Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17 (Collins), at [84](1). Generally, it will only be appropriate to grant leave where there is an issue of principle, a question of public importance, a reasonably clear injustice going beyond something that is merely arguable, or, a factual error that was unreasonably arrived at and clearly mistaken: Collins at [84](2); Houda v Seraphim [2025] NSWCATAP 135 at [31]- [35].
2. The appellant's main argument for leave was that the impugned finding was against the weight of evidence. As explained above, we reject that argument. As to the argument that the decision to require the financial management order to be reviewed within 12 months was oppressive and demonstrably wrong, that in truth, is a challenge to the merit of that decision.
3. The decision under appeal is of great importance to the appellant but does not raise any issues of principle or public importance. The Tribunal appears to have gone about its fact-finding role in an entirely orthodox manner. The Tribunal carefully exposed its reasoning for making the impugned finding and exercising the discretion to require the financial management order to be reviewed within 12 months. The decision could not be said to give rise to an injustice which is reasonably clear. Finally, the decision is not affected by sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal. For these reasons we refuse leave to appeal.

1. The appellant requests that we exercise the discretion to decide to deal with the appeal by way of a new hearing under s 80(3) of the NCAT Act. She contends that the exercise of that discretion is warranted because of new evidence which was not before the Tribunal, which demonstrates that she has capacity to manage her financial affairs and that her estate would not be at risk if the financial management order were to be revoked. That evidence includes:

(1) A letter addressed to the appellant from the NSW Trustee dated 8 April 2025, stating that the maximum annual management fee payable to the NSW Trustee for managing her financial affairs will increase from 1 April 2025 to 1.4%.

(2) A Centrelink customer record, which apparently indicates that the New Start Allowance was paid to the appellant on 26 May 2025, 4 June 2025, 18 June 2025, and 2 July 2025.

(3) Statements addressed to the appellant for the periods, 1 January 2020 to 31 August 2023 and 12 July 2024 to 9 April 2025, issued by Noble Numismatic Pty Ltd. According to the appellant, Noble Numismatic deals with her late husband's valuable stamp and coin collection. That statement appears to indicate that in the five years to May 2025, Noble Numismatic received over $600,000 presumably from sale at auction of the appellant's late husband's coin and stamp collection, and over $500,000 was transferred to the appellant.

(4) A statement for the period February 2025 to June 2025 issued by St George Bank for a savings account in the appellant's name. According to that statement on 28 February 2025 that account had a balance of about $6300 and on 6 June 2025 the balance had reduced to - $47.

(5) The oral evidence given by the appellant, which was to the effect that since being discharged from the Facility she has been under the care of psychiatrist, Dr D, whom she had seen twice. She has fully complied with all requirements of the community treatment order.

(6) A verbal statement made in the hearing of the appeal by a member of the mental health team caring for the appellant, community social worker, Ms I. Ms I said she was participating in the appeal in the capacity as support person for the appellant. Ms I acknowledged that she was not qualified to give an opinion about the appellant's mental health or the prognosis of her condition. However, Ms I went on to say that in her opinion the appellant was "resolving her bipolar" and her decision-making is "rational and considered". Ms I said she had had seen no evidence of the appellant making irrational spending decisions. She confirmed the appellant's claim that she was seeing a psychiatrist and was compliant with taking her medications. The community treatment order is due to expire on 12 September 2025.

1. Subsection 80(3) of the NCAT Act provides that the Appeal Panel may, if the grounds so warrant, determine the appeal by way of a new hearing and in such a case receive further evidence (including evidence additional to or in substitution for the evidence at first instance).
2. For the following reasons, we are not persuaded that the new evidence on which the appellant seeks to rely warrants the exercise of the discretion to determine the appeal by way of a new hearing.
3. First, the documentary material on which the appellant seeks to rely provides at best an incomplete picture about the appellant's current financial position. Concerningly, the appellant was unable to provide an explanation about the statements issued by Noble Numismatic or to answer the questions we asked about those statements, including whether she had an agreement with Noble Numismatic and, if so, the terms of that agreement; whether, as it would appear from the statements, since 2020 Noble Numismatic transferred to her over $500,000, and, if so, how that money was spent. Also of concern was the appellant's apparent lack of understanding of the nature of the payments she had received from Centrelink. She said it was only following a recent visit to a Centrelink office that she had become aware that Centrelink had made payments to her.
4. Second, the appellant has failed to provide any medical evidence in support of her claim that she is now able to manage her financial affairs. The opinion expressed by Ms I is of little assistance given, as Ms I concedes, she is not qualified to offer an opinion about whether the appellant's bipolar disorder currently affects her capacity to manage her financial affairs and her knowledge of the appellant's affairs is limited.
5. We acknowledge the difficulty confronted by a self-represented party seeking to obtain reliable evidence to establish that they are now capable of managing their financial affairs. It may be, as the appellant believes, that she is now capable of managing her affairs. Regrettably, the material she filed in this appeal does not support that belief. In those circumstances, we are not persuaded that the grounds warrant the exercise of the power to deal with the appeal by way of a new hearing.

(2) The application to deal with the appeal by way of a new hearing under s 80(3) of Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) is refused.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.