The respondent contended that access to the document would constitute unreasonable disclosure of information concerning the personal affairs of the caller. The respondent submitted that the views of the caller could not be ascertained and that there was no control on further dissemination if access was provided. The respondent contended that the applicant's stated motivation was not relevant to the reasonableness of the disclosure, and providing access would deter future triple zero calls.

The applicant submitted that access should be granted to the document on the basis that its information was similar to information found in another document to which the applicant already had access, and the fact that the document may be able to be obtained by a Court order was not relevant in determining whether it was exempt under the Act.

Held, setting aside the decision of the agency and determining that, with the exception of any identifying details of the caller, the document was not an exempt document for the purposes of s 20 of the FOI Act:

• Triple zero calls do not inherently impart information that involve the personal affairs of the caller. It will always be necessary to consider whether the information involves the caller's personal affairs in the circumstances of the particular case. In this case, the information related to securing police attendance at a location and was not information about the caller.
• Identifying information does not constitute 'personal affairs' as a class. It is the circumstances in which those details are imparted which informs whether that character can be ascribed to them. In this case, the divulged identifying information during the call did constitute personal affairs.
• Although there was no expectation of confidentiality in the context of the call with regard to the identifying information, disclosure was unreasonable in the circumstances. The likely effect on the caller was the relevant focus in this case, in circumstances where it was not beyond contemplation that the caller could seek to be contacted by the applicant.

Administrative review - Freedom of Information Act 1991 - Person aggrieved by a determination of an agency - Whether a document is an exempt document - Whether document affecting personal affairs

Freedom of Information Act 1991 ss 3, 3A, 4, 12, 20, 26, 40

South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 ss 34, 35, 37

Attorney-General (SA) v Seven Network (Operations) Ltd (2019) 132 SASR 469

Bradshaw v SA Police [2012] SADC 184

Camilleri v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2013] NSWADT 80

Commissioner of Police v District Court of New South Wales (1993) 31 NSWLR 606

Glascott v Victoria Police [2014] VCAT 615

Hall v SA Police [2019] SADC 5

JJK v Police [2023] (2023) 143 SASR 303

King v Department of State Development [2020] SACAT 7

Re Chandra and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1984] AATA 437

Victoria Police v Marke [2008] VSCA 218; (2008) 23 VR 223

Young v Wicks [1986] FCA 169; (1986) 13 FCR 85

Made under the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 s 37(1)(c)(i)

1. This is an application made under s 34 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 ('SACAT Act') for review of a decision made on 15 April 2024.
2. The applicant in this matter, Mr Woreta, seeks access pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act 1991 ('FOI Act') to a document held by South Australia Police ('the agency').
3. The document contains information that concerns an incident in which Mr Woreta was involved on the evening of 26 October 2022. There was an altercation between Mr Woreta and a person or persons at the Curry Lover restaurant at Croyden Park. The restaurant owner, Mr Anand Singh, told police that Mr Woreta tried to rob the restaurant whilst wielding a baseball bat, and that Mr Singh tackled him and held him on the ground until police arrived. When police arrived there was a baseball bat at the scene, some money on the floor, and two witnesses (customers) who had entered the restaurant while these events were unfolding.[1]
4. Mr Woreta was incoherent when police arrived and they arrested him and took him to hospital. It emerged from tests and examinations that Mr Woreta had sustained head injuries, and these appear to be having a prolonged, if not permanent, effect upon his memory and intellectual capacity. Mr Woreta has no, or a limited, recollection of what occurred on 26 October 2022. Through his solicitors, Mr Woreta is gathering information about what occurred on that evening with a view to his solicitors advising him in relation to any legal claim that he might have.
5. Initially, a large set of documents was requested from the agency, and there have been various decisions made by the agency as to whether the documents were liable to be released under the FOI Act, in whole or in part, to Mr Woreta.[2] The applicant has now received most of the documents that he requested. Some of the documents have been released with redactions.
6. It was necessary, in the interlocutory stages of proceedings, for me to conduct a telephone hearing in private with the respondent's solicitor to address a procedural issue. It is not necessary for the purposes of this decision to set out the procedural background, or the documents to which the agency has given Mr Woreta access, in any detail. As the matter now stands, there is only one document in dispute. The Tribunal has been asked to determine whether the agency's redaction of that document is the correct or preferable decision, or whether Mr Woreta should be given the whole of the document.

