YARRAN -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2026] WASCA 34 (20 March 2026)

1. The appellant did not give evidence at trial. He relied on his account given to police during the recorded search of his partner's house and in an electronic record of interview, both conducted on 1 October 2019.

1. In the search video, the appellant was asked how the complainant got the burns to her hands, feet and body. He demonstrated tidying up a dish while a pot with boiling water and noodles was cooking on a front element of the stove. The handle of the pot was hanging over the edge of the stovetop. The appellant said:[2]

I just noticed, um, a little click and fuckin' when, um - when I looked she had the noodles in her hands and, uh, I felt like she was trying to throw her hands, like, get her hands out of the noodles. So when she did that, she put her hands out and went off balance and - 'cause when - when she grabbed this it went like that and it poured out and the noodles went all tangled in her hands and - yeah. The part I seen was she tried to chuck the noodles out of her hand and slipped and, um, went face first and that's when, um, she tried to - she tried to help herself back up but she was slipping and that's when I grabbed her.

1. At this point the appellant demonstrated with his hands out, palms up and fingers spread out, pushing upwards in a flicking motion. He demonstrated the pot lying on its side on the stovetop.
2. Later, the interviewing officer summarised the appellant's account as follows:[3]

DET S/CON HUNT: Just - so when - you showed me that the - so the pot was standing up as you showed me.

YARRAN: Yeah.

DET S/CON HUNT: And then you've turned around and you've seen it tipped.

YARRAN: Yeah.

DET S/CON HUNT: And [the complainant] had the noodles in her hand and -

YARRAN: Uh-huh.

DET S/CON HUNT: - then she - you said she slipped over and fell, trying to, like, throw the noodles off her hand.

YARRAN: Trying to get them off.

1. At this point, the officer demonstrated with his hands, with fingers spread and palms up flicking upwards. The appellant was nodding as the officer did so and briefly moved his hands in the same manner.
2. Later, the following exchange occurred:[4]

DET S/CON HUNT: Um, and you said that she had - she was holding the noodles in her hands like that. Okay. Yeah.

YARRAN: And, um, I think she expected it just to fall.

DET S/CON HUNT: Mmm.

YARRAN: Then when she realised she just chucked it.

DET S/CON HUNT: Yeah.

YARRAN: Then tried to get them out (indistinct).

DET S/CON HUNT: And where did all the noodles go?

YARRAN: Just on the ground.

DET S/CON HUNT: Okay. So who cleaned up all the noodles?

YARRAN: I gave it to the dogs and mopped up the water.

1. At this point, both the officer and the appellant demonstrated the movement with their hands held out, palms up and fingers spread. The appellant again demonstrated an upwards flicking motion with both hands. The appellant nodded when the officer said 'she was holding the noodles in her hands like that'.
2. Later in the interview, the appellant described how he surmised the complainant tipped the pot over, but said that he did not see this happen and only heard the noise. The appellant then said:[5]

YARRAN: And then it happened in a split second as I looked.

DET S/CON HUNT: Yep.

YARRAN: She had everything on her hands and chucked it, sort of -

DET S/CON HUNT: Okay. No dramas. All right. So, um, how tall does she come up to on the stove?

YARRAN: She's about there.

1. At this point the appellant again demonstrated with his hands held out, palms upwards and fingers spread out, and hands flicking upwards. He indicated that the complainant was shorter than the level of the stovetop.

1. In the EROI, the appellant described the incident in the following terms:[6]

I just heard a bit of clutter with the, um, pot, and splashes of water, and I look and I see [the complainant] with the han - noodles wrapped around her hand ... wrapped around her - and she tried to get her hands out of the noodles, and in that one motion, it put her off balance and she went backwards toward - to the side, and, uh, face-planted, and that's how the injuries, or the bruises, happened, and from the noodles and s - uh, the water, uh, that was 'cause - yeah, it just directly - straight onto the hands, and the feet got the - the, um, the splash of the - yeah, hot water and the noodles fell as - as she fell, and I rushed her to the bath ...

1. At this time, the appellant again demonstrated with his hands, with fingers spread and flicking upwards. His palms were generally face upwards, although at some points in the demonstration the palms were vertical and facing each other.
2. Later in the interview, the appellant said that he left the handle of the pot 'hanging over the edge, sort of', which was a 'rookie mistake' and that he 'shouldn't have done it'.[7]
3. After the appellant was asked what happened when he turned around, the following exchange occurred:[8]

YARRAN: Seen the noodles tangled in her hands, and she tried to, um, get - tried to, um, get them off her hands. At the same time, when she did that, she put herself off-balance and slipped, her feet went underneath and she face-planted, um - she tried to h - um, help herself back up, um, she slipped and, um, that's when I just grabbed her.

DET S/CON HUNT: Okay.

YARRAN: Yeah.

DET S/CON HUNT: So, I can see you showing me movements with your hands, is that how her hands were when - when you saw them, you - you -

YARRAN: Yeah, um -

DET S/CON HUNT: - so, how - how did her hands look - you said, the hands that had noodles - so, how did her - how was she holding her hands, when you saw her?

YARRAN: Like that, yeah.

DET S/CON HUNT: Like that, okay, so, fingers open, just like you're showing me?

YARRAN: Uh-huh.

DET S/CON HUNT: Okay. Yep. And were there noodles on her hands?

YARRAN: Uh-huh.

DET S/CON HUNT: Okay.

YARRAN: It was all around.

DET S/CON HUNT: All around. Yep. And then, she was - you said, she was trying to shake them off, is that - is that what you're trying -

YARRAN: Yeah.

DET S/CON HUNT: - yep.

YARRAN: She was - she was gonna, like, try to -

DET S/CON HUNT: - try and - yep.

YARRAN: - take it off calmly, she's like - trying to, like - yeah -

DET S/CON HUNT: And she - she -

YARRAN: - flick them out.

