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[2024] AATA 1480
respondent. The application for review was dismissed under s 42B of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).
Comcare accepted that Wills's employment significantly contributed to an adjustment disorder, but said the condition had resolved by 30 September 2019. The Tribunal considered that it could not decide that time-limit dispute while reviewing only the section 14 liability decision. In its view, the earlier authorities reserved questions about the timing and duration of compensation for decisions under other provisions. It treated Woodhouse as distinguishable because that case involved decisions under payment provisions. With no issue left that it could determine in this review, the Tribunal dismissed the application as lacking substance.
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2,065 words · generated 28/09/2026
Robert Leslie Wills claimed workers' compensation for depression and anxiety. He attributed the condition to “3 years of sustained and manipulative behaviour from a superior at work” and identified 17 December 2018 as the date he first noticed symptoms and sought medical treatment [5]. He had worked for IP Australia for many years, took extended leave from late 2018, did not return to work, and took voluntary redundancy on 31 July 2019 [6].
2 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
Comcare initially declined the claim on 19 July 2022. Its delegate considered the claim late and said Comcare was prejudiced, and was also not satisfied that employment had significantly contributed to the psychological disorder [7]-[8]. On reconsideration, Comcare affirmed the refusal, finding that Wills had an adjustment disorder but that employment had not significantly contributed to it [10]-[11]. Wills applied to the Tribunal for review on 23 November 2022 [12].
During conferencing, the decision was remitted to Comcare under section 42D of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) [13]. Comcare then varied its decision. It accepted appropriate notice, an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, significant contribution by employment, and that the condition was not the result of reasonable administrative action [14]-[16]. Those findings resolved the section 14 liability question in Wills's favour.
But Comcare also considered whether the effects of the condition continued. It found that by 30 September 2019 the work-related condition had ceased, and said Comcare was no longer liable to pay compensation after that date because the condition had resolved or no longer caused impairment or incapacity [17]-[19]. That closed-period conclusion was the only matter still disputed between the parties [20].
The Tribunal raised the jurisdiction question itself. It considered whether it could decide, on review of a section 14 determination, that Comcare's liability ended from a particular date [1]-[3]. Both parties saw value in having the dispute resolved, but the Tribunal emphasised that agreement could not confer jurisdiction [2]. It ultimately dismissed the application under section 42B because it considered that the remaining dispute was not determinable in this section 14 review.
The Tribunal's reasoning begins with the function of section 14. Drawing on the earlier authorities, it characterised section 14 as a threshold provision. It addresses whether Comcare is liable to pay compensation in respect of an injury. Other provisions determine the content of that liability, including the amount and timing of payments and the circumstances in which particular benefits are payable [22]-[26].
The Tribunal relied on Lees v Comcare, where the Full Court had said that a section 14 determination cannot do more than determine that Comcare is liable to pay compensation under the Act in respect of a particular injury. The amount, recipients and times at which the liability gives rise to present payment obligations are matters for other provisions. The Tribunal also discussed Australian Postal Corporation v Oudyn, which it understood as limiting reconsideration of a section 14 determination to the elements relevant to establishing that threshold liability. It treated the period for which compensation is payable as outside those elements [24]-[30].
The other cases reinforced that distinction. In Re Liu and Comcare, the Tribunal had said that reconsideration of a section 14 decision could not be used to address the cessation of liability that had been correctly determined. In Rosillo v Telstra, the Federal Court had found that the Tribunal could not affirm a decision purporting to cease section 14 liability from a specified date. Duong v Australian Postal Corporation treated a time limit on payment as a limit on liability under a payment provision, rather than a limit on accepted section 14 liability [31]-[38].
The result of those authorities, as the Tribunal read them, was that Comcare could not use a section 14 decision to accept liability and at the same time foreclose future entitlement by declaring that liability ended on a specified date. If the question concerned whether a claimant was entitled to a particular payment for a particular period, that question belonged under the relevant payment provision [39]-[41].
The complication was the Full Court's decision in Woodhouse v Comcare. The Tribunal acknowledged that some passages in Woodhouse could be read to mean that the statutory contribution requirement for a disease must continue during each period for which compensation is claimed. On that reading, if the disease later ceased to have the required connection with employment, it might cease to be an injury for which compensation is payable [42]-[44]. The Tribunal accepted that these comments sat uneasily with the earlier approach, but did not try to reconcile the two lines of reasoning [45].