1. The document that is in dispute is the audio recording of a telephone call to 000 on 26 October 2022. There is no dispute that an audio recording comes within the broad definition of 'document' for the purposes of the FOI Act.[3] The document is referred to by the parties as document 142, and I will use that identifier in this decision.
2. Document 142 is comprised of the audio of:

b. the emergency call centre operator's utterances; and

1. On 15 April 2024, document 142 was released to Mr Woreta in a redacted form.[4] The redaction relates to the caller's utterances. That is, the redacted version that has been given to the applicant contains the emergency call centre operator's utterances and the background sounds that overlay those utterances. The recording is about three minutes long.
2. Mr Woreta seeks access to the whole of the document. In the alternative, he submits that he should be provided with the whole of the audio with only the caller's identifying details redacted.

1. The applicant's review was brought under s 40 of the FOI Act and s 34 of the SACAT Act. Section 34 of the SACAT Act describes the review jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
2. An applicant has a legally enforceable right to be given access to an agency's documents in accordance with s 12 of the FOI Act. However, an agency is not required to release to an applicant a document that is an exempt document.[5] The agency is required to make a determination as to whether the applicant will be given access to a document. If dissatisfied with the determination by the agency, the applicant may seek an internal review by the agency's principal officer.
3. If still dissatisfied, the applicant may seek an external review by the Tribunal.[6] The review is conducted pursuant to s 34 of the SACAT Act, which requires the Tribunal to conduct a rehearing of the decision of the decisionmaker. The Tribunal must reach the correct or preferable decision and in so doing must have regard to, and give appropriate weight to, the original decision.[7] The Tribunal examines the material that was before the original decision-maker and receives any further evidence that the Tribunal decides to admit.[8] On review, the Tribunal may affirm, vary or set aside the decision being reviewed.[9] If the decision is set aside, the Tribunal may substitute its own decision in its place or send the matter back to the decision-maker for reconsideration.[10]
4. The practical effect of this is that the Tribunal's task, in this case, is to make a determination as to whether document 142 is a wholly exempt document or not.
5. On review, the agency must assist the Tribunal to conduct a merits review in accordance with the terms of s 35 of the SACAT Act. Under the FOI Act, the agency bears the burden of justifying its decision, both in the making of its original decision and on review.[11] Accordingly, whilst it is not of much consequence as to the order by which the parties' cases are advanced, it is appropriate to set out the agency's position first.

1. In accordance with the requirements of s 35 of the SACAT Act and Part 9 of the SACAT Rules 2014, the agency filed two books of documents with the Tribunal. Volume 1 was the comprehensive set of documents that the agency relied on to reach its decision including the unredacted documents to which the application relates. It has not been disclosed to the applicant. Volume 2 replicates Volume 1 but did not include documents over which exemption has been asserted. Volume 2 was disclosed to the applicant.
2. For the purposes of making a determination in relation to the disputed document, I have referred to
   1. Volume 1 and Volume 2 of the s 35 book of documents;
   2. Affidavit of Luke Severinus Feijen affirmed on 27 February 2025, filed on behalf of the applicant;
   3. Affidavit of Christian Stuart Ainley affirmed 1 August 2024, filed on behalf of the agency;
   4. Audio recordings of the redacted and unredacted versions of document 142; and
   5. The parties' written submissions.[12]
3. The parties agreed that I could proceed to determine the application without a further hearing.

1. The agency contended that disclosure of the redacted parts of the document would entail an unreasonable disclosure of information concerning the personal affairs of the caller to 000.
2. The agency submitted that all of the caller's utterances during the call, including but not limited to the caller's statements that identify him, constitute the caller's personal affairs. The agency referred the Tribunal to various interstate tribunal decisions that have found 000 calls to constitute the caller's personal affairs and have described those affairs as extending beyond the caller's identity, to their emotional state and the information that they convey.
3. The agency further contended that it would be unreasonable to disclose the information as the views of the person to whom the material related were not able to be obtained. The affidavit of Christian Stuart Ainley dated 1 August 2024 discloses that the agency made its decision without the views of the caller. It says that the agency attempted to contact the caller without success.[13]
4. The agency maintained that to disclose the contents of the call, particularly without the caller's consent, may reduce the likelihood of people calling 000, knowing that their calls could be released to those involved in a reported incident, and that this would be detrimental to police's ability to investigate offences.
5. The agency also maintained that it would be unreasonable to disclose the document as the disclosure would not be subject to any controls on its further use or dissemination. The agency contended that if the applicant requires the document for legal proceedings, then the document can be obtained in full in a court process that would limit the use of the document to the court process.
6. The agency submitted that the applicant's stated motivation, which is to furnish him with information about a possible legal claim, is not directly relevant to the reasonableness or otherwise of the disclosure, which is directed at the effect on the caller.
7. The agency conceded that the person who provided the witness statement, that is document 46, which was given to Mr Woreta in a redacted form that did not reveal the deponent's identity, is the same person who made the telephone call in document 142.[14] The agency says that the two documents are "of an entirely different character",[15] and that the deponent has not, by virtue of their agreement to attend court, consented to the disclosure "to the whole world" of document 142.[16]

