1. The relevant background up to the decision of 6 June 2025 is set out in the reasons for decision in Xie. In the circumstances, I will only set out what is necessary to understand these reasons. Mr Xie claims to have suffered a work injury of fluoride toxicity poisoning as a result of his exposure to chemicals in the course of his employment. His claims to be entitled to ongoing weekly payments and payment of medical expenses related to the treatment of his claimed work injury were rejected by the Corporation's nominated claims agent by letter dated 16 February 2023. That determination has been the subject of an application for review.
2. The preparation of the matter for trial was supervised initially by Gilchrist DPJ and, subsequently, by Crawley DPJ. Mr Xie made application to Crawley DPJ for conditions to be set in relation to the receipt of his evidence at trial. He sought a direction that his evidence be received in no longer than two-hour blocks at a time, and on alternate days. Crawley DPJ declined the application and listed the matter for trial on 5, 6, and 7 March 2025 to receive and conclude the oral evidence of Mr Xie. This was in circumstances of Mr Xie, at the time, being self-represented and seeking the assistance of a Mandarin-speaking interpreter.
3. Shortly prior to the commencement of the trial, issues were raised by Mr Xie which were addressed by me as trial judge. Mr Xie sought directions as to the manner in which pre-trial directions hearings were to take place, and his applications were refused. Mr Xie also renewed his application for his oral evidence at trial to be received in no more than two-hour blocks at a time, and on alternate days. I refused that application.
4. The trial commenced at 10:15am on 5 March 2025. After approximately two hours, Mr Xie sought a break in the proceedings, which was granted, and the hearing was adjourned to resume at 2pm. The trial did not resume in circumstances of Mr Xie claiming that he was too unwell to continue. Some medical certifications were provided, which I found did not satisfy the evidentiary requirements to prove that he had been so unwell as to be unable to continue with the hearing. The trial was listed to resume on 26 March 2025. On 19 March 2025, Mr Xie forwarded an email transmission to my Chambers asserting that in circumstances of the trial having been listed for not only 26 March 2025 and also on 27 March 2025, that he would be unable to attend the trial. The trial remained listed to resume on 26 March 2025. On 20 March 2025, Mr Xie advised by email transmission that he had been admitted to the Flinders Medical Centre. The Tribunal has subsequently been provided with Flinders Medical Centre records relating to that admission. He had been admitted to the Margaret Tobin Centre, being a psychiatric ward of the hospital. Mr Xie forwarded an email transmission to my Chambers on 10 April 2025 seeking a number of orders.[2] That application was dismissed as being without merit. I became concerned as to whether Mr Xie has the mental capacity to adequately represent himself in these proceedings. I explained in Xie[3] the basis of that concern.
5. In accordance with the direction made by me on 6 June 2025, the Registrar of the Tribunal sought the view of the Ministerial Advisory Committee as to an appropriate medical expert to constitute the IMA. The Ministerial Advisory Committee nominated Dr Khalid who accepted the referral. The parties were notified of the arrangements made for Mr Xie to be assessed by Dr Khalid and the parties were provided with the Referral to an Independent Medical Adviser form completed by the Tribunal. They were afforded an opportunity to advance submissions. The Corporation submitted an additional question to the five questions initially raised by the Tribunal to be asked. That was approved. No objection was raised by either party to the text of the final document. Dr Khalid was requested to answer the following questions:
   1. Is Mr Xie currently suffering from any psychiatric condition and, if so, what is your diagnosis?
   2. Does Mr Xie have the mental capacity to understand the nature of the litigation in the South Australian Employment Tribunal, its purpose, its possible outcomes, and its risks?
   3. Is Mr Xie mentally capable of making rational decisions about the pursuit of the litigation?
   4. Is Mr Xie mentally capable of conducting the litigation without external assistance?
   5. Is there any requirement, medically, within your field of specialty, for there to be any restriction in the times set aside per day for the conduct of a trial hearing? In this regard, trial hearings ordinarily commence at 10am for a possible morning break for approximately 10 minutes at about 11:30am, a continuation until a luncheon break at 1pm, and a resumption at 2:15pm with the days' hearing ordinarily concluded by 4:30pm.
   6. You will see from the Flinders Medical Centre records that Mr Xie expressed both suicidal and homicidal ideation. This was apparently directed both at the Tribunal and those involved in the court process. Bearing in mind your opinion as to question five above, do you think the resumption of the trial may reignite that ideation in such a way that it may pose a risk of harm to himself or others?
6. It is not in dispute that Mr Xie attended the rooms of Dr Khalid at the set time on 19 September 2025. It is also accepted by Mr Xie that he sought to impose conditions in the manner in which the examination was to take place. Upon attending the rooms of MLCOA, where Dr Khalid was to examine him, Mr Xie spoke with some staff and then the acting General Manager of MLCOA South Australia, Ms Catherine Herrmann. I have had regard to all of the statements made by Mr Xie, Ms Herrmann, and Dr Khalid as to what transpired. The documents received have been considered as evidence solely for the purpose of determining the issues to which these reasons relate. The documents are not received in evidence, at this stage, for the trial. There are aspects of agreement between Mr Xie, Ms Herrmann and Dr Khalid as to what transpired, and there are some differences in statements made by Mr Xie in comparison to statements made by Ms Herrmann. I note that an interpreter was arranged by the Tribunal and attended with Mr Xie. To the extent Mr Xie required the assistance of an interpreter, then one was available. It is unclear as to whether the discussion between Mr Xie and Ms Herrmann was conducted with the assistance of the interpreter or not.
7. I find that Mr Xie initially spoke with more junior staff at MLCOA and the matter was subsequently escalated to Ms Herrmann. Mr Xie reported to the staff of MLCOA, and to Ms Herrmann, complaints about Dr Khalid published on Google and stated he wished to record the examination by Dr Khalid. Mr Xie has provided the Tribunal with a copy of three negative Google reviews. They are relevant, not as to the truth of what is contained in the reviews, but for the purpose of understanding Mr Xie's actions at the time. One of the reviews critical of Dr Khalid, refers to "dismissiveness and unprofessional attitude ..." and a claim that Dr Khalid had pre-determined his opinion in relation to that reviewer's claim for compensation.
8. Mr Xie referred Ms Herrmann to one of the reviews and indicated, in the light of that review, he wished to record the examination to be performed by Dr Khalid. From the evidentiary material before me, it appears Mr Xie was referring at the time to an audio or an audio-visual recording. Ms Herrmann told Mr Xie that in "accordance with MedHealth policy on the electronic recording of an assessment", MLCOA did not permit those that are to be examined recording a psychiatric assessment. Ms Herrmann sought to reassure Mr Xie about Dr Khalid's professionalism and independence. She explained that MLCOA is an organisation that has a number of independent doctors and that, in her view, Dr Khalid is one of the best psychiatrists in the country. Ms Herrmann asked Mr Xie why he would accept, at face value, an online review of a complete stranger rather than her assessment based upon working directly with Dr Khalid.
9. Mr Xie maintained a position that he would not agree to be examined by Dr Khalid unless MLCOA and Dr Khalid agreed to it being recorded. Dr Khalid has provided a letter to the Tribunal dated 15 October 2025. I find that Dr Khalid was present, available and seeking to undertake the examination of Mr Xie at the time set, but not if it were to be recorded.