Instead, it distinguished Woodhouse on the issue before it. The decisions under review in Woodhouse had been made under payment provisions, sections 16 and 19. The Tribunal's jurisdiction in that matter therefore extended to considering whether the effects of the accepted injury continued during the relevant payment periods. In Wills's matter, the Tribunal was reviewing a section 14 decision alone. The specific question whether a section 14 review could determine that the effects of an accepted injury had ceased had not been raised or decided in Woodhouse [42]-[45].
The Tribunal consequently applied the earlier authorities. It considered that Comcare had already made a favourable section 14 decision and that the only remaining dispute, the end date for the condition's effects and compensation, could not be decided within the review before it. Because the Tribunal could not determine that issue in a way that resolved the parties' dispute, the application lacked substance under section 42B [45].
Before Woodhouse, the authorities discussed by the Tribunal presented section 14 as a gateway or threshold. Lees said that section 14 liability concerns whether Comcare is liable in respect of an injury, not the amount or timing of payment. Oudyn developed that distinction by explaining that the content and duration of payment obligations are worked out under other provisions. Liu, Rosillo and Duong were treated as applying or reinforcing the same separation between accepted liability and payment decisions.
Woodhouse introduced a point that appeared to complicate that framework. Its discussion of the contribution requirement suggested that, for a disease, the required employment contribution may have to remain present during each period for which compensation is being determined. The Tribunal acknowledged that this could be read as expanding the role of section 14, or as bearing on whether there remains an “injury” for which payment may be made [42]-[44].
The Tribunal did not hold that Woodhouse had overruled the earlier cases, nor did it resolve the apparent tension as a general question. Its narrower conclusion was that Woodhouse concerned decisions under sections 16 and 19, while Wills's matter involved only a section 14 review. It therefore considered itself bound to apply the earlier authorities to the jurisdictional question before it [45].
On the judgment's reasoning, the practical distinction is between a decision establishing threshold liability and a decision determining whether a particular payment is due for a period. The Tribunal considered the latter type of question should arise in claims under the payment provisions, rather than through an attempt to place a final end date on section 14 liability. This is a description of the Tribunal's reasoning in this decision, not a statement that it settled every implication of Woodhouse.
The Tribunal framed the central question as whether it could decide that Comcare's liability “ceased on and from a particular date” when reviewing a section 14 determination [3]. In plain English, the issue was not simply whether Wills had suffered a work-related condition. Comcare had accepted that threshold point. The issue was whether this type of review could decide the date on which the condition stopped supporting compensation.
The Tribunal also said that the parties' consent could not create jurisdiction [2]. Put simply, even if both sides wanted the Tribunal to decide the remaining dispute, the Tribunal first had to have legal authority to do so.
In discussing Lees and Oudyn, the Tribunal described section 14 as establishing liability while other provisions determine how and when payment follows [24]-[30]. In plain English, an acceptance of liability was not, on this analysis, a complete ruling on every future payment claim or every period of incapacity and treatment.
The Tribunal's discussion of Woodhouse was deliberately limited. It acknowledged passages that might support a continuing assessment of the employment contribution during relevant payment periods, but noted that Woodhouse came before the Court through decisions under payment provisions [42]-[45]. The plain-English point is that Woodhouse might matter when a payment claim is being considered, but the Tribunal did not consider it to give it jurisdiction over the closed-period issue in this section 14 review.
Finally, the Tribunal concluded that the application “lacks substance” because it could not resolve the only issue left between the parties [45]. That was a procedural conclusion about the scope of this review. It was not a finding that the condition did or did not continue after 30 September 2019.
The decision is most directly relevant to a situation with these features: Comcare has made a decision under section 14; that decision accepts threshold liability for an injury; the decision also purports to limit liability to a closed period; and the only issue in the Tribunal review concerns whether compensation remains payable after the specified end date.
The distinction between the source of jurisdiction and the issue actually disputed is central. Here, the Tribunal had a section 14 review following a section 42D remittal. It did not have determinations under the payment provisions before it. The remaining dispute concerned the period for which the effects of the accepted condition continued [13]-[20], [39]-[45].