1. The submissions made on behalf of Mr Woreta are necessarily made without access to the information that the Tribunal has been given. The applicant made submissions generally about the law with respect to freedom of information, and about the facts, to the extent that he was able, based on the other documents he received.
2. Document 46 is a witness statement by one of the people who arrived at the restaurant when Mr Woreta was already being restrained on the ground. Mr Woreta has been granted access to this witness statement with the deponent's identity redacted. The witness states, amongst other things, that the witness was a customer of the restaurant who arrived during the altercation between Mr Woreta and the restaurant owner, and that the witness contacted police immediately. Mr Woreta's submissions in pursuit of document 142 proceeded on the basis that it is reasonable for him to assume that the caller in document 142 may be the same person that gave a statement to police contained in document 46. That person stated in their affidavit that they would be willing to attend court if required in relation to the matter.
3. The applicant submitted that if the information in document 142 concerns the same matter that is addressed in one of the documents that has been partly released (a matter which has since been confirmed by the respondent), then document 142 too should be released.
4. The applicant also submitted that he has a special interest in the document, and that it is evident from the FOI Act that the fact that the document may be able to be obtained by Court order is not relevant in determining whether it is an exempt document or not.

1. The FOI Act contains objects and principles of administration as follows:[17]

3 - Objects > > (1) The objects of this Act are, consistently with the principle of the Executive Government's responsibility to Parliament -

(a) to promote openness in government and accountability of Ministers of the Crown and other government agencies and thereby to enhance respect for the law and further the good government of the State; and

(b) to facilitate more effective participation by members of the public in the processes involved in the making and administration of laws and policies.

(2) The means by which it is intended to achieve these objects are as follows:

(a) ensuring that information concerning the operations of government (including, in particular, information concerning the rules and practices followed by government in its dealings with members of the public) is readily available to members of the public and to Members of Parliament; and

(b) conferring on each member of the public and on Members of Parliament a legally enforceable right to be given access to documents held by government, subject only to such restrictions as are consistent with the public interest (including maintenance of the effective conduct of public affairs through the free and frank expression of opinions) and the preservation of personal privacy; and

(c) enabling each member of the public to apply for the amendment of such government records concerning his or her personal affairs as are incomplete, incorrect, out-of-date or misleading.

(3) Nothing in this Act is intended to prevent or discourage the publication of information, the giving of access to documents or the amendment of records otherwise than under this Act if it is proper and reasonable to do so or if it is permitted or required by or under any other Act or law.

3A - Principles of administration

(1) It is the intention of the Parliament -

(a) that this Act should be interpreted and applied so as to further the objects of this Act; and

(b) that a person or body exercising an administrative discretion conferred by this Act exercise the discretion, as far as possible, in a way that favours the disclosure of information of a kind that can be disclosed without infringing the right to privacy of individuals.

(2) Agencies are to give effect to this Act in a way that -

(a) assists members of the public and Members of Parliament to exercise rights given by this Act; and

(b) ensures that applications under this Act are dealt with promptly and efficiently.

1. The exemptions that may apply to a document are set out in Schedule 1 of the FOI Act. Under s 20(4), an agency must not refuse to provide access to a document with the exempt material redacted if it is practicable to do so and if the appears to the agency that the applicant would wish to be given access to the document in that way. The effect of this is that a document may be released in whole or with parts redacted.
2. The basis of the agency's refusal to give access to the whole of document 142 is sub-clause 6(1) of Schedule 1. It is useful to set out the whole of clause 6 for context, and because it contains a qualifying clause in sub-cl 6(3):[18]

