Wyder & Sackville [2025] FedCFamC2F 1648 (24 November 2025)

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These are contravention proceedings. Mr Wyder and Ms Sackville are the parents of X, who was born in 2019. The proceedings relate to a parenting order made in respect of X and a resulting contravention application.
2. Mr Wyder commenced proceedings in respect of X's care in September 2022. He conceded that he and Ms Sackville had ceased to live together in February 2020, when X was a baby and thereafter he had not spent time with her, in her years of early infancy.
3. In an affidavit filed by him in support of his original application, he conceded that the court would need to proceed carefully and incrementally in respect of introducing him to X. Other aspects of his affidavit were extremely critical of Ms Sackville, whom he asserted was a violent and anti-social person.
4. In her responsive affidavit filed on 13 December 2022, Ms Sackville was equally critical of Mr Wyder, characterising him as a violent person, particularly when he was under the influence of methamphetamine or alcohol.
5. In these circumstances, at an early stage of the proceedings, the case was referred to the Evatt List, the court's case management protocol, which is to be applied to cases which involve allegations of family violence.
6. In addition, in late-2022, an order was made that X be independently represented in these proceedings. For obvious reasons, it is a significant matter for a child to have a legal practitioner[1] appointed on his or her behalf. The statutory obligations of an ICL are set out in section 68LA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).[2] These include a duty to examine all relevant evidence and then advocate to the court the outcome, which the ICL believes, will best serve the interests of the child, whom they represent.
7. As part of the Evatt protocol, the court was supplied with documents created by the Department for Child Protection in respect of the family. These indicated that concerns had been raised about the father's violent behaviour to the Department.
8. In these difficult and challenging circumstances, on 7 February 2023, an order was made that Mr Wyder spend time with X at a children's contact service. It is also to be noted that this order was made in the context of Mr Wyder returning a negative hair follicle test for illicit drugs.
9. Along with the negative hair follicle test, the court had access to a Child Impact Report, which had been prepared by Child Court Expert Ms B in early January 2023. In this report, it was noted that Mr Wyder and his current wife Ms Wyder had been approved to be the kinship carers of Ms Wyder's niece and this necessarily indicated that they had been vetted as suitable carers for young children.
10. Ms B observed X to be a polite, considerate and articulate child. As such, there was nothing from her appearance which militated against her being able to commence to develop a relationship with her father.
11. Ms Sackville reported to Ms B that X had recently been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder at level 2, which caused her behaviour to be up and down and when she had been triggered to kick walls, throw things, scream and hit her mother. She has also been diagnosed with attention deficit disorder.
12. In my view, the family in this case must be described as one which faces many significant challenges, which continue to confront it to the present time and which provide the context in which these contravention proceedings arise. They can be summarised as follows:
    • The parties mistrust one another and communicate poorly;
    • Each has made significant allegations of coercive and controlling behaviour against the other and members of the other's family;
    • It would appear to be the case that there are relevant final intervention orders restricting the parties from coming into contact with one another;
    • This has necessitated the making of banning orders, pursuant to the provisions of section 102NA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth);
    • X is a child, who has significant special needs, which impact upon her behaviour;
    • In these circumstances, the parties have no shared history of parenting X together or in any way consensually.
13. The supervised visits between X and Mr Wyder occurred between late-May 2023 and mid-August of 2023. All visits occurred as scheduled and without any concerning incidents being noted.
14. In these circumstances, in September of 2023 orders were made envisaging X spending time with her father for 2 hours on Friday afternoon and for 4 hours on Sunday, with handover to occur either at a police station or the children's contact service. It would appear to be the case that overnight time began around April of 2024.
15. In this context, on 5 April 2024, the court ordered that a more detailed family report be prepared, no doubt to assist both it and the parties to determine what was the best way forward for X. Each of these steps occurred with the approval of the ICL.
16. In summary, between the instigation of proceedings, by the father, in September of 2023 and the order of the family report, the court proceeded cautiously with the introduction of X to her father, in the context of a case involving significant issues of family violence and a child who was of tender years with significant special needs.

1. The report was prepared by Family Consultant Ms D and released to the parties on 3 October 2024. As far as I know, Ms D has not provided any oral evidence in these proceedings, and her methodology and recommendations have not been subject to any outside scrutiny. However, for obvious reasons, given her expertise and objectivity, her report must be considered an important piece of evidence.
2. Significantly, as with Ms B earlier, Ms D assessed X to be a delightful, happy child, who engaged with her readily. Her observation of the family was in the following terms:

From my observations, [X] enjoyed being with [Mr Wyder], [Ms Wyder] and [Ms Sackville]. [X] seemed to have a warm and close relationship with [Ms Sackville] as well as with [Mr Wyder] and a warm and accepting relationship with [Ms Wyder]. During the observation sessions, there was co-operation between [X], [Mr Wyder] and [Ms Wyder], as well as between [X] and [Ms Sackville]. I note for a brief moment, [X] seemed to feel uncomfortable when [Mr Wyder], [Ms Wyder] walked into the waiting room where [X] and [Ms Sackville] were. This moment passed quickly, as [X] separated from [Ms Sackville] to go with [Mr Wyder] and [Ms Wyder] to their observation session. While this moment passed quickly, it may be that [X] becomes anxious when they are in close proximity, but at this time, I was present which may have provided [X] with some reassurance.[3]

1. In addition, Ms D noted the different circumstances in each of the parties' homes. In the mother's home, X was an only child, who was at the centre of her mother's attention. In comparison, in her father's household, X was the second youngest of 4, and sometimes 5 or 6 children, including a child with special needs.
2. The child with special needs is Ms Wyder's niece C, who is around four years of age. It is apparently the case that she too has been diagnosed with Autism but at level 3. It is an aspect of Mr Wyder's case that he and his wife have demonstrated capacity to parent children with autism.
3. As noted above, Ms D considered that X might become anxious at the prospect of her parents coming into contact with one another. In this context, she noted that the animosity between Mr Wyder and Ms Sackville remained endemic, and it was likely that X herself was caught in the middle of it.
4. In this context, Ms D reported as follows:

The animosity between [Mr Wyder] and [Ms Sackville] has continued on from the separation, which leaves [X] very caught in the middle of this conflict. Young children usually manage to emotionally deal with such conflict by showing loyalty to each parent when with each of them. This created a dilemma for [X] on the day of the interviews when she was suddenly confronted with [Mr Wyder], [Ms Wyder] and [Ms Sackville] all being in close proximity. [X] seemed quickly relieved of these circumstances on being asked to go with [Mr Wyder] and [Ms Wyder] for the observation session. Once [X] was away from [Ms Sackville], she was fine being with [Mr Wyder] and [Ms Wyder]. After [Mr Wyder] and [Ms Wyder] left, [X] was with [Ms Sackville] who she was fine with. [Mr Wyder] and [Ms Sackville] need to be mindful of how their animosity affects [X], that it is not emotionally healthy for [X] to have to deal with being in the middle of their conflict.[4]

1. It was clear to Ms D that the respective proposals of the parties remained far apart with Mr Wyder aspiring to a shared care regime; whilst Ms Sackville favoured weekend time - certainly until X had settled into school and Mr Wyder had engaged more with her therapist and so had a greater understanding of her special needs.
2. Ms D agreed that Mr Wyder needs to be involved with all of [X]'s treating professionals. She was also of the opinion that any increases in the time X spent with her father need to be carefully managed, particularly given her autism.
3. Essentially, she opined that X was not likely to adapt well to change in her routine and needed to be prepared well in advance in this regard. The risk arising being that, if the change was too abrupt it may render her liable to becoming highly anxious and stressed. Issues which were liable to be exacerbated by other changes in her life, such as transitioning to school.
4. Ms D acknowledged the relevant experience of Mr and Mrs Wyder with C but noted there was a level of difference arising between her and X. She wrote as follows:

The difference for [C] and [X] is that [C] does not spend regular time with another parent, whereas [X] does. There are also other differences in the parenting of [C] and [X] given their different levels. At least [Mr Wyder] and [Ms Wyder] are very aware of how to parent a child with Autism.[5]

1. In these circumstances, Ms D advised in favour of a gradual increase in the time X spent with her father to enable her to feel secure and trusting of any necessary change in her routine, whilst her special needs were accommodated.
2. It is perhaps axiomatic, given the nature of the current proceedings, that there has been no diminution of the conflict and mistrust between the parties. As will be detailed in due course the source of that conflict, sadly, is X and the differing perception each party has in respect of how she has responded to spending time with her father.
3. The effect of Ms Sackville's evidence is that she (X) has acted out violently at the prospect of spending time with her father and has refused to go to him. On the other hand, it is Mr Wyder's perception that the child does not display any unusual behaviour when with him and Ms Sackville must be either exaggerating her concerns or is intent, for some reason, on derailing his relationship with X in order to satisfy her ow emotional needs.

1. Ms D's report was released to the parties in October of 2024. Shortly afterwards, the parties (including the ICL) attended a child dispute resolution conference and were able to reach final orders in respect of X's care.
2. In orders made by the court on 28 October 2024, they agreed that they would have equal authority for making long-term decisions concerning X's care; and X would continue to live with her mother.
3. Significantly, in the context of the current proceedings, order ten of the orders envisaged the following:

In the event either party is unable to personally care for [X] for any overnight period that they shall first offer the other party the ability to care for X during that period.

1. Handovers were to take place either at a police station or X's school. For obvious reasons, this order also reflects the endemic conflict between the parties. The orders also envisaged X spending time with her father, in even ending years, from 3.30 pm on Christmas Eve until 3.30 pm on Christmas Day.
2. With respect to the order for the father to begin to spend increasing time with her father, as currently memorialised in the order, does not make sense. It reads as follows:

4. [X] spend time with the father as follows:

(a) Until April 2024 from the conclusion of school on Friday (or 3.00pm if a non-school day) until 3.00pm on Sunday.

(b) Commencing from commencement of Term 2 2025, from the conclusion of school Friday (or 3.00pm if a non-school day), until the commencement of school on Monday (or 9.00am if a non-school day).

1. All concerned seem to have acted on the assumption that order 4(a) should read until April 2025. It does not do so. In any event, from Mr Wyder's perspective, the order soon broke down and on 31 March 2025 he commenced proceedings seeking the urgent delivery up of the child, which, if necessary, would be enforced by police taking possession of X so she could be conveyed to her father. He also sought four periods of make-up time.
2. The application was in the nature of an enforcement proceeding. With due respect, no great thought seems to have gone into the application and what it would achieve, particularly given the issues already identified regarding X's idiosyncratic needs. It was made returnable on 13 May 2025.
3. A short time after these proceedings, Mr Wyder also commenced the relevant contravention proceedings, which are the subject of these reasons for judgment. Clearly, they cover the same subject matter and are collateral to his proceedings seeking orders in respect of X. In my view, it is undesirable that there are parallel proceedings concerning the same child which are case managed differently.
4. Such an approach does not appear to be compatible with the court's overarching purpose, as contained in section 190 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021, which enjoin the court (and the parties in proceedings before it) to ensure the resolution of cases in an efficient and cost-effective manner. Equally significantly, it does not appear to be a child-focussed approach.
5. Pursuant to section 69ZN of the Act, the court is directed to give effect to a number of delineated principles in respect of how proceedings relating to children are to be conducted. The effect of these principles is to ensure that the court's focus always remains on the best interests of the child concerned rather than on the perceived rights of their parents or others.
6. In general terms, these principles, of which there are five in number, can be summarised as follows:
   • The court is to consider the needs of the child concerned and the impact the conduct of the proceedings may have on that child;
   • The court is to actively direct, control and manage proceedings involving children;
   • The court is to conduct proceedings to ensure a child, or children and parties are safeguarded from exposure to family violence;
   • Proceedings are to be conducted in a manner that will promote cooperation and child-focus between the parties concerned; and
   • Proceedings are to be conducted without undue delay, formality and legal technicality.