The reasoning may also matter when comparing a section 14 review with a review of a decision under a provision governing a particular benefit. The Tribunal treated Woodhouse differently because it involved decisions under sections 16 and 19, where the ongoing effects of the accepted injury were relevant to the payment question [42]-[45].
The judgment does not decide every case involving a later change in a worker's condition. It addresses the Tribunal's jurisdiction in the procedural setting before it. A lawyer assessing another matter would need to check the decision under review, the statutory provision supporting it, the benefit claimed, and whether a payment decision has actually been made.
The supplied judgment contains no account of later court or tribunal decisions applying, distinguishing or rejecting Wills and Comcare. It therefore does not support a conclusion about how later courts have treated this decision.
The authorities that the Tribunal itself considered include cases decided before this 2024 decision. It treated Lees, Oudyn, Liu, Rosillo and Duong as supporting the distinction between section 14 liability and payment determinations. It considered Woodhouse but distinguished it by reference to the different statutory provisions under review.
Any assessment of subsequent treatment would require later judgments or an authoritative citator search. No such material is included in the supplied text, so claims about later treatment cannot be made on this source alone.
The Tribunal expressly left unresolved how to reconcile Woodhouse's comments on the continuing contribution requirement with the earlier authorities' account of section 14 [42]-[45]. It said that the specific jurisdictional question now before it had not been raised in Woodhouse and that it was unnecessary to resolve the broader tension.
The judgment also does not decide whether Wills's condition in fact continued after 30 September 2019. The Tribunal did not assess the medical evidence or make a substantive finding about later incapacity, treatment or impairment. It said that claims for medical treatment and incapacity would permit Comcare and the applicant to address the periods in which the accepted injury had effects and compensation might be payable [45].
A further issue left dependent on the facts and procedural setting is how a tribunal should approach the contribution requirement when reviewing a decision under a payment provision, particularly in light of Woodhouse. The present decision distinguishes that setting but does not provide a comprehensive account of the law for every such review.
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Wills and Comcare (Compensation) [2024] AATA 1480 (2 May 2024)
The application is dismissed pursuant to section 42B of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).
Workers compensation - jurisdiction of the Tribunal when reviewing decisions under section 14 of the SRC Act - reviewable decision remitted under section 42D - favourable decision on section 14 liability made on remittal - liability accepted but only for a closed period - validity of a closed period acceptance decision - jurisdiction of Tribunal to review a decision under section 14 of the SRC concerning the period in which compensation is payable - no such jurisdiction - application dismissed as lacking in substance
Woodhouse v Comcare [2021] FCAFC 95
Lees v Comcare [1999] FCA 753; (1999) 29 AAR 350
Re Liu and Comcare [2004] AATA 617; (2004) 79 ALD 119
Rosillo v Telstra [2003] FCA 1628
Duong v Australian Postal Corporation [2005] FCA 991
(a) That the applicant gave appropriate notice and consequently section 53 of the SRC Act has no application;
(b) The applicant sustained a psychological condition being an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood with 7 January 2019 being the date the applicant first sought medical treatment;
(c) Employment significantly contributed to the applicant's adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood;
(d) The condition was not the result of reasonable administrative action.
A determination under s 14 cannot amount to more than a determination that Comcare 'is liable to pay compensation in accordance with this Act' in respect of a particular injury. The amount of compensation which Comcare will be liable to pay, the person or person to whom the compensation will be payable and the time or times at which Comcare's liability will give rise to a present obligation to make payments are, as the above examination of the structure of the Act reveals, all matters to be determined under other provisions of the Act.
The decision of the Full Court in Lees makes clear that a decision to accept liability under s 14 of the Act involves no more than acceptance of a liability to pay compensation under the Act in accordance with the provisions of the Act in respect of a particular injury. A decision to accept liability under s 14 of the Act involves findings as to the five elements identified by the Full Court in par [35] of its reasons...
[which I note were: 1] That appropriate notice of injury has been given, 2) that a claim for compensation has been made as required 3) That the claimant was an employee at the relevant time 4) That the employee suffered an injury and 5) that the injury has resulted in death, incapacity for work, or impairment].