6 - Documents affecting personal affairs > > (1) A document is an exempt document if it contains matter the disclosure of which would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information concerning the personal affairs of any person (living or dead). > > (2) A document is an exempt document if it contains allegations or suggestions of criminal or other improper conduct on the part of a person (living or dead) the truth of which has not been established by judicial process and the disclosure of which would be unreasonable. > > (3) A document is not an exempt document by virtue of subclause (1) or (2) merely because it contains information concerning the person by or on whose behalf an application for access to the document is made. > > (3a) A document is an exempt document if it contains matter -

(a) consisting of information concerning a person who is presently under the age of 18 years or suffering from mental illness, impairment or infirmity or concerning such a person's family or circumstances, or information of any kind furnished by a person who was under that age or suffering from mental illness, impairment or infirmity when the information was furnished; and

(b) the disclosure of which would be unreasonable having regard to the need to protect that person's welfare.

1. The expression "personal affairs" is defined in the interpretation section of the FOI Act to "include [a] person's financial affairs, criminal records, marital or other personal relationships, employment records, personal qualities or attributes".[19]
2. Relevant to an application for a document that concerns personal affairs, s 26 of the FOI Act requires an agency to take reasonable steps to consult with the person whose affairs are dealt with in the document. Section 26 provides:[20]

26 - Documents affecting personal affairs > > (1) This section applies to a document that contains information concerning the personal affairs of any person (whether living or dead). > > (2) An agency must not give access under this Act to a document to which this section applies (except to the person concerned) unless the agency has taken such steps as are reasonably practicable to obtain the views of the person concerned as to whether or not the document is an exempt document by virtue of clause 6 of Schedule 1. > > (3) If - > > (a) -

(i) an agency determines, after having sought the views of the person concerned, that access to a document to which this section applies is to be given; and

(ii) the views of the person concerned are that the document is an exempt document by virtue of clause 6 of Schedule 1; or

(b) after having taken reasonable steps to obtain the views of the person concerned -

(i) the agency is unable to obtain the views of the person; and

(ii) the agency determines that access to the document should be given,

the agency must -

(c) forthwith give written notice to the person concerned -

(i) that the agency has determined that access to the document is to be given; and

(ii) of the rights of review conferred by this Act in relation to the determination; and

(iii) of the procedures to be followed for the purpose of exercising those rights; and

(d) defer giving access to the document until after the expiration of the period within which an application for a review under this Act may be made or, if such an application is made, until after the application has been finally disposed of.

(4) If -

(a) an application is made to an agency for access to a document to which this section applies; and

(b) the document contains information of a medical or psychiatric nature concerning the applicant; and

(c) the agency is of the opinion that disclosure of the information to the applicant may have an adverse effect on the physical or mental health, or the emotional state, of the applicant; and

(d) the agency decides that access to the document is to be given,

it is sufficient compliance with this Act if access to the document is given to a registered medical practitioner nominated by the applicant.

(5) A reference in this section to the person concerned is, in the case of a deceased person, a reference to the personal representative of that person or, if there is no personal representative, the closest relative of that person of or above the age of 18 years.

1. The FOI Act establishes a regime that requires consideration of often competing interests regarding the disclosure of documents. The objects do not establish that a preference is to be given to any interest over another. In Attorney-General (SA) v Seven Network (Operations) Ltd,[21] the Full Court of South Australia said:[22]

In our view, where legislation contains express restrictions, as does the Act, and those restrictions are acknowledged as the means by which the objects are to be achieved, in the recognition that there are competing public interests, it would be wrong to interpret the legislation as though its operation was based upon securing a single purpose. > > (Footnotes omitted)

2. However, before the consideration of those interests can be taken, it is necessary to determine whether the information in the document under consideration attracts the exemption that has been relied upon. It can only be open to find the document exempt if the information within it concerns the caller's personal affairs. It has not been suggested that the call concerns the personal affairs of the call-centre operator, the applicant, or any other person.

Does the document contain information that concerns the caller's personal affairs? If so, is it the whole of the call or only that which identifies the caller?

1. The definition of "personal affairs" in the FOI Act is the starting point and, as set out earlier, specifies various categories of information about a person that will be considered to concern the person's personal affairs. However, the definition is not exhaustive, and various courts and tribunals have treated a wider range of information about a person as coming within the term. In Young v Wicks,[23] a Judge of the Federal Court was required to consider the meaning of the term under the Commonwealth Freedom of Information Act 1982 which, unlike the South Australian FOI Act, did not contain a definition of the term. In finding that the requested documents did not come within the definition, Beaumont J said:[24]

... The reference to "personal affairs" of a person was, I think, intended to have its ordinary dictionary meaning, that is to say, to refer to matters of private concern to an individual. ...

