Woodgate (Trustee) v Rumble, in the matter of Rumble

(a) the respondents must delivery up vacant possession of the property known as 69 South Street, Quirindi, NSW 2343, being described as the land comprised in folio certificate described as Lots 8-9, Sec 30 in DP 758863 (Auto Consol 995-163) (Property) on or by 21 October 2025;

(b) a writ of possession in favour of the applicant issue forthwith in respect of the Property, such writ to lie in the Court Registry until the filing by the applicant, not before forty-three (43) days from the date of such order, an Affidavit stating that the first respondent has not given vacant possession of the Property, whereupon after receipt of such an Affidavit, the Registry shall forthwith release the writ of possession to the applicant for its execution.

1. In complying with order 1(a) above, the respondents must remove any and all:

(a) goods, garbage, chattels, vehicles and/or belongings from the Property that have not vested in the applicant pursuant to s 58(1) of the Act; and

(b) animals from the Property.

1. For the purposes of order 1(b) above, the Affidavit may be made by the solicitor for the applicant.
2. Pursuant to s 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) the applicant may:

(a) engage agents to provide services and expertise reasonably necessary or appropriate to assist in the preparation for sale and selling of the Property including but not limited to real estate agents, valuers, cleaners, tradespeople, accountants, solicitors, conveyancers and auctioneers;

(b) take steps to sub-divide the Property;

(c) sell the Property by private treaty, auction or tender, and have sole conduct of the sale of the Property

(d) if the Property is sold by auction, decide whether or not to set a reserve price and, if so decided, the quantum of that reserve price; and

(e) deal with the goods, chattels and vehicles at the Property deemed abandoned at his sole discretion.

1. The applicant may apply the proceeds of sale as follows:

(a) by paying costs, commissions, duties, taxes, rates and other expenses of the sale and transfer of the Property;

(b) by paying the cost of these proceedings;

(c) to discharge any mortgage or charge over the Property (in order of priority) registered prior to the applicant's appointment as trustee;

(d) to pay the applicant's costs at the applicant's firm's hourly rates and disbursements (including any legal fees) incurred in selling the Property; and

(e) the balance to be paid to the applicant in his capacity as trustee of the first respondent's bankrupt's estate.

1. The applicant's costs and disbursements of, and incidental to, this proceeding are to be paid in priority, pursuant to s 109 of the Act, from the Property of the bankrupt estate of the first respondent.
2. Liberty to apply on five days' notice.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographic, clerical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (Rules), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 of the Rules.

1. Before the Court is an application made on 18 June 2025 by the applicant, Mr Giles Geoffrey Woodgate, as Trustee of the bankrupt estate of the first and second respondents, seeking orders that the first and second respondents give vacant possession of the property known as 69 South Street, Quirindi, New South Wales 2343, being land comprised in folio certificate described as Lots 8 to 9, SEC30 in DP758863 (Property). The third respondent to the proceedings is a person who is presently occupying part of the Property. The fourth respondent is the son of the first and second respondents and has an array of chattels located on the Property, and I will return to those chattels later.
2. The Court is informed that the second respondent is recently deceased. That information was provided from the Bar table at the first court date in this matter, on 6 August 2025. On that occasion, the solicitor for the applicant appeared, as did the first respondent. There was no appearance by or for the second respondent nor by, or for the third or fourth respondents.
3. The Trustee's originating application sought from the Court orders to the effect that the first and second respondents;

(a) vacate and deliver possession of the whole of the Property to the Trustee, together with keys to the Property, while also removing any personal property which is not vested in the Trustee; and

(b) failing removal all items and any animals which had not vested in the applicant as the Trustee in their bankruptcy, that the Trustee was also authorised to remove and dispose of said items. In the event that the respondents did not quit the Property, the Trustee sought a writ of possession.

1. In support of the application today are read the following Affidavits:

(a) Affidavit of Giles Geoffrey Woodgate, affirmed 18 June 2025, together with an exhibit thereto (Woodgate Affidavit);

(b) Affidavits of Service of Paul Michael Sternbeck each made on 31 July 2025 in respect of each of the first, third and fourth respondents;

(c) Affidavit of Service of Paul Michael Sternbeck made on 5 September 2025 dealing with matters pertaining to service of the second respondent (September Sternback Affidavit); and

(d) four affidavits of Ms Lucy Tindal, solicitor for the applicant, made by her on:

(i) 20 August 2025;

(ii) 22 August 2025 (August Tindal Affidavit);

(iii) 2 September 2025; and

(iv) 5 September 2025 (September Tindal Affidavit).