The content, duration and means of satisfying the liability to pay compensation is to be found and worked out by determinations made under other sections of the Act including s 24....These determinations give substance to the liability...They do not require that the determination under s 14 of the Act to accept liability be reconsidered or revoked when the liability to pay under s 14 is satisfied by payment in accordance with the requirements of one or more of the other sections of the Act.
is liable to pay compensation in accordance with this Act' in respect of a particular injury. The amount of compensation which Comcare will be liable to pay, the person or persons to whom the compensation will be payable and [importantly] the time or times at which Comcare's liability will give rise to a present obligation to make payments are ... all matters to be determined under other provisions of the Act.[1]
The power of APC to reconsider a determination under s 62 of the SRC Act, when exercised in relation to a determination made under s 14, is a power limited to reconsideration of one or more of the elements identified by the Full Court in Lees ... (emphasis added) [I note - the elements identified in Lees do not include the period for which Comcare is liable] ... The position is different to, and to be contrasted with, the situation where a benefit is being paid under a particular section, in consequence of a determination having been made under s 14.
[33] Where APC is paying compensation under one or more sections of the Act and it determines that its liability to pay in accordance with that section has been satisfied, the relevant determination is that the payment cease because the circumstances entitling payment under that section no longer exist, or can no longer be made out by the claimant.
[34] APC cannot bind itself in advance to reject any future application on the basis of a determination made to cease payment of compensation for an injury under a particular section of the Act...Nor can that result be achieved by purporting to determine on a reconsideration of a determination under s 14 that a liability which correctly and effectively attached to APC in respect of a particular injury, ceased on the date of the determination and that entitlement to compensation under any section of the Act was thereafter excluded in respect of the injury. The Act does not contemplate the making of such a determination once liability under s 14 of the Act has properly arisen and a determination made to accept a claim made in accordance with s 54 of the Act (emphasis added).
[35] ...To the extent that APC attempted to exonerate itself from future liability and to foreclose any future claims by Mr Oudyn by the determination, APC was in error as to its power to do so by the determination.
The only time that liability under section 14 can be reconsidered is under s 62. But that is a reconsideration of whether the original determination was correct on its merits and cannot address any issue of cessation of correctly determined liability.
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal affirms the decision of Telstra of 28 August 2001 which was affirmed by the decision of 26 October 2001 to deny liability for compensation pursuant to s 14 of the [SRC Act] in respect of 'strained lower lumbar region' on and from 28 August 2001.
The legal effect of what the tribunal has done is to affirm a nullity and then purport to say in its reasons that that affirmation has no practical effect for the future. Such was not an option open to the Tribunal. There was only one result that should have followed and it was that the decisions of 28 August 2001 and 26 October 2001 should have been set aside.[2]
Insofar as the reviewable decision limited the respondent's liability to pay compensation up to 26 March 1995, that was a limitation on its liability to pay pursuant to subs 16(1), not a limitation on its accepted liability under s 14. That has to be so otherwise the limitation, once the liability to pay is satisfied or discharged, would operate as a bar to future claims in respect of the injury if the circumstances under the section can be made out again in the future...[3]
...what is required is that the contribution requirement remain in place [for a disease] in the sense that the disease or ailment continues to have the characteristic of having been contributed to in a material degree by the relevant employment...the operative effect of the expression "was contributed to" in the definition is not spent once it has connected the employee's employment with the contraction or aggravation of the ailment. ...If at any later point in time the ailment suffered by an employee ceases to have that character, it will also cease to be a "disease", and will therefore cease to be an 'injury' in respect of which compensation is payable pursuant to s 14 of the SRC Act. For the duration of each of the periods in respect of which the question of compensation is being determined it must be possible to say that the contribution requirement was satisfied in respect of the ailment.
The operation of s 19 amongst others is conditioned upon liability being imposed upon Comcare pursuant to s 14 and that liability will only exist where the injury has the necessary causal connection to the employee's employment on the one hand and causes the relevant detriment on the other. Where the injury does not have those characteristics, Comcare has no liability in respect of which s 19 might operate. So much appears from the decisions in Lees and Prain. Likewise there is no reason for interpreting the reference to injury in s 16 differently to the reference in s 14.[4]
I certify that the preceding 45 paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member O'Donovan.
Woodhouse
Comcare
The application for review was dismissed under s 42B of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).