1. The referral to Dr Khalid was made in accordance with s 121 of the RTW Act. It provides:

(1) The Tribunal or a court may, on its own initiative or an application by a party to proceedings before the Tribunal or court, refer any medical question or questions arising in proceedings before the Tribunal or court to 1 or more independent medical advisers specified by the Tribunal or court for inquiry and report.

(2) In connection with subsection (1) -

(a) the rules of the Tribunal or the court may specify when a medical question must be referred to 1 or more independent medical advisers; and

(b) the selection of an independent medical adviser must be consistent with any principle or process prescribed by the regulations (including any process which determines which independent medical adviser should be used); and

(c) different medical questions may be referred to different independent medical advisers as part of the same proceedings; and

(d) to the extent that a medical question is referred to more than 1 independent medical adviser, any dispute between the independent medical advisers will be resolved in a manner specified or determined by the Tribunal or the court (as the case may be); and

(e) the question or questions to be referred to an independent medical adviser will be framed by the Tribunal or court after inviting submissions from the parties to the proceedings.

1. The powers and procedures on such a referral are set out in s 122, which provides, relevantly:

(1) An independent medical adviser to whom a medical question has been referred under this Division may -

(a) consult with any medical practitioner or other health practitioner who is treating or has treated the worker to whom the proceedings relate (the relevant worker); and

(b) consult with such other persons as the independent medical adviser thinks fit (including another independent medical adviser who has considered or is considering the same or another medical question that relates to the relevant worker); and

(c) call for the production of such information (including medical reports, x-rays and the results of other tests) as the independent medical adviser considers necessary or desirable for the purpose of determining the medical question; and

(d) require the relevant worker to submit himself or herself for examination by the independent medical adviser.

(2) Information (including confidential information) may be disclosed to an independent medical adviser under subsection (1) without the breach of any law or principle of professional ethics.