1. As I noted earlier, on 6 August 2025, the matter came before the Court for the first time for directions.
2. On that occasion, I adjourned the proceedings in circumstances where I was informed from the Bar table that there were discussions on foot for the resolution of the proceedings. The Court ordered that there be an adjournment of the directions hearing to 20 August 2025 to enable those discussions not only to conclude but for any documentation necessary to take place, the proceedings to be executed. However, on 20 August 2025 there was no appearance by or for any of the respondents. The solicitor for the applicant indicated that the settlement discussions had not been successful, and the Court was pressed for a hearing date for the application to be heard. On that occasion, I made various orders and listed the matter for hearing before me on 25 August 2025.
3. On 25 August 2025, the solicitor for the applicant again appeared for hearing. There was again no appearance by or on behalf of the respondents. On that occasion, I further adjourned the proceedings in circumstances where there was no evidence before me (other than what had been said by the respondent at the first court date) to evidence that the second respondent was in fact deceased. The Orders that I made on that occasion, were as follows (emphasis in original).

1. The proceedings are adjourned for further hearing before Judge Given at 10.15am on 8 September 2025 in court 13.1, level 13, 80 William Street, Woolloomooloo.

2. The applicant must file and serve any additional Affidavit evidence and written submissions by 4:00pm on 1 September 2025.

3. The respondents must file and serve any evidence and written submissions by 4:00pm on 5 September 2025.

4. The applicant must serve a sealed copy of these Orders on the respondents by 4:00pm on Wednesday 27 August 2025.

5. Liberty to apply on 1 days' notice.

1. In the interim, the September Sternback Affidavit was filed, as was the September Tindal Affidavit.
2. Annexure "B" to the September Tindal Affidavit is a coronial certificate as to cause of death issued in respect of the second respondent, and in addition to the correspondence and invoices relating to her funeral. I infer from the coronial certificate that the second respondent is in fact deceased notwithstanding that no death certificate has been produced. The explanation that omission is also provided in the September Tindal Affidavit.
3. This morning, the matter commenced at 10:15am. There was no appearance by or for any of the respondents. I had the matter called outside which also yielded no appearance by them. Accordingly, I am satisfied also from the Affidavits that are before me that the first, third and fourth respondents were on notice of today's hearing and have, for whatever reason, elected not to attend.
4. I am further satisfied for the purposes of r 22.04(1)(b)(i) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (Rules) that it is appropriate to proceed in the absence of the respondents, and I will do so. I should also note that none of the respondents has filed a Notice of Appearance or any other form of document despite the attendance by the first respondent at the first court date.
5. The history to this matter is adequately set out in the Woodgate Affidavit as follows (emphasis is in original):

Background

South Street Property

8. On 8 January 1997 Robert purchased the property located at 69 South Street, Quirindi NSW 2343 being described as the land comprised in folio certificate described as Lots 8-9, Sec 30 in DP 758863 (Auto Consol 995-163) (Property). On or about 21 June 20231became the registered proprietor of the Property. The Property is subject to a mortgage in favour of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA).

9. At pages 3 to 5 of Tab 2 of the Exhibit is a copy of a current title search of the Property and the Transfer in respect of the Property, with dealing reference 2787093-U and correspondence from CBA regarding the amount owing on the mortgage as at March 2011.

10. At page 6 of Tab 3 of the Exhibit is a satellite image of the Property obtained from the New South Wales Land Registry Services (Satellite Image). Based on investigations I have made, I understand the Satellite Image was taken in or around 2019. The Satellite Image depicts a three-bedroom dwelling located on lot 8 of the Property and a caravan and a large awning affixed to the caravan located on lot 9 of the Property. The Satellite Image depicts approximately fifty motor vehicles on the Property and approximately thirty-five vehicles, including trailers and a ride-on lawn mower, along the southern boundary outside of the Property. I have been informed by Jake Wiliams, real estate agent at Raine and Horne, Quirindi, and verily believe that the Property is approximately 2919 square metres.

11. Since 2019 I have attended the Property, in my capacity as trustee of the Bankrupts' estates, on several occasions, my latest attendance was on 7 May 2025. During those attendances I observed that there were many odd motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts on the Property, greater in number than those depicted in the Satellite Image. As at 7 May 2025 the caravan and the awning affixed to the caravan were present on the Property. There are also approximately ten non-permanent structures on the Property and a large amount of rubbish and debris.

Bankruptcy

12. On 23 August 2019 a sequestration order was made against both Robert and Lee, and I was appointed trustee of their bankrupt estates. At pages 7 to 9 of Tab 4 of the Exhibit are copies of the Order made on 23 August 2019 and the Certificate of Appointment of Trustee issued by the Australian Financial, Security Authority (AFSA).