1. Mr Wyder filed an affidavit in support of his application, ostensibly seeking further final orders in respect of X. He deposed that on 1 November 2024, which was a Friday, he had attended X's school but she had been upset and did not want to leave with him. The school authorities had called Ms Sackville and it was agreed that a further exchange would be attempted the next day at a police station. This apparently proceeded successfully.
2. Time apparently occurred successfully on the following weekend from 16 November onwards. However, the father is critical that the mother had travelled to Country E, for a holiday, and had not informed him of this vacation, which contravened her obligation to inform him so that he could care for X in her absence.
3. It is the father's position that thereafter the mother did not make X available to spend time with him and she did not spend time with him on the weekend of 29 November 2024; 13 December 2024; and on Christmas Eve of 2024.
4. Ms Sackville had not formally responded to Mr Wyder's application, when it was listed before the court on 13 May 2025. She had however been able to instruct her solicitor to appear on her behalf. In this context, each party made significant concessions in respect of the ongoing viability of the orders of 28 October 2024 remaining viable, at least on an interim basis.
5. The parties agreed that the provision within the Act (section 65DAAA(3)) which prevents the variation of a final parenting order should not apply to them. The essentially underpinning of such an accommodation being a recognition that the existing order was not working.
6. In these circumstances, the parties agreed that X would begin spending time with her father, in gradually increasing periods of time, beginning with daytime only, from 19 May 2025 onwards. The case was adjourned until 3 July and Ms Sackville was ordered to file answering documents.
7. In her response, filed on 2 July 2025, Ms Sackville sought, on a final basis, that the orders of 28 October 2024 continue. On an interim basis, she proposed an alternate weekend regime of time spending, in six-week blocks, commencing from after school on Friday to 3.00pm the following Saturday; extended to 9.00am the following Sunday; then from after school until 3.00pm on Sunday.
8. In conjunction with these orders, she proposed that if X expressed any distress, at handover, particularly in response to the increase in time, that the parties should discuss alternate arrangements with a view to ensuring [X] spends as much time with the father as possible whilst making allowances for her disability.
9. In my view, ostensibly at least, this was a conciliatory response and from Ms Sackville's perspective, recognised what she described as the difficulties she had encountered in encouraging X to spend time with her father and as being appropriate given her special needs.
10. In support of her application, Ms Sackville deposed that X had been struggling to spend overnight time with her father. She conceded that she had had a holiday in Country E, and this had caused X to freak out because she was worried at the prospect that she might have to spend an extended period of time, in her father's care.
11. It is further Ms Sackville's evidence that X weighs approximately 42 kilograms and she herself is unable to physically put the child in her car if she refuses. In addition, she has deposed that X kicks, punches and screams at her, if she (X) perceives that she is being forced to do something, which she does not want to do.
12. Ms Sackville provided photographs of damaged walls, which she claimed X had caused by punching them. In this context, she reported that X's occupational therapist had recommended behavioural support be provided to X.
13. Ms Sackville further deposed to being happy with the final orders overall and expressed a hope that the parties could return to them provided [X] did not feel she was not being pushed into something she does not want_._ From her perspective overnight time was, at times, problematic and seemed to coincide with increases in aggressive behaviour from X.
14. Ms Sackville provided a copy of a report from X's occupational therapist, Ms F. Ms F is employed by G Organisation and her services are funded by the NDIS. In the report, X was described as displaying aggressive behaviours, which were attributed to dysregulation, anxiety and emotional responses to various stresses she was experiencing.
15. Under the heading Home Environment, Ms F wrote as follows:

Throughout 2024, [X] had fortnightly visitation to her dad's house on the weekends, from Friday afternoon to Sunday afternoon, where she spent time with her half siblings and her dad and step-mum going to the movies, or sports games and playing at home. [X]'s visitations ceased in November 2024, after [Ms Sackville] reported that [X] was demonstrating aggressive and extreme emotional behaviours when she tried to get [X] to get in the car to go to her dad's house, such as crying, screaming and hitting and verbalising that she didn't want to go. [X] was also observed to demonstrate these behaviours after coming home from her dad's house and there was a noticeable difference in [X]'s day to day mood and participation.

In May 2025, a new order was put in place where [X] now visits her dad and his family once a week, on alternating Saturday's and Sunday's. This change took place at the time of assessment, and there has been a noticeable change in [X]'s behaviours and mood when she returns home from her dad's house including verbal and physical aggression towards her mum and crying and screaming and having extreme difficulty with emotional regulation and coping with day-to-day life. It has been observed that this change to [X]'s routine and environment around her has been very difficult for [X] to cope with, and she requires intensive support from formal providers to be able to process these changes and develop appropriate coping strategies and form positive relationships with her loved ones.[6]

1. Through the NDIS, X receives support from an occupational therapist; and autism inclusion practitioner; a psychologist; a social worker; and has received support from a positive behaviour support practitioner.
2. The matter returned to court on 3 July 2025. On this occasion, the relevant Judicial Registrar noted as follows:
   1. Both parties seek the continuation of Final Orders made by this Honourable Court on 28 October 2024, however seek on an interim basis the resumption of time-spending of the child with the Applicant Father in a graduated matter. The speed with which the time-spending gradually increases such that the time is then in accordance with the previous Final Parenting Orders is not agreed today.
3. On 22 August 2025, Ms Sackville deposed that X had been recently assessed by a paediatrician, who confirmed her diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder and ADHD. The paediatrician concerned reported that X was obese and presented with significant behavioural challenges.
4. These were described as including aggressive outbursts¸ hitting family members, throwing objects, damaging walls and displaying erratic behaviour. The paediatrician prescribed medication. Ms Sackville also provided details of X's NDIS funding, which amounted to approximately $42,000.00 for the current financial year.
5. However, Ms Sackville also deposed that throughout July and August of 2025 X had been spending regular periods of time with her father. There had been some difficulties, from her perspective, which included Ms Wyder allegedly filming X when she was talking to her mother, which Ms Sackville reported made the child feel uncomfortable. In addition, on 19 July, X had asked to come home early and on 9 August she had declined to go to handover because she had been unwell.
6. Accordingly, at least on the face on the documents filed, the parties were in agreement that the consent order of October 2024 should remain in force in respect of X's care. In this context, a graduated approach had been inaugurated to return to the regime created by the October 2024 order. However, at the same time, it would appear to me that there was a deep evidentiary rift between them, which can be summarised as follows:
   • On the one hand, it was the mother's evidence that she experienced extraordinary difficulties in encouraging and supporting X to spend time with her father, but she herself recognised the important of X spending time with him.
   • On the other hand, Mr Wyder himself had seen no such evidence of X's difficulties and believed any problems in respect of adherence with them were solely attributable to Ms Sackville.
7. In this context, Ms Sackville was interested in exploring mechanisms to support X being able to spend time with her father, without experiencing any emotional outbursts. These mechanisms were focussed on including Mr Wyder in her various therapies so he could be part of implementing any strategies recommended by her occupational therapist and psychologist.
8. Given his stance in the proceedings and his mistrust of Ms Sackville, it is my impression that Mr Wyder remained resolutely opposed to such an approach. However, given the apparent consensus about the application of the final order and the apparent success in compliance with the interim arrangements put in place following the re-instigation of the proceedings by Mr Wyder, when the proceedings came before Judge McGinn on 28 August 2025, with the apparent consent of each of the parties, the initiating application and its response were dismissed.
9. On 28 August 2025, Mr Wyder's solicitor wrote the court informing it that Mr Wyder was no longer in receipt of legal aid and was unable to fund any on-going proceedings privately. In these circumstances, he sought to engage the mandatory provisions of section 102NA of the Act.
10. The contravention application, filed on 3 April 2025, which had case managed on a different pathway, remained on foot and was ultimately listed for final hearing on 7 November 2025. From my perspective, it seemed questionable what the proceedings could achieve and how they could be helpful to X herself. Certainly, it appears doubtful that they would result in any lessening of tensions between the parties, which tension, as Ms D has noted, is not helpful to X maintaining a sense of emotional equilibrium.