(3) If a worker refuses to comply with a requirement under subsection (1) or in any way hinders an examination of the worker, the independent medical adviser may refer the matter to the Tribunal or the court (as the case may require).

(4) If the Tribunal or a court, on a referral under subsection (3), considers that a worker has acted unreasonably, the Tribunal or court may, by order -

(a) suspend the worker's rights to recover compensation or damages under this Act with respect to the relevant injury;

(b) suspend the worker's rights to weekly payments,

(c) the worker has complied with any requirements specified by the Tribunal or court; or

(d) the Tribunal or court makes an additional order in relation to the matter.

(5) Any weekly payments that would otherwise be payable during a period of suspension under subsection (4)(b) are forfeited by force of this subsection.

(8) Subject to the operation of the preceding provisions, an independent medical adviser may determine any medical question in such manner as the independent medical adviser thinks fit (including by adopting such processes and procedures as the independent medical adviser thinks fit).

(9) An assessment by an independent medical adviser as to any of the following matters is to be taken to be conclusive evidence with respect to the relevant matter in proceedings before the Tribunal or court (as the case may be) unless the Tribunal or court, in the exercise of its adjudicative function, determines otherwise:

(b) the nature and extent of any hearing loss suffered by a worker.

(10) The Tribunal or court (as the case may be) may, as it thinks fit, accept any other matter contained in a report furnished by an independent medical adviser as conclusive evidence for the purposes of proceedings before the Tribunal or court, or give any such matter such other weight as the Tribunal or court thinks fit.

(11) Without limiting any other circumstance where it is appropriate to give reasons, the Tribunal or a court must -

(a) when it makes a determination under subsection (9) in the exercise of its adjudicative function; or

(b) when it decides not to accept any matter as conclusive evidence under subsection (10),

give reasons for its determination or decision (as the case requires).

...

1. The Corporation submitted that the Tribunal is required to address three matters. The first is whether the documents from the rooms of Dr Khalid, which have included letters from Ms Herrmann and from Dr Khalid, and subsequent email transmissions from MLCOA, either individually or collectively, constitute a "referral from an independent medical adviser to the Tribunal for the purposes of s 122(3) of the RTW Act. The second is, if so, whether the Tribunal considers that the applicant acted unreasonably within the meaning of s 122(4). The third is, if it does so consider, whether it should exercise any of the powers conferred by s 122(4).
2. In relation to the question of referral, the Corporation submitted that the purpose of s 122(3) is to ensure that the Tribunal is reliably informed where a worker has refused to comply with a requirement of s 122(1) or hinders an examination. In evaluating the evidence before the Tribunal, the respondent contended that Ms Herrmann, as the acting general manager South Australia of MLCOA, was the agent of Dr Khalid and should be regarded as having acted, at least, with his implied authority in communicating with the Tribunal on matters arising from the assessment. The Corporation urged a conclusion that Dr Khalid has referred the matter to the Tribunal under s 122(3).
3. The Corporation urged a finding that Mr Xie acted unreasonably within the meaning of s 122(4) in not cooperating with an examination which had been ordered by the Tribunal. The Corporation referred to the judgment of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales in New South Wales v Hollingsworth (Hollingsworth)[4]as authority for Mr Xie seeking to impose a condition of recording an examination, contrary to the order of the Court, being misconceived.
4. The Corporation submitted that the circumstances support a finding that Mr Xie's conduct amounted to a refusal to be examined by Dr Khalid and that he thereby refused to comply with a requirement under s 122(1), as referred to in s 122(3) of the RTW Act. The Corporation referred to the reasons for decision in Xie and submitted that the examination by Dr Khalid is especially important in this case. That is because the absence of an examination and report by Dr Khalid precludes a continuation of the trial and the Tribunal should view the actions of Mr Xie seriously. It submitted that the appropriate order is to suspend Mr Xie's right to recover compensation under the RTW Act and to suspend Mr Xie's rights to weekly payments until such time as he has complied with the order that he be examined by Dr Khalid. The submission is not to be treated as a waiver of the Corporation's position at trial that Mr Xie has not sustained a work injury and does not have an incapacity for work that would entitle him to weekly payments.
5. In relation to the orders and declarations sought by Mr Xie in his email transmission of 24 November 2025, the Corporation noted that the letter of Dr Khalid is not in the nature of a medical report containing expert opinion. In the circumstances, to the extent Mr Xie may be seeking an order or declaration that it is not a valid report on the basis that there was no examination, the application is misconceived.
6. The respondent opposed all of the orders sought by Mr Xie and submitted his application should be refused.