13 Robert and Lee subequently lodged an Appeal against the making of the sequestration order. The Appeal was heard on 1 June 2020. On 22 July 2020, Justice Abraham ordered that the Appeal be dismissed and the Robert and Lee pay the costs of the Council. At pages 10 to 21 of Tab 5 of the Exhibit is a copy of the judgment in those proceedings.

14. On 26 August 2019 Anitra Yu, a former employee of Woodgate & Co had a telephone conversation with Lee. At page 22 at Tab 6 of the Exhibit is a copy of a contemporaneous file note Ms Yu took of the conversation.

Affairs of the Bankrupt

15. At the date the sequestration order was made, Robert and Lee jointly owned the property located at 73 Henry Street, Quirindi NSW 2343 (Henry Street Property).

16. Throughout the course of my appointment as trustee of the Bankrupts' estate, I have undertaken a range of investigations from which I have obtained several documents and obtained significant information about the Bankrupts affairs. ln summary, and as will be deposed to further below, my investigations into the Bankrupts' affairs from 23 August 2019 to the date of swearing this affidavit, revealed the following information about the Bankrupts:

(a) Robert and Lee have five children.

(b) ln or about 2012 Robert and Lee allegedly separated. Following their separation Robert remained living in the Property with the children and Lee purportedly moved out to live with her mother. This is in contrast to other communication I have had with the Bankrupts which indicate Lee has remained at the Property.

(c) Lee claims that in 2012 Robert and Lee gifted the two properties to their five children. There has been no formal transfer of property. Nor have I received communication from the children that they maintain a claim on the properties.

(d) Lee also claims that the Property is held by Robert and Lee in trust for their children. I have been unable to locate any document to support such claim.

(e) The Bankrupts have no other significant assets.

(f) The unsecured creditors of the Bankrupts are as follows:

i. The Australian Taxation Office in the sum of $205,878.47 (Robert).

ii. The Australian Taxation Office in the sum of $1,445 (Lee).

iii. The Liverpool Plains Shire Council in the sum of $175,260.76.

iv. Credit Corp Services Pty Ltd (Foxtel) in the sum of $201.26 (Robert).

v. Credit Corp Services Pty Ltd (Energy Aust) in the sum of $12,714.98 (Robert)

1. As at the date of today's hearing, the relief sought per the application by the Trustee is that which is as follows:
   1. The Respondents, pursuant to ss 30, 77 and 134 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Act), deliver up vacant possession of the property known as 69 South Street, Qurindi NSW 2343, being described as the land comprised in folio certificate described as Lots 8-9, Sec 30 in DP 758863 (Auto Consol 995-163) (Property), to the Applicant within twenty-eight (28) days from the date of these orders.
   2. Within twenty-eight days from the date of these orders:
      1. The Respondents and any occupiers of the Property:
         1. Vacate the Property;
         2. Remove any goods, garbage, chattels, vehicles and/or belongings from the Property that have not vested in the Applicant; and
         3. Remove any animals from the Property.
   3. Leave is granted pursuant to r 39.1 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) for the issue of a writ of possession of the Property forthwith.
   4. The execution of the writ referred to in Order 3 is stayed for a period of twenty-eight (28 days) from the date of these orders and will not be executed unless the Applicant files an affidavit, deposing that:
      1. the Respondents have not complied with all of Order 2, and
      2. the Applicant does not have vacant possession of the entire Property.
   5. The affidavit referred to in Order 4 may be made by the Applicant's solicitors.
   6. The Applicant:
      1. may engage agents to provide services and expertise reasonably necessary or appropriate to assist in the preparation for sale and selling of the Property including but not limited to real estate agents, valuers, cleaners, tradespeople, accountants, solicitors, conveyancers and auctioneers;
      2. may take steps to sub divide the Property;
      3. may sell the Property by private treaty, auction or tender, and have sole conduct of the sale of the Property
      4. may, if the Property is sold by auction, decide whether or not to set a reserve price and, if so decided, the reserve price;
      5. may deal with the goods, chattels and vehicles at the Property deemed abandoned at his sole discretion.
   7. The Applicant may sell the Property, applying proceeds upon completion as follows:

1. paying costs, commissions, duties, taxes, rates and other expenses of the sale and transfer of the Property;

b. paying the cost of these proceedings;

c. to discharge any mortgage or charge over the Property (in order of priority) registered prior to the Applicant's appointment as trustee;

d. to pay the Applicant's costs at the Applicant's firm's hourly rates and disbursements (including any legal fees) incurred in selling the Property;

e. the balance to be paid to the Applicant in his capacity as trustee of the First Respondent's bankrupt's estate.