1. The contravention application contains three counts, each of which pre-dates the more recent regime of orders directed towards restoring Mr Wyder's time with X and returning to the time arrangements envisaged in the orders of 28 October 2024. The contraventions are as follows:
   • On 29 November 2024 (a Saturday) the mother failed to allow X to spend time with the father, at Suburb H Police Station.
   • On 13 December 2024 (a Friday) the mother failed to allow X to spend time with the father, at Suburb H Police Station.
   • At 3.30pm on Christmas Eve the mother failed to allow X to spend time with the father, at Suburb H Police Station.
2. Each of these matters was formally put to Ms Sackville, who admitted breaching the orders but asserted that she had a reasonable excuse for so doing. It is agreed between the parties that X did not spend time with the father after 24 December 2024 until the matter returned to court in May of 2025.
3. It is the mother's position that [X] flat-out refused to attend handovers until 18 May 2025.[7] In broad terms, this is the basis of her reasonable excuse and relates to X's special needs, which lead to her having at times an inflexibility and rigidity both in thought and attitude in respect of issues of importance to her, which leads her to act out in a volatile fashion, if she perceives that she is being forced to do something to which she is opposed.
4. Underpinning Ms Sackville's position is the fact that X suffers from obesity and she (the mother) is incapable of physically compelling X to either get in a motor vehicle or leave it. By necessary implication, it is her case that she must rely on persuading and supporting X to engage with her father, which is not always easy for her to do.
5. It is common ground between the parties that each of them has a final intervention order against them, which were apparently granted by the Suburb H Magistrates Court, pursuant to the provisions of the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA). It is as a consequence of these orders, that each party is formally banned from cross-examining the other directly and any such cross-examination must be conducted by a legal practitioner pursuant to the provisions of section 102NA of the Act.
6. In order to ameliorate the possibly harsh consequence of the application of the section and prevent any possible miscarriages of justice, which may conceivably arise if evidence is not properly tested, the Commonwealth Government has instigated a scheme known as the Commonwealth Family Violence and Cross-Examination of Parties Scheme, which funds legal representation of any party subject to a ban on cross-examination.
7. Each of the parties, in these proceedings, is funded pursuant to this scheme, as a consequence of their mutual final intervention orders. The relevant explanatory memorandum to the legislation indicates that its purpose is to protect victims of family violence form the trauma of being cross-examined personally by [their] perpetrators and avoid potentially victim re-traumatisation.
8. In the context of the current proceedings and in the light of the consensual dismissal of the substantive parenting proceedings the application of the scheme to the current proceedings seems to me to be somewhat counter intuitive. Certainly, the prolongation of litigation between the parties, in the face of the apparent agreement, does not seem to be conducive to them working together to resolve any future difficulties which may arise in respect of X.

1. The law relating to contravention proceedings was subject to significant amendment, which came into effect on 6 May 2024. Accordingly, given the dates relevant to these proceedings the amended provisions of Division 13A of the Act are to be applied.
2. Section 70NAB contains an extended list of objectives, which the court is to apply to any contravention proceedings relating to an order relating to a child. They can be summarised as follows:
   • Supporting compliance with such orders;
   • Resolving difficulties which have arisen in respect of such orders by changing them to iron out problems which have subsequently arisen and rectify analogous situations;
   • Deterring non-compliance;
   • Upholding the authority of the court by taking appropriate steps to ensure compliance with orders made by it;
   • Imposing sanctions when contraventions are established without reasonable excuse.
3. It would appear axiomatic that these objects have been designed by the legislature to ensure the court adopts a balanced approach to all manner of contraventions to ensure that an idiosyncratic approach is adopted, which balances the need for rectification of orders when called for with more condign interventions in appropriate cases.
4. Prior to the amendment, the purpose of contravention proceedings was to ensure continued and future compliance with parenting orders of the court rather than issues relating strictly to deterrence and punishment per se.
5. Section 70NAC provides an exhaustive definition of what constitutes a contravention of a child-related order. It stipulates that an individual is taken to have contravened a child related order if he or she has intentionally failed to comply with it outright or made no objectively reasonable attempt to comply with it. Interestingly, in the amended section 70NAC the legislature has set out a table in which examples of such failure are set out.
6. In respect of an order which stipulates a regime for a child to spend time with a parent, such a contravention is made out if a person bound by the relevant order hinders or prevents the relevant individual spending time with the child in accordance with the order.
7. The expression hinders is one which is well-known to the criminal law, particularly in respect of the charge of hindering police. In broad terms, it means that the person so charged has committed some concrete act which has interfered with or stopped a police officer or officers from discharging their legal duties.
8. Relevant dictionary definitions of the word include the prevention; impeding; or delay; of some action or behaviour in the sense of limiting the ability of someone or something to do something. The expression prevents is also a transitive verb and means to stop from happening.
9. As a consequence of section 65DA, the court is required to attach to each parenting order it makes details of the obligations created by each such order it makes. The court also has an obligation to provide information about relevant programs to assist parents comply with their obligations. The relevant information is as follows:

You must do everything a parenting order says. In doing so, you cannot be merely passive but must take positive action and this positive obligation includes taking all reasonable steps to ensure that the order is put into effect. You must also positively encourage your children to comply with the orders. For example where the order states your children are to spend time with another party, you must not only ensure that the children are available but must also positively encourage them to go and do so. There are agencies in the community that can help you and your family adjust to and comply with the order

1. In Stevenson v Hughes[8] a case which arose in the context of the previous contravention regime, Fogarty J in the Full Court approved the following passage, which details the obligation incumbent on a parent who is bound by a parenting order:

I have already made reference to the implied obligation of the custodian to take reasonable steps to ensure that the access stipulated in an order takes place. Words and actions have meaning in context and affect. It is not a sufficient discharge of custodian's obligations, express or implied, to point to words and actions and to say, in effect: You see I tried. But the child does not want to go, and thereafter to figuratively fold their arms as if that were an end of the matter. Theirs is an active role with an obligation to positively encourage access. It is not a discharge of their duty to set up access to fail. That is to say, it is not sufficient to make a token effort at compliance by the utterance of a few phrases which, in the main, are designed to impart to the child not positive encouragement to go on access, but to convey the burden on both the child and the custodian of compliance with the obligation.