2. The documents in that matter were found instead to relate to the administration by the Department of the Air Navigation Act 1920 and the Air Navigation Regulations 1947. Even though the applicant was the subject of the documentation, the Court found that the documents were concerned exclusively with the public regulation of air navigation and that therefore the documents had a public, rather than a private, character.[25]

000 calls generally - whether 'personal affairs'

1. For reasons that will be elaborated upon below, the account given by the caller in document 142 (considered separately from the caller's identity) does not, in the circumstances of this case, involve the personal affairs of the caller. It is therefore not necessary to consider whether the disclosure would be unreasonable.
2. The agency referred to a number of decisions from interstate tribunals that have dealt specifically with calls to 000. Even where not binding, comity invites consideration being given to the reasoning undertaken, with due caution where the interstate provision is worded differently or there are differently-worded overarching principles of interpretation.
3. In Camilleri v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force,[26] the New South Wales Administrative Decisions Tribunal was required to determine whether to give the applicant the transcript, or access to a recording, of a 000 call made by his neighbour to police in the context of a long-standing and increasingly violent dispute between them. The applicant sought the recording because he believed it would assist him to establish that the call, upon which he believed police relied when deciding to later charge him with an offence, contained false statements by his neighbour about the applicant's presence at the neighbour's house.
4. In that case, the application was brought under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 ('GIPA Act') which replaced the Freedom of Information Act 1989 in New South Wales. It required the decision-maker to take quite a different approach to that which this Tribunal is required to take under the South Australian legislation. For example, the overriding object of the Tribunal under the GIPA Act is to determine whether the public interest favours disclosure or not.[27] The South Australian FOI Act has no such overriding criterion.
5. The evidence given in that case was that the calls taken in the Police Communications Centre were not ordinarily accessible by police officers or anyone else and were not released other than by court order.[28] The Administrative Decisions Tribunal considered a raft of arguments presented by police against release of the recording to the applicant, separate from whether the call concerned the personal affairs of the caller. The agency's approach was to oppose release based on an exemption directed at the predicted consequences of disclosure for the agency's operations. The Administrative Decisions Tribunal balanced the agency's arguments with the applicant's interest in having access to the content of the 000 call, and concluded that the release of the 000 call "could be reasonably expected to prejudice the supply to the Police of confidential information that facilitates the effective exercise of the Police's functions and prejudice the effective exercise of the Police's functions".[29] It therefore found the document to be exempt. Only after reaching that conclusion did the Tribunal proceed to further find that the disclosure of the information could reasonably be expected to reveal the personal information of individuals. The Tribunal found that the disclosure of the information could "be reasonably expected to expose a person or persons to a risk of harm or of serious harassment or intimidation".[30]
6. I do not consider that this case provides a useful comparator to the task at hand. The issue of whether and how the information was "personal" was not developed, and there is no test of unreasonableness associated with the personal affairs exemption that was under consideration, because that assessment was absorbed by the overriding principle of determining whether the public interest lay.
7. In the case before this Tribunal, the agency did not seek to claim an exemption relating to the effect on its operations of release of the information, although such an exemption is contained in Schedule 1 of the FOI Act as sub-clause 16(1)(iv).
8. In Glascott v Victoria Police,[31] a senior member of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal ("VCAT") considered an application by a prisoner for access to the audio recording of a witness' call to 000. The call was part of the prosecution case against the applicant that led to his conviction for murder. The agency maintained that the recording of the call was exempt on two grounds, one of which was the equivalent provision in the Victorian legislation to, and in the same substantive terms as,[32] sub-clause 6(1) in Schedule 1 of the South Australian FOI Act. VCAT found the recording to be exempt on both grounds. In relation to the unreasonable disclosure of personal affairs of the caller, VCAT found that the call contained "information that identifie[d] the [w]itness, her address or location and other issues", which constituted the caller's personal affairs.[33]
9. In Commissioner of Police v District Court of New South Wales,[34] the New South Wales Court of Appeal was concerned with a provision in the former Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW) which was in identical terms to sub-clause 6(1) of Schedule 1 of the FOI Act (SA). It concerned an application for access to a document that contained the names of police officers who had supplied information about the applicant to the Queensland Criminal Justice Commission. The documents had been given but the officers' names were redacted. The redaction of the officers' names was overturned by the District Court, and the decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal. It was agreed by each of the Judges of the Court of Appeal that the names were personal, but a name does not necessary entail disclosure of personal affairs.[35] Mahoney JA said:[36]