1. Mr Xie submitted that he did not act unreasonably at the rooms of MLCOA. In his written submissions of 28 November 2025 he referred to "a significant number of highly negative public reviews regarding the MLCOA clinic". In his submissions he referred to having requested the assessment be audio, or video, recorded. He submitted that was a reasonable safeguard in circumstances of a mentally focussed evaluation and that he did not refuse to be examined. Rather, he contended he made a lawful request for a transparent assessment which was refused by MLCOA. He submitted his request of a recording was particularly reasonable where he had been compelled to attend by order of the Tribunal for an assessment which could be adverse to him.
2. Mr Xie contended that in the circumstances of no assessment having taken place, no lawful report could have been provided by Dr Khalid.
3. Mr Xie urged the Court to construe s 122(3) strictly by reference to its text so that only the IMA may refer a matter to the Tribunal or a Court and not an officer of MLCOA such as its general manager Ms Herrmann.
4. Mr Xie submitted that there had been a subsequent acknowledgement by MedHealth Governance and Legal that it was unable to comment upon Ms Herrmann's assertion that to allow a recording of the examination to be conducted by Dr Khalid would be contrary to relevant policy. That was not produced to the Tribunal and nor did Ms Herrmann produce the policy she referred to.
5. Mr Xie urged the Tribunal to review the previous order that he submit to an examination by an IMA. He submitted that the medical evidence that he has provided and his demonstrated ability to provide submissions in relation to the issues now to be determined, shows that he is fully capable of representing himself in the current proceedings.
6. Mr Xie expressed concern that the referral to an IMA has resulted in a delay in the trial and contended that he has experienced significant medical deterioration as a result of what he referred to as "prolonged litigation and repeated procedural delays". He opposed any further arrangements for him to be medically examined by an IMA.