DET S/CON HUNT: She slipped and fell.

YARRAN: I dunno if she was trying to flick it out, or, like, chuck it up.

DET S/CON HUNT: That's -

YARRAN: But, yeah.

1. At this point the officer and appellant had their hands out with fingers spread. The officer's hands were palms up. The appellant's hands were palms up or palms facing vertically towards each other.

1. Dr Douglas' evidence was that scalding was a very common mechanism of injury in children and was usually a 'pull down scald'. She said that the injuries to the complainant's hands were not consistent with a 'pull down splash injury' because of the very deep burn injuries on both the palm and back of the hands, with the burns worse on the back of the hands.[9] The following exchange between the prosecutor and Dr Douglas then occurred:[10]

MR DUNGEY: And if there's a splash, why would that be inconsistent to both sides of the hands?

DR DOUGLAS: Usually if hot liquid falls upon a body part, it is deepest on one area where it falls and then the temperature runs off as it trickles down. It is very unusual to have burns of equivalent depth on both sides. I've never seen that.

MR DUNGEY: Okay. But you do - but you do in this case?

DR DOUGLAS: I do in this case.

MR DUNGEY: When you say you've never seen that, you've never seen that at all or you've never seen that with a splash injury?

DR DOUGLAS: Not with a splash injury. Burns that are very deep on both sides of the hands would be more consistent with sustained prolonged contact with that hot water or hot liquid.

MR DUNGEY: Have you treated burns on children where there's been sustained contact with hot liquid?

DR DOUGLAS: Yes, I have.

MR DUNGEY: How does that happen or how has that happened in the cases that you've treated?

DR DOUGLAS: In those cases, it's usually where - been where the child has become trapped in hot water such as climbed into a bath and turned on a hot tap or crawled into something and become trapped. Those would be the sustained contact deep burns from scald injuries as opposed to a splash.

1. Dr Douglas said that the very deep burns to both sides of the complainant's hands were not consistent with 'a pull down splash'.[11]
2. The following exchange then occurred between the prosecutor and Dr Douglas in relation to the appellant's account to police:[12]

MR DUNGEY: The accused man told the police that these injuries were occasioned by a toddler pulling a saucepan containing some boiling noodles off a stove top by a handle which had been left sticking out ... That kind of thing does happen?

DR DOUGLAS: Yes.

MR DUNGEY: You've treated children that have been burned in that manner?

DR DOUGLAS: Many.

MR DUNGEY: Okay. What parts of the body would you expect to have been burnt in such a scenario?

DR DOUGLAS: Usually the child is below whatever is being pulled. It's usually a pull down and then onto the chin, chest and abdomen as the water runs down.

MR DUNGEY: Were - was the chin - did the chin have any scalding burns?

DR DOUGLAS: Not to my knowledge, no.

MR DUNGEY: The chest?

DR DOUGLAS: Not scald looking burns ...

MR DUNGEY: Okay. In Mr Yarran's interview with police at the scene, he demonstrated what he said he saw, namely, [the complainant] holding noodles from boiling water wrapped around her fingers with her palms stretched out in the manner I'm demonstrating. Are the nature of the burns that you saw consistent with that as a form of causation?

DR DOUGLAS: No.

MR DUNGEY: Why not?

DR DOUGLAS: Because as the photographs have demonstrated, the deepest burns, the - were on the back of the hands rather than the palm. In fact, the palm was, if anything, the more spared aspect. And the side of the fingers and the backs of these fingers were the deepest burns.

1. Dr Douglas also described deeper burns to the side of the little finger and the tip of the ring finger which looked more consistent with a contact burn with something such as the metal of a pan, and splash-type scald injuries to the top of the complainant's feet.[13]
2. Dr Douglas also gave evidence that areas of pink shown in the photographs between the complainant's fingers were less burned, which would usually be the result of the fingers being held together. Dr Douglas said:[14]

[I]f the fingers are apart, all areas of the finger would get exposed to the same temperature of water in a scald injury all the same. If the fingers are held together, they are relatively protected and the areas that are not held together are burned.

1. In cross-examination, Dr Douglas accepted that a child could get burns from food, and that she had seen lots of hot noodle burns which was a very common injury.[15] In re-examination, the following exchange occurred:[16]

MR DUNGEY: You said that two-minute noodle - two-minute noodle burns are common?

DR DOUGLAS: Very.

MR DUNGEY: Very. You've treated children with two-minute noodle burns?

DR DOUGLAS: Many.

MR DUNGEY: What's the reported mechanism in those cases?

DR DOUGLAS: It's usually the getting a bowl out the microwave or there's a bowl and it's usually a splash into the lap or onto the chest.

MR DUNGEY: Onto the chest. So two-minute noodles themselves, have you ever seen those kinds of burns on hands?

DR DOUGLAS: I haven't.

MR DUNGEY: No. I think my learned friend just asked you whether noodles in boiling water could have the same effect as an immersion burn and you indicated that any prolonged contact with anything hot can produce a deep burn?

DR DOUGLAS: That's correct.

MR DUNGEY: On both sides of both hands?

DR DOUGLAS: No, I don't think that mechanism's consistent with holding something hot, as I've said, because of the deep burns on the back of the hands as well.