8. The Applicant's costs of this proceeding be paid in priority in accordance with s 109 of the Act from the property of the bankrupt estate of the First Respondent.

9. Such further or other order as the Court thinks fit.

1. Sections 30(1)(a) and (b) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Act), is as follows:

(a) has full power to decide all questions, whether of law or of fact, in any case of bankruptcy or any matter under Part IX, X or XI coming within the cognizance of the Court; and

(b) may make such orders (including declaratory orders and orders granting injunctions or other equitable remedies) as the Court considers necessary for the purposes of carrying out or giving effect to this Act in any such case or matter.

1. Sections 77(1)(e) and (g) of the Act is as follows:

77 Duties of bankrupt as to discovery etc. of property

(1) A bankrupt shall, unless excused by the trustee or prevented by illness or other sufficient cause:

(e) execute such instruments and generally do all such acts and things in relation to his or her property and its realization as are required by this Act or by the trustee or as are ordered by the Court upon the application of the trustee; and

(g) aid to the utmost of his or her power in the administration of his or her estate.

1. Section 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) is as follows:

79 State or Territory laws to govern where applicable

(1) The laws of each State or Territory, including the laws relating to procedure, evidence, and the competency of witnesses, shall, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or the laws of the Commonwealth, be binding on all Courts exercising federal jurisdiction in that State or Territory in all cases to which they are applicable.

(1A) For the purposes of subsection (1), a Court exercising federal jurisdiction in a proceeding is taken to be exercising federal jurisdiction in:

(a) if the laws of a State or Territory apply to a part of the proceeding because of subsection 68C(5)--that State or Territory; or

(b) if paragraph (a) does not apply:

(i) if the proceeding is transferred or remitted--the State or Territory to which the proceeding is transferred or remitted; and

(ii) otherwise--the State or Territory in which the proceeding is commenced;

except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or the laws of the Commonwealth.

(2) A provision of this Act does not prevent a law of a State or Territory covered by subsection (3) from binding a court under this section in connection with a suit relating to the recovery of an amount paid in connection with a tax that a law of a State or Territory invalidly purported to impose.

(3) This subsection covers a law of a State or Territory that would be applicable to the suit if it did not involve federal jurisdiction, including, for example, a law doing any of the following:

(a) limiting the period for bringing the suit to recover the amount;

(b) requiring prior notice to be given to the person against whom the suit is brought;

(c) barring the suit on the grounds that the person bringing the suit has charged someone else for the amount.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (2), some examples of an amount paid in connection with a tax are as follows:

(a) an amount paid as the tax;

(b) an amount of penalty for failure to pay the tax on time;

(c) an amount of penalty for failure to pay enough of the tax;

(d) an amount that is paid to a taxpayer by a customer of the taxpayer and is directly referable to the taxpayer's liability to the tax in connection with the taxpayer's dealings with the customer.