1. The scheduled examination with Dr Khalid at the offices of MLCOA was arranged by the Tribunal following the acceptance of referral by Dr Khalid, and directions that required Mr Xie to submit himself for examination by Dr Khalid. There was a requirement for Mr Xie to submit to the examination in accordance with s 122(1)(d) of the RTW Act. The questions raised with Dr Khalid could not be properly addressed without an examination.
2. Mr Xie had an obligation to comply with the requirement to be examined by Dr Khalid. There is nothing in the RTW Act that entitled Mr Xie to impose unilaterally any condition or qualification upon the referral or the conduct of the examination by Dr Khalid. It is not clear when Mr Xie first became aware of an adverse review of either Dr Khalid or MLCOA. It is not clear as to when he first formed the view that he should be entitled to record the examination. There is no evidence nor contention from Mr Xie that he raised, at any time, either prior to the scheduled examination or on the day of the scheduled examination, with the Tribunal, whether the examination should be recorded. On the day of the examination, Mr Xie continued to require consent to record the examination, as a condition of it proceeding, notwithstanding the absence of a direction of the Tribunal that the examination be recorded, and the absence of consent either by MLCOA or by Dr Khalid. I also note Mr Xie's current position is that there should be no examination at all.
3. Sub-section 122(3) is a facilitative provision which provides for an IMA to refer the matter to the Tribunal in circumstances of a refusal to comply with a requirement under s 122(1) or the examination has been hindered. The sub-section is to be construed in the context of ss 122(1) and (4) together with the purpose of s 122. The purpose of s 122 is to recognise the significance of an IMA undertaking an examination and assessment in accordance with a referral of the Tribunal, to require workers to comply with directions and orders relating to the referral, and to empower the Tribunal to make orders under s 122(4) where a worker acts in a manner contrary to a requirement under s 122(1) or in any way hinders an examination. This facilitates the answers to medical questions raised by the Tribunal. In the circumstances, s 122(3) should be construed broadly and I reject the narrow construction advanced by Mr Xie. I accept in part the submission of the Corporation as to the purpose of s 122(3). It is to facilitate the provision of information by the IMA, including relevant staff assisting the IMA, as to what has occurred where the IMA believes a worker has refused to comply with a requirement of the examination or has in any way hindered the examination. Whether the conclusions reached and information provided are reliable, if contested, is for the Tribunal to determine. I find that, in this case, the initial referral letter by Ms Herrmann was as agent for the disclosed principal Dr Khalid. The letters received from Ms Herrmann and Dr Khalid are consistent and support a finding, which I make, that Ms Herrmann was acting with at least the implied authority of Dr Khalid. In any event, I find that the subsequent letter by Dr Khalid dated 15 October 2025 is also a referral of the matter to the Tribunal. It is directed to the Tribunal, confirms that he had accepted the referral, had been available for the examination scheduled for 19 September 2025, that the assessment did not proceed, and sets out his understanding of the relevant circumstances.
4. I would also construe s 122(4) broadly. Whilst the text makes reference to a referral under sub-section (3), it does not state that it is only in circumstances of the IMA referring the matter to the Tribunal that the Tribunal may make the orders set out in s 122(4). It is most unlikely that the legislature intended, in circumstances of the conduct referred to in s 122(3), following orders and directions of the Tribunal and acceptance by the IMA that the examination take place, that the Tribunal could not be able to exercise the powers referred to in s 122(4) or (5) unless the IMA personally and explicitly made a referral. That would not be consistent with the purpose of s 122.
5. Before addressing the authorities referred to by the Corporation, I note they did not concern an examination following a referral by a court of medical question to assist in quelling a dispute between parties, where this Court is required to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.
6. In Hollingsworth, Mr Hollingsworth commenced proceedings in the District Court of New South Wales claiming damages for false imprisonment, assault, and battery. He claimed that the incident had exacerbated a pre-existing post-traumatic stress disorder. The State arranged an assessment of Mr Hollingsworth by Dr Apler, a psychiatrist. Mr Hollingsworth agreed to attend the assessment, but on condition that he be permitted to electronically record the interview. Dr Apler did not consent to the request and he terminated the interview after Mr Hollingsworth refused to stop recording the assessment. The State then arranged for Mr Hollingsworth to be assessed by Dr Brown, a forensic psychiatrist. Dr Brown indicated that she would not permit Mr Hollingsworth to record the examination and gave written reasons for that position. In the District Court an order was made that Mr Hollingsworth be permitted to make a sound recording of the entire assessment session. The order was made following a finding by the Court that Mr Hollingsworth had a right to record the assessment. An appeal to the Court of Appeal was allowed.
7. The Court of Appeal held that the primary judge had erred in the construction of some rules of Court and that the primary judge had made a number of significant errors. Firstly, his Honour had failed to take into account the right of the State to have Mr Hollingsworth examined by a forensic psychiatrist of the State's choice. That right was not subject to the conditions sought to be imposed by Mr Hollingsworth. Secondly, the primary judge had erred in concluding that Mr Hollingsworth had a right to make an audio recording of his assessment by a forensic psychiatrist. Thirdly, the primary judge erred in relying upon a finding that to not allow a recording amounted to unlawful discrimination under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth).
8. Reference was made to that State's Surveillance Devices Act but only in a particular context. It was noted that there was no suggestion that Mr Hollingsworth intended to record the assessment without the consent of the forensic psychiatrist, so it was observed that the Surveillance Devices Act did not have any bearing on the issue of whether Mr Hollingsworth had a right to record such attendance in that case.
9. In Ryan, Malcolm CJ[5] referred to a suggestion that a person who is required to submit to a medical examination as having a common law right to impose conditions upon the examination as "misconceived".[6]
10. Ryan concerned materially different circumstances. Ms Ryan had been examined by an orthopaedic surgeon and her evidence of that experience included a description of the manner in which she was treated was that of "contempt and hostility". She said that she felt that she was being "peered upon" by the surgeon. The insurer for the employer sought to have her re-examined by the same surgeon. The issue was the extent to which it may have been appropriate, in those circumstances, for conditions to have been imposed upon the second examination. Malcolm CJ identified the relevant inquiry as a factual enquiry, in all the circumstances, as to whether any particular condition would be reasonable. His Honour stated generally that where a person agrees to submit to a medical examination subject to a reasonable condition, that cannot constitute a refusal, but if a person agrees to submit to an examination subject to an unreasonable condition, that may constitute a refusal.
11. The courts in South Australia have also consistently approached provisions that allow a defendant or compensating authority to require a party to submit to a medical examination, to import a concept of reasonableness. This has included a requirement that there is a proper reason for the medical examination and that the proposed examination is reasonable in point of time and place. Further, the party to be examined is to be entitled an opportunity to consider whether there is a proper basis through objection to the proposed examination.[7]
12. In addressing the circumstances of this case, the starting point is to observe an IMA must be an accredited impairment assessor and be duly appointed as an IMA by the Minister. Dr Khalid was nominated in this case to be IMA by an independent Ministerial Advisory Committee. This would indicate a satisfaction by the Minister that Dr Khalid will discharge his professional obligations, including his primary duty to the Court, appropriately. Mr Xie was aware of Dr Khalid's accreditation and nomination when he attended for examination by Dr Khalid as he had been informed by the Tribunal. IMAs are required to act in accordance with the Independent Medical Advisers Guidelines 2022 (the IMAG). Following an examination, an IMA is required to provide a medical report to the Tribunal. Paragraph 33 of the IMAG emphasises the independence of the IMA and states:

33. The adviser must prepare a report (or participate in the preparation of a joint report) at the conclusion of his or her consideration of the medical question and provide the Registrar with a completed report within 10 working days of the assessment or such longer period as the Registrar may allow. The report should be impartial and unbiased and should be comprehensible, easy to read, and explain medical terminology.