Trial judge's ruling as to use of lies as evidence of guilt

1. The appellant's trial counsel objected to the alleged lies told by the appellant to police being used as evidence of guilt. The trial judge ruled that they could be used for that purpose.
2. In doing so, the trial judge found that the alleged lies were not the only evidence against the appellant and were not an indispensable link in the chain of reasoning on which proof of guilt depended.[17]
3. The trial judge held that it was open to the jury to conclude that the appellant's account was 'contradicted by cogent, detailed, expert evidence'.[18] His Honour noted that proof that the complainant could not have injured herself in the manner the appellant contended was 'a very powerful component of the prosecution case'.[19] The trial judge was concerned about whether the use of the appellant's account in the manner proposed by the prosecution would involve circular or 'bootstraps' reasoning, requiring the jury to be satisfied of the appellant's guilt to conclude that he had lied. His Honour concluded this was not the case on the basis that:[20]
   1. If the jury accepted that the complainant could not have been injured in the fashion described by the appellant, they would not, inevitably, find the offence proved.
   2. It was not necessary for the jury to find, assume or determine that the appellant injured the complainant before finding that his statements about how the complainant was injured were lies.
   3. Dr Douglas' evidence was important in the sense that, if accepted, it established the falsity of the appellant's statements about how the complainant received her injuries.
   4. It was open to the jury to conclude that the appellant had told the lies that implicated the complainant in injuring herself because he was involved in inflicting those injuries. The jury could infer that the appellant told the lies because he feared that the truth that he was involved in inflicting her injuries would implicate him in the offence.
4. The trial judge concluded:[21]

Mr Yarran has provided a detailed account of the events surrounding [the complainant's] injuries. Proof that they are lies can be shown independently of proof of guilt. None of Dr Douglas's evidence, if established, proved Mr Yarran's guilt.

Her account does no more than prove the falsity of various aspects of Mr Yarran's account of [the complainant's] injuries, that would then be added to the undisputed fact that Mr Yarran was the only adult in the house at the time and the absence of that scenario of any alterative explanation for [the complainant's] injuries.

It will be a matter for the jury whether, in those circumstances, the only rational inference available on the evidence is that Mr Yarran deliberately inflicted the injuries ...

The fact that proof of the lies may lead to a particularly powerful inference that Mr Yarran believed that he had committed the offence, does not mean that the reasoning to this conclusion is circular. It may be that it is compelling. ...

[I]t is open to the jury to reason that the lies were told because Mr Yarran knew that if he told the truth it would implicate him in the inflection of the injuries. Circular reasoning occurs when the jury is required to assume that an accused has committed the offence in question for the purpose of deciding whether his statement is a lie. That is not the case here.

1. The trial judge ruled that he would permit the prosecution to contend that the alleged lie could be used as evidence of guilt.[22]
2. After counsel's closing addresses, the trial judge made the following supplementary ruling as to the direction he would give the jury:[23]

In relation to the direction as to lies that I will give, whilst I have ruled that it seemed to me that Dr Douglas's evidence if accepted is not determinative of Mr Yarran's guilt on count 2.

I accept that it would be, seems to me, a short step from a conclusion if that conclusion was reached. And that Mr Yarran lied deliberately in this regard to prove that he caused the injuries that give rise to count 2.

Accordingly, I propose to direct the jury that they have to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Yarran deliberately lied before they could rely upon the lie in the manner in which the state contends.

1. The trial judge gave the jury a Liberato direction in the following terms:[24]

In his interviews, Mr Yarran consistently denied inflicting any of the injuries, and he gave an explanation for how the injuries that give rise to count 2 occurred. If you believed Mr Yarran's answers, then you would find him not guilty. If you found difficulty in accepting his answers but you thought they may be true, again you would find him not guilty because you would inevitably have a reasonable doubt.

If you don't believe or accept Mr Yarran's answers, that's not the end of it. What you would simply do in those circumstances is to put his answers to one side and then deal with the question, have the State, on the basis of the evidence that you do accept, proved his guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

Because even if you prefer the evidence of the prosecution, you cannot find Mr Yarran guilty unless you're satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the truth and reliability of that evidence, and it permits you to draw the inferences that the prosecution contend for.

The observation that, in those circumstances, you would put Mr Yarran's evidence entirely to one side is subject to a qualification in respect of count 2 that I will come to later.

1. The trial judge directed the jury about the critical contentious elements of the offence of causing grievous bodily harm charge in count 2 in the following terms:[25]

The third element, and this is the element which is in issue on count 2, is that Mr Yarran caused that grievous bodily harm by placing [the complainant's] hands in boiling water. The State do not seek a conviction on an other basis, the State do not, for example, contend that you can find Mr Yarran guilty because he was negligent.

The State say he deliberately placed her hands in boiling water, and that is the only basis upon which you could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he caused the grievous bodily harm. The fourth element is that Mr Yarran did so unlawfully. So the State there must exclude accident beyond reasonable doubt.

If you think it is a possibility that [the complainant] sustained these injuries in some way other than Mr Yarran deliberately placing her hands in boiling water, you must find Mr Yarran not guilty.

1. The trial judge gave the jury a circumstantial evidence direction, to the effect that they could only return a verdict of guilty if satisfied that the only reasonable inference from the evidence taken as a whole was that the appellant put the complainant's hands in boiling water.[26]
2. The trial judge then gave the jury a direction as to the use of the alleged lies. The trial judge identified the appellant's answers which the prosecution contended were lies.[27]
3. The trial judge then directed the jury in the following terms:[28]

It will be for you, ladies and gentlemen, as the finders of fact to determine whether what Mr Yarran said at those points that I've taken you to were a lie. I direct you that for you to be satisfied that those statements were a lie, you must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that it was a lie. You will appreciate that Mr Yarran denies that he lied.

To prove the lie beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecution rely upon Dr Douglas' evidence, which I took you to before the break and which I do not now repeat.

Even if you accept that Mr Yarran lied in this respect, not every lie told by an accused person is evidence of their guilt. Mr Yarran should not be found guilty on count 2 merely because he has told a lie. And I just reiterate that this direction purely relates to count 2.

It is a matter of common experience that there may be many reasons for telling a lie. Most people tell lies at times out of embarrassment or to protect someone's feelings.