A person's name would not, I think, ordinarily be, as such, part of his personal affairs. It is that by which, not merely privately but generally, he is known. In some circumstances, it may be personal in the sense of private but that has not been shown to the case here. > > ... > > The fact that a person is a public servant involved in a particular transaction or on duty at a particular time may, in some circumstances, 'involve' the disclosure of information concerning his personal affairs. Thus, it may involve that he was not at home at a particular time. Whether it will do so will depend upon the circumstances and what is suggested to be 'involved'. ...

10. I accept that the content of a telephone call to 000 may involve the caller's personal affairs. The person may be disclosing information about themselves that has such qualities about it such as to have the private or personal character to attract the application of the exemption. It is not unreasonable to venture that a call to 000 may involve the caller's personal affairs more often than other types of disclosure. It may involve an emergency in which the caller is directly involved. It may involve the provision of very sensitive information, such as in a case in which the caller is being subjected to family violence. It may, just by the opinions expressed or the emotions exhibited, involve the caller's affairs. But not all calls to 000 impart information that involves the personal affairs of the caller. It will always be necessary to consider whether the information involves the caller's personal affairs in the circumstances of the particular case.
11. Having listened to the call and having considered the information imparted, I do not consider that, subject to what is said below, the information that the caller imparted to the emergency call-centre operator involved the caller's personal affairs. It is not possible, without revealing the content, to explain this conclusion in too much detail. However, in the circumstances of this call, I do not think that anything that was imparted by the caller had the qualities that bring the words within the descriptor "personal affairs". The account given by the caller was not about the caller, but a method of securing police attendance at a location for assistance in what the caller thought might be the aftermath of an offence. I do not consider that, subject to what is said below regarding the caller's identity, this account constitutes the caller's personal affairs. It does not meet the threshold test that is required for the next step of unreasonableness of disclosure to be considered.

1. I have approached the consideration of the caller's identity separately. In particular, I have considered whether, in the context of making a 000 call to seek police attendance to take action in relation to a possible offence, a caller's provision of self-identifying information is a matter concerning their personal affairs.
2. Again, a person's identifying information, such as a name or phone number, do not constitute "personal affairs" as a class. The circumstances in which those details are imparted informs whether that character can be ascribed to them. In this case, the caller was asked to confirm a name and part of a phone number to the emergency centre operator. The caller did so. This suggests that the caller may have been transferred from an initial triaging call-centre operator. No evidence was led by the agency about that, or as to whether the caller was given or had the impression of confidentiality as to their identity. It is not unreasonable to assume that the caller believed that the provision of these details would expedite (or at least avoid hindering) the request that the caller was making for urgent police attendance. It is also not unreasonable to observe that for a person to give a third party their name and telephone number is, outside of dealings with emergency services, usually - as a matter of law at least - a matter of choice. In the circumstances of this case, the provision of identifying information involved, in my view, the caller's personal affairs.

Would revealing the identity involve an unreasonable disclosure?

1. For the utterances that contain identifying information, it still needs to be considered whether it would be unreasonable for those personal affairs to be disclosed to the applicant.
2. In Re Chandra and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs,[37] the Administrative Appeals Tribunal stated:[38]

... Whether a disclosure is 'unreasonable' requires, in my view, a consideration of all the circumstances, including the nature of the information that would be disclosed, the circumstances in which the information was obtained, the likelihood of the information being information that the person concerned would not wish to have disclosed without consent, and whether the information has any current relevance. Plainly enough, what s 41 seeks to do is to provide a ground for preventing unreasonable invasion of the privacy of third parties. > > However, consistently with the stated object of the Act (see s.3), it is also necessary in my view to take into consideration the public interest recognised by the Act in the disclosure of information in documentary form in the possession of an agency and to weigh that interest in the balance against the public interest in protecting the personal privacy of a third party whose personal affairs may be unreasonably disclosed by granting access to the document.

3. In Victoria Police v Marke,[39] Pagone AJA said:[40]

A decision-maker is required by the section to predicate about the disclosure of a document that its disclosure would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information relating to the personal affairs of a person. That requires the decision-maker to identify all of the facts and matters relevant to the question to be determined and to make an evaluative judgment based upon them. The use in the section of the word "would" indicates that the decision-maker must have a high degree of confidence about the conclusion: it is not enough for the decision-maker to conclude that disclosure of a document might or could result in the unreasonable disclosure of the personal information in question. The need for that degree of confidence reflects the primary objective of the Act to provide public access "as far as possible".