1. Accordingly, it is clear that a primary carer must actively encourage a child to spend time with the other parent. This is a positive duty and entails, in appropriated circumstances a parent using their authority to direct a child to attend with a parent. It is not discharged, if the parent concerned, presents the child with an election.
2. However, at the same time, it is clear that the court must also examine the reality of the situation facing both parent and child.[9] Clearly, in the present time, the court must be aware of X's idiosyncratic circumstances and individual and special needs. In addition, as will be discussed in due course, each party approaches X's position in a highly subjective manner.
3. The mechanics of what constitutes a reasonable excuse for contravening a child-related order are set out in section 70NAD. Any parenting order is a child-related order for the purposes of the Division. There can be no controversy that the order of October 2024, relating to X is such an order.
4. A person has such a reasonable excuse if he or she has a lack of understanding of what the obligations imposed by the relevant order entailed or a reasonable belief that the act of contravention was necessary to protect the health or safety of a relevant person or child and was not longer than was necessary to do so.
5. Significantly, section 70NAD(4) provides that there is no limit to what circumstances constitute a reasonable excuse. Accordingly, there is no exhaustive list, provided by the legislation, as to what constitutes a reasonable excuse. Each case must be assessed according to its individual circumstances.
6. Pursuant to section 70NADA the person asserting a reasonable excuse bears the evidentiary onus of establishing it. Pursuant to sections 70NAE the standard applicable is proof on the balance of probabilities.
7. Accordingly, in the present matter, the burden is on Ms Sackville to establish that she has a reasonable excuse for not making X available to spend time with Mr Wyder on each of the dates specified in the contravention - 29 November; 13 December; and 24 December 2024.
8. As will be seen, it is Mr Wyder's position that the only means by which Ms Sackville is likely to follow court orders in future, in respect of X, is if there is a finding that she has either intentionally failed to comply with the applicable parenting order in respect of X spending time with her father or made no reasonable attempt to comply with it. He approaches the case largely from the perspective of enforcement.
9. On the other hand, Ms Sackville seems to want to approach the case from a problem-solving perspective. Essentially how can the difficulties surrounding X spending time with her father be resolved or at least ameliorated in a way which is focussed on X's best interests and which reflects her special needs.
10. Necessarily, each approach is posited on how each perceives X's special needs to be and how the other has responded to them. The father's case is underpinned by his view that the mother has exaggerated the difficulties confronting her and X and could do more to either support X spending time with him or, if necessary, direct her to go with him. Instead she has utilised the problems in order to undermine his relationship with X for some rationale related to her own emotional needs.
11. The mother's case is based on her assertion that she has done the best she could, in the face of the child's staunch opposition to spending time with her father, on the dates in question. The difficulties thereafter being compounded by the failure of the parties, including Mr Wyder, to meet and broker some way forward focussed on supporting X.

1. As noted above, the relevant standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. In addition, I bear in mind section 140(2) of the Evidence Act, which indicates that in applying this standard of proof, I am entitled to consider the nature of the subject-matter of the proceedings and the gravity of the matters alleged.
2. Accordingly, the strength of the evidence necessary to establish a fact or facts, to this standard, may vary according to the nature of what is sought to be proved. [10] It is a significant thing to find that a parent has made no reasonable attempt to comply with a parenting order, particularly, in my view, when the child concerned, as here, has significant special needs which are likely to have the potential to be influential in how the child herself responds to the relevant order.
3. I found this to be a confronting and somewhat dispiriting case. The only parties who gave evidence were the parties themselves. There is no current expert evidence. No ICL who has recently interviewed X. No teacher from X's school or any independent observer of what has occurred at handover or the like. Finally, Ms F, X's occupational therapist did not give any evidence in addition to that contained in her report.
4. Individually, both the father and the mother seemed to me to be truthful individuals, who were each attempting to provide a truthful account of the origins and causes of the problems which currently exists. Necessarily each was involved in presenting a subjective view of these matters, which inevitably must be affected by their deep and long-standing antipathy for one another.
5. The essential difficulty, in evidentiary terms, being the lack of objective evidence, independent of each of the parties, regarding X's behaviour and feelings, on the days she did not spend with her father, and what were the operative factors at play in this regard.
6. Was it the mother's malign influence alone? Was it X's attitude alone? Was it factors relating to the child's perception of her father? If so, what was affecting the child's perceptions in this regard? Was it a combination of these factors? If so, which were the more significant factors in quantitative terms. What are the implications of X's ASD and ADHD in all of this?
7. Essentially, is it possible to attribute fault, in proceedings which have a quasi-criminal flavour - in the sense that charges are put by one party to the other and formally responded to and, at least in theoretical terms, penalties can be imposed - given this complex dynamic.
8. Certainly, in my view, given the complexity and multifactorial nature of these issues, it is difficult, if not impossible, to resolve them through a process of assessment of credit alone - essentially deciding one parent is more believable than the other.
9. It also seems to me to be simplistic to approach it on the basis of one good parent and one bad parent and, if each of the parents can be divided by this dichotomy, the problem presented by the case will be solved and the required result axiomatically apparent.
10. However, there can be doubt, from the medical and therapeutic evidence provided by Ms Sackville that X does have a significant level of special needs, which, on balance must have implications for how easily she can interact with her father and the degree to which Ms Sackville can engage her parental authority and direct the child to attend with her father. I also accept that the engagement of such parental authority, on Ms Sackville's part, has the potential to have implications for both her and X's health and safety.
11. In cross-examination by Ms Harris, Ms Sackville's counsel, Mr Wyder agreed that Ms Sackville was a good mother, who would act in X's best interests as she saw them. He also agreed with the proposition that there had been difficulties in him being able to persuade X to leave with him at her school on 1 November and these had presented in the mother's absence. In this context, the father conceded that there would be no utility forcing X to come with him.
12. It is in this context the inherent tension, which the case presents, emerges. On the one hand, Mr Wyder accepts that, on occasions X, for whatever reason, may not want to spend time with him; on the other hand, he does not always accept that this is a decision she has made of her own volition and without influence from her mother. Overlaying this dynamic is the question of the degree of authority which a parent should wield over a child with the level of X's special needs.
13. The cross-examination was in the following terms:

Ms Harris: You couldn't force X to come with you?