1. The evidence before me concerning the state of the respondent's financial affairs is set out in both the Woodgate Affidavit coinciding with the August Tindal Affidavit. The evidence indicates that the first respondent is the sole proprietor of the Property despite claims that have been made to the Trustee on various occasions that the Property was held together in trust with the second respondent for their respective children. The Woodgate Affidavit at [16(f)], sets out the unsecured creditors of the bankrupts. In respect of the Property, relevantly, the evidence is set out at [14] of the August Tindal Affidavit that there is a mortgage in respect of the Property to the Commonwealth Bank of Australia in the amount approximately of $50,000.[1]
2. The evidence at [13] of the August Tindal Affidavit sets out that the approximate value of the Property as of 22 August 2025 was approximately $350,000 to $375,000. The known liabilities of the bankrupt estate total approximately $450,000. Despite his appearance before the Court at the first court date, it can be accepted that Mr Rumble has now failed to cooperate with the Trustee, relevantly by not vacating the Property.
3. The evidence shows Mr Woodgate was appointed Trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Robert George Rumble and Lee Rumble on 23 August 2019. Correspondence demonstrates that since August 2023 the Trustee has been corresponding with the first respondent in respect of vacation of the Property, and that on 8 August 2023 a Notice to Vacate the Property was issued both to the first and the second respondents.[2] I note that that was because it was not certain as to who was residing on the Property, not because the second respondent is the registered proprietor of said Property. A Notice to Vacate was also issued to the second respondent on the same date and there is correspondence which deals with service of the Notices to Vacate upon the respondents.[3]
4. I also have before me correspondence between the solicitors for the applicant and the third respondent, who resides on the Property. The solicitor for the respondent submits, and I accept, that the third respondent has no right to occupy the Property. However, it is apparent from correspondence which went between the solicitor for the applicant and the third respondent that he now consents to vacating the Property, and has signed a consent order in the terms of the relief sought by the applicants on 22 August 2025, a copy of which forms Annexure "D" to the August Tindal Affidavit. While the Court may or may not be prepared to make orders in those precise terms, it certainly indicates that the third respondent is willing to vacate the Property within a reasonable timeframe.
5. The fourth respondent, as I have noted, is the child of the first and second respondents, and he is joined to the proceedings on the basis that a number of vehicles which are located on and around the perimeter of the Property which are said belong to him. Having regard to the Title Search for the Property indicating the appropriate descriptor for the Property.[4] I also have before me at a satellite image which shows the nature of the Property, from which it can be seen that it is in a particular state of disrepair and that there are approximately 50 vehicles strewn across the Property, including outside of its boundaries.[5]
6. The Property is divided into two Lots (8 and 9), on Lot 8, there is a house. As is detailed in the Woodgate Affidavit, the Trustee has had possession of that house itself since 7 May 2025. In essence it is vacant possession of the remaining Lot 9 which is required in order that it can be sold and realised as an asset of the bankrupt estate of the first respondent. The Trustee is under a statutory duty to realise those assets. I accept the submission of the applicant that he is unable to discharge those duties because of the failure of the first respondent to give vacant possession, which is hampered by thereon the occupation by the third respondent being present on of the Property and by the fourth respondent's storage of vehicles.
7. There is no evidence before me to indicate there are animals on the site. However, orders are sought to that effect, and to the extent that there may or may not be, it is sensible to include their removal as well in circumstances where it cannot be likely that those animals would be property that vests in the Trustee. The same can be said of the caravan in which third respondent apparently resides, which is located on Lot 9 towards the boundary of the Property and Robey Avenue, and any of the cars that are on the Property, whether they belong to the fourth respondent or in fact to anybody else. I otherwise accept the written submissions made in writing for the applicant on 22 August 2025.
8. I am satisfied that the estimated value of the Property exceeds the liabilities that are attached to that Property. There is also no evidence before me that there is any other asset which could be applied to the extinguishment of that liability other than the Property. Despite the appearance by the first respondent at the first court date, he has not filed anything in the proceedings in respect of that issue (or in respect of anything else).
9. The Court has jurisdiction to determine the instant application not only under the Act but also under the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), by virtue of s 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), and in that regard: see Coshott v Prentice [2014] FCAFC 88; (2014) 221 FCR 450 at [94] per Siopis, Katzmann and Perry JJ where their Honours said:

Thus, the section has been held to provide sufficient power to make orders against a bankrupt for the vacation of property, issuing a warrant of possession and for the sale of a property in circumstances where the bankrupt is not complying with his or her obligations under the Act: see, for example, Vince (Trustee), Re Sopikiotis (Bankrupt) v Sopikiotis (No 2) [2012] FCA 1298 at [4] per Bromberg J; Pattison v McKinnon [2008] FCA 1624 at [2] per Jessup J; Official Receiver v Fall (2008) 5 ABC(NS) 772 at [10]-[12] (Lucev FM (as his Honour then was)). It also expressly extends to ancillary relief such as injunctions and other equitable remedies to prevent the scheme of the Act from [2014] FCAFC 88; (2014) 311 ALR 428 at 450 being defeated. Such ancillary orders are, as the Full Court observed in Talackoat [17] , "neither novel or unusual": see also Storey at CLR 557; ALR 134 per Gibbs CJ.

1. I have also had regard to the observations of Judge Jarrett in Trustee of the Property of Currey (A Bankrupt) & Anor v Currey & Anor [2017] FCCA 2692 at [7], and to Ruhe (Trustee) v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2022] FCA 354 per O'Callaghan J at [12]-[14] and see Horne as trustee of the Bankrupt Estate of Sekulovski) [2009] FCA 1164.
2. I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant the relief which the Trustee seeks. I am satisfied that vacant possession is appropriate, and I have had regard to not only the evidence addressed above, but also to [11] of the Woodgate Affidavit.
3. In all the circumstances, I am satisfied it is appropriate to make orders in substantive accordance with the orders which were proposed to the Court.

I certify that the preceding twenty-eight (28) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Given.

[2] Exhibit to Woodgate Affidavit at Tab 13 at pp 49 to 54

[3] Exhibit to the Woodgate Affidavit at Tab 15 at p 57

[4] Exhibit to Woodgate Affidavit at Tab 2 at p 3

[5] Exhibit to Woodgate Affidavit at Tab 3 at p 6