4. In a separate judgement in the same matter, Maxwell P said that what was required was the making of:[41]

... a judgment, based on a synthesis of the relevant features of the case at hand, about whether the disclosure of the personal information to the applicant would be unreasonable.

5. These decisions have since been applied by the District Court of South Australia,[42] and this Tribunal,[43] in considering the matters to be taken into account when determining whether a disclosure would be unreasonable.
6. In the decision of Glascott considered earlier,[44] VCAT heard evidence from a member of Victoria police that callers made calls to 000 on the basis that they were communicated in confidence.[45] The evidence was that people gave their names and addresses on the basis that they understood that their identity would remain confidential unless it was required during an investigation and/or legal proceedings.[46] Further, the Tribunal received evidence that Mr Glascott had attempted to contact the witness whose call was under consideration on several occasions.[47] The Tribunal heard evidence that the release of the identifying information to the applicant would distress the witness.[48] The requested disclosure of the identifying information was held to amount to an unreasonable disclosure.[49]
7. I am not satisfied that the Glascott circumstances are sufficiently similar to those in this matter to provide much by way of illumination of the issues that arise in the present case. In this case before me, there was no reliance by the agency on an exemption based on the information having been given in confidence. There is no evidence before the Tribunal that assurances of confidentiality are given by police or relied on as a general rule by callers to 000. Certainly, in the circumstances of this case, there is no evidence that the caller gave the information on an understanding of confidentiality, was assured of confidentiality, or had a view one way or the other as to the release of the information to the applicant. Whilst in some cases the circumstances may lend themselves to a finding that it would be unreasonable to disclose a 000 call based on expected confidentiality, inherent confidentiality, or promises of confidentiality, this is not such a case.

Is the applicant's interest in the material relevant to unreasonableness?

1. Mr Woreta submitted that his interest in obtaining the information has a bearing upon whether the Tribunal should find that the disclosure of the information would constitute an unreasonable disclosure. This question was considered by Senior Member Stevens in King v Department of State Development.[50] The Senior Member said at [54]-[55]:[51]

... Marke, Colavoski and Bradshaw v SA Police are examples of cases where the applicant could demonstrate a reason (going beyond other members of the public) as to why he legitimately required the relevant information. Those applicants demonstrated a particular interest which was taken into account in favour of disclosure. However, the absence of such interest does not necessarily suggest that disclosure will be unreasonable. Any member of the public is entitled to seek information under the Act, without disclosing or demonstrating any reason for doing so. As Weinberg JA stated in Marke, > > "There are difficulties associated with distinguishing between, on the one hand, a journalist who seeks information in order to disseminate it as widely as possible and, on the other hand, a private individual who seeks the same information for his or her own purposes. The FOI Act does not, as a general rule, accommodate or support any such distinction. It does not, in the normal course, contemplate that the motives of the person seeking access to a document should be scrutinised and characterised as either worthy or unworthy. These are value judgements, which are likely to be highly subjective, and have no place in a scheme that is designed to ensure the proper accountability of Government." > > (Emphasis added) > > The failure to establish a particular interest in the information is not a factor that, of itself, would suggest that disclosure is unreasonable. As Muscat J stated in Bradshaw: > > "It is accepted that an applicant seeking access to documents held by an agency is not required to demonstrate any particular interest in the document nor disclose what might be done with the document if access is granted. In this way, the FOI Act deliberately does not discriminate against one applicant over another. However, there are a number of authorities which have held that in an appropriate case, a decision-maker is permitted to have regard to the special interest of an applicant in seeking access to documents when considering this aspect of the exemption." > > (Footnotes omitted)

2. These authorities suggest that an applicant's purpose for applying for the documents and the use to which they may be put may be relevant to the issue of reasonableness of disclosure.
3. I accept that Mr Woreta has a genuine interest in the information for a legitimate purpose. That interest is a matter that is one of several factors relevant to the assessment of whether it would be unreasonable to disclose the document to him. It is a factor that weighs in favour of disclosure. Weighing all of the factors relevant to that assessment, however, I reach the conclusion that to disclose the document to the applicant, insofar as it contains the caller's name and phone number, would constitute an unreasonable disclosure of the caller's personal affairs.