Mr Wyder; I would never force X to come with me, and I never have, and I never will.

Ms Harris: And so do you accept that you're now asking the mother by forcing her to get X when she says that's behaviour she has seen?

Mr Wyder: Okay, that's fine.

Ms Harris: And so you're wanting to force her?

Mr Wyder: No, I'm not wanting to force her.

Ms Harris: What do you want, then?

Mr Wyder: Just to make the attempt. So if she rocks up to the cop shop for the handover and X says to me in person - X says it to me saying, "I would not like to come," that is fine. But when the attempt is not made in general, that's what's frustrating.

Ms Harris: So to break that down firstly, you're telling the court you want your six-year-old child, who has severe autism, to look you in the eye and say, "I don't want to spend time with you." Is that what you want her to do?

Mr Wyder: That's not how I mean it. But if she would like to come there and say, "I wouldn't like to come today," I - I would be, "Okay. If you don't, that's okay."

Ms Harris: That's what you want. You need it from her mouth to you?

Mr Wyder: I would prefer it to be from her mouth, yes.

Ms Harris: At six years of age, you want her to tell you that?

Mr Wyder: Yes.

Ms Harris: And even though you accept that X may be exhibiting behaviours where she's kicking, she's screaming, she's crying, you want the mother to force her into a motor vehicle to go to the police station to tell you to your face. That's what you want the mother to do?

Mr Wyder: Put it like that? No.

Ms Harris: What do you want, then?

Mr Wyder: To be able to see our daughter.

Ms Harris: You accept that it's difficult for the mother to get her to handover, that it's traumatising, not only for X, but for the mother. Do you accept that?

Mr Wyder: Yes, I do.