A lie could be told out of panic or to bolster up a cause or to escape an unjust allegation, to protect someone else, or perhaps for matters unrelated to the offence, such as trying to hide things from family and friends.

1. The trial judge then directed the jury that there were six things they needed to be satisfied of before the appellant's statements were capable of supporting the State's case:[29]
   1. The lie must be precisely identified. In this case the alleged lies were the appellant's answers the judge had just read out. The jury could not go beyond those answers in considering whether the appellant's answers were lies evidencing guilt.
   2. The lie must be deliberate and not told mistakenly. The jury had to be satisfied that the appellant had deliberately attempted to mislead and to conceal the truth. The trial judge directed the jury that there is a difference between merely rejecting a person's account of events and finding that they have lied.
   3. In deciding whether a lie was told from a consciousness of guilt, the jury should bear in mind that there are many reasons for a person to tell a lie, apart from that consciousness of guilt.
   4. The jury could not use the lie as evidence against the appellant if they accept an explanation for the lie that is consistent with his innocence. The jury had to be satisfied, having regard to all the evidence in the case, that there was no explanation for the lie other than consciousness of guilt.
   5. The lie would not be evidence against the appellant unless the lie was told out of a consciousness of guilt; that is, he knew that the truth would implicate him in the offence, and that the lie reveals knowledge of the offence charged in count 2 or some aspect of it. The lie must relate to a material issue. The trial judge said:[30]

Here it relates to how [the complainant] was injured. If it concerns some peripheral image, it could not form the basis of reasoning that Mr Yarran is guilty of the offence. It must be about a matter which would connect him to the offence. You must be satisfied that the lie was told because of a realisation of guilt, and a fear of the truth. Put another way, you must be satisfied that Mr Yarran told a lie because he knew that the truth would implicate him in the commission of the offence. You should not look at any answer given by him in isolation. You should have regard to all his answers in the interview. But you must be satisfied that the reason the lies were told, if you find them to be lies, was because Mr Yarran realised that the truth would implicate him in the commission of the offence.

1. The facts, events and circumstances relied upon by the State to indicate that the lie constitutes an admission against interest must be precisely identified. In that regard the trial judge directed:[31]

The prosecution say the lie was told because if Mr Yarran told the truth, it would implicate it in someway. If he told the truth about his role in [the complainant's] injuries, that would implicate him in the commission of the offence. You need to be satisfied that there is no other explanation for the lie before you could rely upon it as evidence of a consciousness of guilt of count 2.

1. The trial judge directed the jury that:[32]

So it's only if you're satisfied of all those things beyond a reasonable doubt that you could use a lie that you find beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Yarran told to support the State's case. It's only if you are satisfied that any lie about [the complainant] getting burned through grasping the noodles fits with this - with these criteria that you can use it as part of the circumstantial case advanced by the State. (emphasis added)

1. This direction was given a second time following a request from the jury made during their deliberations.[33]

1. The following summary of the relevant general principles is largely taken from this court's decision in Evans v The State of Western Australia.[34]
2. It is trite that a lie by an accused, particularly a lie told in the course of giving evidence, can be taken into account by a jury in assessing the credibility of the accused's evidence or exculpatory statements to police. The fact that an accused has lied on oath may lead a jury to reject the accused's evidence or statements related to the lie and treat other evidence given or statements made by the accused with caution. A lie told out of court, for example in a recorded interview with police, may also affect the jury's assessment of the credibility of other statements made by the accused either in or out of court.
3. While a lie which merely affects the credit of the accused may lead a jury to reject an accused's evidence or statement, it will not positively support the prosecution case. Once the accused's evidence or exculpatory statement is rejected, it remains necessary for the jury to consider whether the prosecution has established the accused's guilt by evidence which the jury does accept.
4. A second category of lie is where evidence which suggests a consciousness of guilt is admissible as an implied admission against interest. This kind of lie was considered by the High Court in Edwards. In that case, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ observed that:[35]

Ordinarily, the telling of a lie will merely affect the credit of the witness who tells it. A lie told by an accused may go further and, in limited circumstances, amount to conduct which is inconsistent with innocence, and amount therefore to an implied admission of guilt. In this way the telling of a lie may constitute evidence. (emphasis added)

1. The plurality said that the principle applied to lies allegedly told in or out of court,[36] and continued:[37]

It is only if the accused is telling a lie because he perceives that the truth is inconsistent with his innocence that the telling of the lie may constitute evidence against him. In other words, in telling the lie the accused must be acting as if he were guilty. It must be a lie which an innocent person would not tell. (emphasis added)

1. The plurality indicated that was why the lie must be told deliberately, as an inadvertent untruth cannot be indicative of guilt. Their Honours went on to explain the requirement that the lie relate to a material issue in the following terms:[38]

And the lie must relate to a material issue because the telling of it must be explicable only on the basis that the truth would implicate the accused in the offence with which he is charged. It must be for that reason that he tells the lie. To say that the lie must spring from a realization or consciousness of guilt is really another way of saying the same thing. It is to say that the accused must be lying because he is conscious that 'if he tells the truth, the truth will convict him'. (citation omitted)

1. The plurality went on to explain the difficulties with a bare direction that 'consciousness of guilt is required', observing:[39]

A lie can constitute an admission against interest only if it is concerned with some circumstance or event connected with the offence (i.e. it relates to a material issue) and if it was told by the accused in circumstances in which the explanation for the lie is that he knew that the truth would implicate him in the offence. Thus, in any case where a lie is relied upon to prove guilt, the lie should be precisely identified, as should the circumstances and events that are said to indicate that it constitutes an admission against interest. And the jury should be instructed that they may take the lie into account only if they are satisfied, having regard to those circumstances and events, that it reveals a knowledge of the offence or some aspect of it and that it was told because the accused knew that the truth of the matter about which he lied would implicate him in the offence, or ... because of 'a realization of guilt and a fear of the truth'. (citations omitted)