Should a disclosure be approached as if it is "to the world"?

1. However, that does not mean that the Tribunal is required to ascertain the use to which the document will or may be put. Nor should the Tribunal assume that the disclosure is uncontrolled.
2. Senior Member Stevens also considered this issue in King v Department of State Development.[52] He said:[53]

... At para 25 of his determination, the Ombudsman suggested that the personal affairs exemption should be approached on the basis that release of information "is to be treated as release 'to the world at large'." The Court of Appeal in Marke explained why that is not necessarily a correct approach. The better formulation is that there is potential for the document to be released to the world at large. Each case must be considered on its merits as explained in Marke. > > In relation to the potential wider dissemination of information released, it may be relevant to consider to what extent the information is already known. Insofar as the personal information contained in a document is widely known or "notorious", that may be a strong factor suggesting that disclosure would not be unreasonable. > > (Footnotes omitted)

3. In the circumstances of this case, there is no evidence to suggest, nor is it reasonable to expect, that if the information identifying the caller were disclosed to the applicant, that the information would be disseminated further. It is not, for example, information being passed to a journalist for publication. I do not consider that the known likely use of the information is a matter that weighs significantly in the consideration of whether it would be unreasonable for the information to be disclosed. The greater focus, in this case, is the likely effect on the caller.
4. It is not beyond contemplation, however, that Mr Woreta or his representatives might seek to contact the caller, or that the caller might be apprehensive as to their safety upon learning that the person about whom they had reported a potential criminal offence has been provided with identifying details that may lead to the person being able to contact them and/or find out where they live.
5. On this basis, I consider that the provision of the personal affairs information that is the information that tends to identify the caller, would be an unreasonable disclosure of those personal affairs.

1. The decision of the agency in relation to document 142 is set aside. In its place, the following determination is made:
   1. Document 142, with the exception of that part of the document in which the caller provides their name and confirms their telephone number, is not exempt.
   2. That part of document 142 in which the caller provides their name and confirms their telephone number is exempt pursuant to sub-clause 6(1) of schedule 1 of the Freedom of Information Act 1991.

[1] It is evident from the witness statements that have been released to the applicant, with the identities of the deponents redacted, that three people attended at the restaurant in a car to collect take-away food, and that all three exited the car but one returned to the vehicle without entering in the restaurant or witnessing the events to the extent of the other two witnesses.

[2] The history of the application made to SAPOL on 19 December 2023, and the procedural history is set out in the affidavit of Christian Stuart Ainley, Acting Manager of the FOI Unit in SAPOL, affirmed on 1 August 2024.

[3] Section 4(1) of the FOI Act is the interpretation section and provides that a document "includes anything in which information is stored or from which information may be reproduced".

[4] Volume 2, s 35 Book of Documents, p 7, 'Notice of FOI Application Outcome dated 15 April 2024'.

[12] Applicant's Submissions dated 28 February 2025; Respondent's Outline of Argument dated 14 March 2025; Applicant's Submissions in Reply dated 21 March 2025.

[13] Affidavit of Christian Stuart Ainley affirmed 1 August 2024, [8].

[14] Respondent's Outline of Argument dated14 March 2025, [29].

[21] (2019) 132 SASR 469 (Tate, Kyrou, Niall AJJ).

[22] Ibid [75]; See also JJK v Police [2023] (2023) 143 SASR 303 (Lovell, Doyle and David JJA), [9] and [88].

[23] [1986] FCA 169; (1986) 13 FCR 85.

[26] [2013] NSWADT 80.

[31] [2014] VCAT 615 ('Glascott').

[32] Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) s 33(1).

[34] (1993) 31 NSWLR 606 (Kirby P, Mahoney and Clarke JJA).

[35] Ibid 624-5 (Kirby P), 637-8 (Mahoney JA), 643 (Clarke JA).

[37] [1984] AATA 437.

[38] Ibid [51]-[52]. The Tribunal in this matter, amongst other exemptions, considered s 41(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (as it then was) which was an identical provision to the current FOI Act (SA) sch 1 cl 6(1).

[39] [2008] VSCA 218; (2008) 23 VR 223.

[42] Hall v SA Police [2019] SADC 5 (Beazley J); Bradshaw v SA Police [2012] SADC 184 (Muscat J).

[43] King v Department of State Development [2020] SACAT 7.

[50] King v Department of State Development (n 43).