1. Paragraph 11 of the IMAG addresses the circumstances in which a party may apply to have a matter reallocated to another IMA. The procedure is to apply to the Registrar of the Tribunal for reallocation but the only circumstance for reallocation referred to is where there is a conflict of interest. In such circumstances any application for reallocation is to be made within seven days of receiving notification of the name and contact details of the advisor.
2. Chapter C of the IMAG addresses the examination by the IMA and does not refer to the worker having an option of recording the examination.
3. An important distinguishing feature between the circumstances of this case and the cases of Hollingsworth and Ryan is that Mr Xie was required, because of a referral of medical questions by the Court, to attend the examination with Dr Khalid so that Dr Khalid could answer the questions raised by the Court. It is for the Court to determine whether conditions are to be imposed in relation to the conduct of the examination. Mr Xie was given the opportunity to be heard in relation to the referral to Dr Khalid, the content of the Referral to an Independent Medical Adviser document, the documents to be provided to Dr Khalid, and to raise with the Court any concerns that he may have had in relation to the conduct of the examination. He did not do so prior to the examination. Instead, he declined to be examined by Dr Khalid unless conditions that he sought to unilaterally impose, were accepted by Dr Khalid.
4. In all the circumstances, the condition sought to be imposed by Mr Xie, of recording the examination, was unreasonable. Firstly, as noted, it was a condition sought to be unilaterally imposed in circumstances of an order by the Tribunal that he attend the examination without that condition. Secondly, he was aware that Dr Khalid did not consent to the condition sought to be imposed. Thirdly, the basis of the condition was an apparent acceptance by Mr Xie of the correctness of reviews upon Google which had been strongly critical of Dr Khalid. These are documents which appear to have been downloaded from the internet. The reviews are not only untested, they are unverified. I attach no weight to those reviews as to the past conduct of Dr Khalid. Whatever Mr Xie may have thought the recording of the examination, it did not provide a reasonable basis to impose the condition sought. Especially in the circumstances of this case, Dr Khalid may have had a reasonable concern that a recording of the examination would have involved an erosion of trust in him as a health care provider and may have stifled candid discussions. Even without the factors related to his appointment in this case that I have referred to, Dr Khalid is entitled to the presumption that he will act in accordance with the high ethical standards expected of a Fellow of the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists, that he understands the importance of fair and considerate treatment of those he examines and that he must not mislead the Court by inaccuracies in his report. Fourthly, prima facie where the Court had not imposed a condition of a recording, for Mr Xie to have proceeded to record the examination without the consent of Dr Khalid would have been a contravention of the s 4(1)(b) of the Surveillance Devices Act 2016. It provides an offence for a person to knowingly install, use or cause to be use, or maintain, a listening device to record a private conversation to which they are a party. Whilst the Act provides some exceptions to this general prohibition, Mr Xie has not raised for the consideration of the Court any exemptions as being applicable.
5. There are other sections in the SAET Act which confirm the importance of complying with orders made by the Tribunal.
6. Sub-section 42(1) of the SAET Act provides that if the Tribunal believes that a party to any proceedings is conducting the proceedings in a way that unnecessarily disadvantages another party to the proceedings by conduct such as failing to comply with an order or direction of the Tribunal without reasonable cause or by failing to comply with the SAET Act or a relevant Act, then the Tribunal may, if the party causing the disadvantage is the applicant, order that the proceedings be dismissed or struck out.[8]
7. Section 91 of the SAET Act concerns a person disrupting the proceedings of the Tribunal. It provides:

(1) A person who -

(a) wilfully insults a member or officer of the Tribunal, during a sitting of the Tribunal or in going to or returning from the Tribunal; or

(b) wilfully disturbs or interrupts proceedings of the Tribunal; or

(c) misbehaves in any other way before the Tribunal; or

(d) wilfully disobeys an order or direction of the Tribunal,

(2) If a party to proceedings before the Tribunal -

(a) contravenes or fails to comply with an order in the nature of an interlocutory order or an order to do, or refrain from, a particular act; and

(b) makes no reasonable and adequate excuse to the Tribunal for the contravention or non-compliance, the Tribunal may (without limiting its powers to deal with the matter in any other way) order that the party be not heard, or further heard, in the proceedings, or impose another procedural disability or civil penalty the Tribunal considers appropriate to the circumstances of the case.