1. I accept unequivocally that this last statement is a plea for help on Mr Wyder's behalf. Undoubtedly, Mr Wyder has been frustrated at the interruption of his time with X. At this juncture, he sees the best approach to advancing matters is through the court exercising its authority, at his direction, over Ms Sackville.
2. In my view, the striking thing about this approach is that he has already achieved a resumption of time spending with X, with Ms Sackville's acquiescence, through the earlier proceedings resolved in May. He has only been able to continue these contravention proceedings through the agency of section 102NA funding.
3. Necessarily, it would seem to me that these highly adversarial proceedings, centred on each of the parties being highly critical of one another have the potential to have unforeseen consequences for X herself, particularly the likelihood that she will pick-up on any exacerbation in the level of tension between her parents.
4. In this context, in my view, Mr Wyder also seemed to accept that X had been emotionally distraught, in the past, in the context of spending time with him. In cross-examination, he conceded that X had struggled during the two weekends which preceded 29 November. As will be seen this period coincided with controversies arising between the parties regarding Ms Sackville going on holiday to Country E and was wanting to know what was Mr Wyder's recently changed address.
5. He also accepted that, in the period prior to November, on at least one occasion, Ms Sackville had suggested trying again the next day, which had been successful. This is supportive of the mother's contention that X was struggling with the longer periods of time. It is also significant that she had apparently been unwilling to come with him in the absence of her mother, at her school.
6. It was hoped that handovers, for X, would be easier at her school. Mr Wyder, under cross-examination accepted that this had not proved to be the case. In her evidence, Ms Sackville deposed that X had refused to go to school on the days she was due to go into her father's care.
7. I suspect Mr Wyder believes that it was unacceptable that school attendance should become negotiable for X but, be that as it may, Mr Wyder also indicated that, after speaking with staff at her school, he accepted that the mother was doing her best to get the child to go to school and her teachers had also told X that no-one would force her to go with her father.
8. In all these circumstances, I accept that the situation so far as X spending time with her father, in accordance with the relevant regime, which had increased the time to a longer weekend, was increasingly become fraught with difficulty for X herself; her teachers; and indeed for Mr Wyder, who did not want to traumatise the child but acknowledges that she was distressed from time to time.
9. Accordingly, in my view, it cannot be the effect of Mr Wyder's evidence that he believes Ms Sackville to have been wholly obstructive to the process of him spending time with X. Indeed, this is not consistent with the stance taken by her in the earlier proceedings or indeed in the recently completed reinvigorated parenting proceedings and the orders made in them from May of 2025 onwards.
10. Rather, a significant element of his case is that around November of 2024 he did not believe that Ms Sackville was doing enough to foster his relationship with X, and he did not necessarily believe her when she said X did not want to see him. Axiomatically, he does not trust her so far as the prospective application of the orders arising from the recently concluded proceedings.
11. It remains his preference to assess X's mood for himself at handover and in essence hear it from X's own lips if she does not want to come. This attitude seems to stem from the mistrust which has long existed between him and the mother. Necessarily, it is Ms Sackville's position that this lacks child focus and potentially raises the risk of X being upset, which she could not countenance.
12. This mistrust, which has been recognised in both Ms B's child impact report and the more recent family report of Ms D is clearly a factor in the current bitterly contested proceedings, funded under the auspices of section 102NA, which as I have noted is directed toward protecting the victims of family violence from being retraumatised.
13. In this context, I raised with Mr Wyder my concern that the current contravention proceedings were unlikely to have a positive effect on improving the state of affairs between him and Ms Sackville and asked him directly what he thought they could achieve. In this context, he conceded the following:
    • He and Ms Sackville strongly disliked one another;
    • X had significant behavioural issues;
    • Ms Sackville was X's primary carer;
    • Ms Sackville was a good mum and it was a tough job parenting X;
    • X had, on occasions, been reluctant to spend time with him;
    • X, in Mr Wyder's phraseology most definitely picked up on the tension between him and Ms Sackville and did not like them;
    • The current proceeding were unlikely to lessen the tensions between the parties.
14. In essential terms and to his credit, Mr Wyder conceded that the parties' co-parenting relationship was problematic and given X's age this was going to be a problem for a significant period of time. In this context, he had no solutions for this problem other than the court should, in effect, act coercively towards the mother.
15. Bearing in mind the objects of Division 13, which include an obligation on the court to consider potential mechanisms to resolve difficulties relating to parenting orders, at the conclusion of the father's case, I offered the parties the opportunity to take part in a further urgent child impact report.
16. In so doing, I was also mindful of the recently agreed position to return to the earlier time spending regime after a graduated process of reintroduction after the hiatus between November and May. I hope, naively perhaps, that such an intervention might assist them to focus on X, particularly on exploring mechanisms to deal with the root cause of the problems between them. Ms Sackville was open to this intervention. Mr Wyder was not. The case continued and Ms Sackville was cross-examined.
17. In order to found the adverse inference on which Mr Wyder relies - that Ms Sackville has not been sufficiently proactive in supporting X's relationship with him - it will be necessary for me to find that Ms Sackville has not been truthful in what she reported to Ms F about X's behaviour in her home.
18. Although Mr Wyder's evidence that he has never observed X to act out in his home in this way and she has never requested to go home early to him may be true, it does not follow that Ms Sackville's evidence about the child's volatile behaviour in her home is not also true.
19. Mr Wyder himself cannot know what happens in Ms Sackville's home in this respect and the two parents themselves have no capacity whatsoever to exchange any notes in respect or their respective experience of X and so discuss any joint strategies to deal with it. The only source of information for each parent of what happens in the other household, so far as X is concerned, is X herself. For obvious reasons, it may not be prudent for either parent to regard her as an unimpeachable source of information.
20. Mr Wyder presented as aggrieved at what he perceived to have been the mother's intransigence in the latter part of 2024, which he attributed to her being caught out about her holiday in Country E; her annoyance that he had refused to inform her of his new address on moving on the basis of concerns about his personal safety. These being the factors that had led to X not being made available to spend time with him out of spite.
21. The father apparently learnt of the mother's holiday to Country E from X, which he later confirmed in a conversation with X's OT. Axiomatically the issue was badly handled from both parties' perspectives. In my view the reason for this is readily apparent - the parties historically mistrust one another and communicate, at best, in stilted and passively aggressive manner.
22. From the mother's perspective, the prospect of X being required to spend an extended period of time with her father, when she was already showing signs of emotional distress was untenable. On the other hand, the father felt it was his prerogative to have the time at least offered to him.
23. In cross-examination, Ms Sackville conceded that she had not personally told Mr Wyder about the holiday. When asked why she had not done so she said: because I knew that he would enforce, and the orders say for her to stay; however we knew that wouldn't work. In this context, it was put to her that Mr Wyder had not attempted to force the child in the previous period and by implication would not do so.
24. This may be so but it does not preclude me from concluding that the parties had little capacity to work through this difficult issue in a productive and child focussed way. Clearly X herself knew of her mother's holiday and this was causing her some anxiety particularly in the context of her spending time with her father for an extended period. I accept that this would have been a difficult issue for X to have assimilated. Necessarily, it fell to Ms Sackville to deal with it.
25. This issue unfortunately coincided with Mr Wyder moving house and Ms Sackville's desire to know what it was given that she anticipated that X would be staying there. I have been provided with the convoluted text messages, passing between the parties, regarding the issue.[11] To my mind they neatly encapsulate the implicit difficulties in the parties' relationship.
26. On the one hand, Ms Sackville requests the new address. Mr Wyder declines to provide it because Ms Sackville did not know his old one because of the intervention order. She replies that she had always known the old address because it was listed on the IVO. A fact which Mr Wyder denies.
27. The passive vitriol between the parties continues. Mr Wyder invoking the relevant child order pursuant to which he is to have [X] overnight if you are unable to do so. Ms Sackville responds that Mr Wyder does not have [X]'s best interests at heart.
28. I found Ms Sackville to be a credible and truthful witness. More significantly, I found her to be child-focussed in her approach to this litigation. In my assessment she is neither disingenuous nor manipulative. In this context, I accept the thrust of her evidence that she wishes X to have a relationship with her father and spend time with him but subject to the proviso that it is emotionally safe for X to do so, given her special needs.
29. Necessarily, this is the crux of the matter. The parties are likely to have different views about the issue of safety - Ms Sackville being of the view that she is the best placed to make the judgment in this regard; Mr Wyder being resentful at his perception that he is dictated to by her. This is the root cause of the current controversy.
30. The evidence indicates that Ms Sackville has and continues to engage with X's therapists to support and encourage her to want to spent time with her father. This is done through charts and visual aids and prompts, including photographs of Mr Wyder, particularly a book, entitled The Sweet Life of [X][12] which features X and her father engaged in positive activities together.
31. The last contravention deals with Christmas. Clearly, an emotionally charged time for both children and their parents, connected as it with gift giving. Children, more often than not, are excited by the prospect of receiving a present. In this context, Mr Tredrea, counsel for Mr Wyder vigorously cross-examined Ms Sackville about what she said to X about Christmas in her father's household.
32. Ms Sackville confirmed that she knew of her obligation under the order and that Mr Wyder would like to see X and she spoke to X to this effect. Where she was criticised was in not explicitly telling X that she would get a present or presents from her father. To which Ms Sackville replied that she did not do the gift thing and further:

I don't tell her anything about gifts or anything because how would I know what they have and what they don't have? And if she was to walk in and didn't have anything, then obviously I'm not going to do that. So no, I never do gift or bribing, things like that. But I do always tell her, "You have had fun at Dad's, and you will have fun at Dad's. And if you do want to come home at any point, I'm sure Dad will bring you home".