1. The use of a lie in this manner involves drawing an inference, from post-offence conduct, that the accused committed the charged offence. The inference that the accused committed the charged offence is drawn from the telling of a lie which would not be told unless the accused was guilty of the charged offence. The telling of the lie is therefore circumstantial evidence of the accused's guilt of the charged offence. The telling of the lie may be used, together with such other evidence which the jury accepts, to satisfy the jury beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the charged offence.[40]
2. Unless the lie is the only evidence against the accused or is an indispensable link in the chain of reasoning on which proof of guilt depends, it is not necessary for the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the lie itself establishes guilt.[41] That reflects the ordinary way in which circumstantial evidence is to be used in a criminal trial.[42]
3. In Leung v The State of Western Australia,[43] Buss P observed:

A post-offence lie told by an accused which suggests a consciousness of guilt will be admissible as an implied admission against interest if, relevantly, the lie is probative of a fact in issue, including a fact in issue which the State seeks to prove, wholly or partly, by inference on the basis of the lie and other circumstantial evidence. A post-offence lie told by an accused which suggests a consciousness of guilt will reveal knowledge of some aspect of the offence charged if the relevant knowledge, either alone or in combination with other evidence, is probative of a fact in issue.

1. Similarly, in Leung Mazza and Beech JJA observed:[44]

A lie need not reveal knowledge of the whole of an offence - it is sufficient if it reveals knowledge of some aspect of it, including some circumstance or event connected with it. The principles governing the use of an accused's lies were recently outlined by this court in Evans v The State of Western Australia. As is explained in some detail in that decision, a lie may be used to support an inference as to a material fact, rather than as to knowledge of the whole of an offence. (citations omitted)

1. Before a lie can be evidence of guilt, the lie must be demonstrated other than by proof of guilt of the charged offence.[45] A statement by an accused cannot be a lie evidencing guilt if the jury must assume that an accused has committed the charged offence for the purpose of deciding whether the statement is a lie.[46] This court discussed cases recognising the impermissibility of 'bootstraps' reasoning in Corbett v The State of Western Australia.[47]
2. In Zoneff v The Queen,[48] the plurality observed:

There may be cases in which the risk of misunderstanding on the part of a jury as to the use to which they may put lies might be such that a judge should give an Edwards-type direction notwithstanding that the prosecutor has not put that a lie has been told out of consciousness of guilt. As a general rule, however, an Edwards-type direction should only be given if the prosecution contends that a lie is evidence of guilt, in the sense that it was told because, in the language of Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ in Edwards, 'the accused knew that the truth ... would implicate him in [the commission of] the offence' and if, in fact, the lie in question is capable of bearing that character. (The words in italics are ours and, for the sake of clarity, should be included in the statement of principle.)

Moreover, if there is a risk of confusion or doubt as to the way in which the prosecution puts its case, the trial judge should inquire of the prosecution whether it contends that lies may constitute evidence of consciousness of guilt and, if so, he or she should require identification of the lie or lies in issue and the basis on which they are said to be capable of implicating the accused in the commission of the offence charged. (citations omitted)

The plurality identified the role for a trial judge as being to determine whether answers are or are not capable of being regarded as lies indicative of a consciousness of guilt.[49] This court has recognised that a trial judge should not direct the jury that they may use evidence of an alleged lie as evidence of guilt if the evidence relied on by the prosecution is not capable of satisfying those preconditions.[50]

1. Where a trial judge gives a direction about the use of lies as evidence of guilt, it will ordinarily contain the following elements identified by this court in Newhill v The State of Western Australia [No 2]:[51]

(a) the lie must be precisely identified;

(b) the jury must be told that the lie will not be evidence against the accused unless the lie was deliberate;

(c) the jury must be reminded that there are many reasons why people tell lies, apart from the realisation of guilt;

(d) the jury must be told that it cannot use the lie as evidence against the accused if it accepts an explanation for the lie that is consistent with innocence;

(e) the jury must be told that the lie will not be evidence against the accused unless the lie was told out of a consciousness of guilt (that is, the accused knew that the truth would implicate him or her in the offence) and the lie reveals knowledge of the offence charged or some aspect of it; and

(f) the facts, events and circumstances relied on by the State to indicate that the lie constitutes an admission against interest must be precisely identified.

1. As the court also observed in Newhill:[52]

An imperfect Edwards direction will not automatically result in the quashing of a conviction. In Dhanhoa v The Queen [2003] HCA 40; (2003) 217 CLR 1, McHugh and Gummow JJ said:

'[I]t is not enough to establish that a miscarriage of justice has occurred by showing that it would have been better if the trial judge had given an appropriate direction concerning the effect of lies or that there is a possibility that the jury may have reasoned that the accused was guilty because he had lied to the police. To succeed in the appeal, Dhanhoa must establish that it is a reasonable possibility that the failure to direct the jury 'may have affected the verdict' (Simic v The Queen [1980] HCA 25; (1980) 144 CLR 319 at 332) [60].' (original emphasis)

Ground 1: whether Edwards direction should have been given

1. The substance of the appellant's submission in relation to ground 1 is that the Edwards direction ought not to have been given as it was not open to the jury to be satisfied from Dr Douglas' evidence that his statement about the noodles was a lie. The appellant says:[53]

It is submitted that when the evidence is considered there is no arguable inconsistency between the evidence of Dr Douglas and the version of events as outlined by the appellant in his interviews.

Dr Douglas' evidence that the burns are inconsistent with a pull down splash injury are not arguably inconsistent with the appellant's version of events because the appellant did not describe a pull down splash injury. He described a scald from hot food wrapped around the hands, broadly consistent with evidence of Dr Douglas that scalds can be caused by food and that prolonged contact with anything hot can cause deep burns.