(3) Before acting under subsection (2), the Tribunal must give the relevant party an opportunity to be heard on the question.

1. When the RTW Act is considered as a whole, it is evident the legislature intended that where a worker refuses to comply with a requirement under s 122(1) or in any way hinders an examination of the worker under s 122 then, ordinarily, the Tribunal will initially consider a suspension of the worker's rights under s 122(4) and allow the worker a further opportunity to cooperate and to be examined in accordance with the Tribunal's orders and directions. If there is a further refusal to comply with a requirement under s 122(1) or in any way the worker hinders the further scheduled examination, the Tribunal may consider not only an ongoing suspension of entitlements under s 122(4) but also whether an order should be made pursuant to s 42(2)(a) of the SAET Act for the proceedings to be dismissed or struck out or whether the circumstances invoke the operation of s 91 of the SAET Act.
2. In the circumstances giving rise to my finding that Mr Xie sought to impose an unreasonable condition upon the examination to be conducted by Dr Khalid, I also find that Mr Xie refused to comply with the requirement that he submit himself for examination by Dr Khalid. If I am in error about that, then I would find, in any event, that his actions amounted to hindering the examination of him by Dr Khalid under s 122(3) of the RTW Act. The Macquarie Australian Encyclopaedic Dictionary defines "hinder" to include "retard", "to prevent from acting or taking place", and "to be an obstacle or impediment". In my view, each are appropriate descriptions of Mr Xie's conduct.
3. Having found that the criteria in s 122(3) have been proved by the Corporation and having found that there has been a referral to the Tribunal in accordance with s 122(3), the Court is required to exercise the discretion conferred in 122(4) as to whether orders should now be made suspending rights to compensation or suspending rights to weekly payments. Mr Xie did not raise any concerns with the Tribunal relating to the examination either before or on the day of the examination. Mr Xie had the benefit of the Corporation's submissions before he was required to provide his submissions. There has been no indication by Mr Xie of an acceptance of the obligation to act in accordance with orders made by the Tribunal relating to an examination of him by an IMA. Rather, his position has been that "a further IMA would serve no purpose...". He stated that to require him to undergo an assessment by an IMA risked further harm to him. No medical evidence was presented in support of that submission. In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that the discretion should be exercised to order Mr Xie's rights to recover compensation under the RTW Act in relation to his claimed work injury of fluoride toxicity poisoning be suspended and that there should be an order suspending Mr Xie's right to weekly payments until he submits to an examination by an IMA as directed by the Tribunal.
4. Sub-section 112(4) does not expressly state from when the Tribunal may suspend the worker's rights to recover compensation or suspend the worker's rights to weekly payments. Is the suspension operative from the date the worker acted unreasonably, or is it operative from the date the order is made? It is the unreasonable action which gives rise to the exercise of the power and I find the legislative intent is for the Tribunal to be empowered to date the suspension from the time the worker acted unreasonably. It is important to note, however, that the legislature has conferred a discretionary power. The Tribunal may determine that, in the particular circumstances of the case, a suspension from the date of the order would be more appropriate. If, for example, there has been a delay in hearing and determining the matter through default of the Corporation, that would be a relevant consideration. Whether the worker has been in receipt of weekly payments may be a relevant consideration although, s 122 does not expressly provide for a right of recovery in such circumstances.[9] In this case, Mr Xie has not been in receipt of weekly payments so any potential issue of recovery does not arise. In the circumstances of my findings in relation to the conduct of Mr Xie, I am satisfied that it is appropriate for the suspension to commence from the date of the examination.
5. I reject the submissions of Mr Xie relating to his application. For the reasons given, the referral for him to be examined by Dr Khalid as IMA was validly made. I continue to have the concerns expressed in Xie and I continue to be of the view that the questions raised with Dr Khalid need to be answered before there can be a resumption of the trial.
6. The written submissions provided by Mr Xie in relation to the issues addressed in these reasons do not give rise to the finding sought by him that he is "fully capable" of representing himself in the current proceedings. Firstly, his submissions have been in writing. I do not know whether he has had assistance in the preparation of the submissions and, if so, the extent of that assistance. Secondly, there is a material difference between preparing written submissions over time in relation to confined issues and the conduct of a trial in court. In Xie I referred to this.[10]
7. The letter of Dr Khalid dated 15 October 2025, referred to as a "report" by Mr Xie, does not express expert opinion. As indicated earlier in these reasons, I have been prepared to receive and consider evidentiary material for the purpose of determining the issues addressed in these reasons without requiring strict compliance with the rules of evidence. This has been in accordance with s 32(1) and s 32(1a) of the SAET Act. It is for the Court to determine the extent to which the rules of evidence and other formal procedures of a court of record are to apply. As Mr Xie has noted in his submissions, the conduct of the trial has been delayed and the determination of the issues addressed in these reasons expeditiously has assumed some significance. In addition, it has been procedurally fair to both parties to proceed in this manner. In relation to the cause of the delay, I observe that there has been nothing in the actions of the Corporation, associated with the trial, that has given rise to the delay. The delay has primarily arisen from Mr Xie's position as to the conditions he has sought to impose upon evidence to be received from him, conditions sought to be imposed by him, in relation to the conduct in the examination of him by Dr Khalid, and his hospitalisation.
8. There is no merit in the remainder of the submissions advanced by Mr Xie in relation to the orders sought by him and there is no need to address those submissions further.