1. The implication being that Ms Sackville would have obviously achieved success, in her encouragement of the child, if she had advanced the prospect of a present and it is self-apparently disingenuous and manipulative, on her part, that she did not do so and therefore she is not a person of credit. Ms Sackville refuted this suggestion and deposed that she encouraged X in other ways, maintaining her ground that she did not specifically know whether or not a present would be forthcoming for X.
2. I am not prepared to draw the inference sought. Ms Sackville was best placed to determine what was likely to be the optimal strategy at the time. In my view, it must be a matter of conjecture of whether the introduction of the concept of a present would have made any difference and to what degree.
3. I find that X was extremely resistant to spending time with her father from November onwards. Given her propensity to act out in violent and unpredictable way, which presented risks for both Ms Sackville and X herself and given the child's weight, these were not issues which could be resolved by Ms Sackville taking a firm stance with X or directing her to go to father, still less forcibly delivering her to him.
4. In my view, such an approach is clearly incongruent with the evidence provided by Ms Sackville. In these circumstances, I find that Ms Sackville had a reasonable excuse, relating to X's health and safety for not providing her to the father on 29 November; 14 December and 24 December.
5. However, the next issue was whether the period during which she withheld the child was withheld from her father was excessive given the issues raised by Ms Sackville and what occurred when Mr Wyder took the matter back to court in his parenting orders application, which resulted in X engaging with her father to some degree from May onwards.
6. The effect of Ms Sackville's evidence was that the sole focus of X's engagement with her occupational therapist from November 2024 onwards was on getting [X] back to her Dad's house. She agreed that Mr Wyder has not been a part of this process describing it as a catch 22 in the sense that to involve him might have constituted a disincentive for X to be involved.
7. Ms F most recently assessed X in March of 2025 and issued her report in early June. Accordingly, it straddles the period during which it proved possible for Ms Sackville to engage X sufficiently to facilitate her return to spending some time with her father in the following May.
8. It is Mr Wyder's position that the only rational inference, which can be drawn from this state of affairs, is that it was the court proceedings, initiated by him, which secured this outcome and axiomatically it had nothing to do with the efforts of Ms Sackville herself.
9. Again, Ms Sackville was cross-examined along these lines. The implication sought to be drawn being that she could have brought about X's re-engagement with her father sooner and therefore the currency of whatever excuse was available to her had outlived whatever level of reasonableness (which is not conceded) it originally held.
10. In the context of time resuming, Ms Sackville conceded that the relevant handover had occurred at the police station, and she had not used X's book as an aid to encourage the child to attend. Rather, Ms Sackville had invoked a character for X, whom she referred to as her (Ms Sackville's) big teacher. In this context, Ms Sackville deposed as follows:

So what I did that time to ... get [X] there is I told her I had to go and see a big teacher because with [X] starting school, has started to listen to the teachers. So I explained to [X] that Hey, I had to go and see my big teacher today, and my big teacher said we have at least try, [X], or else I'm going to be in trouble with my teacher.

1. The big teacher is the court. The omission from this mild untruth being that it was the father who had invoked the big teacher, a concept which may not well have been open to endorsement by X, if it been explained to her in such a way. Accordingly, in my view, Ms Sackville deserves some credit for the intervention.
2. In this context the implication that Ms Sackville could have utilised a similar amorphous authority figure at an earlier stage (without I presume direct reference to him), to, in effect, direct X to attend on her father loses some of its moment. Essentially, Ms Sackville, it does not appear to me to be an inescapable conclusion that she could have tried harder, to comply with the order, including using this tactic, at an earlier stage.
3. I accept that the tactic does seem to have been successful. In my view that is to Ms Sackville's credit and is consistent with her evidence that she wishes the child to spend time with her father. However, the success of the intervention cannot, in my view, lead to the automatic inference that Ms Sackville was not utilising more conventional (and some might assert more child-focussed) interventions to get the child to spend time with the father, at earlier stages, before having to resort to this subterfuge and so should be open to sanction for this failure.
4. Certainly, the evidence available to me does not support any finding that Mr Wyder himself did anything of a proactive nature or made any practical suggestion - either to any of X's therapist or to Ms Sackville - as to how to bring about a change of heart for her. Whilst accepting that the mother is not making up her evidence about her acting out violently towards her, it is the underpinning of his case that he has no level of responsibility to engage with Ms Sackville to support X. Essentially, each parent sees the other as the problem.
5. In these circumstances, having accepted that X was refused to engage with her father, I am not in a position to determine, if and when, the currency of that reasonable excuse came to an end. Rather, I accept that Ms Sackville was engaged with Ms F and others to get X to engage with her father through a therapeutic approach, which had not yielded results until the added pressure of the court proceedings was applied.
6. When Mr Wyder did seek to engage with her, albeit through court process, Ms Sackville responded in a positive fashion. This may not have occurred as quickly as he would have wanted but he did not himself make any overture to her at an earlier stage. It is also noteworthy, I think, that the parties were able to agree, at this stage, on an approach to enable Mr Wyder to begin spending time again with X. Essentially, they met halfway in a manner which was focused on X.
7. However, in this contravention proceeding, he takes an entirely different stance in that he approaches the case on the basis that the problem it represents is solely of Ms Sackville's making and only she can solve it. No such middle way is possible.
8. This remains his stance at the present time. He declined the opportunity to take part in a child impact report, which is likely to have been directed towards resolving the problems relating to the implementation of the order concerning him spending time with X.
9. In this context, in my view, it is necessary to say something about the utility of the proceedings themselves and the manner in which they have been funded. In the parenting proceedings, funded through general legal aid funding, in a difficult matter, regarding a child with challenging special needs, the parties reached a compromise.
10. In these proceedings, funded by mechanisms directed towards protecting individuals who have been subject to coercive and controlling behaviour being potentially re-subjected to such abuse by court process, no such compromise was reached.
11. Rather, after having agreed on a way forward in the earlier proceedings, the current ones are being used, in a retrospective sense as a spur to ensure future compliance. These seems to me to have a flavour of both disingenuity and abuse of process which the court should not condone.
12. In all these circumstances, I find that the mother has made out a reasonable excuse for her failure to comply with the relevant court order. For all these reasons the contravention application should be dismissed and no order for costs or make-up time made.
13. For all these reasons the orders of the court will be as set out at the commencement of these reasons for judgment.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and sixty-two (162) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Brown.

[1] Hereinafter referred to as "the ICL".

[2] Hereinafter referred to as "the Act".

[3] See Family Report dated 3 October 2024 at [36].

[6] See Annexure MSS-2 to the Affidavit of Ms Sackville filed 2 July 2025.

[7] See mother's affidavit filed 18 September 2025 at [32].

[8] Stevenson v Hughes [1993] FamCA 14; (1993) 16 Fam LR 443 at 450.

[9] See O'Brien v O'Brien [1992] FamCA 52; (1993) FLC 92-396 at 80,043.

[10] See Hadgkiss v Sunland Constructions Pty Ltd & Ors [2007] FCA 346; (2007) 158 FCR 193 at 195 [11].