1. The appellant submits that he did not say the words 'holding', 'clasping' or 'grasping' with reference to what he saw the complainant doing with the noodles. He described the noodles being wrapped around the complainant's hands and did not say that they were wrapped around her fingers. The appellant says that the following scenario put to Dr Douglas (in the passage quoted at [29] above) was not an accurate representation of anything the appellant said:

MR DUNGEY: In Mr Yarran's interview with police at the scene, he demonstrated what he said he saw, namely, [the complainant] holding noodles from boiling water wrapped around her fingers with her palms stretched out in the manner I'm demonstrating. Are the nature of the burns that you saw consistent with that as a form of causation?

DR DOUGLAS: No.

1. The appellant says that Dr Douglas' response therefore says nothing about the truth or falsity of the appellant's version of events. The appellant submits that the appellant's claim that noodles were wrapped around the complainant's hands, all around, is not arguably inconsistent with the evidence that the complainant had deep burns on both sides of her hands.[54]
2. The appellant contends that his statements were not reasonably capable of being characterised as a lie because their falsity was not established by any evidence adduced. He submits that, taken at its highest, Dr Douglas' evidence did not rule out the real possibility that the burns were caused in the manner the appellant described. The question of whether Dr Douglas' evidence falsified the complainant's account was not a proper question for the jury unless it had been correctly determined by the trial judge that it was open to the jury to so find beyond a reasonable doubt. As it was not open to the jury to reach this conclusion, the trial judge erred in presenting Dr Douglas' evidence as possessing the character of logical inconsistency with the appellant's account. The error was material as there is a real risk that the directions about how the jury might use the appellant's alleged lies influenced the verdict.[55]
3. In our view, the appellant's submissions fail to adequately take account of what the appellant demonstrated in the recorded interviews as well as the words he used. The appellant repeatedly demonstrated the complainant holding her hands out with her fingers spread apart and her palms generally flicking upwards. The prosecutor's description to Dr Douglas of the complainant 'holding noodles from boiling water wrapped around her fingers with her palms stretched out' was a fair description of what the appellant had demonstrated to the police officers. Further, it is apparent from the trial transcript that, at this point, the prosecutor was himself demonstrating to Dr Douglas the manner in which the appellant had indicated to police that the complainant was holding the noodles. There was no complaint from the appellant's trial counsel or the trial judge that the prosecutor's demonstration was inaccurate, as would be expected if the prosecutor had not given a fair demonstration to Dr Douglas of what the appellant had indicated to police.
4. Once this is appreciated, it was well-open to the jury to be satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant's account of the complainant was a lie.
5. Based on Dr Douglas' evidence, the complainant's hand injuries were inconsistent with the appellant's account in at least two respects. First, the fact that the more severe burns were on the backs of the complainant's hands is inconsistent with the appellant's demonstration of the complainant holding the noodles with her palms at least generally facing up. Secondly, if the complainant had tipped over the pot of boiling noodles, so that the water and noodles poured down on her, she would be expected to have sustained scalding injuries to her face and chest. The complainant's only scalding injuries were to her hands and the tops of her feet. Dr Douglas' evidence provided a firm basis for concluding that the appellant's account to police was false.
6. On oral submissions, counsel for the appellant emphasised that the appellant did not claim to have seen the pot tip over. Counsel postulated a scenario in which:[56]

(a) the complainant pulled over the pot and boiling water splashed on the backs of her hands causing burns to the back of the hands; and

(b) the complainant then somehow came to be holding the noodles with her palms facing upwards, with the resting noodles causing the serious burns to the palms of the complainant's hands.

1. This scenario strikes us as implausible and far-fetched speculation unsupported by the evidence. Further, this scenario postulated in counsel's oral submissions in the appeal was never suggested by trial counsel to either Dr Douglas or the jury. In the circumstances, it was well-open to the jury not to regard this as a reasonable inference which would preclude them from being satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the falsity of the appellant's account.
2. Counsel for the appellant also referred to the appellant's statements to police as suggesting that the complainant's hands were in the noodles rather than that the noodles were in her hands.[57] We do not accept that submission. In the passages quoted above, the appellant repeatedly referred to the noodles being in or on the complainant's hands. Although he referred to the complainant trying to 'get her hands out of the noodles' in the passages quoted at [14] and [22] above, these statements were made in the context of sentences which began with a statement that the complainant 'had the noodles in her hands' or that the complainant had the noodles 'wrapped around her hand'.
3. The noodle incident was something the appellant claimed to have seen and was not something about which he might have been mistaken. It was well-open to the jury to be satisfied that the appellant's statements, if false, were deliberately false.
4. Therefore, ground 1 as particularised and argued by the appellant, is not established.
5. We note that the appellant's written submissions do not challenge the trial judge's conclusion that the use of the appellant's lies as evidence of guilt did not involve 'bootstraps' reasoning of the type identified in cases such as Corbett. In oral submissions, counsel for the appellant disclaimed any criticism of the trial judge's decision in that respect.[58] We note that Dr Douglas' evidence was critical to establishing both the appellant's account to be a lie and that the only reasonable inference was that the appellant immersed the complainant's hands in hot liquid. Dr Douglas' evidence that the burn injuries were consistent with the complainant's hands being in sustained prolonged contact with hot liquid, and inconsistent with a pull-down splash injury by liquid or noodles, might be seen as two sides of the same coin. However, we agree that the trial judge was correct to conclude that the jury did not have to assume that the appellant had committed the charged offence for the purpose of deciding whether the statement was a lie. Logically, the jury could conclude that the burns could not have been sustained in the manner described by the appellant because the complainant's injuries were inconsistent with that account. The jury could reach that conclusion without assuming the appellant must have placed the complainant's hands in boiling water. The jury could then use the fact that the appellant lied about how the complainant sustained her injuries as one of the circumstances supporting the inference that he must have placed her hands in boiling water.