1. The applicant Mr Yungzhong Xie refused to comply with the requirement to be examined under s 122(1)(d) of the Return to Work Act 2014 when he attended the rooms occupied by Associate Professor Abdul Khalid on 19 September 2025.
2. The applicant Yungzhong Xie hindered the examination of him by Associate Professor Abdul Khalid on 19 September 2025.
3. Associate Professor Abdul Khalid, as independent medical adviser, referred Mr Yungzhong Xie's refusal to comply with a requirement to submit himself for examination by Associate Professor Khalid on 19 September 2025 and referred Mr Yungzhong Xie's hindrance of the examination to be performed on 19 September 2025, to the South Australian Employment Tribunal, in accordance with s 122(3) of the Return to Work Act 2014.

1. There be a suspension of the rights of the applicant Mr Yungzhong Xie to recover compensation under the Return to Work Act 2014 with respect to his claimed work injury referred to as fluoride toxicity poisoning until he has complied with any requirements specified by the Tribunal or the Tribunal makes an additional order in relation to the matter pursuant to s 122(4) of the Return to Work Act 2014.
2. There be a suspension of Mr Yungzhong Xie's right to weekly payments with respect to his claimed work injury referred to as fluoride toxicity poisoning until Mr Yungzhong Xie has complied with any requirements specified by the Tribunal or the Tribunal makes an additional order in relation to the matter in accordance with s 122(4) of the Return to Work Act 2014.
3. The Registrar is to contact the rooms of Associate Professor Khalid to ascertain a date and time for the applicant Yungzhong Xie to be examined, so as to enable Associate Professor Khalid to address the questions set out in the Referral to an Independent Medical Adviser previously sent for the examination that was to take place at 9am on 19 September 2025. In the circumstances of the suspension orders, the Registrar is to seek the earliest availability of Associate Professor Khalid to conduct the examination. Arrangements are then to be communicated to the parties, and the applicant Mr Yungzhong Xie is directed to attend and cooperate with the examination to be conducted and is not to seek to impose any conditions unilaterally.
4. Having considered the submissions of the parties, it is ordered that the examination of Mr Yungzhong Xie by Associate Professor Khalid not be recorded either by audio or audiovisual means.
5. The suspensions set out in Order 1 and 2 above are operative from 19 September 2025 and continue until further order.
6. The parties shall be heard in relation to any application for costs.

[1] [2025] SAET 52.

[2] The orders sought and the difficulties associated with Mr Xie's application are addressed in Xie at [20]-[32].

[3] [33]-[37] and the reasoning in addressing the report of Dr Gareth Kastell dated 28 May 2025 that follows.

[4] [2023] NSWCA 152 at [103]- [110] and the reference therein to Ryan v Regent Enterprises (Ryan) (1991) 3 WAR 552.

[7] In relation to claims for damages see Billett v Nominal Defendant (1996) 66 SASR 500; Wilson v Cetovic (1979) 23 SASR 77; Casley-Smith v the District Council of Stirling (No8) (1989) 151 LSJS 135; Stace v Commonwealth (1988) 48 SASR 492, and on appeal_, Stace v Commonwealth_ [1989] SASC 1509; (1989) 51 SASR 391. In the area of workers compensation see Hill v Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Corporation (1997) 191 LSJS 300; Matusha v Return to Work Corporation of South Australia [2020] SAET 95; Houghton v the State of South Australia in the right of the Department of Human Services (SA) [2023] SAET 61.

[8] The RTW Act is a relevant Act for the purpose of s 42 of the SAET Act.

[9] Cf s 32 of the RTW Act which provides that in the case of the payment of interim benefits, if upon final determination the claimant was not entitled to the interim benefits, the Corporation may recover that amount as a debt in a court of competent jurisdiction.

[10] Xie supra [44] and the reference to Slaveski v State of Victoria and Ors. [2009] VSC 596 and Price v Department for Education [2020] SAET 43.