1. Ground 2 does accurately identify a misconception by the trial judge as to what was said by this court in the passage of Newhill quoted at [60] above. That passage identifies the elements which an Edwards direction should ordinarily contain, rather than the matters of which a jury must be satisfied before relying on a lie as evidence of guilt. However, the trial judge's direction in this case, summarised at [44] - [45] above, treated these as elements of which the jury must be satisfied before relying on a lie as evidence of guilt.
2. As the appellant correctly submits, the requirement is for the trial judge's direction to precisely identify the lie and the events and circumstances relied on by the State to indicate that the lie constitutes an admission against interest. Yet the trial judge's direction in this case was to the effect that the jury had to be satisfied that the lie, events and circumstances had been precisely identified before using the lie as evidence of guilt.
3. While this approach is discouraged, we are satisfied that the trial judge's approach to the direction about lies did not constitute a material error or give rise to any miscarriage of justice in the circumstances of this case. The trial judge did precisely identify the statements of the appellant said to constitute lies at the commencement of this part of his Honour's direction, by reading portions of the interview transcript to the jury. He made it clear that these were the only answers which the jury could use as lies evidencing guilt. The direction also clearly identified the matters relied on by the State - principally Dr Douglas' evidence and the circumstances in which the appellant's statements were made - to support the inference that the appellant had told a deliberate lie out of consciousness of guilt. In our view, there is no realistic possibility that the jury might have been under any misapprehension as to these matters.
4. In oral submissions, the appellant's argument narrowed down to the proposition that the trial judge's reference to the appellant 'grasping' the noodles in the passage quoted at [45] above failed to properly reflect what the appellant had said. Counsel for the respondent accepted that the word 'grasped' may not have been the most apposite word to use. However, this short summary description could not have misled the jury as to what the appellant had represented to police. Members of the jury had watched the search video and EROI and had the videos as exhibits which could be watched in the jury room. They had been directed that they were the sole judges of the fact and must disregard any comments made by the judge about the facts with which they[59]isagreed.59 The trial judge had also just read to the jury the transcript of those portions of the videos which were contended by the State to be lies before giving the impugned direction. There is no realistic prospect that the jury might have been misled by the trial judge's use of the term 'grasped'.
5. Therefore, ground 2 is not established.

1. The principles governing the determination of appeals on the ground that a verdict is unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence, derives from the High Court's decision in M v The Queen,[60] are well established. The principles were recently summarised in Visser v The State of Western Australia [No 2],[61] in the following terms:
   1. It is a question of fact whether, having regard to the evidence, a verdict of guilty on which a conviction is based is unreasonable or cannot be supported.
   2. An appellate court must decide that question by making its own independent assessment of the sufficiency and quality of the evidence, and determining whether, notwithstanding that there is evidence upon which a tribunal of fact might convict, nevertheless it would be dangerous in all the circumstances to permit the verdict to stand.
   3. The appellate court, in making an independent assessment of the whole of the evidence to determine whether it was open to the tribunal of fact to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, must weigh the whole of the evidence (in particular, the competing evidence).
   4. The appellate court's task is not to consider, as a question of law, merely whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction.
   5. The appellate court, in assessing whether it was open to the tribunal of fact to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, must not disregard or discount either the consideration that the jury is the body entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence or the consideration that the jury has had the benefit of having seen and heard the witnesses. On the contrary, the court must pay full regard to those considerations.
   6. The appellate court's function is to determine for itself whether the evidence at trial was sufficient in nature and quality to remove any reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty of the offence charged. The critical issue is whether the court's assessment of the totality of the evidence leaves the court with a reasonable doubt as to guilt, which the court cannot assuage by having regard to such advantage as the jury can be taken to have had by reason of having seen and heard the evidence at trial.
   7. The appellate court examines the trial record to ascertain whether, despite the jury's advantage in having seen and heard the witnesses in the context of the trial, the jury, acting rationally, should have entertained a reasonable doubt as to proof of guilt.
   8. The ultimate question for the appellate court must always be whether the appellate court thinks that upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty.
   9. The setting aside of a jury's verdict of guilty because, having regard to the evidence, it is unreasonable or cannot be supported is a serious step. Trial by the appellate court is not to be substituted for trial by jury.
   10. The appellate court's reasons must disclose its assessment of the capacity of the evidence to support the verdict.
   11. The nature and extent of the appellate court's task, in a particular case, will be informed by the elements of the offence, the accused's defence, the issues in contest at the trial, the manner in which the trial was conducted, the way in which the case was ultimately left to the jury, and the particulars of the ground of appeal.

The question for the appellate court is whether, upon its examination of the record, by reason of inconsistencies, discrepancies or other inadequacies, or in light of other evidence, the court is satisfied that the jury, acting rationally, ought to have entertained a reasonable doubt as to guilt. Differently framed, the central question is whether the assessment of the totality of the evidence leaves the court with a reasonable doubt as to guilt, which cannot be assuaged by the reference to the advantages enjoyed by the jury of having seen and heard the evidence at trial.

(citations omitted)

1. We note that the case was opened by the prosecutor and left to the jury by the trial judge as an allegation that the appellant had immersed or placed the complainant's hands in boiling water. Dr Douglas' evidence was to the effect that the burn injuries to the complainant's hands were consistent with them having come into prolonged sustained contact with a hot liquid. We would not conclude, beyond reasonable doubt, that the hot liquid which caused these injuries was necessarily water or that, if it was water, the liquid was necessarily at a temperature of 100 degrees Celsius. However, we are satisfied that the complaint's hands must have been in prolonged sustained contact with a scalding hot liquid. The appellant's guilt of the charged offence does not turn on whether the liquid into which the complainant's hands were immersed was water or whether it was literally boiling. Below, we will refer the complainant's hands being placed in scalding hot liquid. After this issue was raised in the course of oral submissions in the appeal neither counsel took any issue with the court adopting that approach.
2. In the present case, the critical issue is whether the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence considered as a whole is that the appellant caused the burns to the complainant's hands by placing them in scalding hot liquid.
3. Our review of the trial record leaves us with no reasonable doubt that the appellant caused the burns to the complainant's hands by placing them in scalding hot liquid.
4. The appellant was left alone with the children in his partner's house. There is no suggestion that the complainant's 4-year-old sister might have caused the injuries. The complainant's hands did not have the scalding burn injuries when the appellant's partner left that morning. The complainant could not have immersed her own hands in scalding hot liquid for a sustained period, as the pain caused by the scalding hot liquid would have caused the complainant to immediately retract her hands after touching the water. The complainant could only have received injuries from sustained prolonged contact with a scalding hot liquid if her hands were held in the liquid. The appellant was the only person who might have done so.
5. Dr Douglas' evidence was that the burn injuries were consistent with the complainant's hands being in sustained prolonged contact with a scalding hot liquid. They were not consistent with the pull-down splash injuries that the complainant might have caused to herself.
6. Our own assessment of the photographic evidence of the complainant's scalding hand injuries is consistent with Dr Douglas' conclusion. The photographs show burn patterns consistent with the appellant's hands being clenched at a point when they were immersed in scalding hot liquid. The burns were less severe in the centre of the palms, the ends of the thumbs and some areas between the fingers. Those are areas to which a toddler's clenched hand would be expected offer some protection. Clenching would be a natural response of a child to the pain of her hands being held in scalding hot liquid. The most severe burns were to the backs of the hands and the base of the palms, which would be the most exposed areas if the complainant clenched her hands as they were held in scalding hot liquid.
7. Further, Dr Douglas' evidence demonstrates, in the manner described at [68] - [72] above, that the appellant lied in his account to police of the burns having been sustained as the complainant held noodles she had tipped out of a pot of boiling water. While we recognise that people may lie for many reasons, we are satisfied that this is not a lie which the appellant would have told if he had not caused the burn injuries to the complainant's hands. While it exculpated the appellant from the offence with which he was ultimately charged, the explanation was not wholly exculpatory. On the appellant's account, the injury was still his fault because he left a pot handle hanging over the edge of the stove and did not properly supervise the complainant. There is no plausible reason why the appellant might have given a false partially exculpatory explanation for the incident if he had not directly caused the injuries. The only reasonable explanation of why the appellant might have given a false account of the way the complainant sustained the burn injuries to her hands was that he knew he had directly caused those injuries and that the truth would implicate him in having done so. We are satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that the appellant lied about the manner in which the complaint sustained the burn injuries and that this was not a lie which he would have told if he had not directly caused those injuries.
8. Such evidence as there is from the appellant and his partner is that the appellant promptly acted to place the complainant's hands under running cold water. Accepting that to be the case, this conduct is not inconsistent with the appellant having deliberately placed the complainant's hands in scalding hot liquid. It is consistent with his only afterwards having appreciated the consequences of his conduct, or seeking to minimise the severity of its impact.
9. Having reviewed the trial record, we are satisfied that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the primary facts established by the evidence considered as a whole is that the appellant caused the burns to the complainant's hands by deliberately placing them in scalding hot liquid. Our review of the trial record therefore satisfies us beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the offence charged in count 2. Therefore, appeal ground 3 is not established.

1. The appellant has been in custody since he was convicted of the offence charged in count 2 on 17 November 2022. On 13 January 2023, the appellant was sentenced to a term of 5 years' immediate imprisonment, with eligibility for parole, for that offence. The sentence was backdated to 14 November 2022 to take account of time spent in custody on remand. Although the appellant has been eligible for parole since November 2025, it appears he remains in custody serving his sentence for the grievous bodily harm offence.
2. The present appeal was instituted on 13 June 2025, a little less than 2.5 years after the time for appealing expired. The delay in instituting the appeal has not been adequately explained. In our view this is not a case where the merits of the appeal are such as to demand an extension of time to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The application for an extension of time in which to appeal should be refused.
3. In these circumstances, the appropriate orders are:
   1. The appellant's application for an extension of time in which to appeal is dismissed.
   2. Leave to appeal is refused on all grounds of appeal.
   3. The appeal is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[1] Edwards v The Queen [1993] HCA 63; (1993) 178 CLR 193.

[34] Evans v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 26; (2020) 55 WAR 310 [63] ‑ [71], also adopted in Law v The Queen [2020] WASCA 196 [79] ‑ [91].

[41] Edwards (210); see also this court's discussion of the standard of proof in respect of alleged lies in Martinez v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 143; (2007) 172 A Crim R 389 [288] ‑ [295].

[42] Shepherd v The Queen [1990] HCA 56; (1990) 170 CLR 573, 579.

[43] Leung v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 81 [50].

[45] Aubertin v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 229; (2006) 33 WAR 87 [68] ‑ [70].

[46] R v Sirillas [2006] VSCA 234 [19].

[47] Corbett v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASCA 97 [54] ‑ [59].

[48] Zoneff v The Queen [2000] HCA 28; (2000) 200 CLR 234 [16] ‑ [17].

[50] Hedgeland v The State of Western Australia [2013] WASCA 97 [217]; Corbett [35].

[51] Newhill v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2015] WASCA 121 [70].

[53] Appellant's submission [28] - [29] (WAB 21).

[54] Appellant's submissions [30] - [38] (WAB 21 - 22).

[55] Appellant's submissions [49] - [53] (WAB 25 - 26).

[60] M v The Queen [1994] HCA 63; (1994) 181 CLR 487, 523 ‑ 525.

[61] Visser v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2025] WASCA 74 [118] ‑ [119].